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Introduction
A Metaphysical Archaeology of the  
Psychoanalytico-Cartesian Subject
This book is an investigation into Slavoj Žižek's return to German Idealism 
in the wake of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Its thematic crux is Žižek's attempt 
to develop, by reading the traditions against one another by means of 
their mutually compatible notions of Todestrieb, a highly original theory of 
subjectivity able to explain the subject's simultaneous freedom from and 
dependence upon its material ground. But it does not stop there: rather 
than just limiting itself to a recapitulation of Žižek's account of the eruptive, 
ontologically devastating birth of subjectivity out of nature, it also seeks 
to systematize the stark metaphysical consequences of this account. The 
fundamental thesis of this book is that, if the emergence of the Symbolic out 
of the Real—the passage from nature to culture enacted by the founding 
gesture of subjectivity—is the advent of a completely self-enclosed, self-
sustaining structural system, then not only must its founding gesture 
withdraw from the scene in the very act of instituting the Symbolic, but 
further, even to explain this act we must posit the absolute as a fragile 
not-all wrought by negativity and antagonism. Or, to put it in terms of 
Žižek's Less Than Nothing (his latest magnum opus, or “big fat Hegel book,” 
as he says), as a series of less than nothings whose essence constitutes an 
ontologically incomplete field.
By means of a metaphysical archaeology of the psychoanalytico-
Cartesian subject, an archaeology that is the necessary supplement to 
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Freud's own archaeological investigations of the emergence of mind out of 
the conflict of unconscious drives and their vicissitudes,1 especially in the 
aftermath of Lacan's structuralist reworkings of it, what we will see is that 
Žižek's own ontology of the subject goes far beyond the normal constraints 
of psychoanalytical methodology (which is so concerned with psychogenesis 
and its various pathologies) and radically challenges our normal conception 
of self and world, a challenge summarized by the notion of ontological 
catastrophe, which I extract from it as its key operative moment. In the 
course of the book this concept takes on a number of different meanings.
In a first moment, it refers to Žižek's interpretation of Todestrieb as that 
which incites the passage from nature to culture, a grotesque excess of 
life that is unable to control itself according to its own prescribed natural 
logistics and thus opens up room for the possibility of experience.
In a second moment, it names the self-positing of subjectivity in nature 
tearing the latter apart into irreconcilable zones, which, although in a 
certain sense conditioned by a libidinal-material breakdown of the biological 
system, is ultimately irreducible to the latter as a pure act. Taken together, 
these two moments underlying the emergence of subjectivity demand that 
we delve into the naturephilosophy that this account implies, a nature 
that shows itself (due to the very extimate presence of Todestrieb and pure 
difference within its heart of hearts) to be predicated upon painful tension 
and self-sabotaging tendencies to such a degree that its very being is co-
incidental not only with the existence of death, disease, and monstrosities, 
but also with the always possible unpredictable upsurge of disorder and 
complete collapse as it risks touching the void.
In a third moment, the metaphysical archaeology of the subject is pushed 
to its ultimate limits. Delving into the question of how being could sustain 
itself despite its rampant and devastating negativity, what we will see is how 
the more we move towards the most fundamental level of the universe, the 
latter proves to be in its depths of depths not a dense, fully subsisting reality 
that exists by itself by means of a self-explanatory surplus, but a series of 
indeterminate proto-ontological states only minimally distinguishable from 
the void of nothingness that serves as its contrast. Wondering how this void 
of nothingness could be broken so that creation itself could emerge, Žižek 
argues that the basic form of ontological catastrophe should be extended 
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from that of the subject as the breakdown of nature in Todestrieb, or the 
incompletion of nature testified to by the latter's constitutive tension, to the 
world itself as the necessary disturbance of this void, whereby the classical 
terrain of metaphysics itself is inverted: “[f]or a true dialectician, the 
ultimate mystery is not 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' but 
'Why is there nothing rather than something?': how is it that, the more we 
analyze reality, the more we find a void?”2 
In broad strokes, this is the terrain we will investigate—a terrain that 
is not merely difficult because it is nuanced and challenging because it is 
new, but also primordially uncanny and traumatic, forcing us to encounter 
aspects of self and world that we not only normally do not acknowledge, 
or continually disavow, but that we even try to repress. To arrive at and 
evaluate this notion of ontological catastrophe, my metaphysical archaeology 
of the Žižekian psychoanalytico-Cartesian subject takes three paths: one 
that traverses the wider historical context informing Žižek's project, another 
that internally reconstructs its reactualization of German Idealism through 
psychoanalysis, and a final one that attempts to extract and problematize the 
intrinsic originality and daringness of Žižek's metaphysics.
The first path consists of chapters 1 through 4. Chapter 1 outlines the 
ambiguity of the Real in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Displaying a form of 
radical idealism of a linguistic structuralist variety, it proclaims that the 
Symbolic operates as a self-enclosed system with no need of any external 
support. This not only means that human freedom is equivalent to an 
ontological madness, but also appears to foreclose the very possibility of 
explaining this passage into madness at its basis. Chapter 2 shows how, 
although Žižek believes himself able to find resources to overcome this 
difficulty in German Idealism, he can only do so by psychoanalytically 
tracing and reconstructing an unconscious history of struggle with the 
obscure origins of subjectivity he perceives throughout the tradition. Insofar 
as the psychotic non-relation between the Real and the Symbolic is also 
a rethinking of the cogito, chapter 3 shows why Žižek feels the theoretical 
obligation to revitalize subjectivity in an intellectual milieu that attacks it 
from all sides. Chapter 4 tries to understand how the Real could have given 
rise to the Symbolic. Contra the early and middle Lacan, Žižek argues that 
the Symbolic cannot be an external parasite that attacks the Real from 
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nowhere, but must arise from some sort of self-sabotaging tendency always 
already implicit within it.
The second path, which unfolds through chapters 5 to 10, comprises 
the substantiation of Žižek's claim that there is an identity between the 
founding insights of German Idealism and psychoanalysis by retroactively 
rewriting the former's unconscious history. Drawing upon the late Lacan's 
ruminations concerning the breakdown of nature as the pre-condition of the 
Symbolic, chapter 5 outlines how Kant finds also himself forced to posit a 
meta-transcendental ground of the transcendental in organic disorder, even 
going so far as to anticipate Lacan's mirror stage. Chapter 6 demonstrates 
how the early Hegel, led by insufficiencies in Kant's and Fichte's 
transcendentalism and Schelling's Naturphilosophie, attempts to reconcile 
idealist freedom and realist system by inscribing the subject into the fold 
of being as an eruptive, world-shattering event, thus radicalizing Kant's 
insight into the devastating origins of subjectivity. Chapter 7 then illustrates 
how the mature Hegel psychoanalytically recoils from the ontological 
catastrophe at the heart of the subject's essence by subsuming it under 
the self-mediation of the Notion. It is only with the middle-late Schelling, 
fighting against the perceived threats of Absolute Idealism, that the true 
kernel of truth unearthed by Kantian idealism is brought to the fore and 
along with it its stark, even horrifying implications for our understanding 
of nature, human historicity, and the absolute. Chapter 8 gives flesh to the 
Schellingian-Žižekian subject as the vanishing mediator between the Real 
and the Ideal. The symbolic universe of meaning is not a high point of 
evolutionary achievement, but rather a mistake, the outcome of something 
having gone horribly wrong in the order of things and to which it is only a 
defense mechanism. Given the psychoanalytical horror that is the basis of 
subjectivity, chapter 9 explains how Schelling, although the thinker of its 
abyssal origins, ultimately ends up recoiling just like Hegel from own great 
insights after coming face to face with its full trauma, which gives further 
support to the necessity of a psychoanalytical reconstruction of German 
Idealism. After this concrete exploration of Žižek's methodology, chapter 10 
concludes the second path by bringing to the fore his three most significant 
theoretical contributions: a rich ontology of nature, a new metaphysics of 
the void developed through quantum mechanics, and a nuanced theory of 
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unconscious, each of which goes beyond a mere reactualization of German 
Idealism or psychoanalysis.
The third and final path is summarized by the word “paradoxical” 
in the subtitle of the book—Žižek and the Paradoxical Metaphysics of 
German Idealism. Chapter 11 highlights that, instead of being opposed to 
metaphysics, radical idealism not only demands a metaphysics, for thinking in 
all of its intrinsic paradox and self-referentiality must be seen as existing in 
the world, but more primordially forces upon us a new domain of metaphysics, 
which first became explicit in German Idealism. Whereas all metaphysics 
prior to Kant is dogmatic insofar as it assumes thought's power to reach 
out and touch the truth of being in virtue of a special capacity (a gesture 
that is repeated by, amongst others, Badiou's and Meillassoux's elevation 
of mathematical formalization), what occurs in Schelling and Hegel is an 
intense reflection upon how the very process by which thought forms an 
image of being is inscribed into being as an event, whereby even the very 
philosophical position of theory formation is reflexively thematized both 
epistemologically and ontologically. What emerges is a metaphysics that can 
be baptized as critical because it is capable of developing a theory of reality 
that is maximally realist and idealist and therefore best suited to explicate 
the metaphysical whole of what is without falling into the downfalls of 
a theory that is one-sidedly one or the other.3 Chapter 12 explores the 
paradoxical nature of this endeavour as it articulates itself in the intrinsically 
original and daring character of Žižek's own variation upon this German 
Idealist leitmotif and the problems it potentially poses not only for his 
own philosophy, but perhaps for any radical idealism seeking to break the 
correlationist circle.
Notes
1. This, of course, being a constant metaphor throughout Freud’s corpus, span-
ning from “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896) to “Construction in Analysis” 
(1937). See, respectively,The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, translated from the German under the General Editorship 
of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey 
and Alan Tyson (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 
1953–1974) (hereafter SE), III, p. 192, and XXIII, p. 259.
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2. Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: 
Verso, 2012), p. 925.
3. Gabriel draws a distinction between critical and dogmatic metaphysics for similar, 
but different reasons. See Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift 
(Bonn: University Press, 2006), p. 8. I take up this distinction at length in chapter 
11.
I
Death Drive

Chapter 1
The Madness of the Symbolic 
Transcendental Materialism and the Ambiguity of the Real
Re-interpreting Freud through structural linguistics, Lacan radically 
rethinks the unconscious: no longer a quasi-biological phenomenon 
centered in drives, it largely becomes associated with the differential system 
of the Symbolic responsible for the production of meaning. However, 
since the latter proves to be operationally closed and has no relationship to 
the world in itself, Lacan himself is forced to proclaim that the founding 
gesture of subjectivity is a passage through madness. This poses two 
difficulties that set up the entirety of Žižek's project. First, it points towards 
a transcendental materialism at the basis of the subject, a self-splitting of being 
into irreconcilable material and transcendental zones, but one that Lacan 
fails to systematize. Second, insofar as the Symbolic itself is self-enclosed, it 
seems methodologically impossible even to explain its own obscure origins, 
even if such is ultimately required if psychoanalysis is to find an adequate 
theoretical justification. In this regard, Žižek's primary task is to find a way 
to explain the madness of the Symbolic without overstepping the constraints 
of psychoanalysis.
1.1 A (Transcendental) Materialism of the 
Psychoanalytical Subject
Žižek's return to German Idealism is an investigation of the obscure 
origins of the Lacanian subject. Žižek is attracted not only to Lacanian 
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psychoanalysis' thematization of the non-coincident “gap” in the Symbolic 
and its consequences for politics, but also to the conflictual relationship 
between mind and body that it places at the foundation of psychogenesis. 
If symbolic structures of language display a radical autonomy from bodily 
forces and can construct their own world, the essence of human being must 
be constituted originally by a kind of biological “short circuit” that disrupts 
man's complete immersion in nature, eternally separating the Innenwelt and 
Aussenwelt (inner world and outer world), thereby making it so they can 
never coincide: that is, by a mal-adaptation that “represents the minimum of 
freedom, of a behaviour uncoupled from the utilitarian-survivalist attitude” 
insofar as “the organism is no longer fully determined by its environs, 
that it 'explodes/implodes' into a cycle of autonomous behaviour.”4 If, as 
conventionally defined in Freudian psychoanalysis, psychosis or madness 
is taken to be a withdrawal from the objective world into an inner, self-
enclosed space (a loss of reality),5 then in Lacanian psychoanalysis psychosis 
or madness is paradoxically not a mere accidental state seen in certain 
“sick” individuals, but is the irreducible ontological background of all human 
existence. More disconcertingly, this is understood by Lacan not only to 
be the condition of possibility of human experience as such, but also that 
of freedom, so that the philosophical significance of the two is ultimately 
identified as dialectically interrelated aspects of the same phenomenon:
Thus rather than resulting from a contingent fact—the frailties 
of his organism—madness is the permanent virtuality of a gap 
in his essence.
And far from being an “insult” to freedom, madness is 
freedom's most faithful companion, following its every move 
like a shadow.
Not only can man's being not be understood without 
madness, but it would not be man's being if it did not bear 
madness within itself as the limit of his freedom.6 
For Lacan, the primary question in psychoanalysis is not how various 
forms of madness arise as a deviation from normal mental health, but how 
this more originary, irruptive state of nature as that within which freedom 
and madness magically emerge in a single brushstroke can be regulated 
so that what we regard as sanity and normality can themselves take hold. 
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If madness is “freedom's most faithful companion” it is precisely because 
madness in its most primordial sense refers to the specific ontogenetic 
conditions for the irreducibility of language that makes us distinctly 
human: that is to say, to the state of affairs by means of which language 
can solipsistically relate to itself as a self-enclosed differential system of 
signification “with no an external support.”7 Just as in clinical cases of 
psychosis or madness, here too the subject has “lost touch” with reality, 
although reality must be understood in its natural (animalistic) rather than 
its sociopolitical (human) meaning. It is “the price the Lacanian subject pays 
for its 'transubstantiation' from being the agent of a direct animal vitality 
to being a speaking subject whose identity is kept apart from the direct 
vitality of passions,”8 that which guarantees that the subject is dominated 
by “non-natural” influences or which is, strictly speaking, at its zero-
level abiological (wherein lies its freedom). This has two principal effects. 
First, because Lacan's self-given task is to formulate the autonomous 
structures that constitute human subjectivity in opposition to naturalist 
theories of psychiatry, his philosophy has the formal appearance of a retour 
to the modern transcendentalism of the cogito. The Lacanian subject is 
consequently haunted by similar problems as those of the Cartesian subject, 
both in terms of epistemology (since the relationship to the extra-conscious 
alterity of the world is problematized, how can we justify the propositions 
of science?) and the mind-body relation (what exactly is the relationship 
between symbolic thinking and natural processes?). Second, due to the 
internal constraints of his project, Lacan left unanswered how reality in itself 
could incite the generation of these quasi-transcendental structures that 
make up the universe of human meaning in its psychotic self-enclosure, with 
the concomitant problem of how we relate to this X that simultaneously 
precedes our emergence into language and forms its obscure ontologico-
foundational basis. Seeing a structural identity with the immediate reactions 
to Kant, Žižek sees the possibility of confronting the fundamental concepts 
of psychoanalysis with those of German Idealism.
Žižek's metaphysics originates in his attempt to delve into the material 
origins preceding the psychoanalytical subject by focusing on this moment 
of immanent rupture in being—which he links to the Todestrieb—as that 
which, by opening up a space separating us from nature in the latter, 
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appears simultaneously to be linked to our freedom, that is, to our madness. 
Refusing to buy into the claim that all is ultimately reducible to the ebb 
and flow of matter, he sees his own endeavour as “the necessary step in 
the rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism.”9 Yet this 
designation is inherently problematic, given what we have just seen: not 
only does it try to make Žižek's own form of materialism approach that 
of Marx and Engels without drawing the necessary distinctions between 
them, it more importantly fails to articulate the essentially paradoxical and 
innovative manner in which Žižek rearticulates the materialism-idealism 
debate and therefore risks obscuring his own originality. Consequently, I 
endorse Adrian Johnston's characterization of Žižek's theory of the subject 
as a form of transcendental materialism10 for four reasons, but differ in my 
own understanding in one important way that in turn distinguishes my own 
project from his.
First, it has the benefit of allowing the reader to have a direct intuition 
of what is truly at stake in Žižek's parallax ontology and its metaphysical 
implications. Whereas dialectical materialism traditionally views the mind-
body relationship as grounded within the dynamic interpenetration of the 
two as a complex self-unfolding identity within difference, transcendental 
materialism, by focusing on the ontogenetic conditions of the possibility 
of the transcendental subject, conventionally understood as in opposition to 
natural conditions, already suggests the immanent emergence of an irruptive 
negativity within being, an irreducible transcendence that paradoxically 
shatters the former's pure immanence from within.
Second, a point not mentioned by Johnston, Fichte uses the 
expression in his 1794 Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation to 
draw attention to the impossibility of explaining the (onto)genesis of the 
subject: “[i]t is certainly not true that the pure I is a product of the not-I 
[...]. The assertion that the pure I is a product of the not-I expresses a 
transcendental materialism which is completely contrary to reason.”11 
Fichte's argument is simple: one cannot explain the material conditions of 
transcendental freedom insofar as that would equate two logically distinct 
fields irreconcilable with one another—namely, that of unbridled self-
determination (the realm of acting) and that of dead contingency (the 
realm of being), thus causing us to lose sight of the radicality of human 
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autonomy. Writing in a similar vein, Žižek attempts to show not only how 
we can, but more primordially why we must develop a metaphysical account 
of reality that, instead of jeopardizing the (practical) primacy of idealism, 
would actually found it by inscribing this very dualism of I and not-I into 
the fold of being as that which makes the absolute divided within itself and 
whose non-coincidence to self thereby opens up the birthplace for human 
freedom. Transcendental idealism is—or better, must be said to always 
already spectrally refer to—transcendental materialism, the difference between 
them being only that of a parallax shift: the two are negatively linked to one 
another by an impossible in-between, a disjunctive “and,” the very name of 
which is for Žižek the subject, so that an idealism must convert itself into a 
materialism and vice versa if subjectivity is to be fully explained.
It is precisely at this conceptual conjuncture of the role of a disjunctive 
“and” that my own understanding of Žižek's transcendental materialism 
distinguishes itself from that of Johnston. Although Johnston is right to 
claim that Žižek's own descriptions of the birth of subjectivity have a 
propensity to focus on its process as a self-instituting fiat “analogous to the 
cutting of the Gordian knot” (which in a certain sense obfuscates his project 
insofar as one of its major questions is how the closed circuit of drives in 
the Real could result in the transcendence of subjectivity),12 Johnston in 
my view has a tendency to downplay the intrinsically paradoxical nature of 
all such inquiry into the obscure origins of the psychoanalytico-Cartesian 
subject in Žižek's work in two ways. On the one hand, he emphasizes that 
the subject is rendered possible by a short-circuiting of its libidinal-material 
ground. But if an emergent breakdown in nature's inner being does give rise 
to the ontogenetic possibility of the subject, it in no way gives birth to the 
latter: nature's auto-laceration may be necessary for the self-positing freedom 
of transcendental subjectivity, but it is not sufficient, for there is no possible 
transition from nature to subjectivity, a point that—though also raised by 
Johnston—I believe must be radicalized. This is why on my reading the 
reference to Fichte is so important, for if Žižek's metaphysics is an attempt 
to show how a transcendental materialism can be developed, it nevertheless 
refuses to give up on the fundamental claim made by Fichte that the 
upsurge of the pure I in being is executed “by absolute freedom, not through 
a transition, but by means of a leap.”13 As a result, we can also understand 
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why Žižek displays hesitation concerning Johnston's and Malabou's shared 
project of merging philosophy and neuroscience—because there is ultimately 
no emergence of subjectivity possible within his parallax ontology.14 On the other 
hand, because Johnston attaches less importance than I do to the rupturing 
free leap into subjectivity, he is simultaneously silent concerning the 
necessarily mytho-poetic element of Žižek's transcendental materialism, which 
for me thus becomes central for understanding the nuance of his specific 
overcoming of radical idealism. This has two important consequences, 
one methodological and the other metaphysical. Methodologically, if the 
leap into subjectivity is an ontological passage through madness,15 then there 
is an upper limit to the power of thought to explain its own emergence in 
being. What we need is a capacity for fabulative mythologizing, for “the 
need for the form of mythical narrative arises when one endeavours to 
break the circle of the symbolic order and to give an account of its genesis 
('origins') from the Real and its pre-symbolic antagonism.”16 Metaphysically, 
if subjectivity is the psychotic night of the world, then any investigation 
into its underlying ontology simultaneously requires a metaphysical 
archaeology of madness, that is, a theorizing of what the ultimate structure 
of reality must be like so that the subject's emergence could occur. In this 
manner, if Johnston is perhaps more interested in the paradoxical basis of 
transcendental subjectivity in nature, I am more interested in what occurs 
methodologically and metaphysically once we inscribe radical idealism as 
a form of madness into being, in such a way that two similar yet different 
views of Žižek's system emerge.
Third, to return to the benefits of the characterization “transcendental 
materialism,” I endorse it because it draws our attention to Žižek's 
philosophical relevance outside of the fields of cultural studies, radical 
politics, and film theory by placing his thinking in direct contact with a 
series of other contemporary thinkers rethinking metaphysics, whether it 
be by representatives of the analytic tradition, object-oriented philosophy, 
new French materialism, or various other forms of the new speculative 
turn. Two thinkers deserve to be mentioned here by name, since they offer 
a transcendental materialism radically different from that of Žižek: Iain 
Hamilton Grant and Rainer E. Zimmerman. Although Grant would have 
reservations about his thinking being referred to as a “transcendental” 
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materialism, his Philosophies of Nature after Schelling17 offers an alternative 
account of the materialism-idealism relationship and the immanent 
emergence of the transcendental subject within nature that challenges 
not only Žižek's reading of Schelling, but more strongly his entire 
metaphysics. Zimmerman, a prolific German philosopher little known in 
the English-speaking world, was in fact the first person to use the concept 
of “transcendental materialism” in a contemporary context in his 1998 
book Die Rekonstruktion von Raum, Zeit und Materie (The Reconstruction 
of Space, Time and Matter)18 and then fully develop it in his massive 
2004 System des transzendentalen Materialismus (System of Transcendental 
Materialism).19 Zimmerman, like Grant, departs largely from Schelling, but 
also from Spinoza and Bloch, and offers an understanding of transcendental 
materialism in dialogue with contemporary science, especially physics, in 
stark opposition to the one presented here. For both, the thinking subject 
does not implicate an ontological trembling or pure difference within the field 
of being, and their respective accounts of the mind-body relationship 
can in no means be equated with what Žižek would perhaps be tempted 
to call a return to pre-modern cosmology. Moreover, considering how 
Žižek's own philosophy, similar in spirit to that of Zimmerman, does not 
possess mere implications or consequences for how we conduct empirical 
science, but directly engages with a broad range of disciplines such as 
quantum mechanics20 and cognitive science,21 by calling Žižek's philosophy 
a transcendental materialism I further hope to accomplish two things: to 
emphasize the systematic reach of Žižek's thinking and the exigence that 
metaphysics must also be an interlocutor with science.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in Less Than Nothing Žižek also 
endorses Adrian Johnston's coinage of “transcendental materialism” in two 
passages in the last chapter on quantum mechanics, but with an important 
qualification that renders explicit for the first time a crucial metaphysical 
element of his own brand of materialism and its nuanced character. In 
the first instance, he claims that the key insight gained by contemporary 
physics is that material reality in itself does not present us with a dense 
field of fully constituted realities that form the ultimate building blocks of 
the universe, but rather with irreducibly indeterminate states lacking any 
substantial being and from which “hard” reality can only emerge if there 
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is a collapse of the wave function.22 In this sense, the micro-universe of 
quantum particles is strangely “less” than that of the macro-universe that 
constructs itself from its vicissitudes, in a way that is remarkably similar 
to how the Kantian subject can only construct a unified, coherent world 
of appearances from the inconsistent fragments of sensation. In a strange 
logical short circuit, it would appear that not only is there no bottom-up 
causality at the level of experience (transcendental constitution is more 
real than what Kant calls “a rhapsody of perception”23), but even the most 
fundamental level of the universe is metaphysically more chaotic than the 
ordered macro-level physical world that science classically described. It is 
as if all reality is transcendentally constitutive, so that the only way to break 
free of the correlationist circle is to push “this transcendental correlation 
into the Thing itself:” “[i]t is against this background that one can make out 
the contours of what can perhaps only be designated by the oxymoron 
'transcendental materialism' (proposed by Adrian Johnston).”24 The second 
instance adds some clarification to the metaphysical implications of this idea 
by stating that the “the only true consistent 'transcendental materialism' 
which is possible after the Kantian transcendental idealism” is one that risks 
the following difficult wager: “[w]hat if we posit that 'Things-in-themselves' 
emerge against the background of the Void of Nothingness, the way this 
Void is conceived in quantum physics, as not just a negative void, but the 
portent of all possible reality?”25 Although Žižek here takes transcendental 
materialism in a different direction than Johnston by introducing it to make 
a metaphysical point concerning the absolute rather than a more broadly 
ontological one concerning the subject, part of my project in what follows 
will be to show that his metaphysics of the void is not only completely 
compatible with his older ontology of the subject, but can be seen as its 
organic elaboration.
If Žižek's approach differs significantly from that of Grant or 
Zimmerman, it is because his game is different, even though this leads him 
to cover much of the same thematic domains—and hence it is interesting to 
label all three as “transcendental materialists” for the same reasons as it is 
to refer to Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling as “German Idealists” insofar 
as subsuming such irreconcilably different thinkers under a single category 
reveals a dynamic, pulsating movement, a battleground of theoretical 
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positions around a shared set of problems rather than a shared doctrine, 
and thus something living. What so strongly distinguishes Žižek's form 
of transcendental materialism from others is that, finding a fundamental 
structural identity between Lacanian psychoanalysis and post-Kantian 
idealism, he tries to illustrate the uncanny identity that exists between the 
psychoanalytical subject haunted by the Todestrieb as its constitutive basis 
and the unconscious, disavowed Grundlogik of German Idealism, with the 
conviction that a psychoanalytical dialogue between the two could open up 
a radically new possibility for metaphysics. By falling upon premonitions of 
the psychoanalytical experience in concepts such as Kantian unruliness, the 
Hegelian “night of the world,” and the Schellingian notion of the Grund, 
Žižek psychoanalytically reinterprets the late German Idealist attempts 
to give a metaphysical vision of reality compatible with the ontological 
emergence of the pure I in order to make us not only rethink what is at 
stake in the tradition of modern philosophy, a truth repressed and haunting 
its very history, but more primordially what is revealed with the advent of 
subjectivity as such: the notion of ontological catastrophe, the auto-disruption of 
reality into a painful not-all, at the origin of experience, with all the metaphysical 
implications that entails for our understanding of world in itself. Although 
Žižek's interpretations are heterodox, he believes that he is justified in 
singling out and radicalizing these premonitions, which often only appear in 
textual margins and often officially lack the theoretical primacy that Žižek 
bestows upon them, by means of the methodological application of various 
psychoanalytical techniques to the texts of German Idealism, these enabling 
him to plunge into and reveal the non-coincidences internally plaguing 
their symbolic space and thus retroactively restructuring their surface 
appearance in a manner similar to the analyst-analysand relation in therapy. 
We must traverse the fantasy of tradition if we are to arrive at its truth—this 
is Žižek's provocative claim and one that we will explore throughout most 
of this book. Thus, if we are to gain a preliminary sense of the driving forces 
of Žižek's reactualization of German Idealism and the systematicity of its 
method in spite of its apparent self-serving selectiveness, we must briefly 
pass through the Lacanian subject.
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1.2 The Lacanian Subject and the Irreducible 
Ambiguity of the Real
As the fundamental presupposition of Žižek's philosophy, the Lacanian 
subject is to be radically distinguished from the philosophical subject 
of modernity. Although the former exhibits many traits that link it to 
early transcendental philosophy (it grounds the symbolic structures that 
constitute phenomenal reality through a free idealization) it is in direct 
opposition to the self-conscious transparency of the Cartesian cogito, the 
self-legislation of the Kantian rational agent, or the Hegelian account 
of free personality. For Lacan, the freedom of the I as witnessed in 
phenomenological self-experience is an illusion: completely determined by 
cultural and linguistic influences, the ego is an object and is constantly trying 
to construct a fantasmatic narcissistic space within which it can (falsely) 
perceive itself as a centre of self-effectuating action. Although this does 
not prevent the existence of human freedom for either Lacan or Žižek, it 
means that freedom itself gets largely displaced from consciousness into the 
unconscious, in a move formally similar to the middle-late Schelling of the 
Freiheitsschrift and Weltalter, but with an important twist. The subject is not 
an energetic, productive will that precedes the constitution of phenomenal 
reality, but is in one of its most important modalities nothing but an 
impersonal abyss that, uncannily, renders possible a minimal consistency of 
self. In this sense, the self is infinitely split at its core: when one looks inside 
oneself one not only finds an “extimacy,” material coming from elsewhere, 
where one should find one's innermost core, but if one looks long enough 
one only finds a void staring back. The Lacanian-Žižekian subject has no 
intrinsic content because it is pure form: the entire “plenitude” of cultural 
and psychological experience only emerges as a kind of defence formation 
against this primordial nothingness of the subject as an attempt to fill in 
its constitutive “gap” with false positive substantiality. But because this 
“gap” can never be filled in, it is ultimately repressed due to its traumatic, 
personality-shattering quality, so that we find traces of its disavowed 
knowledge in the slips and slides of speech, symbolic inconsistencies and 
non-coincidences in writing, the images of fantasies and dreams, and other 
phenomena. This creates two levels to any given (personal, ethical, political, 
or even philosophical) discourse: its surface movement, grounded in the 
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narcissistic, self-deceiving orbit of the ego, and its “latent,” underlying truth, 
which shows itself negatively within the holes and inconsistencies of the 
former and can only be brought forth après-coup. In therapy, the task of the 
analyst is to make the analysand encounter and appropriate the second, the 
Real that afflicts the analysand often to a degree of painful agony, thereby 
forcing them to realign the symbolic structures underlying their personality 
so that the latter are more in tune with that which they reject, given that this 
(unconscious) act of recoil and exclusion has begun to obstruct their life. 
After all, the repressed always returns.
To explain this complex, Lacanian psychoanalysis categorizes experience 
in terms of the three registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the 
Real. All three exist in dialectical simultaneity, so that they all depend 
upon and interpenetrate one another. Lacan uses a Borromean knot to 
illustrate this level of mutual co-existence, the point of which is to preclude 
the possibility of arguing for the primacy of one register over the other, as 
it is unclear if either can have logical priority insofar as the cutting off or 
isolating of one destroys the whole. The Imaginary is roughly equivalent 
to phenomenological experience and perception but is also related to the 
cogito and its “narcissistic” fantasy of existential self-mastery. It is identified 
with a necessary moment of misrecognition and irremovable untruth in 
one's everyday being and knowledge of self, world, and others, for it projects 
completion where there is lack. The Symbolic constitutes the logical fabric 
of language and the laws of culture that transcend and are anterior to the 
concretely existing personal subject. It therefore precedes the imaginary 
orbit of experience insofar as the individual phenomenological constitution 
of objects in a strong sense presupposes language. As a self-enclosed 
structural system capable of reproducing and propagating itself, the 
Symbolic displays an irreducible autonomy that displaces the role of nature 
in understanding human psychology and cultural phenomena because it 
is able to articulate itself in utter isolation from it: the “incessant sliding 
of the signified under the signifier,”26 the solipsistic dance of language 
always in step with itself, means that the essential link between signifier and 
transcendent, extra-linguistic signified has been violently ruptured and that 
the mere chains of signifiers relating to themselves are capable of producing/
constructing meaning by themselves in an ontological void. In its simplest 
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form, the Real is that which does not fall under either the Imaginary 
or the Symbolic, whereby its upsurge is associated with experiences of 
breakdown and inconsistency not only of the transcendental unity at the 
basis of phenomenological experience, but even of language or culture itself. 
Lacan and Žižek therefore use a plethora of adjectives to describe it, which 
attempt to capture this element of irrevocable logical and existential rupture: 
“traumatic,” “monstrous,” “horrifying,” and “impossible,” to name a few.
Yet there is an irreducible ambiguity in Lacan's definition of the Real, 
which serves as the starting point for Žižek's own philosophical endeavour, 
for it is precisely in trying to resolve this ambiguity that his metaphysical 
project gets off the ground. The Real elicits two potentially incompatible 
interpretative possibilities, and we often see Lacan oscillating back and 
forth between them. In its first guise, the Real is the excluded Other of the 
Imaginary and Symbolic, which only truly “comes to be” when the subject 
constitutes itself. In this sense, the Real is not only dependent upon the 
symbolic matrix of language and the orbit of phenomenological experience 
but also only shows itself negatively through their immanent obstruction. 
This Real-as-lack is distinctly Hegelian: it corresponds to concepts such as 
“tarrying with the negative” and the suffering that consciousness undergoes 
when it runs up against non-coincidence, paradox, and limitation in social 
and political action or scientific thought about the world. It has absolutely 
no positive content in itself even though, as an internal limit within a given 
symbolic space, it may effectuate an overhauling of the latter's structure and 
possibilities as the subject attempts to overcome its deadlock so that it is 
potentially productive in its very trauma. In its second guise, we could also 
understand the Real as the pre-subjective life of pure jouissance from which 
the human infant exiles itself by becoming a linguistic subject, yet upon 
which the Imaginary and the Symbolic logically depend, even if they only 
relate to it negatively through its primordial foreclosure from experience 
and language as the founding gesture of subjectivity itself. Bruce Fink 
refers to this as the Real
1
 because it is the necessary posit of the Symbolic 
despite the fact that it is inaccessible from within the latter, whose ciphering 
activity doesn't merely “reconstitute” objective reality by meditating it like 
a camera obscura. Given that this pre-subjective Real must be said to be 
without lack (only with language can we speak of absence and presence),27 
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the idealizing process of human meaning makes it impossible to reach. As 
something that overreaches the idealizing, linguistic activity of the subject, 
in this modality the Real, corresponding to the Schellingian concept of the 
indivisible remainder (der nie aufgehende Rest), that pre-experiential darkness 
that can never be brought into light of consciousness yet upon which all 
consciousness rests, is the Real-as-excess. But such a free ciphering activity 
simultaneously creates the condition of the possibility of its own breakdown 
insofar as it will not always be capable of idealizing the Real in a way that 
enables its own autonomous, smooth functioning.28 These “kinks” in the 
Symbolic correspond with the Real-as-lack or Real
2
, something that cannot 
be integrated because it presents itself as intrinsically and paradoxically 
non-relational, as an inassimilable kernel within the self-referential matrix of 
the symbolic relations within which it emerged. The problem is as follows: 
Is the Real
1
 a necessary, illusory construct of the Symbolic designed to 
give a fantasmatically fabricated sense of “positivity” to a world that exists 
beyond its grasp (rendering it a mere secondary effect of a solipsistically 
self-contained structuralist metapsychology)? Or is it, more primordially, 
the pre-subjective, ontological basis of the Symbolic, to which we have 
access despite the apparent impossibility of reaching the pure Real through 
the differential system of language (thus showing the obscure origins of 
the Real
2
 in an ontology)? If the second is possible, what does this mean in 
terms of Lacan's declaration of the logical equivalence and interpenetration 
of the registers?
1.3 From Logico-Dialectical Simultaneity  
to the Ontogenesis of the Subject
Even if all three registers exist in a logico-dialectical simultaneity, within 
the development of Lacanian psychoanalysis we see a gradual shift in 
emphasis in the thematization of the registers largely due to internal reasons. 
Lacan's early work is largely an attempt to come to terms with the mirror 
stage and its implications for understanding psychogenesis. In the mirror 
stage, which happens around the age of six months, there is a recognition 
of an immanent blockage in nature that tears apart the organic unity of the 
body. The human infant lacks motor coordination—its self-experience is 
infinitely fragmented and lacking in any internal unity. Lacan's provocative 
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thesis is that the only way out of this biological short circuit is a vel, a 
misrecognition of the primordial helplessness of the human organism in the 
“specular image”29 of its mirror self in which the child finds a mesmerizing 
and captivating lie of false mastery into which it libidinally invests itself. 
Already at this early stage we see why Lacan is so critical of the modern 
conception of subjectivity and rationality. The result of the mirror stage 
is a reorganization of the fragmented being of the child through a virtual 
and therefore illusionary schema as the self becomes alienated from its 
real chaotic being. Yet Lacan comes to see that the imaginary beginnings 
of psychogenesis are themselves necessarily grounded in the Symbolic: 
the only reason why the child becomes tantalized by his image is because 
their parents provoke the response. “Look, it's you!” In this sense, the entire 
genesis of the self is preceded by a carving out of a space for the child 
within the symbolic universe of familial relations even before the child was 
born. After this “linguistic turn,” Lacan turns all of his attention to the 
nature of the Symbolic and seems, in many respects, largely to leave the 
Imaginary behind.
Inspired by the work of Levi-Strauss, who argued that “[s]tructural 
linguistics will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to the 
social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for the physical 
sciences,”30 Lacan then begins to apply the methodology of Saussure's 
structuralism to psychoanalysis, accomplishing this feat largely by a retour 
to Freud. What Lacan finds so intriguing is that, despite all of Freud's 
attempts to ground the unconscious within a natural vitalism of the body 
or biological movement of instincts, his texts themselves orbit around 
the analyses of images and language. Lacan's fundamental thesis is that, 
retroactively, we can see that Freud already had an implicit idea of the 
importance of linguistics for understanding the unconscious but was unable 
fully to articulate this fundamental insight because he lacked the appropriate 
methodology. This in turn creates a fundamental and irremovable non-
coincidence within Freud's texts as they oscillate between purely structural 
analyses of language and obscure vitalistic biologism. Consequently, Lacan 
argues that if we read Freud against Freud, structural linguistics can give 
psychoanalysis the scientific rigor that it needs by systematizing the logic 
of the unconscious, which is the origin of Lacan's famous saying “the 
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unconscious is structured like a language.” Linked to this linguistic turn are 
his critiques of ego-psychology as an attempt to strengthen the ego and post-
Freudian attempts to biologize the unconscious. For Lacan, the unconscious 
is, strictly speaking, an irreducibly linguistic phenomenon: it only emerges 
after or alongside the advent of language, in the split between the subject of 
enunciation and the enunciating subject. It has nothing to do with deep-
lying personality structures determining how the ego relates to the external 
world or instinctual energetics.
Although this suggests an obvious superseding of the Imaginary by the 
Symbolic, commentators such as Richard Boothby and Alexander Leupin 
warn against this, arguing that Lacan is much more complex and subtle 
than he may initially appear. Lacan never backs away from the claim that all 
registers mutually depend upon one another in order to have any efficacy 
at all. Even if the self-generating matrix of language and culture historically 
precedes and conditions the possibility of any concretely existing person, 
its differential network of meaning is only possible through an originary 
phenomenological perception of signifiers.31 The colonization of the body 
by the transcendentally alienating structures of the Symbolic requires 
the activity of the Imaginary so that the various phonetic differences that 
allow signs to be intelligible in contradistinction from one another can 
be established in the first place. Moreover, the late Lacan's topological 
formalizations of the psyche, as already mentioned, proclaim a strict 
equivalency between them, so that “the symbolic order's supremacy appears 
as an aporia, an ethical decision that logic does not support.”32 But how can 
Žižek then, as a Lacanian philosopher of the Real, justify his own theoretical 
preference for it over the other registers where Lacan's texts seem to 
contradict such an approach?
Although Žižek's work holds an uncertain relation to Lacanian 
orthodoxy, it would be wrong to claim that this troublesome problematic is 
just a direct consequence of Žižek's own reading of Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
By the very act of embarking on a metaphysics of the Real Žižek does seem 
to imply that we must find a way to overstep Lacan's attempt to conserve 
the equivalency of the registers if psychoanalysis is to find a sufficient 
theoretical grounding, even if doing so means that we risk making the 
entire psychoanalytical edifice he constructed collapse. But Žižek's own 
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thinking is not as radical a rupture with Lacan as it may appear, for the 
late Lacan too ruminates about the understanding of nature necessarily 
implied by his theory and therefore himself gestures towards the possibility 
of a metaphysics of the Real consistent with it.33 Even as early as the 
seventeenth seminar, we can find Lacan proclaiming that one of the logical 
implications of the psychoanalytical experience is that substance is not-all 
(that is, nature does not present us with a spherical totality—un tout, une 
sphère).34 Yet if the Real is only lack, and the essential link between signifier 
and transcendent, extra-linguistic signified has been cut, how can Lacan 
even legitimately make such statements? How can he philosophically justify 
such a “direct touching” of the Real given the epistemological solipsism 
intrinsic to the cybernetic ciphering of the Symbolic? Žižek’s wager is that 
one can develop a metaphysics of the Real that not only does not jeopardize 
the equivalency of the registers, but even explains their emergence, thereby 
implying that to grasp the essence of psychoanalysis and draw out its 
philosophical implications we need to do two things: (i) metapsychologically 
explicate the ontogenesis of the subject in terms of a materialism compatible 
with the founding insights of a radical idealism or, in other words, explain 
the relation of the Real
1
 of the apparent excess of the ontological to the 
linguistic to the Real
2
 of symbolic or notional lack, since this is the great 
question left unanswered by Lacan and upon which his entire theoretical 
apparatus ultimately depends; (ii) instead of focusing on Lacan's relationship 
to nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology, French structuralism, 
the Prague school of linguistics, or existentialism, we should return to 
German Idealism, since it is only in a direct dialogue with this tradition that 
we can find a way out of the impasses of Lacanian psychoanalysis. But to 
develop such a metaphysics, we must leave psychoanalysis and venture into 
German Idealism.
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Chapter 2
Grasping the Vanishing Mediator Between the Real and the Ideal 
Žižek and the Unconscious Truth of German Idealism
Seeing a structural homology between the contemporary concerns of 
psychoanalysis and those of late German Idealism's response to Kant, 
Žižek turns to the latter to find the resources he needs to give an account 
of the ontogenesis of the psychoanalytical subject. However, to do so he 
not only has to go against mainstream interpretations of this tradition, but 
also has to do great damage to the founding texts themselves. Outlining the 
methodology behind Žižek's reactualization, what we will see is that the only 
reason Žižek can apply psychoanalytical tools to restructure its symbolic 
space and thereby develop his own philosophy is that this tradition itself is 
haunted by a spectral history of an encounter with an underlying trauma: 
namely, the subject as the vanishing mediator between the Real and the 
Ideal, which both Hegel and Schelling primordially reveal in their own 
manner, but ultimately recoil from and disavow. In this regard, German 
Idealism presents us with an unconscious Grundlogik that we can only now, 
with the aid of Freud and especially Lacan, reconstruct, thus giving us a 
profoundly new and controversial view of its internal development and 
theoretical preoccupations.
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2.1 The Methodology of a Psychoanalytical Dialogue: Or, Lacan 
with Hegel and Hegel with Lacan
 What is amazing about this psychoanalytical dialogue, however, is the 
heterodox readings of German Idealism and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
it produces. To many critics, Žižek simply shows no concern for textual 
faithfulness or the history of ideas in his readings of Kant, Hegel, Schelling, 
and Lacan. His methodological approach appears, if anything, to function 
through a deliberate misunderstanding or liberal reconstruction that 
purposefully overlooks key conceptual distinctions that challenge his own 
philosophical outlook. Although there is some superficial truth in these 
critiques—one must admit that Žižek focuses on often marginal selections 
from texts and raises them to a level of logical priority that they do not have 
in the original—one of Žižek's rare comments on his own methodology is 
very helpful for dispelling confusion on how he proceeds:
Hegel didn't know what he was doing. You have to interpret 
him. Let me give you a metaphoric formula. You know 
the term Deleuze uses for reading philosophers—anal 
interpretation, buggering them. Deleuze says that, in contrast 
to other interpreters, he anally penetrates the philosopher, 
because it's immaculate conception. You produce a monster. 
I'm trying to do what Deleuze forgot to do—to bugger Hegel, 
with Lacan [chuckles] so that you get monstrous Hegel, 
which is, for me, precisely the underlying radical dimension of 
subjectivity which then, I think, was missed by Heidegger. But 
again, the basic idea being this mutual reading, this mutual 
buggering [chuckles] of this focal point, radical negativity 
and so on, of German Idealism with the very fundamental 
(Germans have this nice term, grundeswig35) insight of 
psychoanalysis.36 
Even if Žižek describes his own philosophy as an act of textual violence, 
almost of rape (it is also worth mentioning that the word “bugger” originates 
the old French bougre, meaning heretic, and acquires its colloquial sense 
from heresy being associated with deviate, outlawed sexual practices), 
this quote reveals a hidden methodological presupposition that guides all 
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of Žižek's interpretative work. The comparison of his own philosophy to 
that of Deleuze is of crucial importance and is not to be downplayed. It 
demonstrates that, even if Žižek is intentionally going against surface textual 
movements in his reading, he does not understand his own philosophy as in 
any sense arbitrary, a deliberate misunderstanding of the philosophers with 
whom he is engaging, or even as exhibiting any disregard for the tradition. 
Žižek recognizes that he is not doing traditional history of philosophy or 
any kind of philologico-exegetical interpretation, but is, instead, attempting 
to do something that is productive of new concepts by revealing their 
disavowed insights. But this generative activity of concept-creation can 
bring forth something unexpected, unsettling, even traumatic—we may 
produce monsters.
Žižek is not directly interested in what the texts of the German 
Idealist tradition “have to say,” that is, their intended meaning, because 
this level of their discourse—like most discourses that fail to reflect upon 
the psychoanalytical conditions within which a discourse as such can 
take place—usually operates largely on the level of the Imaginary and its 
illusionary fantasy and can thus, perhaps even at most crucial junctures 
of conceptual argumentation, display a psychoanalytical superficiality. 
What therefore concerns him are hitherto unrealized textual potentialities, 
premonitions of which we can see in “marginal” comments or in various 
structures that often obstruct the general flow of a given philosophical 
system and consequently can be said to protrude out of its symbolic 
universe, negatively contorting it from the inside. Yet it is only by means 
of a thorough familiarity with this system and its surface affirmations that 
one can arrive at such unearthed possibilities and “reactualize” them. 
The analyst must, after all, listen to the analysand, even if, especially in its 
Lacanian mode, it often appears as if they are unconcerned or ignoring 
your needs and demands (for the goal of therapy is not the adaptation of 
the ego but rather a confrontation with unconscious, often traumatic truth). 
Žižek's own methodological approach to the history of philosophy, however, 
drastically differs from that of Deleuze insofar as it takes as its starting 
point the fundamental Lacanian claim that we can never say what we mean 
because there is an irremovable gap between the imaginary moi (“me” as 
the subject of self-conscious awareness who expresses the intention to say 
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something, but somehow says something different and unintended) and 
the symbolic je (the elusive I as the subject that one deduces from what has 
in fact been said). Not only is language something that exerts control over 
us more than we have power over it (as an ego, rather than existing as a 
speaking linguistic subject, we are in a strong sense spoken), but the surface 
content of our own words often belies a greater (consciously) disavowed 
(but unconsciously known) truth, a truth that is not “hidden” in some 
deep, elusive place, but is so obvious that we often do not see it: “[t]he 
psychoanalyst is not an explorer of unknown continents or of grand depths, 
but a linguist: he learns to decode the writing that is already there, under his 
eyes, open to the look of everyone.”37 In the slips and slides of discourse, in 
seemingly meaningless hints and gestures, we catch a glimpse of the Real as 
that which cannot be said directly in discourse but around which it eternally 
moves, acting as a black hole drawing in everything towards it, or what 
Lacan refers to as its “cause” or “truth”:
Lacan's theory of interpretation is based, to some extent, 
on a formulation similar to that of the caput mortuum: an 
analysand speaking in the analytic setting is often unable 
to say, formulate, to come out with certain things; certain 
words, expressions, or thoughts are unavailable to him or 
her at a particular moment and he or she is forced to keep 
circling around them, beating around the bush, as it were, 
never enunciating what he or she senses to be at issue. The 
analysand's discourse traces a contour around that which it 
hovers about, circles, and skirts. Those words or thoughts may 
become accessible to the analysand in time, in the course of 
analysis, but they may also be introduced by the analyst in the 
form of an interpretation. That is what Lacan means when he 
says that “interpretation hits the cause”: it hits that around 
which the analysand is revolving without being able to “put it 
into words.”38 
Keeping this in mind, we can easily see that Žižek's reading of German 
Idealism, by following its unconscious Grundlogik, is an attempt to 
psychoanalytically construct what the tradition in fact tries to say but 
cannot, by revealing what has been repressed in the first-level propositional 
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affirmations of its texts. In other words, to borrow a Lacanian phrase, it 
tries to hit their cause. Although one can, of course, take issue with this 
methodology, one must admit that critics who take issue with Žižek's 
“selective” reading or “obvious misinterpretations” often just miss the point: 
they fail to see the underlying systematicity evident in his engagement with 
the tradition or understand why the conceptual moments he draws upon are 
so important.
In the spirit of Hegel and Schelling, who, in the uncertain aftermath 
of Kant, sought to articulate a philosophical system that could guarantee 
the latter's intuition of the irreducible autonomy of the subject,39 Žižek 
like Lacan before him is convinced that there is something genuinely real 
and insurmountable in the experience of human freedom. Starting from 
psychoanalysis' insight into the constitutive disharmony between mind and 
body as a key to understanding its true essence, Žižek returns to German 
Idealism to see how the notion is conceptually refracted there. But in this 
respect Žižek's method is not a textual reconstruction of their arguments 
through an act of classico-philological retrieval nor is it an attempt to 
polish them up by using new resources at our disposal. What he notices is 
something primordially at odds with their surface content, which rather 
than rendering the texts of German Idealism logically inconsistent is more 
profoundly indicative of some kind of internal unconscious struggle, a 
struggle that is philosophically revealing and whose exploration—now made 
possible by the clinical tools of psychoanalysis—promises to unearth new 
ways of approaching its fundamental concepts. Finding premonitions of 
Todestrieb protruding out of the imaginary-symbolic space of its discourse, 
Žižek sees a disavowed truth lurking “beneath” the tradition's own attempts 
to think substance as subject by means of a dialectical interconnecting of 
mind and body, a disavowed truth that reduces the latter to a mere reaction 
formation, a defence from the true horror of subjectivity finally brought to 
the fore by Kant's account of transcendental freedom. After all, if German 
Idealism's breakthrough is the freedom of the subject, according to Žižek we 
must also recognize that “our experience of freedom is properly traumatic.”40 
Consequently Žižek gives us resources to think how, if we attentively follow 
the tradition's conceptual movements, we can see traces of an operative 
logic ephemerally emerging from time to time at crucial moments only to be 
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covered up by preceding steps, so that our task is to reconstruct retroactively 
this hidden Grundlogik constantly interfering with what the tradition takes 
itself to be, if we are to come to terms with the disturbing metaphysics of 
freedom demanded by its founding intuitions. However, the methodology 
of such a psychoanalytical reconstruction of philosophical trauma around 
which an entire tradition circulates as its unconscious cause or truth 
displays an important paradox that deserves to be highlighted, which we can 
elucidate by means of Žižek's discussion of the legend of Eppur si muove:
The legend has it that, in 1633, Galileo Galilei muttered, 
“Eppur si muove” (“And yet it moves”), after recanting before 
the Inquisition his theory that the Earth moves around the 
Sun[. ...] There is no contemporary evidence that he did in 
fact mutter this phrase, but today the phrase is used to indicate 
that although someone who possesses true knowledge is forced 
to renounce it, this does not stop it from being true. But what 
makes this phrase so interesting is that it can also be used in 
the exact opposite sense, to assert a “deeper” symbolic truth 
about something which is not true—like the “Eppur si muove” 
story itself, which may well be false as a historical fact about 
Galileo's life, but is true as a designation of Galileo's subjective 
position [... B]eyond the truth of reality, there is the reality of 
the fiction.41 
Likewise, the alternative history of German Idealism that I develop in the 
following in a strong sense did not happen as a historical fact. Little if any 
evidence points towards it, and often the philological references that I have 
gathered can be easily opposed by numerous counter-examples. However, 
this is not the point: although this account of German Idealism's failed 
encounter with its inner truth is in many ways nothing but a fiction, this 
does not prevent it from directly expressing the subjective position that 
each of its representatives holds (even if it falsely capitulates their conscious 
interpretation of what they are doing) in a manner that other philosophical 
methodologies cannot, for what concerns us are traces of the Real in 
imaginary-symbolic constructs and their logic. After all, “when truth is too 
traumatic to be confronted directly, it can only be accepted in the guise of a 
fiction.”42 
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2.2 A Metaphysics of the Real: An Hegelian or a 
Schellingian Project?
Central to Žižek's metaphysics of the Real as a psychoanalytical 
reactualization of German Idealism is his stark emphasis on the 
indispensable significance of Hegel. In various places, Žižek characterizes 
his own project as strictly Hegelian because, like Hegel, the enigma 
that occupies him is the possibility of appearance itself: that is, how the 
realm of phenomenal reality could emerge from the self-actualization 
of substance. Hegel is said to be the first to understand this question 
in terms of inscribing the subject into the absolute: a subject that, in 
the Kantian aftermath, is understood as intrinsically irreducible to the 
immanent ontological field that brought it forth, and that can freely 
mediate the latter for itself through its own idealizing activity. In this sense, 
Hegel's metaphysics could structurally supply the missing principle of a 
Lacanian metapsychology. Through Hegel, Žižek believes he can show that 
subjectivity is not illusory by situating idealism into the heart of materialism 
as an irruptive event, the claim being that premonitions of this can be seen 
throughout Hegel's philosophy. Apparently arguing by means of resources 
found in the latter for a self-splitting or of the noumenal within the dark 
pre-history of subjectivity, Žižek tries to show how the only consistent way 
to explain why there is experience is to posit an ontological catastrophe at 
the basis of the subject. Consequently, it would appear that Žižek makes the 
following his axiomatic first principle thanks to a direct confrontation with 
Hegel: Freedom is not a raw, brute fact, but an expression of the caustic collapse of 
material being, a brisure in the heart of Real, which is synonymous with the subject 
itself; “it designates [...] the primordial Big Bang, the violent self-contrast by 
means of which the balance and inner peace of the Void of which mystics 
speak are perturbed, thrown out of joint.”43 
But the overtly Hegelian nature of Žižek's project does not go without 
saying. In one essay, Žižek makes a claim that to many readers must appear 
out of place insofar as he gives it no qualification: “Hegel's 'overcoming' 
of Schelling is a case in itself: Schelling's reaction to Hegel's idealist 
dialectic was so strong and profound that more and more it is counted 
as the next (and concluding) step in the inner development of German 
Idealism.”44 What is more, this claim is repeated almost verbatim in Less 
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Than Nothing.45 The effect of this comment is twofold: not only does it strike 
those immersed within “conventional,” textbook accounts of the history of 
philosophy as essentially wrong (which, it must be said, are losing credibility 
as Fichte and Schelling research has finally gained an autonomy of its own), 
but it also highlights a fundamental difficulty at the core of Žižek's reading 
of German Idealism and by consequence his own philosophy, insofar as his 
parallax ontology is perceived as a reactualization or continuation of this 
movement. This problem is only amplified when one engages with Žižek's 
major works on German Idealism. In both The Ticklish Subject and The 
Parallax View, for example, there are praises of Schelling as the greatest 
philosopher of the pre-symbolic Real, of the nature of the impossible X, the 
je ne sais quoi, which precedes consciousness as the most central theme in 
post-Kantian philosophy and whose problematic uncannily reappears in the 
wake of the Lacanian subject. Žižek even goes as far as to say that Schelling 
was “the first to formulate this task”46 and the philosopher who “gave the 
most detailed account of this X in his notion of the Ground of Existence,”47 
which is why his philosophy and not that of Hegel is “at the origins of 
dialectical materialism.”48 Given that Žižek in Less Than Nothing describes 
“the key question” of philosophy as that of “how thought is possible in a 
universe of matter,” so that we should focus our efforts on “the very rise of 
representation or appearing out of the flat stupidity of being” if we are to 
avoid “the very rise of representation or appearing out of the flat stupidity 
of being” if we are to avoid “a regression to a 'naive' ontology of spheres or 
levels,”49 the issue of whether this project is most radically accomplished 
by Schelling or Hegel is more than a matter of intra-textual consistency or 
classico-philological accuracy, but touches the very heart of what Žižek takes 
to be the program of speculative philosophy.
On account of this ambiguity, Žižek's own project of describing this 
process of the auto-disruption of the Real displays an undeniable oscillation 
between the characterization of this project as a Schellingian or a Hegelian 
one, even though he claims outright that Schelling is the culmination of 
this line of thought. Not only does it potentially suggest that Žižek tries to 
disavow too strong a relationship between a Lacanian-inspired metaphysics 
of the Real and Schelling, but it also shows that he might downplay the 
role that Schellingian notions play (or undermine possible roles that others 
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could) in such a metaphysics, in terms of either our understanding of 
ontology (the universal), natural sciences (the particular), or politics (the 
singular), the trinity that constitutes the conceptual fold of The Parallax 
View, his first theoretical magnum opus. In other respects, however, it appears 
that Žižek may have recently changed or distanced himself from his earlier 
interpretation of Schelling, perhaps precisely for these reasons. Although 
Žižek, despite his constant insistence that his fundamental question is a 
“properly Hegelian one: how does appearance itself emerge from the interlay of 
the Real?,”50 oscillates in his early major theoretical works The Ticklish Subject 
and The Parallax View in his descriptions of who most adequately answers 
this question, in his new masterpiece Less Than Nothing this oscillation 
suddenly stops. While this project is again and again characterized as 
Hegelian,51 the former glory once bestowed upon Schelling as the great 
thinker of the “phenomenalization of being”52 is not just downplayed, but 
apparently completely forgotten, with Žižek even going so far as to say that 
thinking the emergence of appearance is “what at his most radical Hegel 
does,”53 thus contradicting himself. However, despite appearances to the 
contrary, the ambiguity does not thereby disappear. Not only does Žižek 
claim that “[t]he minimal definition of materialism hinges of the admission 
of a gap between what Schelling called Existence and the Ground of Existence,”54 
but the ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling relationship in fact gets radicalized 
in the middle of the second chapter on Hegel, when Žižek describes the 
latter's dialectic as “the science of the gap between the Old and the New,” 
and then without explanation jumps into a two-and-a-half page discussion 
of Schelling's theosophic odyssey of the emergence of “the cosmos (of fully 
constituted reality, ruled by logos) out of the proto-cosmic pre-ontological 
chaos.”55 Although to many readers this may appear as just another “typical” 
Žižekian digression with no inner logic, the argument that I develop in this 
book attempts to show that it is anything but that. Insofar as Žižek himself 
claims that the only way to avoid mystification is not to abandon the project 
of the Weltalter but rather “to reformulate it so as to avoid the mystification 
of the theosophic mytho-poetic narrative,”56 it appears that the proximity of 
his reading of Hegel and Schelling, when coupled with this brief and rare 
methodological elaboration, points to the core of his heterodox reading of 
German Idealism and thus to the core of his philosophy itself. Rather than 
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being purely Hegelian or purely Schellingian, Žižek’s philosophy thus proves 
to be a hybrid of the two, an attempt—in some as yet unidentified way—to 
use Hegel to formalize Schelling's thinking, “saving” it from its theosophic 
commitments, and to use Schelling to radicalize Hegel, allowing him to 
draw out implicit but disavowed moves in his own philosophy and thus 
in German Idealism as a whole. But why does this ambiguity exist in the 
first place?
Immediately after his remarkable and provocative reading of Schelling 
in the first chapter of The Indivisible Remainder, Žižek goes on to argue 
for the supremacy of Hegelian dialectics over Schellingian metaphysics. 
For him, although there are premonitions of a radical breakthrough in 
works such as the Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter,57 Schelling remains 
philosophically inferior to his great rival because Grund and existence 
ultimately remain distinct from one another only by being founded within 
absolute indifference, which itself “is not a product of opposites, nor are 
they contained in it implicite; rather it is a being of its own, separated from 
all oppositions, on which all oppositions are broken, which is nothing other 
than their very non-being, and which therefore has no predicate except 
predicatelessness.”58 Indeed, Schelling claims that “from this neither-nor, 
or from this indifference, duality [...] immediately breaks forth, and without 
indifference, i.e., without an unground, there would be no twofoldness of 
the principles.”59 For Žižek, however, this means that “the [Schellingian] 
Absolute is primarily the 'absolute indifference' providing the neutral 
medium for the coexistence of the polar opposites” of the Real and the 
Ideal60 and, as such, is at odds with the potential latent in his middle-late 
philosophy, a potential Žižek sees in its articulation of the eruptive logic 
of Grund and its relationship to existence at the basis of subjectivity. In 
this regard, Hegel provides a superior logic in which there is no need for 
a principle of meditation exterior to Grund and existence as two reflective 
pairs that determine themselves through their internal dynamic, which in 
turn allows us to internally restructure Schelling's own descriptions of the 
interrelation of the two. In Hegel the very category of “and” changes—it 
becomes, in essence, tautological, thereby enabling us to identify Grund 
and existence instead of rendering them mere opposites or dual principles 
founded in something external to their own inner movement. In the logical 
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process of the dialectic, the third term is already the second, understood as 
a negativity or internal limit inscribed in the first, insofar as it has merely 
taken over, usurped, the primary position from which the movement began 
by asserting itself as such. In terms of substance and subject, this means 
that “this very reversal is the very definition of subject: ‘subject' is the name 
for the principle of Selfhood which subordinates to itself the substantial 
Whole whose particular moment it originally was.”61 Nothing at the level of 
content changes: it expresses a purely formal change at the level of structure 
due to the tension generated by the contorting presence of negativity. 
The dialectical movement that goes (i) immediacy → (ii) negation → 
(iii) negation of negation is superior because there is no genuine return 
movement to the first, although it all takes place in a single, logically 
immanent field. The beginning and end do not overlap because something 
irreducibly different emerges within the first moment (negativity now being 
made foundational to identity), namely, to take the example that concerns 
us here, an “out of joint” spirit that has a degree of notional self-reflexivity 
in opposition to its ontogenetic ground, the whole within which it gave birth 
to itself. There is no need to posit a state of “originary health” of which 
the devouring restlessness of the negative cannot be predicated (absolute 
indifference as that which stands in the difference between Grund and 
existence and thus is equally in one as in the other) in order to explain the 
dialectical movement of reality and its relation to the absolute.
As we shall see, Žižek's criticism of Schelling gets more complicated 
because it does not universally apply to the entirety of Schelling’s work, 
since for Žižek the latter is not characterized by an organic unity or 
continuity, but rather by a series of irreconcilable ruptures. He draws a 
distinction between a Schelling
1
 of the period of quasi-Spinozism (the 
philosophy of indifference), a Schelling
2
 of the radical ontology of freedom 
as seen in the second draft of the Weltalter and the Freiheitsschrift, and 
a Schelling
3
 of the philosophy of mythology and revelation, which he 
qualifies—very violently—as a return to pre-modern essentialism. For 
Žižek, what distinguishes the middle-late period of Schelling's thinking 
is, strictly speaking, the articulation of an ontogenetic emergence of self-
positing freedom in a manner remarkably similar to the Hegelian dialectical 
movement from abstract immediacy to notional self-reflexivity, which goes 
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against the surface-level theosophic inclinations of the texts. It protrudes out 
of them and makes them non-coincidental with themselves in such a way 
that we can psychoanalytically reactualize their fundamental movement by 
“tarrying with the negative”—that is, by encountering the Real within them. 
What this means is that even if the self-operative logic of the Grund contains 
premonitions of a radical transcendental materialism, Schelling is at the 
same time the father of “New Age obscurantism.”62 Expressing a reliance 
upon and indebtedness to Schelling would, in essence, open up a possible 
connection between Žižek’s own thinking and everything he denies—the 
non-Freudian unconscious (in its Bergsonian, Jungian, Deleuzian, and other 
forms), “pre-modern” cosmology, Romantic theories of nature, theosophy 
and even its pop-culture descendant, New Age spirituality. In this sense, the 
very act of placing the logic of the Grund at the heart of the psychoanalytic 
subject appears to risk “destabilizing” the primacy of the Lacanian mode 
of the unconscious insofar as it opens up the possibility of interpreting it 
through a different account of one's relation to the pre-subjective life of the 
Real; covering up the pivotal importance of Schelling would seem to be 
nothing but a certain ideological act on Žižek's part. But here two remarks 
must be made. First, although it is perhaps a bit underhanded on Žižek's 
behalf to downplay the importance of Schelling for the development of 
his transcendental materialism, it must be added that this obfuscation is 
consistent with his overall interpretation of Schelling, for he rejects most of 
the latter's philosophy and needs recourse to Hegel even to reactualize the 
logic of the Grund that he sees as its breakthrough. But second, and more 
importantly, such an explanation does not solve the problem of the Hegel-
Schelling relation insofar as this emphatic shift is simultaneously ambiguous, 
given the fact that Žižek does not distinguish which Schelling he is arguing 
against or justify how he is able to read the second draft of the Weltalter as an 
ephemeral breakthrough.
In this regard, by characterizing his own philosophy again and again as 
a Hegelian, but never a Schellingian project Žižek belies his overt reliance 
on texts such as Schelling's Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter for his project. 
What I propose, therefore, is to read Žižek against Žižek not only to 
demonstrate the implicit, complex intertwining of Schellingian ontology 
and Hegelian logic throughout his thinking, wherein I perceive the nuance 
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of his theoretical philosophy, but also to show how by unravelling this 
ambiguity we can find new resources to explore the obscure origins of the 
psychoanalytical subject and the fundamental structures and essence of the 
world within which it emerges. Yet if embarking upon a reconstruction of 
the Hegel-Schelling relation within Žižek's work can achieve this, it is only 
because Žižek sees his own work as an attempt to culminate the Grundlogik 
of German Idealism itself, which gestures towards the hypothesis that the 
intra-textual ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling relation within his thinking is 
perhaps less expressive of an internal inconsistency in his philosophy than of 
a fundamental problem inherent in the self-unfolding of that tradition itself in its 
endeavour to overcome radical idealism; so that, if by a dialectical reversal 
we turn an epistemological limit into a positive ontological condition, 
apparent textual confusion into a real feature of the movement itself in 
its historical development, the ambiguity will prove itself in a second 
moment to be a side effect of a sustained methodological engagement with 
the fundamental insights of German Idealism which thus deserves to be 
investigated in its own right. As we will see, this ambiguity is in fact due to 
a single traumatic kernel of truth that both Hegel and Schelling, attempting 
to ground the Kantian subject, bring to the fore in different ways, but 
ultimately have to repress or force into the unconscious, a fact that therefore 
requires us to use a mode of inquiry that goes beyond philologico-exegetical 
interpretation if we are to penetrate it:
The notion of Schelling's Grundoperation—the “vanishing 
mediator” between the two poles (the Real and the Ideal, B 
and A)—opens up the possibility of establishing a connection 
with Hegelian dialectics: the founding gesture “repressed” by 
the formal envelope of the “panlogicist” Hegel is the same as 
the gesture which is “repressed” by the formal envelope of the 
“obscurantist” Schelling, yet which simultaneously serves as its 
unacknowledged ground. [...] Does the gesture of “vanishing 
mediation” not point, therefore, towards what, following some 
German interpreters, one could call the Grundoperation des 
Deutschen Idealismus, the fundamental, elementary operation of 
German Idealism?
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It is our endeavour to articulate clearly the Grundoperation 
of German Idealism which necessitates reference to Lacan; 
that is to say, our premiss is that the “royal road” to this 
Grundoperation involves reading German Idealism through the 
prism of Lacanian psychoanalytical theory.63 
In this manner, to raise the question of whether Žižek's project is 
Schellingian or Hegelian is misleading, for what interests Žižek is not 
Kant, Schelling, or Hegel as particular historical thinkers per se, but a 
psychoanalytically retrievable unconscious truth self-unfolding throughout 
their works, a truth inaugurated by the Cartesian cogito but from which 
the entire tradition of modern philosophy has been repelled because of its 
horror, but to which we can now have access thanks to Freud's and Lacan's 
groundbreaking work on the original trauma of the human subject. In 
short, my wager is that Žižek forces us to consider that what makes German 
Idealism so singular in the history of philosophy is that it is haunted by an 
unconscious history that is nothing other than one of the sustained encounters 
with the ontological catastrophe at the very basis of human subjectivity in 
human thinking, this concept thus presenting itself as a Lacanian cause or 
truth around which the surface structures of its great epics circulate as their 
repressed traumatic Real and whose movement demand being systematically 
reconstructed retroactively.
But the ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling relationship has another 
advantage: it not only allows us to construct an original and perhaps 
controversial understanding of German Idealism and its legacy by 
articulating its unconscious history, a dynamic spectral history of 
repression and the return of the repressed, but it also allows us to evaluate 
the philosophical significance of Žižek's work by situating him directly 
within its concerns. Žižek is able to rely upon Hegel and Schelling to 
explicate the origins of subjectivity and their metaphysical implications 
because he sees them as embarking upon a metaphysics from within a 
self-grounding transcendental framework, whereby German Idealism and 
the psychoanalytical tradition in its Lacanian legacy become uncannily 
close due to their underlying epistemologies and the need to make sense of 
them ontologically. In this respect, unpacking the ambiguity of the Hegel-
Schelling relation is of profound methodological importance, for it brings to 
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the fore and deals explicitly with the critical difficulties posed by attempting 
to give an account of the emergence of the Ideal out of a Real that has been, 
from within the former, always already lost. The psychoanalytical fusion of 
Schelling and Hegel implicit in his thinking—a fusion which points towards 
a certain unconscious struggle inherent to German Idealism itself—either 
reveals or resolves a potentially fatal ambivalence in the conception of the 
Real, an ambivalence that risks jeopardizing not only Žižek's project, but 
also the development of any form of metaphysics from within a radical 
idealism. According to Lacan, the Symbolic exhibits what may be called 
a form of ontological solipsism insofar as it is an irreducibly self-referential 
matrix of signifiers whose relation to an external, extra-ideal world has 
been utterly cut off. Yet to give a theoretical grounding of our inability to 
access objective reality we must describe its dark pre-history in the orgasm 
of forces that is the pre-symbolic Real. Is the Real that which precedes and 
exceeds consciousness, or a pure lack that only presents itself through the 
breakdowns of the Symbolic? Can these two modalities be reconciled 
within a metaphysics? If so, can a hybridization of Hegel and Schelling 
help us conceive of the emergence of the Symbolic out of the Real from 
within the Symbolic by overcoming the opposition between materialism 
and idealism? But before we answer these questions, we should step back 
and ask: why would we even want to proclaim such a Cartesian dualism 
of mind and body, nature and spirit, the Real and the Symbolic, especially 
since such a form of subjectivity has been criticized for so long in the 
contemporary intellectual scene as no longer sustainable? What are its 
theoretical advantages?
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Chapter 3
Psychoanalysis and the Enigma of Transcendental Subjectivity
Towards a New Materialism
Žižek's reactualization of German Idealism represents an avid attempt 
to revitalize Cartesian transcendental subjectivity. In the face of a 
contemporary discourse that attacks from all sides the very possibility 
of a non-material I that stands in its own autonomous register, Žižek's 
philosophy aims to articulate the theoretical currency still implicit within 
the groundbreaking intuition that heralds modernity. But what warrants 
this repetition/resurgence of such an apparently “outmoded” idea? What 
kind of explanatory efficacy could it still exhibit in a theoretical field that 
believes itself to have largely overcome its shortcomings? By exposing the 
various theoretical holes revealed in the contemporary intellectual scene by 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Žižek rethinks the modern materialism-idealism 
debate by showing how movements such as those in current phenomenology 
of the body, postmodernism, and neurobiology are philosophically 
insufficient and thus force us to reconceptualize transcendentalism radically.
3.1 Postmodernism and an Uncanny Defence of 
Transcendentalism
Although phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and more recently Michel 
Henry and Jean-Luc Marion argue for the primordial unity of consciousness 
and the lived body or the self's immanent auto-determination from the 
unfolding of givenness of the flesh (which indicates the disappearance 
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of a radical subject-object distinction by the interpenetration of both 
in embodiment), Žižek makes the claim that such descriptions are 
intrinsically lacking insofar as they fail to take account of the experience 
of the monstrous and the traumatic irrevocably tied to the essence of 
human being. One cannot merely replace classical subjectivity with a 
more organic theory of experience that intertwines consciousness with a 
phenomenological auto-affection of the flesh. The rift between the spiritual 
and the material uncovered by the I destabilizes the very possibility of 
such a primordial union or identity: if we take transcendental reflexivity 
seriously we see, according to Žižek, a pure self-positing that tears itself away 
from any kind of immersion within the field of corporeal activity. The very 
possibility of the psychoanalytical experience as that which reveals a split 
between the energetic dynamics of the body and subjective, experiential 
reality presupposes an irreducibly antagonistic interrelation, a discordant 
dichotomy, between mind and body, which proclaims that the human 
subject must in some sense “protrude” out of its carnal materiality and be 
understood on its own terms. The claim is that the modern subject not only 
paves the way for the psychoanalytical discourse of the unconscious, but 
also sets up the possibility of a genuine encounter with what it means to 
be a human subject existing with an intrinsic relation to a bodily substrate 
that paradoxically presents itself as Other. We cannot just think the self 
that comes after the subject in a way that does away with the latter, for 
transcendental subjectivity brings to our attention a primordial truth of what 
it means to be a free human being that, in many ways, we have yet to come 
to terms with: that of a structural conflict between mind and body which divides 
our being into two incommensurate spheres.
However, the implications of Žižek's reactualization of German Idealism 
are not just limited to the phenomenology of the body. Arguing against 
postmodern theorists like Derrida and Foucault, who claim that the subject 
itself is merely an empty, accidental construction that arises out of the flux 
of historical experience, Žižek contends that by forgetting the ontological 
schism between mind and body that enables the self to be determined 
according to linguistic and political forces in the first place, they lose sight 
of the very formal structure of the I that is required even to speak of the 
endless temporal variations of selfhood within the contingent upsurge of 
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sociopolitical activity. The unceasing play of cultural difference, the non-
finite proliferation of identities and discourses, can only be adequately 
understood through the transcendental framework offered by Cartesian 
subjectivity because, as that which prevents human activity from being 
explicable through solely natural or biological grounds, it supplies the 
formal-universal structure through which such change is rendered possible. 
The cogito is necessary for deciphering not only human embodiment, but 
also human historicity insofar as it gives us a clue to what kind of ontological 
event could have led to the emergence of something like a symbolic universe 
in contrast to the “cyclical” movement of nature. Here we see another 
advantage of the cogito that transcends its theoretico-explicative currency, 
or more strongly, coincides with it: as the transcendental condition of the 
possibility of historical contingency, the pure I always stands above all fixed, 
particular sociopolitical constellations and thus presents the always possible 
basis of ideological critique and political revolution.
But perhaps the greatest threat to subjectivity comes from contemporary 
cognitive science. In light of decades of groundbreaking research in 
neurobiology, there is a growing tendency to turn towards scientific models 
of explanation to explain away the uniqueness of human subjectivity. 
Researchers are not just constantly downplaying the role of systematic 
self-observation and autonomous discourses that deny the supremacy of 
experimental science; rather, what is increasingly coming into question 
is the infinite array of material offered by self-consciousness and the 
meaning of philosophical investigations into its culture and politics as 
structurally free from biological concerns. Instead of having recourse to 
first-person experience as it shows itself to us in the irreducibility of its 
complex dynamics as the site of personality (phenomenology), or the 
labyrinthine network of the symbolic universe of discourses informing our 
sense of self and other (postmodernism), they are able to explain the entire 
range of emotional and social characteristics through the nonconscious, 
asubjective pulsation of brute matter, the mere non-personal movement of 
neurochemico-electrical activity wherein the I becomes an epiphenomenal 
illusion created by a closed biological system of response mechanisms pre-
determined by genetic code.
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Žižek's argument here is twofold. Firstly, founding itself upon classical 
biology, contemporary cognitive science presupposes that every organism 
is a self-contained system in harmony with itself seeking homeostasis 
and self-preservation, which prevents it from coming to terms with the 
psychoanalytical concept of Todestrieb. Representing a malfunction in 
biology, whereby a person no more strives for pleasure and satisfaction, 
for the minimal possible level of distress and affliction, but rather for 
pain and even self-destruction, psychoanalysis identifies this apparently 
negative moment of short circuit within the biological machine with one 
of the defining traits of human subjectivity and thus of culture itself.64 
Instead of being a mere haphazard disorder or a contingent feature of a sick 
mind, Todestrieb comes to represent a necessary feature of the singularity 
of our being: the condition of the possibility of psychopathological self-
destruction is ultimately linked to our very freedom because the two are 
structurally homologous. Secondly, what Žižek adds to this argument for 
the supremacy of psychoanalysis over reductionist biology is the following 
insight: if there were nothing but the self-contained, deterministic system 
of the neuronal interface of the brain, then why is there (self-)experience at 
all?65 Why is there not just blind existence, a mere mechanism that auto-
develops according to its own laws? Why does the nonconscious trembling 
of brute matter in its dynamic pulsations need to be aware of itself? Since 
the category of subjective experience is superfluous, unnecessary, to the 
materialism displayed by science, the mere fact of experience proclaims that 
neurobiological activity is not-all—that there is a gap, a series of interstices, 
which arise within its logical fold as a kind of unpredictable short circuit to 
which, perhaps, phenomenal reality arises as a response. Naming the place 
of this rupture the subject itself, Žižek's own work on cognitive science 
consequently tries to underline the inherent difficulty that the discipline has 
(for this very reason) to explain the emergence of consciousness, insofar as it 
points to a limit-situation within which the discourse itself breaks down.
Neither the phenomenology of the body, postmodernism, or cognitive 
science can just dispel the “myth of subjectivity” because all three of them, 
in distinct ways, need it to account for the very subject matter they take as 
their own. If the phenomenology of the body is to understand the very field 
of the (self-)appearing of phenomena to consciousness as embodied, then it 
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has to come to terms with the breakthrough of transcendental reflexivity as 
a form of pure self-positing that institutes a subject-object schism rendering 
the very body that we live in Other to ourselves: “the subject (Self) is [...] 
immaterial: its One-ness, its self-identity, is not reducible to its material 
support. I am precisely not my body: the Self can only arise against the 
background of the death of its substantial being, of what it 'objectively' 
is.”66 Postmodernism needs to presuppose the pure I as something over 
and above the contingent field of non-finite cultural difference that it sets 
up even to talk about the complex network of discourses irreducible to 
naturalistic influences. Lastly, cognitive science cannot discard the subject 
if it is to explain the very possibility of how a gap in (material) being could 
emerge so that there is the basic distance from self that is necessary for the 
phenomenalization of reality. If we are to understand the true nature of 
the human being, Žižek's contention is that we must reread transcendental 
philosophy through the psychoanalytical category of Todestrieb, for both 
seem to cover the same theoretical set of problems in an uncanny manner; 
this unholy marriage of German Idealism and psychoanalysis aims to 
reconfigure the contemporary intellectual scene by offering a comprehensive 
system that is able to respond to the intrinsic limitations of all three 
disciplines.
However, although Žižek's retrieval of subjectivity thus superficially 
appears to be an attempt to assert the unshakeable supreme position of 
the human subject against the various de-centerings that it has undergone 
in the twentieth century, this is an overt vel. Whereas most defenders of 
the transcendental ego return to Descartes, Kant, or Hegel to regain and 
unpack their conviction in the self-grounding ipseity at the core of human 
activity in face of its dissipation within flux of radical historicism, the all-
engulfing force of structuralism, or the brute determination of mechanical 
nature, what intrigues Žižek are the various ways in which the cogito fails 
at its own task and the implications of this failure for our understanding 
of self and world. Instead of presenting an intuition of a self-positing 
substantiality that persists behind all representational content of thought 
while being co-given, co-equal, and ultimately fully coinciding with my own 
personal self, what we truly find in the thinkers of subjectivity according to 
Žižek is the affirmation of a negatively charged void that holds together the 
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sedimentations of personality through its sheer self-reflexive nothingness. 
Whether this be Descartes' inability to establish the positive characteristics 
of the I that necessarily thinks,67 Kant's failure to penetrate into the kernel of 
the subject an sich that makes experience possible,68 or Hegel's early account 
of the night of the world,69 what is obvious to Žižek is that the impervious, 
vacuous core of subjectivity is simultaneously its condition of possibility 
and impossibility. Consequently, what interests Žižek are two things: (i) the 
traces of this abyssal nature of subjectivity that can be found in modern 
philosophy, which immanently problematizes all attempts to ground 
experience in the intuition of a self-positing substantial core of existential 
familiarity and transparency; and (ii) how this grounding insight into 
transcendental reflexivity and the deadlocks it generates are schematized 
under the textual surface in different modalities by Kant and his followers, 
yet in such a way that they display in them a hidden logic implicitly 
working itself out throughout the entire tradition that can be retroactively 
constructed and used today in order to combat a range of theoretical 
problems that plague us.
3.2 Idealism and its Shadow: Materialism in the Cracks
However, to return to German Idealism and its “rampant” transcendentalist 
inclinations with the intention of retrieving a conception of the subject able 
to respond to perceived dead ends in contemporary intellectual discourse 
presents an immediate problem. In order to articulate an account of 
experience that can combine psychoanalysis and modern subjectivity in a 
manner capable of combating the phenomenology of the body, postmodern 
discourse theory, and cognitive science, Žižek must fight against the anti-
materialistic tendencies evident in the German Idealist tradition itself. 
Žižek's fundamental thesis is—perhaps counter-intuitively—that it is 
the latter's very descriptions of the non-material, purely spiritual I that 
point the way. The nothingness of the cogito reveals more than a form of 
ontological dualism, the horrifying split nature of subjectivity that forever 
haunts psychic life: not only is the cogito unable to find an existential or 
ontological interiority at the heart of one's own most personal being—
being a mere formal void that guarantees the self-sameness of identity 
through phenomenal time, the I is an empty set—but the very gesture of a 
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self-grounding idealism that it sets into play shows itself to be structurally 
incomplete and riddled with holes. In modernity's irreversible establishment 
of the primary function of the cogito (as a synthesizing activity that idealizes 
our contact with the world in such a way that we lose contact with real 
entities non-mediated by mind) Žižek argues that we immediately come 
face to face with the internal limitation and contradiction of idealism as 
such, insofar as absolute mediation is not possible for the subject. Instead 
of exhibiting a smooth transcendentally constituted fabric of experience 
freely brought forth by the subject on its Godlike throne, idealism generates 
in and of itself irremovable and unpredictable moments of blockage and 
obstruction that infringe upon the subject's totalizing claims for autocratic 
autonomy and a complete, undisturbed idealization of experience. In other 
words, every attempt of idealism to affirm itself as “all,” to set the stage 
for the transcendental constitution of phenomenal reality as an almighty, 
full-blown “hallucination,” fails: within idealism there is always something 
uncannily more than ideal, an extimacy that corrodes it from the inside and 
cannot be explained from within its free idealization of the world.
Taking the inevitable failure of self-grounding idealism to fully posit itself 
as a guide, Žižek's reading of German Idealism focuses on what he perceives 
as an ambiguous relationship in its texts: between such a self-grounding 
idealism, and the spectral presence of what appears as a form of materialism 
within its ideal-synthetic fold that must somehow be posited as theoretically 
more fundamental and primordial après-coup. The agonizing tension within 
ideality as it tries to constitute the world of experience suggests that, 
although a non-mediated, purely material reality has been forever lost due to 
the idealizing activity rendered possible by the subject, we can still, through 
the very limitations, blockages, and obstructions of this activity, negatively catch 
a glimpse of it, the very inconsistency of thought guaranteeing that we gain 
knowledge of reality “outside” our representations. The figure of Fichte is 
of utmost importance in this context for comprehending the conceptual 
contours of Žižek's position. Instead of being a contradictory, deficient 
concept within the internal trajectory of German Idealism that automatically 
reveals Fichte's inconsequentiality and impotence as a thinker, the concept 
of Anstoß manifests the truth of the materialism-idealism relation expressed 
within the tradition, albeit in a manner that he does not explicitly thematize. 
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In Fichtean subjective idealism, the I is the axiomatic starting point of 
philosophy. Even the not-I, the entire sphere of everything that presents 
itself within consciousness as “extra-subjective” content, is freely posited 
and brought forth by the self-grounding activity of the absolute subject, in 
effect robbing it of any alterity that it would possess in itself as a material, 
non-mediated being with its own interiority that thrusts itself upon 
consciousness. In other words, the not-I does not affect the I through a form 
of causality. Yet because of the double meaning of Anstoß as a hindrance and 
impetus, as something that obstructs and incites our activity, one cannot just 
say that the Anstoß is a mere obstacle created by the subject so that it can 
have the necessary degree of resistance needed in order concretely to assert 
and actualize its own freedom. Although the not-I depends upon the pure 
I for its meaning, the former of itself cannot be reduced to the idealizing 
activity set up by the latter: it is not “like the games the proverbial perverted 
ascetic saint plays with himself by way of inventing ever new temptations 
and then, by overcoming them, confirming his strength.” For if this were 
so, “it would present a case of the hollow playing of the subject with itself, 
and we would never reach the level of objective reality.”70 There is therefore 
an element of speculative truth in Fichte that Žižek wants to bring to the 
fore: even if the circle of idealism is a self-enclosed, free creation rendered 
possible by the subject, due to the painful curvature of this space we must 
nevertheless speak of a negative materialism in Fichte's thinking.71 Here, we 
encounter a paradoxical coincidence of internal-external limitation and 
inside-outside: “Anstoß thus designates the moment of the 'run-in,' the 
hazardous knock, the encounter of the Real in the midst of the ideality of 
the absolute I: there is no subject without Anstoß, without the collision with 
an element of irreducible facticity and contingency—'the I is supposed to 
encounter within itself something foreign,”72 some inassimilable body that 
sticks in its throat like a bone. According to Žižek, this truth is then later 
radicalized by Hegel's and Schelling's own response to Fichte's thinking 
insofar as they realize it gives us the necessary resources we need to develop 
a metaphysics while never leaving the transcendental idealist framework.
Žižek's own theoretical position is therefore a rather precarious one. It 
contends that it is only from within the deadlock and limitations of a full-
blown idealism asserting the ultimate irreducibility of mind and subjectivity 
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to matter—here we must think of Žižek's philosophy as a turning inside-
out of Jacobi's challenge that idealism must become a speculative egoism 
by following it to its logical conclusion: “[t]he transcendental idealist [...] 
must have the courage to assert the strongest idealism that has ever been 
taught, and not even to fear the charge of speculative egoism”73—that we 
can develop a truly speculative materialism up to the task of explaining 
the emergence of experience, for it also suggests that only a full-blown 
idealism is truly capable of disclosing crucial facts about the nature 
of materiality. However, such a materialism rests upon the apparently 
paradoxical claim that it is the very auto-collapse of idealism that is 
epistemologically capable of overcoming itself and describing the world in 
itself. As Adrian Johnston says, “materialism [...] formulates itself vis-à-vis 
the deadlocks internal to radical transcendental idealism. On this account, 
materialism is philosophically tenable solely as the spectral inverse of 
idealism, accompanying it as the shadow cast by idealism's insurmountable 
incompleteness.”74 But the stark consequences of this thesis must be 
brought to the fore: it claims that all forms of radical idealism always already 
contain traces of materialism in their blind spots, even if they do not recognize 
this. Yet how are we to grasp this overlapping of the Real and the Ideal, this 
contradictory mode of inclusion/exclusion, internal/external, presence/
absence, from within a logical space that by its very essence proclaims to 
exclude it? How can this impossible feat of a materialism within the cracks 
of idealism be accomplished?
3.3 A Metaphysics of the Disjunctive “and”
By zoning in on the limitations of idealization, the experiences of internal 
resistance within its own self-enclosed phenomenal space (experiences that 
reveal a difficult truth concerning the impotence of self-positing idealist 
freedom), Žižek tries to construct his own metaphysics. Only able to 
sustain itself from within the cracks of transcendental synthesis, his parallax 
ontology functions within the impossible in-between of spectral materialism 
and full-blown subjective idealism. But Žižek does not just claim that the 
latter is wholly untenable because its internal tension proclaims that there 
is necessarily an extimate, spectral presence of the Real within the Ideal 
haunting it due to its impotence to hallucinate its own world. What is 
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more, the very nature of idealizing activity must tell us something about the 
nature of the world as it is in itself and this in two ways: firstly, we cannot just 
understand our own inability to grasp the Real as a mere limitation due to 
the finitude of human cognition, but must see this inability as revelatory 
of an ontological state of affairs—the subject is, after all, an event in the 
world, such that our entrapment in the solipsistic circuitry of ideality is 
always already minimally revelatory of that which we are searching for once 
we make a parallax shift in perspective. Secondly, the very inconsistency 
of our notional apparatus points to the fact that there can be no absolute 
constructionism, which appears to epistemologically justify the possibility 
of using the internal limitations and obstructions of ideality to overcome 
ideality's very self-enclosure. The goal of Žižek's materialism is to seek to 
understand the precise philosophical status of the free ideal constitution 
of the world and how and why this autonomous register could collapse. In 
other words, its defining feature is that, although it strives to maintain the 
ontological significance of the irreconcilable difference between materialism 
and idealism, it searches for a way to overcome this absolute opposition 
at the epistemological level so that the conflict between them does not 
infringe upon knowledge. If the self-grounding gesture of idealism expresses 
a constitutive opposition to materiality, and its failure is indicative of the 
phantom-like presence of the latter in the former, then this disharmonious 
non-relation must reveal a method of explaining it.
The underlying question guiding Žižek's ontology is therefore the 
following: What do the internal obstructions in idealization and the fact of 
ideality itself tell us about the mind-body relation: that is, our connection 
to the vital movement of being? Whereas there have been for some time 
in the contemporary intellectual scene two options for understanding the 
relationship of consciousness and world—their dynamic interconnectivity 
and unity in phenomenological accounts of the lived body or the outright 
rejection of the importance of lived first-person experience as a mere 
epiphenomenal effect due to the mechanical movement of nature or the 
structures guiding discourse, both of which comprise a disavowal of the 
primordial self-reflexive ipseity of the subject—Žižek opts for a third. What 
is noticeable in all of these approaches is not only an inability to grasp the 
true insight unveiled by a transcendental freedom, but also the latter's direct 
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consequence: namely, the experience of idealistic disintegration and failure, 
the two types of experiences being so crucial in Lacanian psychoanalysis 
for our understanding of psychopathologies and psychogenesis that for 
Žižek they demand the rehabilitation of the ontologically schismatic duality 
opened up by Cartesian subjectivity. These are not merely revelatory of 
the structure of an individual psyche lost in disarray, but rather reveal 
a basic metaphysical truth of subjectivity by presenting a world where 
“the mind and body are, so to speak, negatively related—oppositional 
discord is, obviously, a form of relation.”75 Pointing towards the subject 
being more than the matter it inhabits, insofar as the symbolic structures 
constituting psychic life display a quasi-absolute degree of freedom from 
purely naturalistic activity, the psychoanalytical experience proclaims that 
these two zones must resist, must be in perpetual conflict with, one another, 
so that the structure of psychoanalytical subjectivity is brought close to an 
archaic form of modern dualism while calling for a radical reconfiguration 
of the latter's split between mind and body. Accordingly, Žižek's attempt to 
think materialism and idealism requires a far-reaching remodulation of the 
logical conjunctive between the two into a form of psychotic non-relation, 
insofar as transcendentalism implies a kind of negative space isolated unto 
itself and alienated from external reality, an isolation that is simultaneously 
the logical structure of normal and pathological subjective reality. But 
what exactly is this disjunctive “and”? Žižek's answer is unequivocal: the 
place of non-coincidence between mind and body, the break or rupture 
between these two zones of independent activity, is nothing but the subject 
itself, where the subject is transformed from a mere transcendental-
epistemological construct grounded through concerns in a theory of 
knowledge into some kind of self-positing negativity in material being, a 
bone in substance forever holding apart materialism and idealism. The 
lacuna in contemporary thinking is therefore immense: by failing to take 
into account the experience of psychopathology whose possibility coincides 
with that of freedom (as that which institutes an infinite conflict between 
mind and body) its representatives fail to see the terrifying truth intrinsic 
to our very relation to the world: something that proclaims the need for a 
new paradoxical form of materialism developed within idealism to be able to 
combat phenomenological accounts of embodiment, postmodern theories 
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of discourse, and cognitive science, a materialism that would be at the same 
time a metaphysics of the disjunctive “and.”
Since it is Lacanian psychoanalysis that most strongly brings forth this 
disjunctive “and” as an irreducible element of human experience, Žižek's 
controversial thesis is not merely that Lacan brings to the fore something 
previously underdeveloped or neglected in other theories of subjectivity. 
Rather, it is much stronger—he claims that Lacan constitutes a true 
breakthrough in the history of thought that irreversibly restructures the 
field within which we can do philosophy, in a gesture that rivals that of 
Kant. Yet the great downfall of Lacan is that he is only interested in the 
systematization of the breakdowns and structural inconsistencies that define 
psychoanalytic experience, the antagonistic interaction of the three registers 
as the condition of the (im)possibility of phenomenal reality, and largely 
leaves unanswered the ontological question of the subject. Realizing that 
the Lacanian subject is lacking any explicit account of its genesis—which 
leads many commentators to argue that Lacan is a transcendental idealist 
or linguistic phenomenalist—Žižek is driven back to German Idealism to do 
away with this theoretical deficiency.
But if German Idealism, alongside Lacanian psychoanalysis, is able 
to help us elucidate the paradoxical “and” negatively linking together 
materialism and idealism, it is because there must be something homologous 
in their attempts to think the subject that would allow them to be creatively 
read through one another. By drawing out various passages that link the 
basis of subjectivity in late modern philosophy to fundamental concepts of 
psychoanalysis, Žižek gives flesh to this disjunctive “and” by showing how 
the very fact of the existence of the field of ideality illustrates the necessity 
of the existence of the former, a fact from which many recoil. In this 
respect, if the Symbolic cannot assert itself as all, it is not only because of 
the ever-present pressure exerted from the inside upon its constitution of 
phenomenal reality, but also because the very “and” that precedes and sets 
the stage for the autonomous universe of meaning prevents the latter from 
being able to posit itself as a self-sustaining, total positivity. Idealization 
always collapses upon itself, and it is due to its self-foundering that we are 
led to see that there is a disharmonious relationship between mind and body 
that requires a new materialism to complement its internal limitations. The 
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fundamental problematic guiding Žižek is consequently the following: what 
is the relationship between (i) this abyssal void of the I; (ii) the pre-symbolic, 
material X; and (iii) the mediating activity of conscious ideality? What are 
the “meta-transcendental” conditions of possibility for the emergence of 
the subject that could explain the systematic discord that persists between 
mind and body? Can the psychoanalytical notion of the Todestrieb as a form 
of biological malfunction and its avatars in the tradition tell us something 
about the extra-ideal state of affairs logically preceding experience? But in 
order to grasp the stakes at hand in this endeavour, we must first understand 
the problem of nature bequeathed by Lacan and how it sets up the 
coordinates of his own procedure.
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Chapter 4
The Problem of Nature in the Lacanian Subject
The Obscure Origins of the Symbolic
In this chapter I will lay out various theoretical problems plaguing Lacan 
that serve as the starting point for Žižek's own endeavour. Beginning 
with a precursory analysis of Žižek's identification of the Cartesian and 
psychoanalytical subjects, I move on to a discussion of the intrinsic 
limitations of Lacan's psychoanalytical methodology for understanding 
the ontologico-foundational basis of subjectivity. By focusing on the self-
grounding, non-natural function of images and words, especially the 
transcendental reflexivity underlying both, Lacanian psychoanalysis has a 
tendency to perceive them as an external parasite that derails the substantial 
unity of the body. But this tendency renders problematic any account of 
how images and words could successfully implant themselves, thus leaving 
the Symbolic itself potentially without theoretical justification. Seeing an 
uncanny structural homology here between post-Kantian idealism and the 
legacy bestowed upon us by Lacan, Žižek returns to Hegel and Schelling 
with the conviction that a combination of psychoanalysis with late German 
Idealist metaphysics could help us articulate the paradoxical emergence of 
subjectivity.
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4.1 An Uncanny Pair: The Cartesian and 
Psychoanalytical Subjects
Lacan's and Žižek's situating of the psychoanalytical discourse within the 
trajectory of modern transcendental philosophy could appear surprising. 
Following the works of Freud, it is clear that the father of psychoanalysis 
understands the psychoanalytical subject as intrinsically anti-Cartesian. 
Whereas the cogito conjures forth the idea of an untouchable conscious 
freedom, of complete self-mastery and perfect self-transparency as 
guaranteed by our capacities of reason, ratiocination, and deliberation, the 
Freudian unconscious does not merely haphazardly obstruct existential 
self-familiarity like some kind of accidental feature of human being, but 
rather puts all conscious activity in the clutches of a mysterious, obscure 
Other that by definition resists all ideational (re)presentation. The goal of 
modern philosophy as the articulation of a sound foundation for systematic 
philosophy through the free mediation/idealization of the world by means 
of the rational, self-grounding activity of consciousness is by definition 
foreclosed, for the very process of (re)constituting reality by the I rests 
upon a structurally non-representational process, a process that constantly 
risks interfering with the subject's synthetic mediation of self and world. 
It is no longer the subjective I that “thinks,” but the impersonal, non-
subjective Es (the id): the “it” thinks in the same way that “it” rains. So 
how can “the subject of the unconscious [be] none other than that of the 
Cartesian cogito”?76 
Although this may be true it is evident that, despite the qualitative 
remodulation that subjectivity undergoes in Freudian psychoanalysis, 
especially in terms of the nature and scope of conscious personality, there 
is nevertheless a series of homologous structures at the heart of both the 
psychoanalytical and modern Cartesian subjects. Most fundamentally, both 
rely on the splitting of being into two separate zones, the mental and the 
material, and the inability to reduce one to the other. Even if Freud's later 
theoretical works exhibit a propensity to reduce psychic processes to the 
vital force of biological activity, this very attempt self-destructs (as Lacan 
makes clear) in the face of the brute autonomy of images and words in his 
analyses over and against their subsumption within the pulsating activity 
of nerves or the movement of instincts. There always remains a chasm 
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separating human psychological life from the mere flux of corporeal or 
instinctual energetics, because ideality and materiality are operationally 
different registers in terms of their inner articulation or logical makeup. For 
Žižek, it is not a question of the actual doctrine espoused by Descartes with 
respect to his own doctrine of the cogito and the essence of consciousness 
it entails, but rather of various theoretical potentialities and possibilities 
exhibited by the very structure inherent in his concept of subjectivity, which 
come to the fore in the aftermath of psychoanalysis.
Consequently, what Žižek perceives in the Cartesian subject and its 
various reworkings is the possibility of extracting theoretical resources from 
it that could be used to help explicate the enigma of human freedom and 
the essence of personality as revealed in the psychoanalytical experience 
of the conflictual (non-)relation that holds between mind and body. 
In Cartesianism and psychoanalysis, we do not come across a mere 
conceptually regulative difference between the arena of human subjective 
activity and the raw processes of brute material nature, which would 
enable both to enjoy a strong degree of epistemic autonomy insofar as 
both could self-actualize themselves in terms of a standalone language 
game with the appearance of being intrinsically incommensurate to one 
another despite being on the ontological level fundamentally one. Žižek 
is unwilling to reduce this difference to the level of useful “working 
distinctions” that have the status of an “as if,” for consciousness refuses to 
be completely naturalized. In a similar vein, in contradistinction to a theory 
of monism according to which both are merely seen as attributes of a single, 
overarching whole (however it may be conceived) and whereby both would 
offer differing expressions of an ultimately identical self-same reality, Žižek 
wants to bestow ontological heft upon the difference. The claim is that any 
account of subjectivity that attempts to reduce conscious experience to 
the register of a pure material or substance caught within self-sustaining 
laws, whether it be the neuronal Real, vitalistic energetics, or nature as 
all, not only does not take heed of the radical metaphysical implications 
of the psychoanalytical experience, but is also by consequence unable to 
propound a satisfactory account of what it is to be a human and our relation 
to the world.
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In Žižek's view, the theoretical advantage of Cartesianism and 
psychoanalysis is their defence of the profound ontological difference 
between the registers of objective material corporeality and (inter)subjective 
cultural and psychic experience. Difference is just another word for an 
irresolvable two-way resistance that constitutes a battleground of conflicting, 
oppositional systems and thereby sets the very stage for the experiential 
reality that we find ourselves thrown into. To speak in Freudian parlance, 
one cannot understand consciousness merely in terms of the id-forces 
that comprise the bodily substrate of the libidinal-material basis of human 
existence. Although they may serve as the ontologico-foundational basis for 
all psychic and ultimately phenomenological life, they are philosophically 
inadequate to explain the full essence of personality and its pathologies 
insofar as the latter are constituted through the antagonistic interaction of 
forces that emerge within the tripartite field of id, ego, and superego. None 
of these alone would be able to articulate what it is to be a human subject, 
but must be implicated within an intricate psychological trinitarian logic if 
we are to hope to come to terms with ourselves and our world of experience. 
Even though the ego and superego arise out of the pre-subjective activity of 
the id—the id immanently generates the ego out of itself as a way to cope 
with its own organic insufficiency and primordial Hilflosigkeit to deal with 
the demands of its external environment—they are not dependent upon it 
for their being, their very vitality, each constituting a self-subsisting system 
enjoying a level of genuine autonomy and irreducibility to the other. This 
very structure of independence is also hinted at in the breakthrough that 
is the Cartesian subject, which argues that although we could attempt to 
understand the ideality of spirit by recourse to the mechanics of nature, 
this attempt would ultimately collapse upon itself because something 
essential would be lost. It is not that the mechanical externality that forms 
the causal determinacy of the body's extensive field as the obscure ground 
of mind and its sensations is a mere underdetermination of mental activity. 
Descartes’ claim is much stronger: it is ultimately incapable of helping 
us establish the nature of subjectivity, even if some kind of paradoxical 
non-relation must nevertheless be said to hold between the two; the 
cogito's founding gesture exhibits an irreducible self-grounding that rejects 
mechanical externality in all of its modes (or however it may be reworked by 
The Problem of Nature in the Lacanian Subject 71
reinterpreting it as nature, vitalistic energetics, the neuronal Real, etc.) in a 
process that not only makes it distinctively non-natural in terms of its inner 
structuration, but also thereby guarantees its capacity for transcendental 
self-determination and its incommensurability with other logical registers. 
The question is how we can explain this ontological difference opened up by 
Cartesianism with the aid of psychoanalysis, and vice versa.
4.2 Lacan, antiphusis, and the Parasite of Images and Words
In order to expand upon this problematic, two comments can be made 
that will enable us to uncover the conceptual limitations inherent to the 
psychoanalytical theory of subjectivity and that allow us in turn to draw 
out its similarities with the central conceptual problems plaguing post-
Kantian German Idealism as bestowed upon it by its Cartesian heritage. 
First, for psychoanalysis, the language that we use mediates our very 
experience of the biological constitution of the body in such a way that 
there is a radical degree of separation between the idealization of the 
givenness of the flesh and its objective, extra-subjective existence in itself. 
Freud speaks of people who suffer from paralysis of a certain part of their 
body, although scientifically speaking the paralysis does not coincide with 
where the nerve anatomically ends, and when this is pointed out the pain 
ceases. Here it is the common, everyday belief of where a nerve ends 
and begins that structures the symptom. Thus, understood as a complex 
cultural phenomenon and not just grammatical structures of syntax and 
morphology, language shows itself as an irreducible element of experience 
and points to a discordant relationship between mind and body. Second, 
as arising from the facticity of cultural, historical experience, language 
appears to emerge out of a symbolic interpersonal network of meaning 
that operates according to its own intrinsic and self-unfolding logical 
matrix. Even if it has a basis in our physiology (vocal folds) and neurology 
(language centres in the brain), words themselves appear to exist in an 
autonomous world of their own that, in many ways, shows itself as a kind 
of external parasitic attachment to the biological unity of the body. Taken 
together, these two points assert more than the fact that both registers, the 
Symbolic and the corpo-Real, exist in disunion: the former even appears to 
manifest itself as a “psychotic” withdrawal from the latter into some kind 
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of self-enclosed sphere. What is obvious from this is not only the intrinsic 
Cartesian structure of the psychoanalytical subject—here the deadlock of 
ontological dualism is amplified, brought to its extreme, by the advocation 
of a constitutive dissonance—but that the latter's philosophical legitimacy 
depends upon the precise articulation of the delicate relation between these 
two mutually incommensurate spheres. Although these zones are infinitely 
conflictual and never to be harmonized, they must nevertheless be somehow 
related if the system is to be held together. The Cartesian problem of the 
mind-body relation is consequently inverted: the issue at hand is not how 
both can be in unison with one another through some kind of occasionalism, 
but how the conflictual gap that separates them emerged in the first place so 
that there can never be a harmony or overlapping of each sphere.
Both Freud and Lacan spend the majority of their careers elaborating 
this field of disparate spheres whose interaction generates and constitutes 
personality. Rereading Freud through contemporary developments 
in linguistics and structuralism and even drawing upon cybernetics, 
Lacan attempts to reconfigure our understanding of the self in what he 
believes to be a more scientific manner than Freud could by excavating 
the strict logical structures constituting the condition of the possibility 
of the psychoanalytical subject: that is, the irreducibly non-natural basis 
of experience and the mind-body discord it reveals. There is something 
intrinsically transcendental about the project, even if the end result is 
apparently quite removed from the Kantian analysis of consciousness in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, or later attempts such as 
Husserl's transcendental idealism. Any project that advocates the autonomy 
of subjectivity over materiality and a form of self-grounding idealization 
or symbolization of reality must at some level seem so, for the question of 
the condition of the possibility of experiential reality does not pose itself in 
more “realist-inclined” philosophies insofar as experience is here seen as 
just the effect or another instantiation of a large set of dynamic relations 
between objects in the world. As a consequence, fighting against Freud's 
attempt to biologize/naturalize the unconscious by highlighting that one can 
never escape the ultimate primacy of images and of words in psychoanalysis, 
Lacan relentlessly maintains what he perceives as the Cartesian essence of 
subjectivity. Just as the Kantian, the Fichtean, and even to a certain extent 
The Problem of Nature in the Lacanian Subject 73
the Husserlian transcendental ego grounds itself and the fabric of the 
world of its experience in a moment of absolute freedom that establishes an 
insurmountable rupture between reflexive self-consciousness and the causal 
mechanics of nature, within Lacanian psychoanalysis we encounter the 
same logical move, but merely displaced. In the latter it is not a subject in 
any traditional sense, but rather the self-generating play of signifiers within 
the web of the Symbolic that expresses the impossibility of articulating a 
comprehensive, satisfactory psychological theory of the self only by recourse 
to the pulsations of neurological activity or biological instincts. There are 
two principal reasons for this. First, the Symbolic constitutes the possibility 
of the orbit of the Imaginary within phenomenological experience in such 
a way that it autonomously mediates all contact with the outside world, 
thus diminishing the latter's importance; second, as a consequence, it 
represents the predominance of non-natural (= irreducible to the ebb and 
flow of the material-objective world) influences in the explanation of the 
essence of psychic life. It is in this precise manner that the ciphering activity 
of the Symbolic can be said to obey its own self-grounding transcendental 
logic and be that which sustains the primordiality of the real-ideal divide: 
“subjectivity has no relationship to the Real, but rather to a syntax which is 
engendered by the signifying mark.”77 
Accordingly, one can now understand why Lacan defines the object of 
psychoanalysis in “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of 
its Power” as “antiphusis.”78 With this terminological choice he is drawing 
our attention to the fact that what analysis deals with is not something 
natural in any sense of the nature investigated by science or understood 
by our common sense. Analysis operates at a level that is, by definition, 
incommensurate with natural laws. The effect of this designation is much 
greater than it may initially appear, for the human subject is characterized 
as “non-natural” not only insofar as the structural fabric forming the base 
of conscious experience enjoys a freedom over and above, or an ontological 
heft irreducible to, the flux of nature, but also because it transcendentally 
alienates us from the immediacy of the corpo-Real of our body, the ground 
of our objective substantial being, as the very condition of our possibility of 
what we call experience. Images and words not only precede us historically 
in terms of the temporal genesis of our identities (we are often named before 
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we are conceived: a space is always already carved up for us in the symbolic 
universe before we can be said to exist in the Real) but also structure the 
logico-formal space that makes personality possible in such a way as to 
prevent us from having a genuine access to the brute reality of our own 
“intimate” being as it is an sich. After the I is spoken, that is, after self-
reflexive subjectivity emerges, an experience of the Real is only possible 
through the ideational (re)presenting capacity of a symbolic network of 
signifiers, thus becoming impossible: a mysterious, ever-elusive X. As soon 
as we enter language, the Real as a time of “fullness,” “immediacy,” and 
“complete immersion,” if ever there was one, is subsequently lost forever, 
leaving us trapped within the fragmented, ontologically solipsistic world 
opened up through the Symbolic-Imaginary matrix.
Insofar as the symbolic network simultaneously constitutes the 
underlying structural support of experience and mediates all our contact 
with an external, subject-independent reality, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
appears to be a completely self-grounding transcendental idealism in the 
spirit of Kant. Whatever the human subject is, it is not natural in the same 
sense as other objects within phenomenal reality, even those that appear to 
have some kind of spontaneous connection with that which they find around 
them. Indeed, according to Lacan even animals have a kind of knowledge in 
the Real79 that is missing in us due to the Symbolic. Although language is 
intimately linked with “our” freedom—and “our” madness, we must never 
forget, the two being structurally identical—nevertheless it thus appears as 
some kind of alien, foreign presence that cannot be understood in terms of 
the categories of the world because it has no analogue within it. But then the 
question arises: where do these transcendental structures come from? How 
and why do they irredeemably separate the human subject from the vital ebb 
and flow of nature? As a science of the symbolic network that constitutes 
the nature of personality and self-conscious experience, if psychoanalysis 
is unable to articulate the origins of these non-natural structures and the 
process of their genesis, it itself rests groundless insofar as the object of its 
inquiry remains unable to explain its own theoretical, ontogenetic basis: that 
is, how it itself is possible as a discourse.
As Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel looked upon Kant's critical philosophy, 
they themselves were taken by a similar problem concerning the heritage 
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bestowed upon them. They asked themselves how the transcendental 
structures of subjectivity could be explained in a more comprehensive 
manner, how and why they emerged in the first place, and why they were 
as such necessary for the very possibility of experience. They held the 
brute givenness of the categories of understanding to be philosophically 
unacceptable and took it upon themselves to explore the Achilles' heel of 
the entire critical system. Their guiding intuition was that by undertaking 
an explanation of their genesis they would not only save the Kantian 
breakthrough, but also delve into the wider implications of the subject as 
propounded by it. Similarly, there is a brute givenness in Lacan's account 
of the transcendentality of the symbolic matrix because he never gives an 
account of its origins. When one reads his early and middle works, one is 
consequently struck by the impression that images and words are a purely 
external force that attacks the raw unity of the body and devastates it 
from the outside, thereby creating a denaturalized human subject out of a 
preexisting substantial whole. There is a movement from uncontaminated 
instinctual being within the positive order of the Real—the oneness of 
the body, the immediacy of an organic nature—to a being that speaks, to 
words as intruders that radically split the subject, destroying its immersion 
in objective being. The network of the Symbolic comes from an infinite 
elsewhere ravaging the unity of substance and precluding the possibility 
of a biologically closed libidinal economy as an inborn, innate movement 
of energy defined by materially articulated, instinctual schemata. Whereas 
in the animal kingdom this schema directs bodily energy towards various 
objects that it needs within its immediate environment through a kind 
of immanent causal push, language eternally obstructs the dialectic of 
need and satisfaction, fullness and lack, by instituting an ontological 
going-haywire in being. Preventing the flow of the search for homeostatic 
constancy, the subject is thrown into the endless deferral of desire 
and structurally loses the possibility of attaining its object. Instead of 
predetermined, biological goals, we are left with the objet petit a:
[T]he standard Lacanian theme in the 1950s and 1960s was 
the unsurmountable opposition between the animal universe 
of imaginary captivity, of the balanced mirror-relationship 
between Innenwelt and Aussenwelt, and the human universe 
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of symbolic negativity, imbalance. Lacan thereby fully 
participates in the line of thought that begins with Hegel, 
according to which man is “nature sick unto death,” a being 
forever marked by traumatic misplacement, thrown “out of 
joint,” lacking its proper place, in contrast to an animal which 
always fits into its environment, that is to say, is immediately 
“grown into” it. Symptomatic here is Lacan's “mechanistic” 
metaphorics: an almost celebratory characterizing of the 
symbolic order as an automaton that follows its path, totally 
impervious to human emotions and needs—language is a 
parasitic entity that battens on the human animal, throwing his 
or her life rhythm off balance, derailing it, subordinating it to 
its own brutally imposed circuit.80 
Within this advocacy of a split between the cyclical, balanced world of 
nature and the derailed being of man, the following theoretical concerns 
immediately emerge: how does the symbolic-imaginary matrix give rise 
to itself through a transcendental act of self-positing? How is it able to 
take control of and infiltrate the body, apparently lacerating its objective 
unity? If the symbolic order is really an external force, an alien blow, that 
in some way tears apart or obstructs the body's knowledge in the Real, 
how is it able to sustain itself in face of the corpo-Real of the biological 
organism? To put it another way, why is it not “rejected by this economy 
in a manner analogous to failed organ transplants”?81 The problem of the 
psychoanalytical constitution of human experience opens up unto the extra-
psychological/meta-transcendental conditions or state of affairs that must 
have preceded the emergence of the subject if we are to give a complete 
account of the psyche as such. Psychoanalysis must explain its own 
beginnings in a lost ontological time in a move similar to how the categories 
of the understanding must not be taken as mere elementary facts liberated 
from the theoretical exigency of explaining their genesis. Just as the history 
of the reception of Kantian idealism has shown that it must open up onto 
a comprehensive metaphysics that is inclusive of it, so too we must try to 
develop a metaphysics in the wake of psychoanalysis.
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4.3 German Idealism, Psychoanalysis, and the Quest for the 
Birthplace of the Transcendental
Yet after the 1950s and 1960s, we see within Lacanian psychoanalysis a 
developing preoccupation with the ontologico-foundational basis of the 
subject. After the period of Lacan's “The Direction of the Treatment and the 
Principles of its Power” (1958), which defines the object of psychoanalysis 
as “antiphusis,” there is a profound shift in the meaning of this concept 
that is highly significant for the development of a metaphysics capable of 
explicating and thus justifying the psychoanalytical subject. Whereas the 
early to middle Lacan focuses on the derailing capacity of images that set 
the stage for words as that which parasitizes the corpo-Real of the body, 
which makes the human subject radically non-natural by preventing its 
immersion in the autopoietic, self-regulating unity of positive organic being 
by creating an alienating self-distance within it, we encounter in the late 
Lacan a reconceptualization of the problematic. His new emphasis on the 
Real proclaims that one must radicalize this notion of self-distance. The 
object of psychoanalysis and by consequence the human subject are not 
antiphysical because images and words are an infinite Other to nature, an 
external alterity that arises ex nihilo only to penetrate into its secret chamber 
like a vandal and deface its sacred inviolability. The incommensurability lies 
elsewhere: images and language cannot be the cause of the denaturalization 
of the human subject; there must be something in nature itself that 
immanently moves it toward denaturalization. In short, nature itself is 
antiphusis, self-sabotaging, self-lacerating.
Although this represents a fundamental change in the meaning of the 
category of the non-natural, it only serves as a beginning. Insofar as the 
psychoanalytical experience is engulfed by images and words, which means 
that it is predominately ridden by non-biological influences, the only way 
to philosophically ground the primacy of psychoanalysis is to elaborate 
an underlying ontology that could explain how the subject could have 
emerged out a biological field that it presents itself as irreducible to. The 
theoretical merit of the Lacanian project is dependent upon the articulation 
of the workings of substantial reality that renders possible the birth of 
a more-than-material subjectivity out of its material Grund (to borrow 
an expression from Adrian Johnston), a paradoxical ontologization of the 
78 Chapter 4
transcendental structures that constitute and found experience by separating 
themselves from and effacing their ontological foundation. It is exactly this 
problematic that thematically binds together the theoretical concerns of the 
psychoanalytical and German Idealist traditions, for according to the latter 
the only way to save the breakthrough of the Kantian critical system is to 
find a way, from within the self-founding idealism that it advocates, to reach 
out into the extra-subjective Real, or to speak in its parlance, the field of 
noumena, and ground it within a system that does not represent a return to 
previous modes of thinking (naïve dogmatic realism) but rather somehow 
manages to reach the Real through the Ideal despite the self-enclosed, self-
subsistent ideal activity of consciousness. But how? The very trap in which 
we find ourselves proves to hold the way out:
We can now see in what sense Hegel's logic remains 
“transcendental” in the strict Kantian sense—that is, in 
what sense its notional network is not merely formal, but 
constitutive of reality itself, whose categorical structure 
it describes. Hegel's Logic is the inherent tension in the 
status of every determinate/limited category: each concept 
is simultaneously necessary (i.e. indispensable if we are to 
conceive reality, its underlying ontological structure) and 
impossible (i.e. self-refuting, inconsistent: the moment we fully 
and consequently “apply” it to reality, it disintegrates and/or 
turns into its opposite). This notional tension/contradiction is 
simultaneously the ultimate spiritus movens of “reality” itself: 
far from signalling the failure of our thought to grasp reality, 
the inherent inconsistency of our notional apparatus is the 
ultimate proof that our thought is not merely a logical game 
we play but is able to reach reality itself, expressing its inherent 
structuring principle.82 
Looking back at the history of the inner development of modern 
transcendental philosophy, Žižek sees a structural homology to his own 
task of searching for the ontogenetic condition of the possibility of the 
psychoanalytical subject, a question left unanswered by Freud and Lacan, 
in the tradition's attempt to find a way to construct a metaphysics from 
within the internal deadlock of transcendental idealism. If our generation of 
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experience proves itself to be unable to posit itself as an absolute and 
unbridled hallucination of objects, then we must encounter some kind 
of paradoxical limit to our autonomous ciphering and constitution of 
phenomenal reality from within; the impasses obstructing the self-grounding 
idealization of the world demonstrate that, although we are forever stuck 
within ideality, we are not simply prisoners of the completely solipsistic 
sphere of the self-referential, masturbatory play of thought within thought 
and that a metaphysics of the Real, an account of the noumenal, appears 
to be theoretically possible. The inassimilable kernel of the Real within our 
notional, symbolic code points to the paradoxical negative coinciding of 
inside with outside, the Real and the Ideal, within thinking: the cracks of 
ideality cast an abyssal shadow that opens up onto the materiality of being, 
albeit only as refracted through the impossibilities of the Ideal, in such a way 
that tarrying with the latter offers a way to develop idealism into a science 
of the Real. Idealism has been overcome because the materialism-idealism 
distinction has become intra-discursive, that is, internal to idealism itself. 
In this sense, we should not understand Žižek's proclamation of Hegel's 
“transcendentalism” to say that Hegel, like Kant, remains at the level of a 
pure subjectivism: due to the constitutive movement of notional tension 
intrinsic to the concept of dialectics, not only is idealism prevented from 
being subjective, but, more strongly, “[t]he opposition between idealistic 
and realistic philosophy is therefore without meaning,” which is why 
idealism can be said to be absolute.83 Embracing the paradox of the critical 
system, its breakthrough articulation of the irreducible idealizing activity 
of consciousness, the mediative structures that freely transcendentally 
constitute the fabric of experience, Hegel's philosophy is a daring attempt 
to rethink the possibility of a metaphysics in the wake of the Kantian 
revolution, to carve a space between idealistic ontological solipsism and a 
speculative materialism within the former. It is only within such a space that 
the question: “What is the transcendental subject's relation to nature?” or, 
in Lacanian parlance, “What is the Symbolic's relation to the pre-symbolic 
Real?” can be asked.
Žižek's retrieval of the cogito and his reactualization of German 
Idealism are therefore irrevocably caught up in his own attempt to develop 
a metaphysics of the Real able to explicate the obscure grounds of the 
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psychoanalytical subject. Attempting to excavate the ontological edifice 
implied by the latter, his more overtly theoretical works pass through 
modern to late modern philosophy by means of an intuition of a basic 
structural parallelism binding together such seemingly different traditions. 
Although the starting point is always psychoanalysis—“psychoanalysis is 
ultimately a tool to reactualize, to render actual for today's time, the legacy 
of German Idealism”84—it is clear that Žižek does not understand his work 
as an intrusion or unmethodological tearing apart of the tradition according 
to extrinsic philosophical principles he is imposing upon it. In fact, for him, 
the psychoanalytical subject is not merely a direct consequence of German 
Idealism's grounding insights—there is actually something intrinsically 
identical in these traditions, so much so that it seems that the only way to 
fully realize the former is to supplement it with the latter and vice versa, 
insofar as they are both really dealing with the same central issues that 
each fail in their own way to adequately thematize. Describing his own 
project, Žižek says:
If you were to ask me at gunpoint, like Hollywood producers 
who are too stupid to read books and say, “give me the 
punchline,” and were to demand, “Three sentences. What are 
you really trying to do?” I would say, Screw ideology. Screw 
movie analyses. What really interests me is the following 
insight: if you look at the very core of psychoanalytic theory, 
of which even Freud was not aware, it's properly read death 
drive—this idea of beyond the pleasure principle, self-
sabotaging, etc.—the only way to read this properly is to 
read it against the background of the notion of subjectivity 
as self-relating negativity in German Idealism. That is to 
say, I just take literally Lacan's indication that the subject of 
psychoanalysis is the Cartesian cogito—of course, I would 
add, as reread by Kant, Schelling, and Hegel.85 
By zoning in on this basic identity, Žižek's philosophy doesn't lose 
methodological rigor, as if it made him blind to other, more broad-reaching 
concerns in the tradition, thereby reducing his thinking to a mere haphazard 
picking out of various conceptual structures and ideas that are useful for 
his own project to the neglect of others. Rather, it enables him to show 
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how there is an unconscious, disavowed Grundlogik that repeats and self-
unfolds throughout modern transcendental philosophy and finally comes 
out into the open with the advent of psychoanalysis, which shows itself as 
the culmination of this entire lineage. Because Žižek perceives some kind 
of self-developing truth inherent within the tradition that binds it together 
with psychoanalysis, his reading is pushed on by a sense of fidelity to the 
movement as such so that his return to German Idealism resembles Fichte's, 
Hegel's, and Schelling's return to Kant86 just as much as Lacan's return to 
Freud: what is at stake is never merely textual faithfulness, but a hidden 
kernel of truth that has been simultaneously opened up and obscured by the 
tradition itself.
The effect here is twofold: while psychoanalysis allows us to 
reconstruct retroactively the Grundlogik inherent in the German Idealist 
account of subjectivity by bringing to the fore the relevance of previously 
underemphasized concepts and textual moves, this reconstruction of its 
fundamental concepts also allows us to elaborate our understanding of 
the psychoanalytical subject. It is not merely that psychoanalysis reveals 
a hidden unconscious logic at work throughout tradition; the backward 
retroactive glance is simultaneously a forward-looking task that tries to pave 
the way for the new. Žižek's investigation into the history of philosophy 
is never a mere activity of philological exegesis, the retrieval of the 
“primordial” meaning of a text, but a creative generation of new concepts 
that, paradoxically, must be said to have been already present in the now 
lost factical past, yet to have existed there in the paradoxical temporality of 
a futur antérieur (“I will have been”) whose contours are now first visible 
in the après-coup reconstruction of said past. A repetition is always the 
establishment of a difference, so that the legitimacy of Žižek's reading rests 
not so much upon his apparent “lack” of faithfulness to the words or the 
spirit of the great German philosophers, but how this temporal intersection 
of philosophico-psychoanalytical interpretation, the space within which 
Žižek effectuates his reactualization, functions and realizes itself. But what is 
the true breakthrough of the German Idealist and psychoanalytic traditions 
and why can only a psychoanalytical dialogue between the two enable us to 
see the conceptual impetus underlying the former's unconscious Grundlogik 
and also to come to terms with the ontology of the subject? Žižek's answer 
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not only questions our conventional reading of this movement, but more 
fundamentally challenges our very conception of ourselves and the world.
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II
Nature Torn Apart

Chapter 5
Kant, Todestrieb, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle
The Unruly Basis of Transcendental Freedom
In this chapter I begin an examination of Žižek's metaphysics by 
showing how the thematic intersection between German Idealism and 
psychoanalysis allows him to develop a highly original approach to the 
transcendental. Beginning with a brief discussion of Adrian Johnston's 
summary of Lacan's passing remarks on nature in largely unavailable 
seminars stemming from the late period, I then precede to analyze how 
these remarks lay the foundation for Žižek's own radical rethinking of the 
Symbolic-Real relationship. Trying to comprehend the emergence of the 
Symbolic, Žižek attempts to demonstrate that the very fact of its existence 
must be revelatory of some ontological process that set the stage for its 
immanent genesis out of the Real as an extimate Other, even if, in turn, it 
makes the very Real from which it arose an impossible concept. Perceiving 
the key for understanding this paradoxical point of discordant (non-)
relation between the pre-subjective Real and the transcendental matrix of 
the Symbolic in the Todestrieb, and following Lacan's claim that “Kant's 
practical philosophy [is] the starting point of the lineage culminating in 
Freud's invention of psychoanalysis,”87 Žižek reactualizes the legacy of 
German Idealism in order to articulate his own parallax ontology through 
an intuition of a fundamental identity between Kantian transcendentalism 
and psychoanalysis as established in the former's concept of the primordial 
unruliness and diabolical evil at the core of subjectivity.
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5.1 From the Rottenness of Nature...
Although Lacan lacks an explicitly developed philosophy of nature as a 
complement to his structuralist metapsychology, throughout his career 
we see a growing interest in and appreciation for the underlying ontology 
implied by his theory of the subject. Adrian Johnston succinctly describes 
the theoretical situation plaguing the late Lacan in his shift from the primacy 
of the Symbolic to that of the Real, a problematic of utmost importance for 
understanding the deficiency in Lacanian psychoanalysis that guides Žižek's 
own project:
A psychoanalytically influenced theory of the subject that 
fails to furnish a basic delineation of human nature as the 
precondition for the genesis of subjectivity is groundless, 
incapable of explaining a foundational dimension of its 
object of inquiry.
In the later seminars of the 1970s, a series of somewhat 
cryptic remarks testify to Lacan's awareness of the need to 
redefine nature itself in order to account for why human 
nature is predisposed to being thoroughly altered by the 
denaturalizing mediation of socio-symbolic structures. In both 
the twenty-first and twenty-fourth seminars, Lacan contends 
that nature is far from being entirely natural. However, this 
isn't just a slightly reworked reiteration of his earlier remarks 
from the 1950s about humanity's denaturalized nature. Rather 
than grounding his assertions here by invoking the externally 
imposed intrusion of images and signifiers as the ultimate 
cause of the denaturalization involved in subjectification, 
Lacan takes the additional step of pointing to something 
within nature itself that inclines it in the direction of its own 
effacement.88 
What is missing in Lacan, however, is a fully worked out account of the 
consequences of this shift, a detailed investigation into the paradoxical 
ground of the subject intrinsic to the very gesture of psychoanalysis. Yet he 
makes a crucial advance by suggesting that the Real is not to be, despite the 
fact that we can only posit its existence from within the differential network 
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of signifiers, merely taken as that which must be said to logically precede the 
emergence of the linguistic subject, but also as that which renders the latter in 
a certain sense possible by virtue of a self-destructive tendency always already 
within it that opens up the space for its infinite loss to self through the 
colonizing activity of images and words. We encounter a metaphysical thesis: 
subjectivity does not come on the scene as a scar inflicted upon an otherwise 
harmonious nature, as a disturbance of its symphonized order by means of 
a haphazard intrusion into its sphere of non-natural influences that produce 
an accidental zone of ontological non-coincidence. The psychoanalytical 
experience is, rather, revelatory of something much more primordial: 
namely, that nature itself must be always already antiphusis, self-sabotaging, self-
lacerating, and responsible for its own demise in the human being's denaturalized 
essence. But why?
Lacan provides only a few hints. At one point, he identifies 
“liberty” (liberté) with “the non-existence of the sexual 
relationship,” which, in light of the above, can be understood 
as indicating that the freedom enjoyed by the autonomous 
subject is made possible by the lack of an integrated organic 
foundation as the grounding basis of the subject's being. 
Similarly, several years later, Lacan speaks of nature as not all 
that natural due to being internally plagued by “rottenness” 
(pourriture), by a decay or defect out of which culture (as 
antiphusis) bubbles forth (bouillonner). Viewed thus, human 
nature is naturally destined for denaturalization. Put 
differently, more-than-material subjectivity immanently arises 
out of the dysfunctionality of a libidinal-material ground.89 
Yet it would perhaps be erroneous to say that this theoretical awareness is 
limited to the late Lacan's move from the primacy of the Symbolic towards 
that of the Real. As early as 1949 in his work on the Imaginary and the 
mirror stage, Lacan had already said that “these reflections lead me to 
recognize in the spatial capture manifested by the mirror stage, the effect 
in man, even prior to this social dialectic, of an organic inadequacy of his 
natural reality—assuming we can give some meaning to the word 'nature,'” 
an inadequacy that points to “a certain dehiscence at the very heart of the 
organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of malaise and motor 
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uncoordination of the neonatal months”90 which is, in fact, responsible 
for the alteration we see in our relationship to nature in comparison with 
other animals insofar as it represents “the shattering of the Innenwelt and 
Umwelt circle”91 and thus functions as the true “intersection of nature 
and culture.”92 Here it is noteworthy to mention that the French word 
stade does not completely map onto the English stage. Although it does 
correspond in one of its principal meanings to the latter (a distinct stage in 
a process of evolution: les stades de la vie) it also means stadium (a terrain 
or area where something takes place) and thus signifies a primordial scene 
constituting the foundation or arena within/through which an activity 
unfolds. Consequently, Lacan's thesis is that the mirror stage can never be 
subsumed in a later phase of development, forcing us to conclude that, even 
in the early period, it must necessarily refer to some kind of self-effacing 
force immanent within nature that gives rise to and simultaneously sustains 
the ontogenetic condition of the possibility of the paradoxical emergence 
of a more-than-material subject. This force thereby institutes the infinitely 
denaturalizing process of flirtation with images and symbolic castration, so 
that organic discord in the motor coordination of the body is not a mere 
failure of the biological system but also a “positive” support that persists 
in its very non-naturalness even after the Imaginary and the Symbolic have 
taken hold as their dark origin. If the quasi-experience of dismemberment is 
to be taken as originary, as that which incites the libidinal investment of the 
captivating mirror picture the human infant sees of itself as the beginning 
of psychogenesis by letting itself be alienated by the Otherness of images 
and words, then nature here must also be seen—at least in the case of 
human being—as a festering, half-living corpse. The shift of emphasis in 
the late seminars is already contained within the founding texts of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, which not only suggests their central thematic unity, despite 
the stark differences that they may exhibit, but more strongly a historical 
unfolding that follows an internal development conforming to the model of 
the Hegelian movement from the in-itself to the for-itself.
But we should avoid looking at the various hints and suggestions in the 
late Lacan that gesture towards the character of the material edifice upon 
which the subject rests as a mere immanent elaboration of the implications 
of his previously laid out position, given that there are important changes 
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of position in the development of his thinking. What is important is not the 
unity or disunity of Lacan, but rather the radicality and nuance inherent 
in his thinking of the subject as brought to the fore when we focus on 
this very specific constellation of problems hovering around the obscure 
relation between nature and the essence of human being, a constellation 
that proposes a frightening metaphysical conception of the world, albeit 
only implicitly. Synonymous with the irrevocable organic inadequacy of 
its biological prematurity at birth, and functioning as such as the basis for 
full-fledged subjectivity, the primordial Hilflosigkeit of the human infant 
already points toward a vision of the world that exceeds the constraints of 
psychoanalysis as a mere investigation into psychogenesis and its pathologies 
as to be dealt with in the psychiatric setting. Driven by its own concerns, 
psychoanalysis—indeed, perhaps like any strong theory of subjectivity—
offers a metaphysics, or at least must become a metaphysics, since we can 
never safely isolate the subject under investigation from the greater scheme 
of ontology within which it is inscribed as a thing, process, or event. The 
subject is. What Lacan proclaims about its modality of “being” is that 
subjectivity can no longer be perceived as unnatural in the sense of an 
external-parasitical invasion into the vital movement of nature through the 
alienating effects of flirtatious images and castrating words, which somehow 
spoil or disfigure its pure unity by disrupting the smooth functioning of its 
immanent laws. The necessary theoretical posit of an originary rottenness of 
nature contends that there was never a realm of innocence, a pre-symbolic 
whole whose peaceful in-itself precluded division, a self-pervasive oneness 
whose unbroken energetic flow was then interrupted through the advent 
of language, which would be said not only to forever ideally fragment and 
lacerate it through artificial categories, but more disconcertingly to upset 
the very positivity of its movement, the cyclical repetition of things in the 
Real of nature, by short-circuiting the body's self-determining laws striving 
after homeostatic balance by giving rise to desire. No: it is not that it is only 
here that we see a snag, a breakdown, in the natural flow of things. Lacan's 
claim is much stronger: nature, in some sense, was never completely natural 
(it is in this spirit that we should interpret Lacan's hesitation in “The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytical 
Experience” of being able to “give some meaning to the word 'nature'”93).
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For Žižek, it is precisely this intuition of a necessary moment of 
negativity, which simultaneously rots nature from the inside out and 
gestures towards its constitutive weakness, that allows us to come to terms 
with the Symbolic-Real relation in Lacanian psychoanalysis. It alludes to 
the necessity of a metaphysics of the Real to explicate what the subject truly 
is and sketches its contours. Yet due to his conceptual reworking of Lacan, 
Žižek is led to part ways with and challenge many conventional ways of 
understanding this relation. Bruce Fink, for example, says:
So too, Lacan's Real is without zones, subdivision, localized 
highs and lows, or gaps and plenitudes: the Real is a sort of 
unrent, undifferentiated, fabric, woven in such a way as to 
be full everywhere, there being no space between the threads 
that are its “stuff.” It is a sort of smooth, seamless surface or 
space which applies as much to a child's body as to the whole 
universe. The division of the Real into separate zones, distinct 
features, and contrasting structures is a result of the symbolic 
order, which, in a manner of speaking, cuts into the smooth 
facade of the Real, creating divisions, gaps, and distinguishable 
entities and laying the Real to rest, that is, drawing or 
sucking it into the symbols used to describe it, and thereby 
annihilating it.94 
For Žižek, if we are to understand how language emerges out of/within the 
Real, this pre-symbolic, pre-logical Real sans fissure does not go far enough 
and must be argued against for two reasons, even if traces of it can be 
found in Lacan. First, it is a necessary posit created by the Symbolic at the 
moment of its free self-instituting, just as the transcendental subject posits 
the notion of a pure noumenon as a consequence of its (re)constitution of 
phenomenal reality. In this sense, the idea of the extra-subjective Real as 
an undifferentiated “mass” exhibiting no absence and negativity, just like 
the noumenon, risks being a mere fantasy of some kind of positive state of 
ontological completion outside of symbolization and idealization, which 
psychoanalytical experience (the mind-body discord) disproves. The Real 
prior to language may not possess linguistic and conceptual determination 
into a system of strict symbolic differences, but it cannot be said to be a 
substantial reality fully existing unto itself in such a way that language 
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“pierces” its smoothness by “cutting into it” it like a flesh wound, which 
such presentations of the problematic appear to imply. This means that 
the above reading (represented by Lacanians such as Fink) is not false, 
but must be qualified. The Real sans fissure and the noumenon represent 
a compensation for the impossibility of an intimate experience of the Real 
within the Symbolic by claiming that, outside the reach of this synthetic 
(re)constitution of reality, it can still be said to persist in a state lacking 
contradiction and antagonism. It safeguards us from the realization that 
the Real itself is morcelé: it does not merely get itself into traps, producing 
monsters that disrupt the flow of knowledge in the Real by making the latter 
howl under ontological pain (chaotic states such as black holes, wherein the 
laws of physics seem to break down, or states in which animals, misreading 
meteorological conditions, perceive warm days in winter as the beginning 
of spring and act accordingly, “not only rendering themselves vulnerable 
to later onslaughts of cold, but also perturbing the entire rhythm of natural 
reproduction”95) but is always already riddled with internal differences, in 
such a manner that symbolic categories, due to a certain kind of “family 
resemblance,” cannot be said to be some kind of lacerating agent that 
first cuts up the stuff of the world into a system of divisions. Speaking of 
quantum mechanics (which Žižek is interested in precisely because it gives 
us resources that prevent us from having recourse to “a 'naive' ontology of 
spheres or levels”96 and challenges our understanding of nature and culture/
the Real and the Symbolic), he says:
According to [our] “spontaneous ideology,” nature stands 
for the primacy of actuality over potentiality, its domain is 
the domain of the pure positivity of being where there are no 
lacks (gaps) in the strict symbolic sense; if, however, we take 
the ontological consequences of quantum physics seriously, 
then we have to suppose that the symbolic order pre-exists in 
a “wild” form, albeit in what Schelling would have called a 
lower potency.97 
Žižek outlines four precise ways in which the symbolic order unexpectedly 
“pre-exists” in the Real as according to quantum mechanics, which deserve 
to be paraphrased in full in this context:
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1. Possibility as such possesses actuality, that is, has effects. Just like 
parental authority imposes itself all the time despite the fact that it 
is normally only virtually and not actually present, understanding 
a particle's trajectory at the quantum level presupposes that we 
already know its possible trajectories within its wave function, 
which have a “being” of their own. What is more, the actualization 
of one of these latter does not do away with the rest: similar to 
the case of parental authority, as various phenomena of guilty 
conscience arising from an act or thought that no parental 
authority (or their stand-in) could ever find out or demonstrate, 
“what might have happened continues to echo in what actually 
happens as its virtual background.”98 
2. Both possess knowledge in the Real. As the now (in)famous double-
slit experiment testifies, if we observe a particle to see through 
which slit it will pass, it will always behave as a particle, but if 
we do not observe it, it will always behave as a wave; it is as if 
the particle knows when it is and when it is not been watched by 
scientists. We display similar behaviour in the Symbolic—often, 
for instance, when others project certain roles on us, we act 
appropriately, being aware of the projection and assuming it.
3. Each exhibits the phenomenon of registration. In the symbolic 
universe of meaning, an event only truly occurs when the 
surrounding “external” environment takes note of or registers it, 
that is, if it can leave a trace. In order to explain the phenomenon 
of the collapse of the wave function, physicists must also resort 
to such metaphors: even at the quantum level, an event only 
“fully actualizes itself only through its symbolic registration, its 
inscription into a symbolic network, which is external to it.”99 For 
this reason, particles can pop into and out of existence, just as 
long as the universe does not notice—like it is possible to cheat a 
banking system if one does not violate normal functioning.
4. Both exhibit an irreducible openness. In the Symbolic, there is always 
a delay between an event and its symbolic registration. The rise 
of a new master signifier that rewrites the entire logical field 
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within which it occurs is not a substantial, fully constituted and 
self-unfolding process that was determined from the get-go, like 
a plant growing from a seed: it was not until the precise moment 
when it fully actualizes itself (when it inscribes itself into its 
surroundings as a master signifier) that it comes to be that which 
it retroactively always already was, thus rewriting its own entire 
past. Similarly, in the double-slit experiment, when a particle is 
observed, it “will not only (now) behave as a particle, its past will 
also retroactively become (‘will have been’) that of a particle,”100 
so that beforehand it could be said to have only existed as a form 
of proto-reality.
Secondly, if we try to understand the pre-logical Real as in itself an 
undifferentiated “mass” or ontologically complete, we just cannot comprehend 
the possibility of the emergence of the Symbolic in the first place. If 
something like the human subject is to emerge, then nature must be 
self-divided, wrought with tension-ridden zones of inner laceration, for 
otherwise we cannot account for its ontogenesis in any adequate manner, 
insofar as the subject, intrinsically exhibiting an originary ontologico-natural 
discord, could not be inscribed into the world. The subject and its linguistic 
capacities must be seen as expressive of the underlying ontological status 
of the Real, even if they represent within Lacanian metapsychology the 
loss and impossibility of such a non-mediated, pre-symbolic reality: the 
Symbolic is not merely some kind of extraneous, self-unfolding construct 
(a self-generating matrix of “meaning” that can assert itself in complete 
freedom from the Real as such) for the mere fact that we are entrapped 
within it must be revelatory of the essence of objective reality at some level 
since it must have given birth to it. The meaning of this is twofold: firstly, 
descriptions of the Symbolic-Real relation such as Fink's risk obfuscating 
what is for Žižek of essential importance for understanding what is at 
stake because they describe language as “encrusted upon the living,”101 
thereby reducing language to an external reflection upon substance and 
rendering the task of explicating its obscure origins impossible; secondly, 
the apparently self-grounding idealism of Lacanian psychoanalysis—the 
autonomous, self-positing ciphering of the Real by the Symbolic—already 
points to a way of explaining its emergence, and thus of breaking free from 
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its correlationalist prison, by zoning in on that very feature that seems to 
prohibit such an inquiry: that is, its ontological solipsism now understood as an 
ontological event. It is necessary to explain how the Real can open itself up 
and give rise to a force seemingly Other to itself, to explain how images and 
words can “colonize” being from within, but this process forces us to include 
a moment of non-coincidence and antagonism with the Real. Although 
it may be without meaning to say that in the Real there is lack—lack only 
being brought forth in the reign of the Symbolic—it would nevertheless 
be erroneous to deduce from this that there is no negativity or difference 
within it. Yet how are we to understand this element of negativity in the all-
pervasive fabric of the pre-symbolic Real, this self-sabotaging moment in the 
very heart of being?
5.2 …to a Denaturalized Monstrosity
We can now begin to see why the psychoanalytical experience of the infinite 
dichotomy between the structures underlying personality (subjectivation, 
culture) and the vital flow of energy sustaining us in objective being (nature, 
the corpo-Real of the body) is so pivotal for Žižek. The two registers of 
the Symbolic and the Real may function without any degree of reciprocal 
interaction or mutual interconnectivity, but the simple declaration of this 
unstable Cartesian bipolarity actually belies a third element that subsists 
throughout the discord and, in fact, paradoxically ties them together in their 
very antagonistic dialectical (non-)relationship. Here, following another hint 
given by Lacan—
While psychoanalysis cannot, since its experience is limited to 
the individual, claim to grasp the totality of any sociological 
object or even the whole set of forces currently operating in 
our society, the fact remains that it discovered in analytical 
experience relational tendencies that seem to play a basic 
role in all societies, as if the discontent in civilization [das 
Unbehagen in der Kultur] went so far as to lay bare the very 
meeting point of nature and culture.102 
—Žižek writes:
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Furthermore, is not the object of psychoanalysis precisely this 
gap between first and second nature—the insecure position 
of a human subject who, after losing his footing in the first 
nature, can never feel fully at case in the second: what Freud 
called das Unbehagen in der Kultur, the different way the 
subject's passage from first to second nature can go wrong 
(psychosis, neurosis ...)? There is thus a core that resists 
the subject's full reconciliation with his second nature: the 
Freudian name for this kernel is drive, the Hegelian name 
for it is “abstract negativity” (or, in more poetic terms of the 
young Hegel, the “night of the world”).103 
The conceptual contours of this passage are much more complex than they 
may originally appear. Žižek is saying that central to any psychoanalytical 
theory of psychogenesis and psychopathology is the claim that the subject 
is out of joint with both the biological needs of the corpo-Real of its body 
(the anorexic eats nothing, the romantic is willing to die for love) and the 
symbolically constituted “second” nature that is created to compensate for 
the primordial Hilflosigkeit of human organic insufficiency. Understood 
in the context of seeking the obscure origins of the Symbolic in the Real, 
the subject, as the very gap between first nature (Real) and second nature 
(Symbolic), cannot be said to fit into either: it is a paradoxically self-standing 
space of non-relation that protrudes out of and obstructs both. Strictly 
speaking, the subject is neither Real nor Symbolic—it is a pure logical 
non-coincidence that possesses no place in either, so that the question of 
its upsurge within being must also go beyond a mere exploration of the 
breakdown of the libidinal-material fold of its biological nature as that which 
sets the stage for its emergence by opening up a liberating space within 
nature's hold.
What is crucial and groundbreaking here is the outlining of the 
ontological edifice that grounds human subjectivity qua cogito: we see the 
articulation of the “site” or “juncture” from which transcendental freedom 
and spontaneity emerge and take told. Self-positing autonomy, as both 
freedom from the laws of a closed libidinal-material economy and the 
relatively closed structural determinism of the symbolic law of culture, rests 
upon the subject as a self-relating point of infinite negativity, a positively 
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charged, excessive void, but it can only beget itself if there is first of all a 
short circuit, a breakdown, in the dynamic flow of energy constitutive of 
nature's rhythms as that which carves up room for its more-than-materiality. 
Full-fledged subjectivity is rendered possible by a devastating ontological 
violence and is consequently nothing but a denaturalized monstrosity 
(Todestrieb) logically existing above and beyond the flux of being (due to 
its non-coincidence with the latter) while never able to leave its immanent 
plane within which it is primordially inscribed as out of joint: representing 
the failure, the collapse, of a self-enclosed biological system based upon the 
homeostatic self-preservation of the organism, it is an extimate inassimilable 
body in nature that exhibits the double feature of inclusion/exclusion, 
internal/external, presence/absence so characteristic of the Real in Lacan, 
which simultaneously demonstrates why the pre-symbolic Real must be 
said to be morcelé. In other words, set up as nature turned against itself, the 
first dull stirrings of the human subject refer to some kind of trauma that 
eventually incites the growth of individual ego life and culture in such a way 
that the latter exhibit the structural form of a reaction formation against 
this dysfunctionality in being and thus can never prevent themselves from 
being a negative, symptomatic expression of their basis in an ontological 
crisis, no matter how they may try to occult this fact. The psychoanalytical 
experience by definition presupposes an emergent schism in the fabric of the 
world between substance and subject, matter and mind, the Real and the 
Symbolic. But how can psychoanalysis—explicitly a theory of psychogenesis 
and its pathologies—explain where this denaturalization comes from, since 
such an investigation by principal must be external to its theoretical field 
and methodology?
Using Lacan's gesture towards an originary rottenness plaguing nature 
as a theoretical starting point, Žižek seeks to expand this structuralist 
metapsychology in order to secure the means of articulating the ontogenetic 
possibility-conditions of the Symbolic in the Real. Seeing psychoanalysis as 
conceptually unable to fulfill this task, he expands its horizon by recourse 
to modern philosophy, seeing therein a certain homology that enables 
him to draw upon its resources.104 Following Lacan's claim that “Kant's 
practical philosophy [is] the starting point of the lineage culminating in 
Freud's invention of psychoanalysis,” Žižek's project could be described 
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as having two goals.105 First, because the Lacanian subject is lacking any 
account of its ultimate origins, Žižek turns to German Idealism to develop 
a transcendental materialism insofar as there exists a structural parallelism 
in the underlying problematic plaguing both post-Kantian idealism and 
contemporary psychoanalysis. Second, and more strongly, Žižek's claim 
is that this parallelism is more than a mere shared set of theoretical 
concerns hovering around the grounding of the subject. If we read Kant, 
Schelling, and Hegel through Freud and Lacan, we actually see that there 
is a fundamental identity between the psychoanalytical subject haunted 
by the Todestrieb as constitutive of its very existence and the unconscious 
Grundlogik of German Idealism. We just have to look at how the latter's 
key representatives have recourse to various concepts (unruliness and 
diabolic evil in Kant, the night of the world in Hegel, or the Entscheidung 
in Schelling) that indicate a necessary disruption, breach, or violence at the 
very basis of the founding attributes they bestow upon the subject (self-
legislative reason, the irreducibility of spirit, or freedom as the capacity for 
good and evil). It is exactly this paradoxical connection between real discord 
and ideal freedom throughout both traditions that enables Žižek to develop 
a new metaphysics by working in the intersections of both traditions, a 
metaphysics whose first conceptual contours we already see in Kant.
5.3 Kant, Unruliness, and the Cry of the Newborn
Lacan's claim that the beginning of psychoanalysis is in Kant's practical 
writings appears, at first, counter-intuitive. Especially given Lacan's 
structuralist bent, one would perhaps expect the clearest elaboration of 
the subject to be found in Kant's philosophical treatises on the mediating 
structures of consciousness. What do we see by delving into his practical 
philosophy except an attempt to found the ethical in the self-legislative 
spontaneity of human reason through articulating the self-imposing 
impetus of the categorical imperative and a listing of the a priori duties that 
automatically follow from its law? How could such a cold, machine-like 
way of determining the legitimacy of existential action be the immediate 
origin of psychoanalysis? Although we do encounter traces here of the 
irrevocably split nature of subjectivity in the tension between reason and 
sensible inclination, Kant's practical philosophy appears to have absolutely 
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nothing to do with the unconscious in the Lacanian sense; on top of that, 
it displays great hope in the modern Enlightenment project of establishing 
the self-transparency and powers of reason—albeit through reason's own 
self-critique—as a means of historical progress and concretizing man's 
perfectibility. However, even if this might be the image of Kant's practical 
philosophy that always comes to mind, the matter at hand is far more 
complicated.
Kant's practical philosophy is of central importance because it is an 
expression and systematization of the experience of freedom in its irreducible 
essence, freedom understood as the self-legislative spontaneity at the 
core of human subjectivity, a faculty that separates us from the rest of 
mechanical nature insofar as we generate and obey our own laws. One must 
also remember that, for Kant, the Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to 
make room for faith by limiting knowledge and reason, a point that directs 
the entirety of the critical enterprise from beginning to end by penetrating 
into the originary self-positing of human liberty at all costs, something that 
the late German Idealists were retroactively convinced revealed a decisive 
deficiency present in all the great thinkers in the history of philosophy. It is 
not the Copernican revolution—indeed, Schelling's106 and Hegel's107 projects 
are founded upon an attempt to escape its consequences—which forces 
us to rethink the very possibility of philosophy, but rather Kant's account of 
freedom.108 This is also true of Žižek: “Kantian practical reason provides a 
glimpse into the abyss of freedom beyond (or beneath) the constraints of 
traditional metaphysical ontology.”109 
It is all a matter of how one understands the Kantian breakthrough. 
Even if it is true that it is a response to specific epistemological and scientific 
concerns that emerge out of modern philosophy (the [im]possibility of 
universal and necessary knowledge, the nature of the correlation of our ideas 
to reality in the genesis of concepts, etc.) it is clear that Kant's revolution 
cannot merely be reduced to his innovative way of rethinking the question 
of the subject-object relation, for the radical reflexivity of the cogito that 
imposes upon us the task of reconceptualizing what it is for an object to 
be present in the field of experience is also at the basis of what it means to be 
a practical subject. The movement goes both ways: if we read the Critique of 
Pure Reason through the later ethical, pedagogical, and religious writings, 
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Kant appears to be making the self-legislative freedom we witness in 
concrete, existential situations the very basis of theoretical philosophy—
instead of a passive thinking subject that receives external reality as a kind 
of inert receptacle, a mere spectator, we have a reflecting subject that 
spontaneously and freely generates the very fabric of its own experience into 
a continuous, unitary whole through an activity of synthetic integration in 
a way similar to how it gives itself its own laws. The theoretical subject that 
is unearthed in transcendental apperception is ultimately identical with the 
practical subject of self-legislative freedom—or in other words, one cannot 
speak of one without the other, because they form a dialectical whole: if one 
wants to plunge into the labyrinthine depths of subjectivity, one should not 
read the Critique of Pure Reason in isolation from later works such as Lectures 
on Pedagogy and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.
In a similar vein, Žižek locates the true Kantian breakthrough in 
Kant’s practical thinking on subjectivity instead of his epistemologico-
transcendental destruction of metaphysics insofar as it is in the former 
that we most directly see the abyss of freedom at the obscure origin of 
subjectivity. But what is so primordial in the former that could bestow upon 
Kant's pedagogical writings such a privilege for understanding the radicality 
of critical philosophy, while also enabling us to shed light on the basis of 
the Cartesian-psychoanalytical subject? Finding numerous textual traces 
of the death-drive understood as a self-sabotaging tendency in nature as 
logically prior to subjectivity in both Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, 
what interests Žižek in Kant's pedagogical writings is how they set the stage 
for what he claims to be the unconscious Grundlogik of German Idealism: 
that is, its founding intuition of the passage from nature to culture centred 
around a disturbing moment of irreducible negativity inscribed within 
the palpitating heart of being, which suggests that what first appears as 
a mere homology in conceptual structure between psychoanalysis and 
German Idealism is in fact a strict identity. What they bring to the fore is a 
thematization of the subject as some kind of disjunctive “and”:
The key point is thus that the passage from “nature” to 
“culture” is not direct, that one cannot account for it within a 
continuous evolutionary narrative: something has to intervene 
between the two, a kind of “vanishing mediator,” which 
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is neither nature nor culture—this In-between is silently 
presupposed in all evolutionary narratives. We are not idealists: 
this In-between is not the spark of logos magically conferred on 
Homo sapiens, enabling them to form his supplementary virtual 
symbolic surroundings, but precisely something that, although 
it is also no longer nature, is not yet logos, and has to be 
“repressed” by logos—the Freudian name for this In-between, 
of course, is the death drive. Speaking of this In-between, it is 
interesting to note how philosophical narratives of the “birth 
of man” are always compelled to presuppose such a moment 
of human (pre)history when (what will become) man is no 
longer a mere animal and simultaneously not a “being of 
language,” bound by symbolic Law; a moment of thoroughly 
“perverted,” “denaturalized,” “derailed” nature which is not 
yet culture.110 
According to Žižek, within Kant this “in-between” finds its expression in 
the necessity to discipline the excessive “unruliness” (Wildheit) of human 
nature, the “wild, unconstrained propensity to insist stubbornly on one's 
own will, cost what it may.”111 What is to be emphasized here is the drastic 
nature of this claim: if we do not tame this primordial rawness (Rohigkeit) 
that presents itself as the zero-level of human spontaneity, not only do 
we fail to become full-fledged, fully adjusted subjects in the sociopolitical 
field of the world, but our freedom even threatens to devour itself in its 
frenzy in such a way that we become failed subjects: we are not born as 
humans, but rather become human—or, as Kant says, “[m]an only becomes 
man by education,”112 which leads him to contend that “with education is 
involved the great secret of the perfection of human nature”113 insofar as 
it is only through the principles offered by this act of disciplining, a means 
of schematizing our originary unruliness, that a “second nature”114 can 
emerge as a response to the grounding ontological dilemma of human being, 
“nature ha[ving] placed no instinct in [man] for that purpose.”115 Even if 
the dysfunction of nature, this ontological abortion that is a monstrous, 
uncontainable excess of life, can in a second dialectical moment serve as a 
“positive” foundation or support, it can also collapse upon itself like a dying 
star. Yet this “unruliness” cannot be equated with the brute reality of animal 
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existence—even if it exists within nature, it is strictly speaking something 
non-natural:
The love of freedom is naturally so strong in man, that when 
once he has grown accustomed to freedom, he will sacrifice 
everything for its sake [...]. Owing to his natural love of 
freedom, it is necessary that man should have his natural 
roughness smoothed down; with animals, their instinct renders 
this unnecessary.116 
For Žižek, this extract shows that the enigma of the emergence of 
subjectivity in German Idealism cannot be reduced to a mere dichotomy 
between nature and culture, as if in order to conform to the symbolic law of 
our own making we must first tame the blind, egotistical pleasure-seeking 
principles of our animal nature. The self-creative, logically autonomous 
milieu of culture is only possible through a prior, infinitely uncontainable 
freedom that acts as the “vanishing mediator” between brute animal reality 
and structured human intersubjective existence. The passage to culture does 
not consist in a sublimation of animalistic needs, but rather in a disciplining 
or symbolic re-articulation of a monstrous and logically irreducible 
unruliness that marks the essence of the human being, a disciplining 
that, when it succeeds (the possibility of neurosis always lurks in the air), 
simultaneously functions as that which once and for all separates us from 
nature by causing this denaturalized Grund (our ontogenetic “origins”) to 
withdraw from the scene.
It is worth pointing out that Žižek strangely overlooks an important 
passage on the first page of the transcript we have of Kant's Lectures on 
Pedagogy, the very text that he makes use of at such a crucial point in his 
argument, which actually further supports his own Lacanian-inspired and 
ontologically oriented rereading of the vision of practical freedom it offers. 
In a perhaps unexpected move, Kant defines the human neonate as non-
natural, claiming that, if an animal came to the world crying as a human 
does, it would merely attract attention to itself as potential prey, thus 
establishing that there is something off, primordially non-advantageous 
from a biological point of view, about the obscure ontogenetic beginnings of 
human subjectivity. In this context, we only need to cite a passage from the 
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Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View to show how explicitly Lacanian 
Kant's point is:
The cry of a newborn child is not the sound of distress but 
rather indignation and furious anger; not because something 
hurts him, but because something annoys him: presumably 
because he wants to move above and his inability to do so feels 
like a fetter through which his freedom is taken from him.—What 
could nature's intention be here in letting the child come into 
the world with loud cries which, in the crude state of nature, 
are extremely dangerous for himself and his mother? For a 
wolf or even a pig would thereby be lured to eat the child, if 
the mother is absent or exhausted from childbirth. However, 
no animal except the human being (as he is now) will loudly 
announce his existence at the moment of birth [...]. One must 
therefore assume that in the first epoch of nature with respect 
to this class of animals (namely, in the time of crudity), this 
crying of the child at birth did not yet exist; and then only 
later in a second epoch set in, when both parents had already 
reached the level of culture necessary for domestic life; without 
our knowing how, or through what contributing causes, nature 
brought about such a development.117 
Not only does Kant relate the dark unruliness that sets the stage for full-
fledged human freedom to some kind of ontologically disjointed state of 
natural being, but he more radically links the cry of the newborn to the 
infinite dis-coordination of the corpo-Real of the human neonate, its feeling 
of utter dismemberment so central to the mirror stage in Lacan, and even 
suggests that this direct expression of painful negativity immanent in the 
fold of material being is fundamental to the passage from nature to culture.
These passages could be further drawn out by supplementing them with 
a number of possible citations from Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
the first book in which Kant attempts to deal with the insurmountable 
propensity to evil that lies at the core of human subjectivity and ethical 
action. It argues two major points: (i) “the ground of this evil cannot 
be placed, as is so commonly done, in man's sensuous nature” and (ii) 
“neither can the ground of this evil be placed in a corruption of the morally 
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legislative reason.”118 As such, this diabolic evil can neither be linked to the 
corpo-Real of the body and its pleasure-seeking tendencies or to the self's 
being within the law of a criminal or coercive symbolic order, but must 
itself be a foundational, constitutive part of the subject insofar as, being 
an infinitely self-asserting activity irreducible to and incommensurate with 
either zone, it articulates this same paradoxical structure of the in-between. 
Protruding out of nature and culture and failing to be understood except 
by its own self-positing, self-determining logic, the diabolic evil at the basis 
of freedom can only appear as an uncontrollable urge threatening to devour 
everything, even itself, in its self-destructive forward thrust. But here we 
see one crucial difference: whereas before we were at the strict level of 
ontogenesis (the “origins” of transcendental subjectivity) we now encounter 
full-fledged speaking subjects acting in a world (the ambiguity of freedom). 
Linking this consuming fire at the core of subjectivity to the perverse truth 
hidden in the Cartesian gap between mind and body, nature and culture, 
we already see in Kant the outlines of a radical materialist ontology, for 
it is as if in the movement from the former to the latter we see unruliness 
positing or owning itself in its own attempt at self-domestication, the 
structural consequences of which have profound metaphysical consequences 
for our understanding of reality as a substantial whole or totality. Since the 
ontogenetic origins of the subject are linked to a denaturalized unruliness 
and a full-fledged subject only comes on the scene when the latter posits 
itself as such in this endeavour of schematizing itself, which in turn institutes 
a pure difference in being by forever sustaining the gap it attempts to 
fill in, subjectivity exhibits an insurmountable propensity to evil because 
its very founding gesture is structurally evil. It is a radical, egotistical “No!” 
that reverses the order of the world according to its own self-assertion 
and cannot be undone without undoing itself. What is more, not only did 
Kant identify the intrinsic break from the order of substantial being that 
sets the stage for the cogito's very autonomy and sketch this movement, he 
also already saw the paradox at the heart of subjectivity. That is to say, he 
implicitly understood that we can only grasp the latter as a pure act non-
deducible from the obscure libidinal-material grounding that renders it 
possible (after all, for Kant evil is intrinsically enigmatic insofar as once as it 
is understood, it fails to be evil and becomes misguided good).
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Kant's breakthrough is the following: if human subjectivity is to be truly 
self-legislative, at its zero-level there can be no formal distinction between a 
good and evil free act insofar as both are self-chosen in a non-disciplinable 
frenzy that has no definitive (real or symbolic) status and knows no influence 
exterior to its own self-asserting, self-positing activity. In itself, freedom is 
indifferent to both: there is no intrinsic difference between a will that wills 
evil and a will that wills good in terms of the pure act itself insofar as both 
are merely following their own self-given causality, an unconstrained self-
legislation that tears apart the very fabric of nature in its self-imposition.119 
A will that wills evil is not merely giving itself over to the animalistic 
impulses of the body, nor is it expressing its ignorance or even corruption of 
the symbolic fold of cultural laws; it is merely forcefully upholding its own 
diabolical evil for the sake of it, basking in its own self-grounding tyranny, 
even when it has complete knowledge of its nature and repercussions. 
What is so difficult to come to terms with in the theoretical positing of this 
state of unruliness, and the ambiguity at the core of the self-positing of the 
subject, is its proclamation that the good itself is only possible through the 
gentrification or taming of evil. In order for good to be truly good, it too 
must present itself as a non-deducible act that breaks free from any order 
within which it could be contained by refusing all inscription within a field 
of heterogeneous, external forces that could impose itself upon the absolute 
originarity of its uncompromising self-assertion. The Yes of union depends 
upon the No of separation, but the process of converting the latter into 
the former can never be complete, since this would reduce freedom to a 
mere moment of cultural law as a kind of quasi-natural immersion within a 
pre-given logistics, thereby robbing human spontaneity of its untouchable 
autonomy in face of everything else that may be said to have influence upon 
it. Posited as that which transcendentally precedes and even conditions the 
possibility of its (logico-symbolic) articulation, at the very heart of the good 
there paradoxically lies evil as its extimate Other and menacing ground, 
threatening at any moment to erupt and disturb its smooth surface. Evil 
and good are not infinitely different and opposed, but merely two logical 
modalities of freedom, a freedom that in and of itself knows no law except 
its own uncontainable upsurge. If subjectivity is evil and the subject is an 
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event in the world, then the world must not be understood as not-all, for the 
latter is not incapable of subsuming the former within its smooth touch.
It is precisely for this reason that Žižek, along with Lacan, believes that 
Kant's practical philosophy is the beginning of the lineage that culminates 
in psychoanalysis, the latter being understood as the second great revolution 
in philosophy that inflicts upon us the task of radically reconfiguring 
how we view ourselves and our relation to the world. Not only can we 
already therein see its traits principaux being thematized in an implicit 
way, but paradoxically one could even say that it in any uncanny manner 
develops them in different directions from Freud or Lacan so that bringing 
psychoanalysis and the German Idealist tradition together promises to 
produce something new. Just as Kant asserts an ultimate identity between 
the theoretical and practical ego, Žižek argues for the interpenetration of 
modern transcendental philosophy and psychoanalysis through the Kantian 
notion of the original “unruliness” of human nature. Todestrieb becomes 
a synonym for the transcendental “I,” the cogito, by giving expression to 
the pre-subjective conditions of the possibility of freedom as some kind 
of non-masterable excess in nature that must be “tamed” if full-fledged 
subjectivity is to come on the scene. Exposing an activity uncontainable 
within positive being, it alludes to an ontologically self-violent “wildness” 
that serves as the ontogenetically constitutive basis of the subject's self-
positing, in such a way that makes the late Lacan's passing remarks over the 
ontology of the psychoanalytical subject (“the rottenness of nature”) come 
strikingly close to those of Kant (“[w]hat could nature's intention be here 
[...] ?”). In Kant, however, just as in Lacan, the actual status of the subject 
remains ambivalent and theoretically undetermined, even if there are various 
suggestions littered throughout their texts that programmatically outline 
how to proceed if one were to develop a materialism of transcendental 
freedom, despite the insurmountable problem that such gestures surpass 
the very constraints imposed upon the epistemology that they develop. 
The exact same set of theoretical questions is brought to the fore by both 
thinkers but remains unsolved: why does transcendental freedom develop? 
What is its exact relation to the “unruliness,” synonymous with the excess 
of life presented by the Todestrieb, at the core of our being that appears to 
logically precede it? Insofar as transcendental spontaneity is just as related 
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to the synthetic powers of the imagination as it is to self-legislative reason 
in Kant, what role does the former play in this picture (or, in a Lacanian 
parlance, how can the Symbolic emerge as that which [re]constitutes the 
fold of experience)? It is only in Kant's successors that such concerns will 
be addressed in a more explicit manner, and it is through a psychoanalytical 
reactualization of their thinking that the transcendental materialist ontology 
at the heart of Kant's breakthrough can finally come to light.
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Chapter 6
From Transcendental Philosophy to Substance as Subject
Hegel and the Psychotic Night of the World
This chapter comprises a Žižekian-inspired interpretation of the 
philosophical movement from Kant to Hegel by focusing on Kant's 
thematization of freedom and how it radically reconfigures the possibility of 
metaphysical inquiry. In the aftermath of critical philosophy, what is clear 
is that any philosophy unable to think system and the irreducibility of the 
human subject is to be rejected. By following certain premonitions within 
Kant's pedagogical writings that appear to link transcendental spontaneity 
to the psychoanalytical concept of Todestrieb, Žižek gives us resources to read 
Hegelian Absolute Idealism against standard interpretations by claiming 
that Hegel's attempt to think substance as subject implies the ontogenetic 
emergence of freedom through a self-sundering of being, the immanent 
advent of a devastating ontological non-coincidence, which forces upon 
us the necessity of a new kind of metaphysics: a metaphysics of the not-all. 
This enables us not only to rethink the Kant-Hegel relation in a provocative 
manner, but also to explain how Žižek is able to draw upon post-Kantian 
idealism to lay the foundation for the logic of his own transcendental 
materialism.
6.1 Fichte and the Frailty of Freedom
Within the trajectory of modern philosophy, the inheritors of the legacy of 
the critical system all agree that it is with Kant that we see the first truly 
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penetrating account of the essence of human freedom.120 Although much of 
what he says concerning freedom is already laid out in Descartes' thinking 
on the cogito, it was Kant who gave it a full, profound expression. For Žižek, 
this means that it is here that the principal intuitions that heralded forth 
modernity—the ontologically shattering schism between the thinking mind 
and extended substance and subjectivity's irreducible reflexivity as that 
which institutes this very split—are radicalized and find an overpowering 
degree of theoretical articulation. After Kant, there is just no going back, for 
this would be to give up on what it means to be an infinitely self-standing, 
autonomous subject, to turn one's back on one's own freedom, whose 
apparently indemonstrable existence has been proven once and for all.121 Any 
system that regresses into a “primitive,” “pre-critical” way of philosophizing 
is in effect merely recoiling from the difficulty that is the burden of 
freedom, “our experience of freedom [being] properly traumatic, even for 
Kant himself.”122 Herein lies the fundamental undecidability intrinsic to 
the Kantian breakthrough: not only is the freedom of human subjectivity 
liberating, but it is also (and perhaps more originally) monstrous, insofar as 
we are infinitely given over to it and therefore responsible for it, yet can only 
comprehend it according to the frenzy that is its own self-positing essence. 
In the wake of the Kantian system, there is only “the uncanny abyss of 
freedom without any guarantee in the Order of Being”:123 
in Kantian ethics, the true tension is not between the subject's 
idea that he is acting only for the sake of duty, and the hidden 
fact that there was actually some pathological motivation at 
work (vulgar psychoanalysis); the true tension is exactly the 
opposite one: the free act in its abyss is unbearable, traumatic, 
so that when we accomplish an act out of freedom, in order 
to be able to bear it, we experience it as conditioned by some 
pathological motivation. Here I am tempted to bring in the 
key Kantian concept of schematization: a free act cannot be 
schematized, integrated into our experience; so, in order to 
schematize it, we have to “pathologize it.”124 
Immediately following the birth of transcendental idealism, however, there 
is an overall ambiguity as to how to proceed. Although there is some general 
consensus concerning the various ways that the critical system is by itself 
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incomplete, internal discord quickly arises. Leaving aside Reinhold's and 
Maimon's own responses to its perceived insufficiencies, Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel, despite all agreeing that (i) the categories of the understanding 
are dogmatically asserted (they lack a genetic deduction grounding their 
necessity and universality) and ultimately too static (there is no clear 
articulation of their systematic interconnectivity) and (ii) concepts such 
as the thing-in-itself in their Kantian mode are internally contradictory or 
at least theoretically unnecessary, each offer different strategies to think 
through the deadlock of Kant's legacy to retain its grounding insights.
The early Fichte of the Jena period—the only Fichte who had a 
significant impact on the internal development of German Idealism—
proceeds by removing the extra-subjective alterity of the thing-in-itself, 
often referred to as the residual trace of a materialism in Kant, by reducing 
its status to a mere generated effect of subject's purely autonomous activity 
that knows no outside. Taking as his starting point the immanent field of 
absolute actuation presented by the subject's radical freedom, whose self-
manifestedness is revealed in the unavoidable transcendental reduction 
of any given fact of consciousness to its activity and most primordially 
demonstrated by intellectual intuition, and which is best exemplified in the 
infinite thetic judgement I am,125 subjectivity, as uncontainable freedom, 
cannot be trumped. Groundless, nothing can get beyond it: it is the 
ultimate, self-explanatory condition of experience. Yet, although a wondrous 
fountainhead of activity, the theoretical and practical unconditional 
beginning that is the I is paradoxically lacking. Not only is its essence (an 
essence that is its very act of existing) indistinguishable from nothingness 
insofar as it knows no bounds; more disconcertingly, it is also immensely 
fragile and immediately threatened by a not-I that risks destroying its very 
omnipotence from within its own sphere. In the face of the “not-I,” which 
is transcendentally simultaneous with the “I,” freedom cannot be simply 
restricted to the undetermined nothingness of the I am, but it must upsurge 
in an attempt through our very actions and finitude to overcome that which 
opposes it. In order to truly sustain its theorectio-practical firstness, to assert 
its own primordiality against the not-I that “desires” its annihilation, the 
subject must bring forth the freedom that is its own capacity for absolute 
actuation in the natural and sociopolitical field of the world, since as soon 
From Transcendental Philosophy to Substance as Subject 111
as the pure act of freedom tries to posit itself as such, it runs up against the 
impossibility of asserting itself as an autarchic all. In this conflict-ridden 
battle, the not-I proves to be more than a pure alterity wreaking havoc on 
the subject's freedom. Instead, it becomes a determined other, an Anstoß 
(an obstacle and impetus). Through encountering this Anstoß there can be a 
continual overcoming of the menacing not-I and a never-ending perfecting 
of the I’s own savage freedom by attaining an ever greater degree of concrete 
autonomy. In this sense, consciousness emerges from the shock of the not-I 
on the immanent field of actuation that is the unconscious I in its pure 
freedom and the latter's defiant cry and refusal to submit when confronted 
with the possibility of its own demise. The victory of this freedom is never 
ontologically guaranteed, but can only ever be won again and again in the 
onslaught of time, whose basic structure is described by the total theoretico-
practical syntheses of divisibility opened by the third principle, thus making 
all principles simultaneous in experience.
In this picture there is nothing outside of the pure immanence of the 
I as freedom and the dynamics of its subjectification as necessitated by 
the opposition it encounters to its raw, unconditional power. Due to this 
internal opposition, the I is divided between the absolute I (which is less 
an egological pole than a faceless, even inhuman activity that only warrants 
the title of I because it is always spoken of in relation to persons amongst 
whom it incarnates itself, thus making it in its very essence cryptic126) and 
the finite (which in turn is divided into passive and active aspects wherein 
the absolute totality of reality as expressed by the I is never completely 
annihilated). There is no need for a hard, impenetrable remainder left over 
from the transcendental constitution of reality: that which threatens to 
destroy the subject if not gentrified through the syntheses of divisibility, the 
not-I, is a mere negative magnitude, even if its contorting effects upon the 
subject can never be predicated and could potentially upsurge as traumatic 
events. We do not need to go beyond this logical role of an internal 
pressure proclaiming the possible implosion of the I as freedom to explain 
experience. Thus, to say that the thing-in-itself becomes a theoretical posit 
of the subject is to say that its irreducibility to conscious, finite subjectivity 
and thus its apparently extra-subjective status have been deduced from the 
self-manifestedness offered by subjectivity as a first principle: its function is 
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to underline the paradoxical simultaneity of radical spontaneity and fragility 
in the free constitution of phenomenal reality as it continually comes 
upon an alien presence within its very intimacy: namely, the irresolvable 
contradiction that exists in subjectivity between the groundlessness of 
consciousness as a radically self-grounding idealist freedom and the 
necessary realist contingency that continually jeopardizes it.
For Fichte, the removal of an extra-subjective reality is a necessity 
imposed upon us not just by Kant's radical articulation of freedom, but 
more broadly by idealism as such. From within the latter, there can be no 
coherent assertion of a self-subsisting thing-in-itself which, existing outside 
of the closed idealist circle of phenomenality in an infinite elsewhere, 
causes our representations. This would be to transgress the epistemological 
constraints imposed upon us by the very confines of the idealization of 
the world; any assertion of the thing-in-itself would constitute a return 
to the worst kind of dogmatism. The Anstoß is therefore not merely the 
true limit of idealism, but contains the necessary resources to synthesize 
idealism and realism into a greater unity:127 instead of proclaiming that 
all our idealizations are first caused by a foreign intruder pushing in upon 
subjectivity, it says that if there are immanent obstructions from within 
the mediating activity of the Ideal, if phenomenal experience is plagued by 
internal inconsistencies, we can legitimately say that these knots negatively 
point to some extra-subjective, inassimilable body in subjectivity itself 
forcing it partially to negate itself and transfer its power to that which is 
extimately Other in order to save itself from complete collapse.128 Giving the 
immanent intruder reality is a way to appropriate it: in short, to idealize it. 
In this way, one of the major tasks of Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre is to 
draw our attention to the radicality of this conditional: if we take idealism 
seriously then we can without difficulty account for realism, for the realist 
character of our everyday experience can be entirely explained by the very 
movement of the Ideal itself. Idealism does not infringe upon the freedom 
of the objective world, since it is clear that the latter can in some way make 
itself known through the very obstructions of our idealizations of it. The 
epistemic priority of the Ideal is not to be equated with the unknowability 
of the world, since its autonomous operational self-closure is precisely that 
which enables us to have a world at all.
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For Fichte, however, the most decisive consequence to draw from the 
removal of the thing-in-itself is not a rethinking of the realism-idealism 
debate. He never takes an interest in the resources that this new way 
of philosophizing would offer for developing a new form of spectral 
materialism. The reason is simple: taking the unbridled freedom of the I as 
his starting point, Fichte agrees with Kant's prohibition on searching for 
the ontological origins of the subject because, even if it seemingly becomes 
methodologically possible in Fichte, he argues that it is a futile project, the 
Ideal being self-explanatory without recourse to the Real. That the subject 
has no need for the thing-in-itself signifies that the subject is characterized 
by a constitutive groundlessness: transcendental spontaneity demonstrates 
that it is totally engulfed within a self-unfolding practical world of its own 
making, so that what is of primordial importance is never an extra-subjective 
reality, but the unconditioned freedom of our concrete activity. Fichte 
does not need to embark upon a metaphysical archaeology of the subject, 
instead focusing all of his attention on the dynamic inherent in the process 
of subjectification itself, which inflicts upon us a frightening realization 
ridden with stark ontological and political implications. Not only are all our 
actions—and thereby the identities and the collectives that we construct 
through them—irreducible in themselves insofar as they have no foothold in 
objective reality, but they become, as it were, mere parts of the free play of 
an infinite imagination so engrossed by its own self-composing stories that it 
almost lacks the power to know its self-narrating fiction as a fiction:
There is no being. I myself do not know at all and don't exist. 
There are images: they are all that exists and they know about 
themselves in the manner of images—images which drift by 
without there being anything by which they drift; images 
which hang together through images; images which do not 
represent anything, without meaning and purpose. I myself 
am one of these images. No, I am not even that, but only a 
distorted image of these images. All reality is transformed 
into a fabulous dream, without there being any life the dream 
is about, without there being a mind which dreams; a dream 
which hangs together in a dream of itself. Intuition is the 
dream; thought (the source of all being and all reality which I 
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imagine, of my being, my power, my purposes), thought is the 
dream of this dream.129 
Subjectification is nothing more than a spinning in the positively charged 
void of freedom. In the latter's aftermath, we become irrevocably lost in a 
series of dream-like images, a rhapsody of sociopolitical phantasmagoria, 
which give a transcendental structure to the fabric of our experience and 
thus to our ethical striving, thus even making our own self just one image 
amongst others, but without having any basis in the world at large. If we take 
Freud's definition of psychosis as a loss of the causal impact of the world 
upon the self—a “loosening of the relationship to reality”130—due to a 
radical withdrawal into primary narcissism, whereby object cathexes are 
libidinally cut off and the primary process slowly takes over psychic reality, 
we could venture the claim that the founding gesture of the Fichtean 
subject is a form of psychosis (the I “posits itself absolutely, and is thereby 
complete in itself and closed to any impression from without”131), justified 
in the name of autonomy. Here, just as in the illusionary, image-filled world 
of the psychotic, the “objective” world is reduced to a mere haphazard 
obstruction to a self-unfolding and self-sustaining tale creative of its own 
experiential reality (which for Fichte, “absolutely creates itself [...] in a genesis 
out of nothing”132), a mere haphazard obstruction that is to be overcome 
and integrated within the tale if the latter is to sustain its very consistency. 
What is more, in the same manner that the psychotic must continually 
refuse new perceptions so as to “autocratically” construct an external and 
internal world that pleases the id's wishful impulses,133 the Fichtean subject, 
struggling to subsist as a pure I due to the contemporaneous emergence 
of the not-I and its violence with its self-positing, strives to rid itself of all 
influence of the not-I in the syntheses of divisibility and thereby actualize 
the sphere of absolute self-positing at the empirical level. In this respect, 
its ideal is a full-blown psychosis, an “alloplastic”134 creation of its own 
experience, which, though technically impossible (without the influence 
of the not-I, the I would lack determination), is a structural tendency in 
all experience, the paradoxical basis of practical freedom. From within this 
originary psychosis at the heart of subjectivity, there is no escape “except” 
accepting it and taking the path it opens up to its end by the self-conscious 
creation of fabulous, imaginative identities (criticism) that can be used 
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to give the subject the resources it needs to actualize itself through the 
formation of an absolutely free identity liberated from all external causality 
(dogmatism). What this means is that “the human being is originally 
nothing:”135 it is free to strive, and should strive, to absolutely create itself 
according to its own transcendental self-positing/primary narcissism.
For both Schelling and Hegel, however, this complete removal of 
the problematic of the grounding of the subject is not satisfying on 
two accounts. First, although Fichte's notion of the Anstoß in the 1794 
Wissenschaftslehre does allow us to develop something like a spectral 
materialism, Fichte does not use his own real-idealism/ideal-realism to 
investigate the obscure origins of the subject, rejecting any transcendental 
materialist account of the emergence of the I out of the not-I as contrary to 
reason.136 Transcendentalism must remain purely immanent—we need not 
investigate its ontological origins, since these will never suffice. But this does 
not necessarily mean we cannot embark on such an inquiry (a “pre-history” 
of the Ideal). Second, Fichte himself, despite his remarks concerning its 
impossibility, like Kant cannot refrain from commenting on the paradoxical 
ground of the subject's freedom, as if to say that the matter at hand cannot 
be limited to the transcendental structures at the heart of the self-unfolding 
conceptual-imaginative fabric underlying subjectification, but must also 
include the birthplace of the I as causa sui:
Every animal, a few hours after its birth, moves and seeks 
nourishment at the breast of its mother [...]. To be sure, the 
human being has a plant-like instinct, but he has no animal 
instinct at all in the meaning given here. He needs the freely 
given assistance of other human beings, and without it would 
die shortly after birth. When the human offspring has left its 
mother's body, nature withdraws her hand from it and cuts it 
loose, so to speak [...]. For it is precisely nature's abandonment 
of him that proves that the human being, as such, neither is 
nor should be nature's pupil. If the human being is an animal, 
then he is an utterly incomplete animal, and for that very 
reason he is not an animal.137 
What is striking about this quote is not only that Fichte, like Kant before 
him, draws attention to the utter helplessness of the neonate as an indication 
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of some kind of ontological indeterminacy within nature as that which 
sets the stage for subjectivity and freedom, an indeterminacy that is non-
natural (“nature withdraws her hand”), but also that he is forced to do so 
from within the confines of a self-grounding idealism. To account for the very 
transcendental unity of experience, there is a point during the deduction 
of its laws that something meta-transcendental must be posited whose 
very existence appears to be responsible for the subject's groundlessness. 
That there is no possible explication of the leap from not-I to I appears 
now shaken, for a certain relation between the two has been established 
despite the fact that such a relation would seem to jeopardize the I's self-
standingness. What is at stake is not that Fichte creates an unacceptable 
subjective idealism within which knowledge of the world is lost and even 
precluded through being constructed, but that his philosophy ultimately 
lacks the resources to tie together an ontology of nature with the spontaneity 
of the I, though such an impossible link has been immanently deduced. 
Although Fichte too outlines a transcendental materialist ontology of 
the subject, he, like Kant before him, cannot answer the question “How 
does appearance itself emerge from the Real?,” even if he stumbles upon 
the solution.
If Fichte and Kant are right in these intuitions in the same way that 
Lacan could be said to be right in his late musings on the status of nature 
in light of the psychoanalytical subject, the task facing Hegel, Schelling, 
and Žižek is thus remarkably similar: how can being and thinking, the Real 
and the Symbolic, be reconciled to one another, for surely the latter must 
exist in the former? For the early Schelling, what is necessary is a theoretical 
project that supplements the ontologically solipsistic Fichtean subject with 
an account of its emergence out of an unconsciously creative nature, which 
would implicate the interpenetration and ultimate identity of the Real 
and the Ideal, so that such a problem is shown to be ultimately moot.138 
Interestingly, though he is initially satisfied with Schelling's response to the 
deadlock of Fichtean idealism,139 Hegel later breaks from what Schelling 
himself refers to as a “real” or “objective idealism,”140 claiming that by 
attempting to solve the internal contradictions of Fichte's idealism, Schelling 
unknowingly becomes its inverted opposite, a mere reactionary form 
spurred on by the inconsistencies of the former that ultimately fails because 
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of its one-sided countermove.141 But what, then, exactly drives Hegel to 
part ways from Schelling and develop his own way of balancing idealism 
(radically self-positing freedom) with a philosophy of nature (a system of 
the world)? And why is this juncture so important for understanding Žižek's 
own metaphysics of the disjunctive “and”? To answer this question, we must 
first make a brief detour through the development of modern philosophy.
6.2 Metaphysics in the Aftermath of Freedom: The 
Case of Spinoza
A common critique of Schelling and Hegel as they attempt to think through 
the problems bequeathed by Kantian idealism is that they ignore the basic 
breakthrough of the Critique of Pure Reason: that is, the recognition of the 
insurmountable finitude of human reason and its inability to grasp the 
absolute structure of reality. In face of its debilitation of a priori enquiry 
by pure reason, they return to a metaphysical thinking that has already 
been debunked. According to the canonical reading, while Schelling talks 
of the interrelated poles of subject and object in his attempt to balance 
transcendental idealism with a naturephilosophy, and then of their ultimate 
identity in the absolute as indifference by developing an account of absolute 
reason, Hegel supposedly attempts to show that the logical structures that 
the thinking subject uses to constitute the world transcendentally are 
actually one with its ontological, that is, its extra-conscious structure. What 
Hegel does is dialectically “fix up” Schelling by revealing that reality in all its 
facets (mind and matter, nature and subject) is merely an expression of the 
rational self-actualization of the absolute as a logical self-unfolding totality, 
which does away with the Schellingian indifference as an indeterminate void 
lacking genuine philosophical content, “the night in which, as the saying 
goes, all cows are black.”142 Žižek, however, refuses this interpretation, 
calling it “the standard cliché according to which German Idealism pleads 
the 'pan-logicist' reduction of all reality to the product of the self-mediation 
of the Notion.”143 
Žižek gives us material that allows us to shed new light on the movement 
from Kant to Hegel by showing that this conventional reading of German 
Idealism levels off the daring character of the post-Kantian gesture by 
making it look like just another classical metaphysical system. Not only 
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are Hegel and Schelling attempting to demonstrate how it is still possible 
to do metaphysics within the very breakthrough of critical philosophy 
without denying any of what they consider to be its necessary/essential 
presuppositions, but also, and most importantly, why it is necessary to do so:
Here, however, a gap between Kant and his followers occurs: 
for Kant, freedom is an “irrational” fact of reason, it is simply 
and inexplicably given, something like an umbilical cord 
inexplicably rooting our experience in the unknown noumenal 
reality, not the First Principle out of which one can develop 
a systematic notion of reality, while the Idealists from Fichte 
onwards cross this limit and endeavour to provide a systematic 
account of freedom itself. [... F]or the Idealists [this is] just an 
indication that Kant was not yet ready to pursue his project to 
the end, to draw all the consequences from his breakthrough. 
For the Idealists, Kant got stuck half-way.144 
Although this may mean a vigorous rethinking of transcendental spontaneity 
and imagination, noumena and the status of nature, ultimately neither Hegel 
nor Schelling wants to give up on Kant's descriptions of freedom in order to 
substitute transcendental idealism with just another classico-metaphysical 
system. Yet for this endeavour to be successful, they realize that they need to 
fight against the Critique of Pure Reason's own prohibition of pure ontological 
inquiry; they deny one of the major claims of critical philosophy in the hope 
of saving it from itself.
This becomes clear when we realize that for both Hegel and Schelling, 
Spinoza is the very emblem of a philosopher. His rationalist system is 
admirable not only for its depth and beauty, but for its self-consistency, 
clarity, and comprehensiveness. In terms of an expression of metaphysics, 
each looks up to him and sees something fundamentally askew in Kant's 
preclusion of its possibility—or, as Hegel says “[i]t is therefore worthy 
of note that thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of 
Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all 
Philosophy.”145 Not only did Kant not show trust in the capacities of human 
reason, more problematically his critical system was lacking any foundation 
insofar as it left the origins of the transcendental subject, the very object 
of its thematic, a mystery and even went so far as to put a ban on their 
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investigation. They reject this for two reasons: first, it seems arbitrary, and, 
second, it threatens to destabilize the very Kantian edifice. Although both 
Schelling and Hegel believe that metaphysical knowledge of an objective 
reality is still possible, they are at the same time unwilling to abandon 
idealism insofar as they are not willing to back down from its articulation of 
freedom, which leads them to see both questions as intimately intertwined 
and refuse to separate them as Kant does in order to make room for faith 
and human autonomy. Schelling, for instance, bemoans the fact that 
“idealism,” whose founding intuition he identifies in the Freiheitsschrift with 
the principle of freedom, “is not a work of reason,” and that consequently 
“the supposedly sad honor of being a system of reason remains only for 
pantheism and Spinozism.”146 Even if Kant's systematization of freedom 
is of irreducible importance for the late German Idealists, it must be 
stressed that of itself it remains theoretically negative in a strong sense: 
largely remaining at the level of formality, it never really manages to get off 
the ground and provide a thoroughly developed basis for itself.147 We must 
provide the missing link between system (Spinozism, absolute determinism) 
and idealism (Kantianism, the true philosophy of freedom) by showing that 
freedom itself is a metaphysical possibility. But what does it mean for system if 
freedom is inscribed within it?
Amongst other things, Spinozistic metaphysics represents an avid 
attempt to rethink the ontological splitting of mind and matter by 
reconceiving the very notion of substance so that the two categories no 
longer represent a schismatic split but are subsumable under a single, 
unified substrate of which they are merely different attributes, all the while 
preserving as much as possible the basic intuitions of Cartesianism. Mind 
and matter, the brute material Real of the universe and the self-reflexive 
powers of ideal spirit, are merely differing “perspectives” on the same, 
unchanging substance,148 a kind of epistemic parallax shift between two of 
the countless logical modalities of an all-pervasive “weave” that encompasses 
all things within its vital ebb and flow. Although they succeed in manifesting 
the infinite power of substance through different refraction mediums 
irreducible to each other, they ultimately must be said to interpenetrate 
one another insofar as they articulate the same content: there is no possible 
rupturing chasm between them, but only an untouchable oneness.149 But 
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this oneness is not some kind of undifferentiated, static whole, an abyssal 
metaphysical void that devours all difference within its cruel awesomeness, 
like Chronos who eats his own offspring, but rather a pure power or force 
that is capable of expressing itself in an infinite variety of ways,150 and indeed 
is only one insofar as it does so. If “nothing exists except substance and 
its modes,”151 it is because the two constitute one another in an immanent 
pulsating field teeming, overflowing, with immanent life. Substance is a 
raw, pulsating activity, an unconstrained upsurge of a dynamic, quivering 
freedom that is at the very core of the flux that is perceived reality and 
circulates through its most minute and insignificant features: “God's power 
whereby he and all things are and act, is his very essence.”152 Substance 
exists absolutely as a harmonious play of forces even in its most seeming 
conflict, tension, and struggle. It is a wondrous ballet of cosmic energy 
whose dance is something peaceful and inspiring, sometimes macabre and 
dreadful, for us mortals who without choice are engaged in its spectacle.
Although this may appear to preclude human liberty, it actually 
proclaims that human beings are in a certain sense free insofar as they 
directly participate in the self-actualizing movement of substance (God, 
nature) as causa sui. In Spinozism, however, there is a crucial modification 
of the underlying logic of modern subjectivity already seen in Descartes: 
the intuition of irreducible subjective freedom is said to arise out of a 
misrecognition of our fundamentally determined character as egos. By 
locating freedom within the kernel of my being, my will, I am merely 
misperceiving its notion, for real spontaneity lies in the impersonal self-
writing symphony of the universe, the self-creative flow of life and difference 
(“we are in God's power as clay in the hands of the potter”153), in which I 
also play a constitutive part insofar as its energy expresses itself through 
me, animates me, constitutes me, so that any radical distinction disappears. 
The cause is fully in its effect, for it itself is immanent. Spinoza's account of 
human freedom, instead of being a pure cancellation of the significance of 
concrete human ethical striving by its submission to the total system of the 
world in its self-imposing oneness, is an attempt to show its greater truth, 
meaning, and role by its inclusion in the intimate life of God or nature: 
in short, its function within the autonomous and infinitely inventive self-
actualization of substance. It is precisely for this reason that metaphysics 
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is an ethics: the whole endeavour of Spinozism is meant to show how, by 
coming to this realization step by step through clear and precise reasoning, 
one can liberate oneself from the bondage of one's passive emotions and 
see how one directly takes part in the freedom of the self-unfolding cosmos, 
overflowing with uncontainable energy. Showing the structure of the world 
forces us to act differently—logical proofs are equivalent to opening the 
mind's eye to the dynamics of substance as totality.154 For the late German 
Idealists working in the aftermath of Kant, however, this vision reduces the 
apparent autonomous essence of subjectivity to a mere epiphenomenon, 
a false appearance, of the vital flux of a more primordial life force that 
runs through and simultaneously is the universe, thus leaving nothing 
untouched and no room for a transcendence within its omnipresent pull. 
This “direct participation” can only be paradoxically interpreted as a 
passive participation, a forced enactment, which befalls us. We see this most 
unsettlingly in Spinoza's stone:
Furthermore, conceive, if you please, that while continuing in 
motion the stone thinks, and knows that it is endeavouring, as 
far as in it lies, to continue in motion. Now this stone, since it 
is conscious only of its endeavour and is not at all indifferent, 
will think it is completely free, and that it continues in motion 
for no other reason than that it so wishes. This, then, is that 
human freedom which all men boast of possessing, and which 
consists solely in this, that men are conscious of their desire 
and unaware of the causes by which they are determined. 
In the same way that a baby thinks that it freely desires 
milk [...].155 
For the late German Idealists, if this is freedom, it is a grotesque joke: 
instead of being liberating, it is claustrophobic, for our infinite strivings are 
reduced to a mere puppet show for an impersonal God sive nature whose 
power drowns any hope we may have for true self-standing independence 
in its might. Whatever freedom is here, it is distant from us: “[i]n the mind 
there is no absolute, or free, will. The mind is determined to this or that 
volition by a cause, which is likewise determined by another cause, and 
this again by another, and so ad infinitum.”156 It is without a doubt Fichte 
who most succinctly expresses the German Idealist disdain at this picture. 
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What repels him is that freedom is “not my freedom at all but rather that 
of an alien force outside me:”157 “[t]o stand there cold and dead and merely 
to look at the change of events an inert mirror or fleeting forms—that is an 
unbearable existence and I disdain and deplore it. I want to love, I want to 
lose myself in taking an interest, I want to be glad or sad. [...] Only in love is 
there life; without it there is death and annihilation.”158 
At this juncture, a Spinozist may argue that the German Idealist 
misgivings of Spinoza's naturalistic pantheism are false. Is not the Ethics 
itself a profound celebration of life rather than death, love rather than 
indifference, a text that itself can be read as a quasi-psychotherapeutic 
intervention that aims, with the aid of its geometrical proofs, to liberate 
one from the passivity of the passions and in so doing find a new manner 
of radically asserting the (limited, though existent) freedom of one's own 
conatus? As Spinoza says, the Ethics “concerns the method, or way, leading 
to freedom.”159 By demanding that we build a new organ of sight,160 it 
asks us to undergo a profound change in our relationship to self and 
world, to become a new species, by giving up ill-founded politico-theological 
ideals and conceptions of humanity (mere fictions),161 which we can only 
accomplish by giving into and working with the relational dynamics at the 
heart of what it means for to be singular essence insurmountably inter-
bound with the infinity of other essences. Substance as a causal network of 
complete interpenetration wherein each being attains its life force reveals 
the immanent “potentials” of existence: that is, how it can achieve more 
power, more strength, more force in this or that existent. However, even if 
in this respect Spinoza does allow for the mind to have some power over 
the body and thus a certain degree of spontaneous activity (for surely the 
Ethics is emancipatory for the subject only because it is a work of ideas), 
according to the German Idealists this does not come close to articulating 
the irreducibility of freedom attested by Kant.162 Spinoza fails to see the true 
kernel of human liberty, a failure that not only makes the Spinozistic system 
insufficient in terms of the lived essence of freedom, but also thereby takes 
away life and richness from its ontology. Without inscribing the difference 
announced by subjectivity into substance, we miss something essential about 
the life of the absolute, a critique raised by Schelling in his Freiheitsschrift:
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The error of his system lies by no means in the positing 
of things in God, but rather in that there are things in the 
abstract concept of the world's being, instead of infinite 
substance itself, which in fact is also a thing for him. Thus 
his arguments against freedom are entirely deterministic, and 
in nowise pantheistic. He treats the will, too, as a thing, and 
then naturally proves that it must be determined in its every 
action by another thing, which, in turn, is determined by yet 
another thing, etc., into infinity. Hence the lifelessness of his 
system: the mindlessness of its form, the impoverishment of 
its concepts and expressions, the unyielding acerbity of its 
definitions [...]. One could view Spinozism in its rigidity as 
Pygmalion's statue: it needed to be given a soul by the warm 
breath of love.163 
Hegel makes a similar point in his Science of Logic:
Of course, substance is the absolute unity of thought and being 
or extension; it therefore contains thought itself, but only in 
its unity with extension, that is to say, not as separating itself 
from extension and hence, in general, not as determining and 
informing, nor as a movement of return that begins from itself. 
For this reason, on the one hand substance lacks the principle 
of personality—a defect that has especially aroused indignation 
against Spinoza’s system.164 
Humans are not mere passive players in the self-unfolding drama of the 
universe, but constitutive writers of it, dominating it from the inside out, 
to such an extent that they even present a challenge to the autonomy of 
substance. In the face of man, the very fabric of substance appears lacerated, 
for it encounters a transcendent Other within its heart of hearts that 
makes it non-coincident to itself, infringes upon its oneness and thereby 
renders it not-all. According to Žižek, what both Hegel and the middle-late 
Schelling find unsatisfactory about Spinoza is that he is unable to articulate 
the ontogenetic condition of the possibility of the emergence of a freely existing 
transcendent(al) subjectivity out of the purely immanent plane of being and its 
implications for understanding the metaphysical nature of reality. The problem 
is that freedom—in its very specific articulation in German Idealism—is 
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not compatible with substance qua devouring totality. How, then, are we 
to think substance and subject/system and freedom if we are to retain the 
spontaneity first brought to light, albeit for the most part formally, by Kant? 
For Žižek, the answer is clear: “[t]he passage from the Spinozan One qua 
the neutral medium/container of its modes [to] the One's inherent gap is 
the very passage from Substance to Subject.”165 But the recognition of this 
gap has to be intrinsically traumatic, terrifying—it demonstrates a radical 
shift in our understanding of the world as some sort of harmonious cosmos 
that holds itself together in its infinite rational majesty to a world that, 
lacking totalizing order, must be predicated upon disruption and upheaval. 
If such an intuition did arise in the history of German Idealism, we would 
expect to see a series of psychoanalytical defence mechanisms against a 
conscious acknowledgment of its truth, which in turn obstruct its texts. 
It is a direct confrontation with this Real of the tradition that will enable 
Žižek to bring forth the true metaphysical horror of subjectivity that he thinks 
Descartes had already glimpsed and that has been haunting philosophy like 
a spectre ever since.
It is this specific spin on the dialectical “union” of system and freedom 
that is of utmost importance for understanding Žižek's psychoanalytical 
reactualization of German Idealism. It has two functions. First, it 
demonstrates the heterodox character of Žižek’s appropriation of the 
tradition insofar as he proclaims that its real truth has always been this 
disjunctive, parallax relationship between the two terms.166 It clearly shows 
us how and why Žižek challenges our normal preconceptions of German 
Idealism's internal historico-theoretical concerns and puts us in a position 
to evaluate Žižek's own readings more clearly. Second, it demonstrates that 
Žižek's own specific take on its unconscious Grundlogik is grounded in an 
extremely coherent reading of the stakes at play in post-Kantian philosophy, 
even if these have been drastically reformatted along the way according to 
a perceived and unrealized textual possibility. This makes reading Žižek a 
strange experience because there is an irreconcilable tension between Žižek's 
account of German Idealism and what its representatives on the surface 
appear to accomplish with their systems. Yet through this productive clash, 
Žižek is trying to create a space of “therapeutic” interplay between German 
Idealism's surface content (what it takes itself to be in the narcissistic orbit 
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of the Imaginary that often tells itself lies to cover up its dirty spots) and 
various symbolically non-integrated elements visibly existing in its fold (the 
ephemeral flickering of a traumatic Real interrupting its normal discourse 
pointing to its repressed truth), whose integration would demand a radical 
reconfiguration of its own self-perception (in the spirit of Wo Es war, soll ich 
werden). Žižek seeks to understand what the role played by this disavowed 
knowledge could teach us about this crucial turning point in the history of 
philosophy, the nature of subjectivity, and, ultimately, the very ontological 
structure of the world we live in.
6.3 The Suffocating Deficiency of a Naturphilosophie
The immediate problem facing the late German Idealists is that the Kantian 
affirmation of transcendental freedom must be grounded in an ontological 
edifice that can rival Spinozism, for otherwise a Spinozist could argue that 
freedom is merely the misrecognition of the absolutely free self-unfolding 
oneness of substance, of man's subsumption within the positive order of 
being driven by a divinely energized and productive nature as its immanent 
cause. While both the early Schelling and Hegel offer their own solutions, 
Hegel remains unsatisfied with the results of his onetime colleague and 
friend, both in terms of the former's naturephilosophical response to the 
early Fichte and his quasi-Spinozistic attempts to ground transcendental 
subjectivity and creative nature in a point of absolute indifference that is 
neither subjectivity nor nature, but possesses both equally within it. Both 
projects seem to miss the mark, but why this would lead to a break between 
Hegel and Schelling is not clear. As hinted by Žižek's vision of Hegel and 
the middle-late Schelling, Hegel must have implicitly recognized here 
that Schelling fails to grasp the true radicality of Kantian freedom and 
its implications by adhering too much to a unitary view of the absolute, 
the seamless oneness of all that is. Consequently, Hegel tries to save the 
breakthrough of the critical system by thinking substance as subject, by 
thinking how the positive order of being ex-ists (existere in the sense of 
stepping or standing out) in the mode of subjectivity, instead of merely tying 
two apparently different yet complementary areas together into a precarious, 
“dead” harmony in indifference, wherein all qualitative difference between 
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subjectivity and objectivity becomes secondary, unimportant, and ultimately 
lost. As Hegel himself says in his Philosophy of Nature:
The cause of [Naturphilosophie's] aberration lay in the 
fundamental error of first defining the Absolute as the 
absolute indifference of subjective and objective being, and 
then supposing that all determination is a merely quantitative 
difference. The truth is rather, that the soul of absolute form, 
which is the concept and living reality, is solely qualitative self-
sublating differentiation, the dialectic of absolute antithesis. 
One may think, in so far as one is not aware of this genuinely 
infinite negativity, that one is unable to hold fast to the 
absolute identity of life, without converting the moment of 
difference into a simply external moment of reflection. This is 
of course the case with Spinoza, whose attributes and modes 
occur in an external understanding; life must then completely 
lack the leaping point of selfhood, the principle of autonomous 
movement, of internal self-diremption.167 
This citation clearly shows the task Hegel believes must be accomplished: 
a full actualization of the primordial insight underlying the cogito by 
instituting the I and the schism it evokes into the very immanent activity of 
the absolute. For if we follow Fichte's intuition that the subject emerges in 
being “by absolute spontaneity alone,” that is, “not through a transition, but 
by means of a leap,”168 in the wake of the subject the life of substance must 
be said to undergo a process of internal self-diremption. Accordingly, Hegel's 
project is an attempt to ontologize the Kantian framework by exploring 
conditions of the possibility of the emergence of the subject out of a ground 
that remains Other to it (its “pre-history”), insofar as its self-positing must 
be identical to a liberating self-caused separation from substance that leaves 
the latter bleeding in its ontological fold. Hegel's goal is to balance Spinoza 
and Kant by creating a metaphysical system that renders possible rather than 
precludes freedom in such a way that his “transcendentalism” reaches far 
beyond the conditions of theoretical knowing or practical action and directly 
opens up to a metaphysics of the ontological rupture that presents itself as 
the extra-subjective condition of human autonomy.
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The issue is to explain how a true freely existing subject can arise 
from within the internal mechanics of substance. Žižek's heterodox 
and challenging claim is that the only way to do this is by taking the 
split announced by Cartesian subjectivity and pushing it to its limits by 
inscribing the non-coincidence of mind with matter into the very heart 
of being. If human freedom is irreducibly self-reflexive and self-legislative 
it cannot be understood in terms of the basal energetic pulsating of 
the absolute. Reading the Hegelian response to Schelling remodulated 
through psychoanalysis, Žižek suggests that what provokes the movement 
from transcendental philosophy to Hegelian substance as subject is how 
Spinozism and the Kantian articulation of freedom reciprocally expose 
each other's intrinsic limitations, which simultaneously force us to rethink 
our understanding of ourselves and our relation to the world. While the 
latter lacks a metaphysics, the former misses the irrevocable (ontological) 
disturbance of/in nature at the basis of the cogito, which signals that human 
spontaneity cannot be contained in the positive order of being, something 
also missed in Schelling's own early Naturphilosophie. For Žižek, the true 
breakthrough of Kantian idealism, made explicit for the first time in Hegel 
and in the middle-late Schelling and then most acutely in psychoanalysis, 
is the proclamation of transcendental freedom as linked to Todestrieb, an 
excess of being that breaks from all externally given laws, dirempts being 
from the inside out, and thereby produces a tension-stricken not-all bursting 
at the seams from inner turmoil. Because of the value Žižek accords to 
the psychoanalytical experience of the discord between mind and body, 
he arrives here at a conditional: If freedom exists, substance cannot be all. 
Substance's auto-disruption is the first-level condition of the possibility of 
the subject. Although this is perhaps a tenuous claim to make within the 
context of post-Kantian idealism (it exhibits an abundance of other ways 
of understanding the substance-subject relation), we should be wary of 
dismissing Žižek for purely “historico-contextual” reasons. He himself is 
more interested in another possibility of understanding German Idealism he 
sees hinted at behind the scenes of its texts. The fact that his reading is not 
a mere line-by-line commentary is no reason to proclaim that it is outright 
wrong. As a Lacanian, Žižek does not share the presuppositions that would 
make such a reading possible in the first place—and to apply external 
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methodologies and constraints of truth for evaluating his interpretation 
would, in fact, merely do to Žižek what his critics accuse him of doing. In 
this respect, their critiques are a performative contradiction.
What intrigues Žižek in Hegel's articulation of the subject as self-
relating negativity is its connection with the Kantian pedagogical concept of 
“unruliness” and “diabolic evil.” Insofar as self-relating negativity indicates 
that human subjectivity is non-natural, it shows that, if we follow the internal 
course of German Idealism, many of Hegel's concepts such as the “night 
of the world” or “the activity of dissolution [which] is the power and work 
of Understanding”169 appear to be nothing other than an elaboration of 
the subject's origins within an ontological disruption from the closed 
circuitry of nature's homeostatic laws as already alluded to but not fully 
developed by Kant. Žižek proclaims that we normally overlook something 
crucial in Hegel, for what Žižek's Hegel adds to the Kantian notion of the 
transcendental constitution of experience and rational self-determination is 
a gesture towards their dark commencement, a glimpse into how the spectral 
pandemonium of the pre-logical Real we see in “unruliness” precedes and 
makes possible the autonomy of the cogito and its originary “diabolic evil,” 
thus drawing a more explicit link between notions whose interdependence 
Kant merely suggested:
The human being is this night, this empty nothing, that 
contains everything in its simplicity—an unending wealth 
of many representations, images, of which none belongs to 
him—or which are not present. This night, the interior of 
nature, that exists here—pure self—in phantasmagorical 
representations, is night all around it, in which here shoots a 
bloody head—there another white ghastly apparition, suddenly 
here before it, and just so disappears. One catches sight of this 
night when one looks human beings in the eye—into a night 
that becomes awful.170 
Prior to the self-legislative laws of practical reason and the synthesis of 
transcendental imagination constituting the unity of phenomenal reality, we 
must posit some kind of ontological going-haywire that represents a savage 
tearing apart of the flow of vital being (“here shoots a bloody head—there 
another white ghastly apparition”) as that which opens up their logical 
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possibility. If practical reason and transcendental imagination go hand in 
hand, it is because both are a response to subjectivity itself, a radicalization 
of this denaturalizing tendency, to a nature whose fold has been disrupted 
and thus demands re-articulation (“a night that becomes awful”):
The pre-synthetic Real, its pure, not-yet-fashioned 
“multitude” not yet synthesized by a minimum of 
transcendental imagination, is, stricto sensu, impossible: a 
level that must be retroactively presupposed, but can never 
actually be encountered. Our (Hegelian) point, however, is that 
this mythical/impossible starting point, the presupposition 
of imagination, is already the product, the result of, the 
imagination's disruptive activity. In short, the mythic, 
inaccessible zero-level of pure multitude not yet affected/
fashioned by imagination is nothing but pure imagination itself, 
imagination at its most violent, as the activity of disrupting the 
continuity of the inertia of the pre-symbolic “natural” Real. 
This pre-synthetic “multitude” is what Hegel describes as 
the “night of the world,” as the “unruliness” of the subject's 
abyssal freedom which violently explodes reality into a 
dispersed floating of membra disjecta.171 
This chaotic aggregate of ghastly forms and shapes making up the quasi-
phenomenological self-experience of the night of the world is the pure 
expression of the unruliness/biological short circuitry of the human 
organism, the German Idealist variation upon Lacan's mirror stage.172 
As in the latter, this moment is not to be taken in isolation, but to be 
supplemented with what it ontogenetically makes possible, namely, the 
ideal-symbolical realm of ordered experience. What we see here is quasi-
phenomenological because, in actuality, there is no fully developed I that 
stands in relationship to an alterity over and against which it can stand 
(rather than there being well-defined Gegen-stände, there is nothing but a 
fragmentary field lacking coherence). This I can only emerge après coup 
after a free act of synthesis of this initial state of chaotic dispersion, that is, 
its ideal-symbolic re-articulation. As a result, the unruliness of the human 
organism is nothing other than another logical modality of transcendental 
imagination, its ontological zero-level as a disruption in/of the circuitry of 
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nature's laws that demands its recombination, a recombination that can only 
be done in a non-natural (virtual) register; and reading this insight in light 
of Kant's pedagogical writings on the necessity of disciplining unruliness 
for the emergence of culture, we can thus further say that the epigenesis of 
the categories173 as that which bestows upon experience its form cannot be 
limited to the logico-scientific structure that the latter assumes, but must 
also extend to the sociopolitical code underlying culture itself. The out-
of-control freedom of the subject is intimately linked with the power of 
imagination (Einbildungskraft) precisely because it is only by means of the 
latter that the subject is capable of producing images (Bilder or schemata) 
by which it can give structure to this ghastly state of chaos in the Real, a 
quasi-phenomenal field lacking subject-object articulation since, although 
the subject itself has emerged in a primordial sense, as of yet there are no 
conceptual structures and no symbolic network necessary to mould reality 
into an integrated, smooth fabric (a process of transcendental Bildung, a 
schematization of the night of the world). The paradox lies in the following: 
we can only explain the order of experiential reality in its multifarious 
modes by presupposing an originary, impenetrable pandemonium that we 
can only glimpse, but never know (it being always already “overcome” as 
soon as experience has come on the scene), a pandemonium that logically 
precedes and ontologically renders possible the consistency of full-fledged 
subjectivity and psychic life.
The I itself as an irreducible core of transcendental reflexivity can only 
emerge out of this chaos, this macabre seizure of forms that represents 
ontological mayhem/madness at its finest, which in turn signals that, at its 
zero-level, the subject is nature in the mode of auto-denaturalization. Hegel's 
horrifying ontologization of transcendental imagination in the night of the 
world, however, goes a step further. The night of the world does not merely 
indicate a radical breakdown in the flux of materiality in the Real; it is also 
the beginning of an infinite withdrawal of being into itself that cuts all ties 
with the outside world through obeying its own self-given law. Consequently, 
if this ontogenetic mayhem/madness is that which renders possible the 
absolute spontaneity of the I, then it shares an uncanny structural identity 
with Hegel's definition of evil in the Jenaer Realphilosophie as an “internal 
reality, absolute certainty of itself, the pure night of being-for-itself.”174 
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Just as Kant demonstrates in Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, 
the basis of subjectivity for Hegel is inherently ambiguous, insupportably 
undecidable: not only does it necessarily bring our own understanding of 
freedom dangerously close to that of evil, where the difference between them 
threatens to dissipate, but more disconcertingly it points to the ancestral 
past of the subject as entangled in some kind of unfathomable ontological 
crime.175 Whereas early post-Kantian philosophy, namely that of Reinhold 
and the early Fichte, sought to unify the critical project through elementary 
philosophy and the absolute self-positing of the I, respectively, Hegel came 
across something disquieting in his own endeavour to escape its impasses: 
theoretical and practical reason coincide in a chasm in being that testifies to an 
unspeakable extra-subjective violence. What both Kant's pedagogic writings 
and Hegel's night of the world reveal is that in order for idealization/
symbolization to occur as a purely autonomous activity, there must be 
something in nature that leaves it lacerated, wounded, bleeding, this being the 
only way that a zone freed from its hegemony could arise. In other words, 
even if we take the breakthrough of Kantian idealism to be the priority 
of the symbolic-conceptual categories whereby the subject engenders 
experience rather than its account of freedom (a move that also assures 
that culture is always of our own making because not subject to natural 
determination) even on this reading, this is the dark horizon within which 
ideality and, by implication, the sociopolitical as a logically autonomous 
milieu can operate: the death of nature in us. In this respect, if the major 
insight of German Idealism and psychoanalysis is that “the passage from 
'nature' to 'culture' is not direct,”176 then one of its major implications is 
that the Symbolic is not only a “kingdom within a kingdom” (imperium 
in imperio), but more radically one that has won its way to ontological 
sovereignty through a destructive, murdering force, thus establishing the 
avid anti-Spinozism of both traditions.177 
The pure I inaugurated by transcendental philosophy exposes a bone 
in the throat of substance, a snag in natural causality, proclaiming that 
the absolute as nature or the physical universe cannot be all. What must 
be taken from this is one of the key principles of Žižek's ontology: freedom 
is not a raw, brute fact, but depends upon the caustic collapse of the vital fold of 
being, a brisure in the heart of the Real; the chaotic aggregate of ghastly forms that 
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constitutes the zero-level of human freedom represents an ontological catastrophe, 
a catastrophe that is synonymous with the subject itself: “it designates [...] the 
primordial Big Bang, the violent self-contrast by means of which the balance 
and inner peace of the Void of which mystics speak are perturbed, thrown 
out of joint.”178 In this sense, the Žižekian appropriation of the Hegelian 
attempt to think substance as subject readdresses what really differentiates 
Hegel from Schelling the Naturphilosoph and sets the stage for his own 
philosophical career. Although the early Hegel does support Schelling's 
project to develop a rich teleological account of nature (as various sketches 
in the Jena period demonstrate), he must be said to have come to some kind 
of recognition of the inherent limitations of Schelling's endeavour. It is this 
vital hemorrhaging of nature that, preventing the ideality of the subject from 
being subsumed within the self-actualizing of the absolute, pushes Hegel 
away from Schelling: before the transcendental (re)constitution of reality 
by the I can occur, an internal ontological short circuit, a metaphysical 
breakdown of substance, must be posited, which not only renders impossible 
a complete immersion of subjectivity within a natural evolutionary narrative, 
but declares the ultimate discontinuity between nature and spirit instead 
of their peaceful identity and mutual interpretation in nature as “the 
unconscious poetry of spirit.”179 
6.4 The Night of the World/A Monism Bursting at Its Seams
Hegel makes a crucial step towards elaborating the paradoxical ground of 
the subject by demonstrating that it is this going-haywire, this dysfunctioning 
of substance that makes subjectivity incommensurable with material 
being and renders possible freedom in the truly “idealist” sense of the 
word. It is Hegel's account of the advent of the I in nature that is the first 
to truly explicate the eruption of the subject as an extimacy that cannot 
afterwards be resubsumed within the oneness of the self-integrating unity 
of the absolute. There is no smooth union, no ultimate self-penetrating 
identity within the fabric of all-pervasive being, for we encounter an infinite 
breakdown, an internal tension, that causes irrevocable havoc in the life 
of the absolute: “Subject designates the 'imperfection' of Substance, the 
inherent gap, self-deferral, distance-from-itself, which forever prevents 
Substance from fully realizing itself, from becoming 'fully itself.'”180 The 
From Transcendental Philosophy to Substance as Subject 133
subject, therefore, has no positive ontological substrate, so that in Hegel 
the German Idealist attempt to supply a foundation for freedom strangely 
backfires on itself. But in its very failure, this attempt stumbles upon a 
great truth: the zero-level of human freedom is a blockage, an obstruction 
in the mechanics of nature, for the ontological status of the transcendental 
expresses its dependence upon a self-destructive negativity in substance itself. 
The Žižekian thesis is that without the articulation of this paradoxical 
site of excessive negativity (Todestrieb) as emerging immanently within 
being, all metaphysical accounts of human subjectivity and freedom risk 
their reductionist-monistic cancelation—otherwise we cannot explain the 
leap constitutive of the latter without risking their subsumption within an 
evolutionary transition. If we are to defend the fact of freedom, we must 
assume it and go all the way, which leads us to a single coherent conclusion: 
“either subjectivity is an illusion, or reality itself (not only epistemologically) is 
not-All.”181 
Here we see again how Žižek's reactualization fights against textbook 
accounts of German Idealism. If Hegel is to be a philosopher of freedom, 
his metaphysical articulation of the absolute must pass through the Kantian 
critical system, which means it cannot just be a simple retour to Spinozistic 
metaphysics; we must witness some kind of brisure within the absolute 
that disrupts the blind, immanent movement of natural laws and thereby 
enables the possibility of a freely existing subject. Although this is a rather 
controversial claim to make in the context of German Idealism, Žižek 
believes it allows us to reconceptualize its attempt to think substance as 
subject in such a way that it does not fall into conventional platitudes that 
smother its theoretical potential: platitudes such as comprehending the 
absolute as a cosmic subject-like agency that remains constant through 
all determinate change, preceding and (sub/con)suming the freedom of 
concrete existence by autonomously actualizing itself from a safe distance 
from the flux and contingency of reality, thereby guaranteeing the movement 
of history.182 The subject only emerges from an accidental blockage, an 
irrevocable moment of self-division, which means that substance and subject 
are in themselves dirempt and caught in finitude:
“Substance is Subject” means that the split which separates 
Subject from Substance, from the inaccessible In-itself beyond 
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phenomenal reality, is inherent to the Substance itself. [...] 
The point is not that Substance (the ultimate foundation of 
all entities, the Absolute) is not a pre-subjective Ground but 
a subject, an agent of self-differentiation, which posits its 
otherness and then reappropriates it, and so on: “Subject” 
stands for the non-substantial agency of phenomenalization, 
appearance, “illusion,” split, finitude, Understanding, and so 
on, and to conceive Substance as Subject means precisely that 
split, phenomenalization, and so forth, are inherent to the life 
of the Absolute itself.183 
Not only does the transcendental reconstitution of reality depend upon a 
prior upsurge of pure ontological violence, but the very phenomenalization 
of experience is co-incidental with this rupturing, the not-all, of substance. 
In other words, subject is substance in its mode of self-alienation: the 
transcendental reconstitution of reality is nothing but an immanent attempt by 
the absolute as nature to overcome its split by filling in the gap opened up in the 
core of its vital being, whereby ego development and concrete experience are 
reduced to a reaction formation, an attempt to suture a wound. Substance 
is not subject (as a proclamation of identity): substance becomes subject (in a 
moment of trauma). The very fact that there is experience demonstrates this 
for Žižek, for there is no intrinsic reason for experience within the “smooth” 
self-articulation of substance.
But here we should make another addition. When we say that the 
subject is a transcendent Other created from within the immanence of 
being, we must be careful. It is not that substance creates or produces 
another substance, in which case the enigma concerning how one could 
explain the genesis of one out of the other would remain unsolved. Rather, 
the subject is nothing but the void of substance, the minimal difference of the 
absolute to itself,184 which creates a metaphysical vacuum that is able to 
have devastating effects in the fabric of the Real of nature from which it 
emerged as soon as it develops the capacity to paradoxically relate to itself 
(movement from “unruliness” to “diabolic evil,” from the tearing apart of 
the flow of vital being to its radicalization in “the night of the world”). In 
this sense we should understand late German Idealism, and by consequence 
Žižek's own metaphysics, as attempts to think system and freedom as a 
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critique of Propositions 12 and 13 of Part I of the Ethics, which argue 
for the absolute indivisibility and untouchable oneness of substance, but 
in such a way that we do not fall into the logical conundrum outlined 
in Propositions 2 through 6, whose goal is to show the impossibility of 
two substances having nothing in common being able to have an effect 
upon one another or to produce one another, all the while paradoxically 
without violating Propositions 14 and 15, which argue that all things 
must be within one substance. What idealism reveals to us is that freedom 
expresses something operatively new that has emerged within being and is 
irreducible to its ebb and flow, yet that does not exist outside of it, a transcendence 
in immanence that indicates some kind of split within substance itself 
infringing upon the logical hegemony of its infinite power by means of its 
internal breakdown. The subject “is not a new name for the One which 
grounds all, but the name for the inner impossibility or self-blockage of 
the One.”185 In man, negativity, having attained notional self-reflexivity, 
shows itself to be foundational to identity rather than a mere subcategory 
of positivity of the absolute used in the determination of finite things, so 
that it possesses its own monstrous logic that colonizes the immanent field 
within which it has emerged from a place that can only appear, from within 
that field, as an infinite elsewhere. However, what do we see here except 
the beginnings of a systematic ontologization of Lacanian metapsychology, 
centred in the mirror stage as a primordial organic disharmony indicative 
of a disjunctive “and” inscribed within being? Doesn't Žižek imply here that 
the only possible way to answer Miller's famous question: “Lacan, what's 
your ontology?” is by a passage through German Idealism, because of the 
distinctly “psychoanalytical” themes omnipresent in the latter once we 
psychoanalytically reconstruct its Grundlogik?
Yet one other thing should be clear at this juncture. Although Žižek's 
Hegel glimpses into the ontologico-foundational basis of human spontaneity 
preceding the transcendental constitution of experiential reality, he is unable 
to account for two things. First, the immanent generation of this negativity 
within the material flux of substance that sets the stage for subjectivity by 
enacting the first lacerations upon substance. How does the vital flow of 
being itself rupture? How does this extimate core germinate within the Real 
and incite a violent explosion that forever precludes the ontological life of 
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the Real, thus making it barred, nothing but a series of membra disjecta? 
Second, the absolute spontaneity of the very founding gesture of subjectivity that 
depends on nothing but itself for its own self-positing, a self-positing that 
presents itself as a fiat that of itself institutes a pure difference in being:
the problem for us is how we are to conceive of the founding 
gesture of subjectivity, the “passive violence,” the negative 
act of (not yet imagination, but) abstraction, self-withdrawal 
into the “night of the world.” This “abstraction” is the abyss 
concealed by the ontological synthesis: by the transcendental 
imagination constitutive of reality—as such, it is the point of 
the mysterious emergence of transcendental “spontaneity.”186 
To answer these questions, we will need to delve into Žižek's oft-neglected 
work on Schelling, for it is Schelling who delved most profoundly into the 
obscure origins of subjectivity.
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Chapter 7
The Logic of Transcendental Materialism
Schelling and the Spectral Other Side of German Idealism
Žižek needs to go beyond Hegel to articulate a crucial dialectical moment 
of transcendental materialism: the emergence of an ontological violence 
within being that prohibits the indivisibility of the absolute as an infinitely 
powerful, self-sustaining whole and creates room for irreducible freedom 
and ideality. To demonstrate this, I will outline the inherent limitations 
in Hegel's attempt to think substance as subject by focusing on Žižek's 
criticisms of the mature Hegelian Encyclopedia, thereby showing the 
theoretical hole simultaneously opened up and concealed by Hegel. Spurred 
on by the perceived threat of Absolute Idealism to human freedom, what we 
will see is how Schelling's investigation of the abyssal origins of subjectivity 
presents us with a passionate attempt to rethink the grounding of the subject 
and its role in being so that the former is never reducible to the latter. In this 
regard not only can Schelling's “materialist” response to Hegel be seen as 
the culminating, concluding step in what Žižek takes to be the unconscious 
Grundlogik of German Idealism, but it puts us face to face with the spectral 
Other Side of that tradition which it previously recoiled from to varying 
degrees: the insurmountable tension between the Real and the Ideal, which 
imposes a new conception of a never-to-be-reconciled quadruple dialectics 
with stark consequences for our understanding of nature, human historicity, 
and the absolute.
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7.1 The Hegelian Recoil, The Schellingian Breakthrough
In order to explicate how substance auto-disrupts into a chaotic series of 
membra disjecta, the ontological zero-level preceding the synthetic modality 
of transcendental imagination, we have to move outside Žižek's reading of 
Hegel and confront his works on Schelling. The night of the world is merely 
a profile portrait of the disarray and pandemonium that pave the way for 
the transcendental constitution of reality into a (relatively) unified fabric of 
experience. It does not of itself explain the originary moment of withdrawal 
from organic immersion in the positive order rendered possible by Todestrieb 
as the obscure birthplace of an irreducible more-than-material subjectivity; 
comprehending this event requires us to first plunge headfirst into the 
immanent pulsation of the vital ebb and flow of being itself if we are to see 
how it sets the stage for the latter—a project that Žižek explicitly says is 
most acutely developed in Schelling:
Kant was the first to detect this crack in the ontological 
edifice of reality: if (what we experience as) “objective reality” 
is not simply given “out there,” waiting to be perceived by 
the subject, but an artificial composite constituted through 
the subject's active participation—that is, through the act of 
transcendental synthesis—then the question crops up sooner 
or later: what is the status of the uncanny X that precedes the 
transcendentally constituted reality? F. W. J. Schelling gave the 
most detailed account of this X in his notion of the Ground 
of Existence—of that which “in God Himself is not yet God”: 
the “divine madness,” the obscure pre-ontological domain of 
“drives,” the pre-logical Real that forever remains the elusive 
Ground of Reason that can never be grasped “as such,” merely 
glimpsed in the very gesture of its withdrawal.187 
This, however, creates an internal problem for Žižek's work insofar as 
he describes his own project time and time again as Hegelian and never 
as Schellingian. If it is Schelling who is the philosopher who most fully 
describes the material ontogenetic conditions for the emergence of the 
subject rather than Hegel and thus more predominantly influences Žižek's 
metapsychology and ontology, then the fact that his own overt reliance 
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upon Schelling remains largely behind the scenes potentially demonstrates 
some kind of error, inconsistency, or sleight of hand. Not only does Žižek 
fail to give any systematic argumentation for the superiority of Schelling 
over Hegel in terms of the obscure origins of the I out of its pre-subjective 
Grund, he also levels off the differences between the two insofar as he 
appears, as will become clear, to read them reciprocally through one other. 
Here I am thinking specifically of his endeavour in The Parallax View to show 
that, “far from posing an irreducible obstacle to dialectics, the notion of 
the parallax gap provides the key which enables us to discern its subversive 
core. To theorize this parallax gap properly is the necessary first step in the 
rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism.”188 But this quote 
is suspicious: remarking that Schelling was “the first to formulate the post-
idealist motifs of finitude, contingency and temporality,”189 and is even thus 
“at the origins of dialectical materialism,”190 it is clear that Žižek associates 
Schelling with the beginning of this tradition rather than Hegel; Schelling 
occupies an “immediate” place, acting “as a kind of 'vanishing mediator' 
between the Idealism of the Absolute and the post-Hegelian universe of 
finitude-temporality-contingency, [such] that his thought—for a brief 
moment, as it were in a flash—renders visible something that was invisible 
and withdrew into invisibility thereafter.”191 It is Schelling, not Hegel, who 
supplies us with the premonitions of a new radical way of philosophizing, 
a new dialectics. Moreover, the very idea of an insurmountable internal 
limit (a gap) as constitutive of (onto)logical movement—the necessity of 
positing the non-coincidence and tension of its moments to one another 
in order for it to function—has a more manifest affinity with Schelling's 
middle-late philosophy, which, developed as a response to the absoluteness 
of the Hegelian self-mediating Notion, bases itself on the idea of the 
indivisible remainder, der nie aufgehende Rest, as an irremovable snag in 
every system that guarantees its very vitality. Žižek in many ways appears to 
be interpreting Hegel retroactively through Schelling, which would explain 
why the irreducibility of the parallax between moments in contradistinction 
to their organic interpenetration in the notional structure of any given 
phenomenon is the “perverse” truth of Hegelian dialectics.192 What is more, 
in a key passage in Less Than Nothing that describes dialectics as “the science 
of the gap between the Old and the New,” Žižek abruptly and without 
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explication jumps into a discussion of the middle-late Schelling, going so 
far as to say that to avoid mystification properly we should not abandon 
his project from this period of his thinking, but rather “reformulate it so as 
to avoid the mystification of the theosophic mytho-poetic narrative,”193 in 
such a way that it appears that the proximity of his reading of Hegel and 
Schelling when coupled with this brief and rare methodological explanation 
points to the core of his heterodox reading of German Idealism and thus his 
philosophy. This suggests that the core of Žižek's philosophy is a hybridism 
of Schellingianism and Hegelianism, so that exploring this intersection 
puts us face to face with the theoretico-ontological stakes underlying his 
entire project.
Yet the following question imposes itself: at what point is Žižek's own 
metaphysical archaeology of the subject Schellingian or Hegelian? The 
very posing of this question is relatively misleading within the context of 
Žižek's reactualization of German Idealism, considering that what interests 
him is not Kant, Schelling, or Hegel as particular historical thinkers 
whose respective philosophies often display insurmountable differences 
to one another, not to mention incompatible concerns (to such a degree 
that one could even question whether German Idealism constitutes a 
coherent tradition with a single logical nucleus). What he finds alluring 
is a psychoanalytical truth self-unfolding throughout their works, a truth 
inaugurated by the Cartesian cogito and ultimately culminating in Freud 
and Lacan, but that they are unable to articulate fully due to its traumatic 
nature, “our experience of freedom” being, after all, “properly traumatic.”194 
However, even if what intrigues Žižek is the disavowed Grundlogik implicitly 
driving the movement as an unconscious formation—something that 
appears in a flash only to withdraw again into the abyss from which it 
came—we can nevertheless demonstrate a certain dominating influence of 
Schelling by showing how the latter fills in a theoretical void opened up by 
Hegel and thereby radicalizes the founding insight of German Idealism.
According to a Žižekian narrative of the untold history of German 
Idealism, the essence of that impossible X that eternally precedes the birth 
of consciousness remains underdeveloped in the Hegelian attempt to think 
substance as subject. Although the Hegel of the night of the world hints at 
the disturbing metaphysical paradoxes that arise out of the ontologization of 
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transcendental imagination and its concomitant concept of freedom, in The 
Ticklish Subject Žižek expresses outright dissatisfaction with Hegel's most 
systematic undertaking to inscribe the subject within a dialectics of nature 
as propounded in the various versions of The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences. Since this book is written after The Indivisible Remainder, it would 
appear that Žižek's critical engagement with Hegel's mature system and its 
account of the passage to culture is based on the presuppositions that guide 
his own transcendental materialism as worked out in this vehement work 
on Schelling published only three years earlier. In other words, his admitted 
disapproval is an implicit proof of the prioritization given to Schellingian 
ontology for the theorization of the parallax as a metaphysics of the 
disjunctive “and.”
Pointing to an ambiguity persisting within the movement from self-
contained Notion to nature and then to spirit in his mature system, Žižek 
suggests that Hegel was unable to bring into conceptual fullness the earth-
shattering realization that he was on the verge of.195 What is left aside is, 
strictly speaking, the night of the world that Hegel's earlier Realphilosophie 
had uncovered. In the Encyclopedia, it is uncertain how this radical 
negativity, this moment of irremediable ontological breakdown haunted 
by sanguinary spirits, truly fits in. Instead of the precarious, never-to-be-
complete “reconciliation” between nature and finite spirit brought forth 
by the subject, culture itself becomes a closed circuit, a complete return of 
the Idea to itself out of its infinite self-outsidedness in nature, a move that, 
by rendering culture a self-sufficient, self-contained all, completely does 
away with the unruliness that is the zero-level of freedom as revealed in 
psychoanalytical experience and potentially jeopardizes the irreducibility of 
the practico-concrete in Kant and made explicit for the first time in Fichte. 
The issue is that the Idea is nothing other than this very act of its own 
returning to itself, nothing but the attempt at reconciliation, so that not only 
is this very movement generative of that to which the movement returns, but 
more drastically the self-alienation of the Idea is a condition of its returning 
to itself.196 If the ontological zone wherein the fabric of the world is torn 
apart (“here shoots a bloody head—there another ghostly apparition”) 
disappears, the claim is stronger than simply the subject as the irreconcilable 
in-between of nature and culture, the bone in the throat of substance and 
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the snag in the machine of the Symbolic, loses all currency: we would 
paradoxically lose the very condition of free spiritual activity, for a complete 
sublation of nature into culture would herald the destruction of culture 
as a process of building an artificial, second nature where one is missing. 
Losing the obstacle causes us, in turn, to lose the goal; dialectics needs its own inner 
impediment to get off the ground.
Corresponding to the reality/Real distinction in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
we may thus venture that there are two forms of Hegelian dialectics: either 
we have the perfect dialectical triad of the mature system (Logic → Nature 
→ Spirit) or a non-closed tetrad that signals the self-collapse of dialectical 
logic itself as seen in the Realphilosophie (Logic → Nature → finite Spirit 
→ objective/naturalized Spirit).197 The triad is, strictly speaking, not merely 
inconsistent with Hegel's—and ultimately Kant's—true earlier insight, but 
self-defeating: it robs dialectics of its own energy, energy that can only be 
mobilized due to the structural impossibility of completing the task it sets 
out to complete. At the most basic level, culture can never utterly sublate the 
excessive kernel of human being and simply make it a moment of the self-
meditation of the Notion as it seeks to actualize itself: there must always be a 
minimal, insurmountable distance between the unruliness of human nature, 
the withdrawal into the nocturnal Innenwelt of the world that is the founding 
gesture of subjectivity, and the symbolic, cultural network that attempts 
to form and discipline this non-natural violence into a new order after 
subjectivity has posited itself as such. The two can never overlap within an 
all-pervasive totality, insofar as for Žižek this overlapping would not merely 
level out the singularity that marks the subject (namely, the fact that it 
cannot be fully explained by either material or cultural determinations) but 
also in the same breath radically preclude the condition of the possibility of 
human freedom and the exploration of its larger metaphysical implications.
The difference between traditional accounts of Absolute Idealism and 
the quadruple dialectic of the Realphilosophie thus enables us to demonstrate 
the logic Žižek wants to defend both in terms of his own transcendental 
materialism and the unconscious Grundlogik of modern philosophy that 
he psychoanalytically constructs. Whereas the former articulates itself 
according to a series of upward-moving spirals wherein each new turn 
completely encompasses the previous one in an act of subsumption (so 
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that we encounter a completely self-enclosed, organic oneness that slowly 
articulates itself in increasing complexity) the very self-unfolding operation 
of the later precludes the possibility of such a self-totalizing activity. While 
Absolute Idealism itself does move forward on the basis of fundamental 
non-coincidence or immanent contradiction (there is conflict internal to the 
system), it is always productive of new, evermore comprehensive unity, but 
in such a manner that its innate teleological push towards greater order and 
self-coherence is able to project an upper limit. Since it knows no radical 
inner impediment, the ever-expanding series of upward spirals predicts a 
point in history when the Idea would attain perfection by returning to itself 
and in turn overcome its prior self-alienation, that is to say, when nature 
and culture would become reconciled in a moment of ontological jubilation. 
Here, understood as the self-development of the structure of the world, the 
absolute is seen as an immanent processual movement from self-externality 
to absolute self-mediation: by making itself into the Idea, nature (as a 
realm of pure contingency) would have succeeded by coming to a complete 
grasp of itself in the freedom of thought, whereby the end of the movement 
would see itself in the beginning, thus closing the circle of circles. Within 
transcendental materialism, however, the passage from nature to culture 
does not reveal a struggle of notional transmutation as culture endeavours 
to rid itself of its basis in nature in the onslaught of history with the 
promise of completion, but rather reveals a standstill in the heart of being 
that cannot be brought into a higher moment of truth of free spirit that 
would bring the circle of circles to an end: the ebb and flow of substance 
ontogenetically incites the birth of a freely existing subject only through a 
self-sabotaging, self-destructive movement that defies perfect reconciliation, 
because this unruliness inheres in all culturally achieved unity and disrupts 
it from within. Conflict, though here too internal to the system, articulates 
at this juncture of the passage from nature to culture an irrevocable place 
of rupture, devastation, or laceration in the absolute, which points to a 
dialectical residue that can never become a vehicle of internal growth of the 
structure of the world, yet that simultaneously sustains culture as the very 
attempt to overcome it. With culture, we see that nature had immanently 
produced an eruptive, shattering transcendence (the subject) that bursts 
the seams of any monistic wholeness and gets in the way of the immanent 
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self-development of the absolute by instituting a new age of the world 
that can never be reconciled with that which came before, in a moment of 
ontological triumph. As a consequence, if we inscribe culture into the fabric 
of the universe according to the second model of dialectics, we are forced to 
conclude that the absolute is open, precarious, and necessarily incomplete, 
for the symbolic universe is not only constitutively out of joint with nature, 
but as the always doomed attempt to reconcile itself with the latter, is 
constantly forced to reinvent itself.
The process of subjectification (culture) emerges out of the ontological 
chasm opened up by the pure I and holds a position of infinite difference 
with respect to nature insofar as it operates within a zone of logical non-
coincidence that has been carved out from within the laws of the latter. 
Instead of a self-enclosed spiral or circle of circles, we see an immanent 
“break” that prevents the next dialectical phase of self-appropriation from 
occurring and by means of which another level of autonomous activity 
irreducible to the first can take hold. The image is of two cones—one 
ontologically positive, the other immersed in a virtual zone of nonbeing—
linked together by a black hole that is the pure I, the night of the world, 
whereby nature and culture self-actualize in isolation to one another, but are 
nevertheless negatively tied together by the abyssal void of subjectivity—that 
which “protrudes” out of both as an impossible in-between non-explicable 
in either. The subject stands for the bone in the throat of substance that 
prevents it from being a devouring all following its own immanent laws 
(nature's non-coincidence to self) just as much as it stands for that snag 
in the cultural machine (the non-all of the symbolic Other) that can 
never be filled in or completely overcome, and that thus constitutes the 
impetus for all subjectification as a series of reaction formations and 
the infinite proliferation of the forms it can take on due to its necessary 
failure of covering up, schematizing, the primordial trauma. In this regard, 
transcendental materialism presents a radically different view of dialectics 
as Absolute Idealism, going so far as to claim that what the latter misses is 
that it is, at best, a mere compensation in fantasy for the traumatic truth 
of the former. Here we have a rich account of the emergence of two zones 
of activity wherein, although the second is dependent upon the first that 
constitutes its genetic ground, it remains entirely free. To anyone familiar 
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with the Freiheitsshcrift or the Weltalter, this demonstrates the manifest 
Schellingian character of Žižek's criticism of Hegel, while at the same time 
locating the germ of the former's logic of the Grund within Hegel's early 
Realphilosophie:
But dependence does not annul autonomy or even freedom. 
It does not determine essence, but merely says that the 
dependent, whatever it might be, can only be as a consequent 
of that upon which it is dependent; it does not say what it 
is, and what it is not. Each organic individual, as something 
which has become, has its being only through another, and to 
this existent it is dependent in terms of becoming, but not at 
all in terms of being. It is not incongruous, says Leibniz, that 
he who is God is at the same time begotten, or vice versa; as 
it is no more a contradiction to say that he who is the son of a 
man is himself a man.198 
7.2 The Weltalter and the Systematization of Freedom
One of the most interesting aspects of Žižek's reactualization of German 
Idealism is its claim that the middle-late Schelling's “departure” from the 
throes of reason and “descent” into theosophical obscurantism does not 
demonstrate a break from modern rationality as inaugurated by Descartes' 
search for a self-evident Archimedean starting point for all philosophy 
(famously developed further in Kant's transcendental conditions of 
the possibility of knowledge, and ultimately epitomized by Hegel's self-
mediating Notion).199 On the contrary, Žižek's reactualization states that 
Schelling actually makes explicit for the first time the perverse, unconscious 
truth that remains hidden throughout the entire tradition, but only appears 
ephemerally through the distortion of its imaginary-symbolic universe: his 
attempt to present a system that would be able to combat the perceived 
threat posed by Hegel's horrifying “pan-logicism” presents a radicalization, 
a completion, of modernity's fundamental insight into the paradoxical origins 
of subjectivity, an insight that Hegel himself was unable to follow through 
in his own endeavour to solve the impasse bequeathed by Kant's critical 
philosophy. In this sense, Žižek implies that it is philosophical orthodoxy 
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that got it wrong: it is not Schelling who is the misfit, but rather Hegel, 
for it is he who turns away from the abyss brought forth by the idealist 
account of freedom after gazing too deeply into its traumatic core. After the 
Realphilosophie, something prevents Hegel, holds him back—there is a recoil, 
a hesitation.
What is so compelling for Žižek about works such as the Weltalter is 
not their anti-Hegelian character, but their ability to penetrate into the 
breakthrough heralded by modern philosophy and to bring it to a new, 
higher level. It is Schelling who gives the complete articulation of its 
underlying but disavowed core insofar as it is he who most fully outlines the 
principles of a quadruple dialectical logic, whereas Hegel, going against his 
own initial tendencies, falls back into a triad at a crucial moment and loses 
sight of the “deontologized being” of the subject. What thus characterizes 
the passionate fury of the middle-late period is its embrace of the paradoxes 
surrounding subjectivity. This is what makes Schelling that which is in 
Hegel more than Hegel himself, the extimate core deeply entrenched 
within the body and soul of Hegel's philosophy that he could not own, as 
if Schelling were the real spectre haunting and destabilizing his mature 
system. Consequently Schelling, more than anyone else, is the culmination 
of German Idealism: it is he who most passionately tarries with its Real, for, 
in their “very failure, [the Weltalter drafts] are arguably the acme of German 
Idealism and, simultaneously, a breakthrough into an unknown domain 
whose contours became discernible only in the aftermath of German 
Idealism”;200 “Hegel's 'overcoming' of Schelling is a case in itself: Schelling's 
reaction to Hegel's idealist dialectic was so strong and profound that more 
and more it is counted as the next (and concluding) step in the inner 
development of German Idealism.”201 
In the context of the Žižekian reactualization of German Idealism, the 
fundamental assertion to be made is that to understand the movement 
towards the middle-late period in Schelling we must at some level say 
that Schelling himself came to realize the deficiencies of his previous 
philosophical endeavours, perhaps either through a rethinking of the 
Kantian critical system or by being spurred on by Hegel. Although, for 
instance, in the Naturphilosophie Schelling is also interested in the dark 
side of nature, the project forecloses the possibility of Todestrieb as an 
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emergent and infinitely disruptive force in being. In this sense, Žižek's 
rejection of the early Schellingian attempts to balance transcendental 
idealism with materialism follows the same line of argument as his denial 
of the theoretical weight of contemporary evolutionary models of self-
reflexive consciousness,202 for both share the same fault: the ultimate 
identification of mind and matter instead of the articulation of their ultimate 
irreconcilability to one another. From the standpoint of the immanent laws 
of the pre-symbolic Real (as avowed by Spinozistic monism or reductionistic 
materialism), Žižek's claim is that the Ideal cannot be explained either on 
the basis of a teleological or purely naturalistic emergence. The Ideal explodes 
from within the vital throes of positive being,203 rather than just being one 
specific (albeit complex) mode of physical organization, for it names an 
alienating distance to self, a non-coincident split that literally short-circuits 
the world. Rather than inhering in matter as its implicit structure, mind 
can only emerge within the void of this ontological scar, thus making it 
impossible to reconcile with matter.
Written in the aftermath of the birth of the Hegelian system with the 
publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1807, which contains a famous 
explicit criticism of the Schellingian philosophy of absolute indifference 
as an attempt to balance the two poles of realism and idealism,204 the 
Freiheitsschrift (1809) and the Weltalter (1810–1815) radically restructure 
the problematic that had occupied Schelling's philosophical career. But 
what complicates the issue at hand is the fundamental ambiguity of the 
Hegel-Schelling relationship in Žižek's own thinking, which is brought to 
an extreme at this crucial juncture: while one could say that much of the 
young Schelling's work is an attempt to rethink the subject's relation to 
the noumenal thing-in-itself that haunts its representations or to explicate 
the androgynous complementarity of the ideal-real poles, the middle-
late Schelling's problematic, on Žižek's reading, is the one he erroneously 
attributes to Hegel: “the true problem is not how to reach the Real when we 
are confined to the interplay of the (inconsistent) multitude of appearances, 
but, more radically, the properly Hegelian one: how does appearance itself 
emerge from the interplay of the Real?”205 Although Žižek does oscillate 
between calling this problematic Hegelian and Schellingian, what should 
be clear is that it is more accurately Schellingian, insofar as it is the latter—
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according to Žižek's own words—who most fully develops the quadruple 
logic of the passage from the pre-logical Real into the Symbolic as the 
unconscious Grundlogik of German Idealism, whereas Hegel recoiled at the 
most crucial moment.
Interpreting the Weltalter through this theoretical framework, 
Žižek is then able to interpret its ontology as an attempt to articulate a 
transcendental materialism capable of grounding the psychoanalytico-
Cartesian subject by thematizating the vanishing mediator between the 
Real and the Symbolic. He can do this, perhaps surprisingly, because 
first and foremost the Weltalter manuscripts present themselves as a 
theosophic exploration of creation. Perceiving Hegelian logic as a purely 
conceptual artifice that suffocates the freedom under the self-articulating 
necessity of the Notion, Schelling puts his philosophical prowess to use 
to give his own account of the emergence of temporality and finitude that 
could rival the dialectics of his great adversary. His basic thesis is that, 
although Hegelian logic can express notional necessity (what something 
ideally is) it ultimately fails to grasp the fact of any being, the thatness of 
its existence, especially if that being has its primordial basis in the brute, 
raw reality of freedom, something that forever eludes the self-mediation 
of conceptuality.206 For Schelling, however, this failure of pan-logistic 
dialectics in the face of a freely deciding being (the emergence of the 
subject) does not amount to a mere admittance of the intrinsic limitations 
of knowledge and human reason. It must be distinguished from a merely 
negative constraint upon philosophizing because this dialectical dead end 
we come across in explicating freedom does not arise due to the limited 
synthesizing activity of the subject and the finite conditions of the possibility 
of knowledge, but rather through an (onto)logically disruptive and yet 
productive metaphysical activity: to say that the fact of a specific being 
that possesses freedom as its essential predicate cannot be conceptualized 
according to an a priori dialectics is to point to the uncontainable act 
constituting its very self-positing, which is therefore capable of continually 
heralding forth the new and tearing apart any given causal matrix in 
which it finds itself,207 thereby making itself only graspable après-coup in 
the wake of its own self-instituting revelation in the world. The inability 
to conceptualize the advent of eruptive subjectivity in substance through 
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pure reason transcends mere epistemological constraints and reaches out 
unto the ontological: it is not merely that we must be agnostic concerning 
the existence of a totalizing principle that holds being together, but more 
disconcertingly, freedom proclaims that there is not any. The subject is an 
unpredictable event in being that rewrites what we consider to be possible. 
Thus, in trying to systematize freedom in a way to escape the perceived 
threat of Hegelian Absolute Idealism, Schelling reaches a contradiction, 
a contradiction that paradoxically becomes the very vitality of his system 
itself, insofar as it declares that the totality of being must be understood in 
terms of a constitutive yet conflict-ridden relation with an immanent Other: 
“[w]ere the first nature in harmony with itself, it would remain so. It would 
be constantly One and would never become Two. It would be an eternal 
rigidity without progress.”208 Both the Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter give 
expression to the necessary snag in the dialectical machine, the primordial, 
unruly excess of the Real over the Ideal that prevents any system of thinking 
from being self-enclosed unto itself and in the same breath guarantees the 
dynamic character of the latter by making it inclusive of freedom as an 
irrepressible, self-rupturing event at its very core.
In order to situate ourselves more firmly within the dialectical nuance of 
the Weltalter and show how, in relation to Žižek's ontology, Schelling holds 
a position of theoretical primacy over Hegel, we can use the problem of evil 
as an entry point, since it is perhaps in their respective theories thereof that 
they most strongly distance themselves from one other. Whereas for the 
mature Hegel evil becomes a mere sublated moment in the self-development 
of the good, a necessary phase for its establishment, for Schelling evil 
remains at its very core irrational and illogical. By definition it cannot be 
sublated as a moment within a higher dialectical standpoint because it 
is, at its primordial basis, the effect of an irreducible act of will. There is 
something spontaneous about evil that forever eludes conceptualization, 
something insurmountable about the wildness of a soul that insists on 
that which it wants and will sacrifice whatever it can to achieve it. Evil 
has something crazed and frantic about it: it is the capacity to say “No!” 
with the full knowledge of the implications of one's action. As soon as 
evil is understood, it fails to be evil; it becomes, rather, misguided good in 
the Platonic sense that no one does wrong willingly. Hence Schelling's 
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articulation of freedom as the capacity for good and evil: freedom in itself 
must rest intrinsically incomprehensible, that which cannot be dialectically 
mediated, which means that its pure self-positing can only resemble 
madness insofar as it precedes and makes possible any articulation of a table 
of values that could be used to comprehend it. It of itself knows no order, 
no rationality—if it did, it would be explicable in terms of the principle of 
sufficient reason and at risk of being thrown into a subordinate position 
within a greater self-articulating whole of which it is a mere functional part. 
There is therefore something always essentially impenetrable in every good 
and evil act done out of freedom, something always irreducible and violent 
in each act of self-positing: without this intuition, we lose the breakthrough 
of the critical system as revealed most poignantly in Kant's pedagogical 
writings and succumb to another form of determinism (dogmatism) 
that cancels out the primordial meaning of autonomy within a logic of 
overarching and self-unfolding reason. Insofar as the act itself is concerned, 
both the modalities of good and evil as expressions of freedom are formally 
identical; they involve an act logically distinct at its zero-level from any set 
of values—or in other words, an act done without any guarantee and without 
any external determination or influence. More radically, this testifies that evil 
is itself at the core of every good act, that evil is actually more primordial 
than the good. In order for an act to be truly good and authentically free at 
the same time, it must “pass” through evil, discipline it, and use it as the 
tamed Grund for its own expansive power—any Yes (adherence to rationally 
determined ethical principles) must first be a No (an egoistic self-assertion) 
if it is to be utterly self-determined and not just a blind following of laws: 
“the day lies concealed in the night, albeit overwhelmed by the night; 
likewise the night in the day, albeit kept down by the day, although it can 
establish itself as soon as the repressive potency disappears. Hence, good lies 
concealed in evil, albeit made unrecognizable by evil; likewise evil in good, 
albeit mastered by the good and brought to inactivity.”209 In this respect, 
a priori dialectics must fail: if all birth is a birth from darkness to light, 
there is always something in the emergence of rational order that remains 
impervious to the latter.210 
From this it becomes clear that the Schellingian concept of freedom 
is an explicit rethinking of the Kantian notion of diabolic evil and its 
154 Chapter 7
co-related concept of the original “unnatural” unruliness of the human 
organism, so that these original insights become an intrinsic part of his 
own logic of the Grund as the indivisible remainder, the “incomprehensible 
basis of reality,” which is missing in mature Hegelian dialectics. As a full-
fledged ontologization of Kant's declaration of the radical spontaneity at 
the basis of human practical activity,211 Schelling's philosophical impulse 
initiated by the Freiheitsschrift is an attempt to develop a system wherein 
freedom is irreducible to notional necessity, for “[o]nly he who has tasted of 
freedom can sense the desire to make everything its analogue, to spread it 
throughout the whole universe.”212 What intrigues him is the fact that there 
is an insurmountable enigmatic blind spot at the core of every action, every 
decision, a blind spot that not only presents the truth, mystery, and potential 
horror of human freedom, but more primordially reveals a deep hole that 
has been carved out in the flesh of being, making it tremble from within, 
for the unpredictable has emerged in its core. It is this strong conviction in 
freedom that leads Schelling into the abyssal labyrinths of self-exploration 
that constitute the conceptual fabric of the Weltalter, in the same way the 
intuition of freedom made Kant limit knowledge in order to make room for 
faith and embark down the path where he would eventually articulate the 
necessity of diabolic evil and unruliness in his pedagogical writings after 
years of original investigation into the essence of self-legislative practical 
reason. For Žižek, it is not an accident that Schelling's own project in the 
Weltalter ends up radicalizing Hegel's descriptions of the night of the world 
or Kant's account of unruliness, which in turn proves that his response 
to Hegel is the concluding step of German Idealism: all are driven by an 
attempt to give a philosophically adequate bedrock to freedom,213 with 
Schelling merely following its intuition right to the metaphysical conclusions 
it forces upon us in a way other representatives in the tradition were unable 
to do. What distinguishes Schelling is that he, propelled by an immense 
energy to battle against what he perceived as the threat posed by Hegelian 
dialectics on human freedom, had the strength to go further than the others 
in the symbolization of the unconscious Grundlogik inherent in the tradition. 
If his best-known work is called Philosophical Investigations into Human 
Freedom, which in many ways spends more time speaking of God/nature 
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than of humanity, it is because it is a work that delves into the ontological 
implications of the freedom revealed by idealism.
7.3 The Problem of the Beginning Itself: Schelling's Uncanny 
Response to Idealism
Just as in the Freiheitsschrift, and using the operative logic that it had already 
programmatically developed as a guide, Schelling in the Weltalter embarks 
upon a specific form of introspective analysis with the aim of developing 
a theosophy, the founding intuition of which is that the same process 
underlying the birth of human subjectivity is fundamentally structurally 
identical to God's creation of the world (as exhibited in the alchemical 
principle “so above, so below”).214 In another vein, the idea is that 
psychological experience is in some sense directly revelatory of the absolute 
drama of divine being in all its vicissitudes, even if it must pass through 
the meditating filters of self-reflexive consciousness: the experience of the 
relationship of dependence and autonomy that holds between one's pre-
subjective, material Grund and free personality is primordially disclosive of 
an ontological event that is a symbol of God's relation to the finite created 
world. In this way, the theosophic odyssey of the birth of God out of that 
which in God is not God himself, is irrevocably intertwined with a parallel 
investigation into the ontogenesis of subjectivity out of a nature that presents 
itself as Other to and irreconcilable with its free self-standingness. Since the 
methodological starting point is similar to the psychoanalytical experience of 
disharmony between mind and body as the obscure basis of freedom (which 
hints at the vanishing mediator between them), Žižek is led to discard the 
entire theosophic scope of the work as ultimately accidental to its “true” 
philosophical core, so that Schelling's narration of the painful process 
of the self-begetting of God and the decision of divine creation presents 
itself as a mere “metapsychological work in the strict Freudian sense of the 
term.”215 Whether or not Žižek himself is justified in completely removing 
the theosophic scope from Schelling's argument, one must at the very 
least admit that Žižek's wager follows the spirit of Schelling's middle-late 
philosophy to the letter, for Schelling himself declares in the Freiheitsschrift to 
“have established the first clear concept of personality.”216 
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What makes Žižek's appropriation of Schelling at times so provocative 
and compelling is his profound ability to penetrate into the fine details of the 
conceptual structures that make up the operative logic of the Freiheitsschrift 
and the Weltalter in a way no one else has. What interests him is how 
Schelling advances the descriptions in the tradition of the status of the 
elusive X, which simultaneously haunts transcendentally constituted reality, 
precedes it, and appears to set the stage for its condition of possibility. 
These three conceptual aspects of this je ne sais quoi map directly unto the 
three modalities of the Real: (i) the Real as a “kink” in the Symbolic, which 
pressurizes phenomenal reality; (ii) the Real as pre-symbolic “immediacy” 
that is lost through the advent of language; and (iii) the barred Real (R⁄ ) now 
understood as an auto-disruptive substance (N ≠ N) whose self-laceration 
creates the necessary room within which the transcendental constitution of 
reality through the Symbolic-Imaginary matrices underlying self-experience 
can take place, thus drawing attention to the interconnection of each aspect. 
Prior to these middle-late works, as we have seen, our relation to this 
mysterious X had already been partially “schematized” by a list of concepts 
(from Kantian transcendental freedom, diabolic evil, and unruliness to 
the Hegelian accounts of the night of the world and substance as subject). 
However, for Žižek, it is only with Schelling's own additions that we move 
away from the paradoxes of the ideal representation of the extra-subjective 
world or from a mere haphazard glimpse into the self-effacing ontological 
catastrophe that precedes the very possibility of free idealization. With him, 
we completely plunge into the auto-disruptive logic of the pre-symbolic Real 
at the basis of subjectivity so that the unconscious Grundlogik plaguing the 
German Idealist tradition, which had already from time to time appeared 
only to fall back into the darkness from which it came, finally comes 
clearly into light, becoming now minimally subjectified, as it were. The 
major difficulty, however, is how to articulate a philosophical system that 
can synthesize the various aspects of the Real together into a stable whole 
insofar as the very ontological space whose exploration would enable it 
retreats the very moment that conscious experience begins and is only visible in 
its very gesture of self-withdrawal.217 It is no accident that the problem that 
haunts the entirety of the middle-late Schelling of the Freiheitsschrift and the 
Weltalter is, as Žižek emphasizes:
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the problem of the Beginning itself, the crucial problem of 
German Idealism—suffice it to recall Hegel's detailed 
elaboration of this problem and all its implications in his 
Science of Logic. Schelling's “materialist” contribution is best 
epitomized by his fundamental thesis according to which, to 
put it bluntly, the true Beginning is not at the beginning: there 
is something that precedes the Beginning itself—a rotary 
motion whose vicious cycle is broken, in a gesture analogous 
to the cutting of the Gordian knot, by the Beginning proper, 
that is, the primordial act of decision. The beginning of all 
beginnings, the beginning kat' exohen—“the mother of all 
beginnings” as one would say today—is, of course, the “in 
the beginning was the Word” from the Gospel according to St 
John: prior to it, there was nothing, that is, the void of divine 
eternity. According to Schelling, however, “eternity” is not a 
nondescript mass—a lot of things take place in it. Prior to the 
Word there is the chaotic-psychotic universe of blind drives, 
their rotary motion, their undifferentiated pulsating; and 
the Beginning occurs when the Word is pronounced which 
“represses,” rejects into the eternal Past, this self-enclosed 
circuit of drives. In short, at the Beginning proper stands a 
resolution, an act of decision which, by differentiating between 
past and present, resolves the preceding unbearable tension of 
the rotary motion of drives: the true Beginning is the passage 
from the “closed” rotary motion to “open” progress, from 
drive to desire—or, in Lacanian terms, from the Real to the 
Symbolic.218 
 What Žižek refers to as “Schelling-in-itself: the 'Orgasm of Forces'”219 
is the remarkable capacity Schelling's philosophy possesses of being 
able to descend into the immanent driving forces governing the extra-
subjective, material Real, the elusive, obscure phase of darkness that 
precedes and sets the stage for the birth of the light that is the openness 
of self-reflexive consciousness. But what fascinates Žižek is the depth 
of his materialist response to Hegel, which still remains immersed in 
the fabric of transcendental idealism, a response that is “at the origins 
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of dialectical materialism.”220 This is why Žižek describes Schelling as a 
vanishing mediator between classical philosophy and the contemporary 
discourse of finitude: Schelling stands in a position of irreconcilable 
contradiction between the two, a tension that Žižek takes upon himself 
to further develop insofar as Schelling, according to him, is unable to 
endure his own breakthrough and recoils.221 If, onto the ground/existence 
distinction propounded in the Freiheitsschrift and systematically laid out in 
the Weltalter, we superimpose the real(ity)/ideal(ity) distinction operative 
within modern philosophy from Descartes onward, we perceive a nuance in 
the ontologization/grounding of Cartesian subjectivity: this split announced 
between mind and matter, which makes them non-reconcilable to one 
another, occurs “within” or “on the side of” the material Real through an 
ontologico-metaphysical deadlock, a schismatic rupture. The standard debate 
between idealism (ideality precedes and structurally makes possible the 
positive order of physical being and is thus the insurmountable metaphysical 
zero-level as in Platonism and textbook Hegelianism, or constitutes 
completely self-grounding and self-justifying transcendental conditions or 
normative values that make discourse possible as in Kantianism or much 
linguistic philosophy) and materialism (there is nothing but the ebb and flow 
of brute matter, the rest being reducible to an epiphenomenal production of 
nature's self-enclosed laws, as in the Greek atomists, conventional cognitive 
science, and logical positivism) is thus stood on its head in Schelling:
idealism posits an ideal Event which cannot be accounted for 
in terms of its material (pre)conditions, while the materialist 
wager is that we can get “behind” the event and explore how 
Event explodes out of the gap in/of the order of Being. The 
first to formulate this task was Schelling, who, in his Weltalter 
fragments, outlined the dark territory of the “prehistory 
of Logos,” of what had to occur in pre-ontological proto-
reality so that the openness of Logos and temporality could 
take place.222 
This quote expresses Schelling as one of the most crucial figures (if not the 
most crucial figure) in the history of dialectical materialism for Žižek, and 
thus establishes once and for all the pivotal role Schelling's ontology plays 
in his own philosophical development, despite his own characterizations 
The Logic of Transcendental Materialism 159
of his project as Hegelian. So how, then, do the vicissitudes of pure, 
raw materiality open up unto the irreducible event of the Ideal and the 
transcendentally constituted reality of phenomenological (self-)experience?
7.4 Grund and Existence: The Pulsating Heart of Nature and the 
Upward Spiral of Human Temporality
Schellingian nature is more than a mere symbol or paradoxical 
representation of the eternal Past that precedes consciousness: it is that 
elusive, impossible X, that je ne sais quoi in the modality of the pre-symbolic 
Real prior to conceptual-linguistic mediation. Yet when we move from the 
world of human meaning and into the circuitry of nature's vital ebb and 
flow, we see that “[e]verything that surrounds us points back to a past of 
incredibly grandeur. The oldest formations of the earth bear such a foreign 
aspect that we are hardly in a position to form a concept of their time or 
origin or of the forces that were then at work,”223 in such a way that the 
task of philosophy becomes to reconstruct this ancestral trajectory of the 
immemorial into a system of times:
We find the greatest part of [its formations] collapsed in 
ruins, witnesses to a savage devastation. More tranquil eras 
followed, but they were interrupted by storms as well, and lie 
buried with their creations beneath those of a new era. In a 
series from time immemorial, each era has always obscured 
its predecessor, so that it hardly betrays any sign of an origin; 
an abundance of strata—the work of thousands of years—
must be stripped away to come at last to the foundation, to 
the ground.224 
It is at this very juncture in the Weltalter that Žižek invites us to risk a daring 
thesis. If we draw our attention to its operative logic, we see that Schelling's 
system of times does something more radical than displace the primordiality 
of the human subject by illustrating its subsumption within the tenebrous 
pulsating heart of nature's productive potency, whose own self-unfolding 
takes place in the abyssal dregs of an immemorial time that threatens to 
engulf they who look into it. The crucial observation to be made here is that 
nature does not have a history that evolves by means of an activity of internal 
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self-transmutation that leads to man, so that he is ultimately included within 
it. The reason for this is not that nature, instead of being characterized 
by a smooth teleological development, is plagued by unpredictable 
catastrophism, irruptive disharmonies of widespread murder and extinction 
that cover up their own traces, so that the history of the world cannot be 
subsumable under a single, all-pervasive trajectory that, preceding from 
simple to more complex organizations in the unimaginable passage of aeons 
and aeons, would crown man as the summit of an unconscious yearning 
for the Word, that is, the structured logos of the symbolic world (contra the 
surface structure of Schelling's thinking225). This would effectively prevent 
nature from being motivated by an unknowing search for the light of self-
consciousness from within the darkness of its raw, productive potency,226 
but the reason lies elsewhere. There are, of course, differing stages, periods, 
and epochs in nature—and ones that have been lost forever, never to be 
recovered—due to varying levels of dynamic evolution and growth within 
its immanent activity, even if there is always unforeseeable violence risking 
to wreak havoc. Yet when we look around, we cannot find the subject within 
the system of nature. It just does not fit, a fact that has stark metaphysical 
implications: the progressive, transformative time of nature presents itself 
as radically Other to the distinctiveness of human (spiritual) temporality 
because it does not display the same intensity of uncontrollable dialectical 
self-sublation. In nature, beginning and end for the most part coincide: 
in the darkness of the soil, the seed gives birth to the plant, which, after 
reaching the life-giving light of the radiant sun, finally dies, leaving behind 
its fruit and thereby returns to itself, only to burst forth again in an 
eternal recurrence of the same. Change can only transpire in the span of 
incomprehensible ages: unmeasurably dilatory, dialectical movement is here 
“enchained” within the unbreakable spurious infinity of endless circularity 
and does not display the same frantic upward-moving spiral of human 
temporality, the never repetitious onslaught of history, where beginning 
and end exist in a productive non-coincidence that is the very vital force 
of its unimaginably fast paced metamorphosis and unending creation of 
nuance.227 A new era of culture displaces and supersedes the previous one, 
going in an unfathomable number of conflicting directions at once, so that 
no return to the beginning is even possible: the beginning, the origin, is 
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always out of place in the inaccessible residue that is the past. The end, 
the result, is a qualitative break rewiring the plethora of human thoughts, 
expressions, and emotions, and even the past itself,228 thus setting up a new 
beginning to be surmounted in its own right. As Žižek succinctly puts it, 
“[h]ere we encounter the key feature of the Symbolic: the fundamental 
'openness' it introduces into a closed order of reality,”229 in such a manner 
that saying nature yearns for humanity in its depths as the solution to its 
enigma230 merely covers up the fact that humanity is an irreconcilable break 
from it. But if the subject is a break from the system of times that constitutes 
nature and its catastrophism by bringing forth a new age of self-unfolding 
activity, this does not mean that we are liberated from all dismay by being 
brought into the luminous sphere of holy spirit. Instead, bound by the 
erratic and excessive life of freedom that overflows itself, we face our own non-
natural catastrophes.
We also encounter traces of this paradoxical upward spiralling and 
uncontrollable linear time in Kant and Hegel, which establish its integral 
place within founding intuitions of the tradition. Kant's account of 
unruliness as the ontogenetic starting point of transcendental freedom not 
only establishes the non-natural basis of human sociopolitical activity—not 
only is the human being “the only creature that must be educated,” but due 
to his unruliness, man “has no instinct” and is therefore separated from the 
vital throes of nature231—but, what is more, it demands to be disciplined if it 
is not to devour the subject in its frenzy. Due to this exigence of discipline, 
there is an intrinsic link between what Kant calls moral education and the 
historical destiny of man that institutes a new form of temporality driven 
forward through a productive non-coincidence at the core of what it is to be 
man. Although presenting itself as an excessive energy whose domestication/
schematization will enable us to attain terrestrial perfection, the very 
ground of our progress is in actuality its own inevitable obstacle: the meta-
transcendental condition of subjectivity, while it opens up a distinctly 
human sphere within which progress is possible, at the same time tarnishes 
it with the inevitability of eventual collapse, misfire, failure. But this is 
not a mere proclamation of defeatism, resignation, and forfeit: the very 
impossibility of our task is the impetus for action, that which provokes an 
infinite plurality of new ways of “purifying” the insupportable surplus of our 
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being, so that man is forever spurred on in the course of history to reinvent 
himself because of the insurmountable ontological violence preceding all 
acts of subjectification: “[t]he human being must therefore be educated to the 
good; but he who is to educate him is on the other hand a human being who 
still lies in the crudity of nature and who is now supposed to bring about 
what he himself needs. Hence the continuous deviation from his destiny 
with the always repeated returns to it.”232 But the consequence of this is that 
man is nothing more than this perpetual deviation from his destiny, that “man 
only becomes man”233 by continually (re)creating his own identity by means 
of education through the construction of a second nature within the forward 
onslaught of history, its fragile movement of contraction and expansion, 
history itself thus circulating around an ideal sociopolitical point that it 
posits by its very activity as necessary to it but which it can never reach, for 
beginning and end can never coincide as in the realm of nature. In other 
words, the impossibility of reaching our destiny is that which constitutes its 
very possibility, that which gives us a destiny in the first place. Due to this 
impossibility, we have historical time.
This idea of a sharp distinction between the natural and the spiritual 
in terms of time is also taken up by the mature Hegel, even if, on Žižek's 
reading, he misses the radicality of the vanishing mediator—the night of the 
world—that enacts the passage from the former to the latter. There are two 
sides to the story. First, Hegel's starting point in the philosophy of nature 
is nature as “the Idea in the form of otherness.”234 This means that nature 
cannot exhibit the characteristics Hegel associates with the Idea, such as 
development qua self-unfolding activity, whose image we see in the growth 
of plants from seeds, wherein we encounter a purposive causality guiding 
all change and movement. “The abstract universality of nature's self-
outsidedness”235 demonstrates that nature lacks any inner structuration that 
would enable it to realize itself freely according to a pre- or self-given telos. 
In this sense, there is no teleological activity intrinsic to nature: its zero-level 
is a deterministic mechanics ruled by the contingency of its relations that are 
always external to themselves. Exclusively determined by the conditions that 
engulf them, the bodies emerging here do not display any capacity for self-
reproduction, but merely stumble against one another due to empirical laws, 
whereby nature presents itself as a dead husk and time is nothing other than 
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a meaningless giving birth to and destruction of its own offspring.236 Second, 
at the level of organic life, although nature has sublated this prior staleness 
and intrinsic lack of purposiveness within its ebb and flow, it nevertheless 
exhibits a kind of claustrophobic immanence wherein the freedom 
distinctive of spiritual temporality is foreclosed by the eternal repetition of 
sameness within nature's cycle of life and death, fullness and lack, for there 
is a suffocating coincidence between the birth of one individual and the 
death of the other. Even though there is teleological self-unfolding explicit 
within organic living being—there is a universal genus that concretizes itself 
by constituting itself within the series of particulars that it generates and 
that generates it in turn, a complex unity that sustains itself within difference 
throughout the dispersion of time—there is no real difference and thus no 
history possible, even if we are allowed to speak of gradual sedimentations of 
change over the course of living being's activity. To put it crudely (borrowing 
one of Hegel's favourite animal examples) in nature we see nothing but one 
damn parrot after another,237 which ultimately makes nature uninteresting 
for him: nature remains immensely poor with regard to its notional 
reflexivity, for in contrast with historical existence, it is not capable of the 
faster-than-light transformations constitutive of the latter's essence. Hegel 
refers to this deficiency as the “impotence of nature,”238 insofar as it is 
incapable of the power of self-relating negativity and therefore displays a 
spurious infinity.239 Consequently, we must assert the following “distinction 
between the spiritual and the natural worlds: that, whilst the latter continues 
simply to return into itself, there is certainly a progression taking place in 
the former as well.”240 As such, it is thus only with the rise of human spirit 
that we see contradiction posited as such, and with it, the possibility for real 
metamorphosis: “[s]pirit is posited as contradiction existing for itself, for 
there is an objective contradiction between the Idea in its infinite freedom 
and in the form of singularity, which occurs in nature only as an implicit 
contradiction, or as a contradiction which has being for us in that otherness 
appears in the Idea as a stable form.”241 
In German Idealism, a human subject is not merely born and then, 
by dying, proliferating his progeny in an endless repetition of the same. 
During man's slow march towards his oblivion, a frenzy of naturally 
uncontainable and unfathomable activity articulating itself emerges, a 
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difference representing an irreconcilable rupture with the autopoiesis of 
nature, a self-legislative spontaneity that defines itself in direct opposition to 
its self-organizing totality, even if it must rely upon it as a dark, inaccessible 
ground. Human history begins with a cutting off of immemorial natural 
history, a tearing itself away from the natural cycle of life and death. 
Although our biology falters and brings us to our end, we die as men, not 
as mere creatures immersed in the world of substantial being. Schelling 
testifies to this insight, and advances it further than other representatives 
of the tradition (despite the fact he simultaneously recoils from, represses, 
the radicality of his own thematization of it242) insofar as, when we examine 
the genealogy of natural history in the Weltalter, we realize that nature is 
not the unconscious proper. Strictly speaking, nature is nonconscious.243 In 
it, we only encounter a pulsation of matter, an annular rotary movement of 
contraction and expansion that follows its own automatic rhythm—what 
we see knows no pure upsurge of the irrevocable forward march of time, 
no dynamic linear temporality, as first witnessed in the human symbolic 
universe, even if its constitutive openness already appears in a “wild” form at 
lower levels of being. Nature eternally repeats itself in an infinite, relatively 
self-enclosed cycle of life and death, day and night, fullness and lack, 
wherein change sediments excruciatingly slowly over inscrutable eons and 
eons through a sluggishly self-developing, self-growing activity. Outside of it, 
there is nothing—everything is caught within an agonizing deadlock insofar 
as there is no room for completely free movement, for there is nothing 
but a symphonized flow of energy within the indivisibility of nature that is 
at the same time, from our perspective, a “blind” oscillation because our 
singularity is there lost. When one looks into nature as that impossible X, 
that je ne sais quoi, which sustains our life as subjects, one is almost forced to 
collapse: in face of the all-encompassing immanent laws of substance, one 
is pushed into an infinitely claustrophobic space. For Žižek we get a sense 
of this all-devouring, all-consuming force when we look inside the body 
and specifically the skull—“the realization that, when we look behind the 
face into the skull, we find nothing; 'there’s no one at home' there, just piles 
of grey matter—it is difficult to tarry with this gap between meaning and 
the pure Real.”244 This raw flow of biochemical and electrical energy is so 
“terrifying” for two reasons. First, it is faceless, personless—it has absolutely 
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nothing to do with either the orbit of phenomenal experience or the human universe 
of meaning. There is no indication of any genuine human quality: we are only 
confronted with anonymous, dull palpitations, which resemble the industrial 
buzzing of automatic machinery, a machinery that may amaze us with its 
complexity and dynamism (the plasticity of the neuronal network) but that 
nevertheless exists as a matrix of closed circuitry locked within its own self-
enclosed, self-sustaining movement, a movement that is not only greater 
than us but also thereby appears to “threaten” our very existence as free 
subjects at every step. Second, the passage from the pure, senseless Real of 
nature in its mechanism to the absolute spontaneity of the I—the rupturing 
advent of a dialectical leap—is stricto sensu inexplicable, for given our 
inability to locate the full-fledged human subject in nature, there is always a 
moment of arbitrariness and fiat.
In the contemporary scientific scene, however, these menacing 
dimensions of the writhing, pulsating material of the Grund and its 
irreconcilable tension with free existence are constantly being brought 
into a new power, because neuroscience puts the very gap itself in question: the 
neuronal Grund, as a seething, all-devouring force, comes closer and closer 
to annihilating the distance from nature necessary for the autonomous 
transcendental constitution of reality, insofar as the fact of experience here 
risks being reduced to a mere epiphenomenon of a complex biological 
interface that uses the I as a system of representation to mediate itself to the 
world. As Žižek reiterates time and time again, “there are two options here: 
either subjectivity is an illusion, or reality itself (not only epistemologically) 
is not-Al.”245 That being said, Žižek's reactualization of Schelling's revamped 
Cartesian positing of the difference between nature (cyclical time, body, 
ground) and human being (dialectical temporality, mind, existence) allows 
him to rethink the significance of contemporary neuroscience. The divide 
between our world of experience and the mechanisms of the natural world 
does not proclaim the irrelevance of the latter for our understanding of 
human subjectivity in face of the pure power of scientific explanatory 
models, their efficacy and statistical guarantee, as perhaps various 
representatives of phenomenological psychiatry or even psychoanalysis 
would advocate. On the contrary, according to Žižek, these models 
adequately describe the Real of our lives with a rigorous vigor and precision 
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never before imaginable by penetrating into the true ontologico-foundational basis 
of experience. Žižek criticizes attempts to respond to the threat announced 
by neuroscience that merely assert the irreducible character of the subject, 
seeing instead the only feasible way to find a solution being to “develop one 
approach to its extreme, radically abstracting from the other—to develop 
the logic of brain science, for instance, at its purest.”246 The question is how 
a parallax gap could emerge from within the self-regulated biochemical and 
electrical activity inside the skull, how “the 'mental' itself explodes within 
the neuronal through a kind of 'ontological explosion.'”247 The question 
and problematic here is distinctly Schellingian: what is the nature of the 
copula in judgement?248 Grund is existence in exactly the same way that the 
neuronal is the mental: the copula here does not primordially distinguish 
a relation of identity or pure equivalence, so that the latter is entirely 
subsumable under the former (ground = existence; the neuronal = the 
mental). It represents an activity that, through the logical self-withdrawal of 
its pervasiveness and primordiality, results in the production of irreducible 
difference (ground generates existence; the neuronal immanently gives rise 
to the mental), wherein each exists as opposite and therefore autonomous 
to one another, although the unpredictably new—a pure difference—that 
emerges nevertheless retains an internal thread of logical dependence upon 
that which gave birth to it at an originary level of theoretical investigation: 
that is, one of ontogenesis, whereby a productive or creative (schöpferisch) 
identity emerges between the irreducibly different terms.249 But one must be 
careful. Grund and existence are just as much “contemporaneous” logical 
relations as stages of historical development. Although the emergent split 
institutes two autonomous zones of activity—or, to speak in the parlance 
of the Weltalter, although the divide in being created by the irreducible 
spontaneity of the unconscious decision or de-scission (Entscheidung as 
Ent-Scheidung) sets the stage for the irreconcilability of the Present and 
the Past as epochs or ages in nature that forever alter it—they both exist 
simultaneously after the act of separation, despite the fact that the Grund also 
represents the dark “pre-history” of existence. It is in this way that the body 
as an independent entity existing in infinite contradistinction to mind can 
still follow its own laws, even if mind ultimately proves itself to be superior 
to its ontogenetic origins by existing in its own free register only in the 
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aftermath of its hegemonizing self-positing or usurping of the primacy of 
body—or, to put it differently, natural cyclical time can still exist alongside, 
albeit in tension with, the out-of-joint dialectical temporality of spirit in 
the same creature. The neuronal interface can subsist in two paradoxical 
times, in the non-coincident two-way pull of the parallax as a multistable 
figure, the eternal “Past” of nonconscious material pulsation and the 
eternal “Present” of self-consciousness, both being “held” together in the 
positively charged void that is the subject as the impossible in-between (the 
vanishing mediator) generated within/by the negativity of being, so that the 
gap that sustains the subjective consistency of the universe of meaning can 
be maintained without denying the autonomy and power of cognitivism to 
describe the pure Real of biochemical and electrical activity that is the brain. 
The two zones are not to be confounded with one another, even though 
in a certain sense there is only the brute matter of the neuronal interface. 
Here we must recognize an implicit wordplay in Schelling: the copula in 
judgement (Urteil) is not merely an act of mind, a mental synthesis bringing 
a subject and predicate into relation with one another, but the expression 
of an act of primordial ontological division (Ur-Teil as ursprüngliche Teilung) 
exhibited by the thing in question with itself.250 The principle of identity 
should be able to explain eruptive breaches in the fold of being instead 
of being doomed to subsume everything under the dead univocity of a 
claustrophobic immanence: “[t]his principle does not give expression to an 
unity which, revolving in a circle of sameness, would be unprogressive, and 
thus insensitive or unalive. The unity of this law is immediately creative.”251 
The copula in judgement is, in this sense, one of Schelling's many 
expressions for a metaphysics of the disjunctive “and.” But what does this 
moment of the breaking of existence out of Grund, of the explosion of the 
Ideal out of the Real, look like? This leads us into a detailed analysis of the 
role of ontological catastrophe in the emergence of experience in being.
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Chapter 8
When the World Opens its Eyes
The Traumatic Fissure of Ontological Catastrophe
Žižek's quadruple dialectics sets forth a conception of the absolute that is 
incomplete, insofar as it has split itself through a moment of primordial 
division into two irreconcilable zones of activity: body and mind, nature 
and spirit, the Real and the Symbolic. However, to explain this moment of 
self-sundering, Žižek must reappropriate various elements from Schellingian 
ontology to articulate the pre-conditions of subjectivity in the throes of 
being, something that the mature Hegel, recoiling from his Jenaer night of 
the world, fails to do. Žižek's provocative claim is that if we attentively read 
Schelling's account of the eruption of a freely existing subjectivity out of a 
nature that becomes infinitely Other, we encounter two startling insights. 
First, the emergence of desire in being as the ontogenetic condition of 
the possibility of subjectivity and phenomenalization displays a structural 
parallel to Schelling's own theory of disease and evil. Second, we must 
follow the implications of this to the end: rather than exhibiting a great 
triumph at the end of the odyssey of being, self-consciousness is merely 
the possible aftereffect of a cancerous negativity in being, an ontological 
catastrophe, which points to an irreversible fracturing of the very essence of 
the world. We will also explore the consequences of this for evolutionary 
theory and contemporary philosophy of mind.
172 Chapter 8
8.1 Desire, the Disease-Stricken Body of Being
Following Schelling's descriptions of the eternal Past forever anterior to 
consciousness and language, a concern immediately arises: when we look 
at the elusive X of nature in the immemorial epochs of cosmological and 
geological time or the evolutionary strata of biological auto-development, 
we encounter an all-encompassing/all-consuming whole that precludes 
the absolute freedom of the subject. Insofar as this self-totalizing causality 
immanent in nature represents a relatively closed circle, how is this 
deterministic “deadlock” surpassed so that autonomy is possible? How 
exactly can the Grund/neuronal interface act in the self-effacing yet world-
giving mode of existence/the mental? Although Žižek's own descriptions 
of the passage in The Indivisible Remainder and The Abyss of Freedom 
focus on the founding gesture of subjectivity as a self-instituting fiat, this 
is not enough. It is only one side of the story. The question is how the 
undifferentiated circuit of drives that constitute the pre-logical Real could 
paradoxically ground—give rise to or help incite—the irreducible self-
positing act of decision. As Adrian Johnston argues, although this self-
positing is ultimately an arbitrary, groundless act “analogous to the cutting 
of the Gordian knot”—which, as Žižek himself says, “can be described 
(narrated) only post festum, after it has already taken place, since we are 
dealing not with a necessary act but with a free act which could also not 
have happened”252—Schelling himself searches for a way to inscribe the very 
condition of the possibility of the act itself within the material palpitations 
of nature, in works that Žižek for the most part does not discuss.253 In this 
sense, Žižek's own account is not satisfactory because it has a tendency 
to present the drives as an irrevocably closed and blind system without 
explaining how of themselves they could short-circuit, a theoretical point 
that would be advantageous to his overall project.
As Johnston points out, within the Schellingian ontogenetic narrative, 
the self-positing of the subject is first possiblized by the emergence of desire 
(Begierde) within being. Desire marks the first juncture of some kind of 
primordial blockage in the heart of blind necessity that upsets the automatic, 
unbridled oscillation of drives by shattering their pure immanence. This 
has two effects. First, in psychoanalytical terms, it means that instead of a 
relative homeostasis as the inner telos guiding the entirety of an organism's 
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biological life, we see for the first time a relative short-circuiting within 
the pleasure principle, an inability to find satisfaction through the mere 
repetition of the same constitutive of the movement of instincts. Second, 
in place of a smooth, determined relation to the environment wholly 
programmed by instincts (the coincidence of Innenwelt and Aussenwelt 
through a predetermined set of biological schemata that hardwire the 
organism into its “exterior” surroundings) we get a degree of liberation from 
the various sense data of perception that normally mechanically determine 
an organism's actions as it enters into a state of denaturalization that is 
contemporaneous with an act of withdrawing from its immersion in being, 
and thereby the first stirrings of a free creation of a world of experience. 
Desire in its Schellingian mode is thus an intermediary stage between nature 
and the violent unruliness that is the dark birthplace of the transcendental 
I. But what must be noted here is how desire, as the beginning of the 
idealization of reality, is essentially identical to the conventional definitions 
of psychosis as withdrawal from objective reality into self, but here at the 
ontological level instead of that of sociopolitically structured reality. Consequently, 
it is Schelling and not Hegel who most succinctly describes the ontological 
passage through madness insofar as it is the former and not the latter who 
describes how the night of the world could disrupt the world into a series of 
membra disjecta. In this respect, when Žižek in The Ticklish Subject and Less 
Than Nothing proclaims that it is Hegel who is the most radical philosopher 
of the abyss of madness at the core of subjectivity and the minimal paranoia 
at the basis of order itself,254 he appears to be completely unaware of how 
strongly his reading of Schelling influences his own reactualization of 
German Idealism. On his own account, not only is the Schellingian concept 
of the erratic oscillation of drives that precedes fully constituted reality 
the expression of the abyss of madness at the core of subjectivity, which 
Schelling himself supplements with the emergence of desire/ontological 
madness in being, but at the end of the first chapter of The Indivisible 
Remainder Žižek discusses Schelling's great insight into the necessarily 
paranoiac structure of universality as such, a point made explicit for the first 
time by Lacan, thus establishing a link between the two.255 
In this sense, in both Žižekian and Schellingian ontology we can speak 
of something like a spectrum of subjectivity or ideality inherent within 
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nature. Following this claim literally, we must say that we come across 
traces of desire within other organisms to varying degrees: there is a kind 
of quantitative accumulation of desire (an evolutionary genesis) that may 
lead to a complete qualitative break with nature (the splitting act of Ent-
Scheidung) but in such a way that the possibility of the latter is not logically 
contained within the former as a kind of hidden, self-unfolding kernel—
rather, the former can only incite it, so that only after the fact can we 
establish a “relation” between the two. There is no guarantee for freedom in 
the realm of mere being. Yet, what desire shows us is that the pure Real is 
not completely all-consuming: it is teeming with crevices within its positive 
fold, interstices within its being, which present a restless negativity tearing 
it apart. However, these sites of negativity are to be distinguished from 
human subjectivity insofar as despite expressing a minimal level of liberation 
from nature's cycles, they are unable to completely liberate themselves 
from nature's biological hardwiring and thus seek a new form of non-
natural (virtual) organization. In this respect, they would only resemble the 
primordial unruliness prior to the advent of the Symbolic insofar as they 
would not exhibit a violent process of utter denaturalization, although we 
must nevertheless speak of a tension-ridden trembling of the organic system 
as it begins to quiver under its own weight.
It is for this reason that Žižek can adopt Heidegger's claim in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics that animals feel “the ‘poorness’ of 
their relating to the world” in such a way that we see “an infinite pain 
pervading the whole of living nature.”256 As Žižek points out, this shares 
common ground with Schelling's notion of “the veil of despondency 
that spreads itself over nature.”257 But we must understand this pain or 
despondency in nature in two separate but interrelated ways. First, one 
could say that in desire as the beginnings of the idealization, that is, of the 
world's psychotic replication of itself within itself, animals have a kind of implicit 
yet nonconscious “knowledge” that they are unfree because they exist in a 
mode of unfathomable tension between the Real (instinctual-deterministic 
schemata) and the Ideal (desire as a blockage), but without this distinction 
being posited as such, as if here the Ideal has begun to inhere/persist within 
the Real, disrupting it from the inside, without yet being autonomous. The 
Real rules supreme—and not only has full-fledged ideality not yet emerged 
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in being, but what we encounter here may only be referred to as a form 
of ontological proto-ideality once ideality in its freedom has come on the 
scene, that is, retroactively. By consequence, the slightest tinge of desire 
within the biological system that is supposed to determine the animal's 
reaction with its environment in advance through a pre-set logistics gives 
it, as it were, a taste of its own possible, but unreachable freedom, the 
animal being liberated yet confined in its movement. It is this simultaneous 
nonconscious “dreamlike” premonition of subjective freedom and its 
ultimate ontological foreclosure that constitutes nature's despondency or 
melancholy (Schwermut). But it must be noted that the “despondency” 
or “melancholy” of nature is not a moment of mere poetical rhetoric or 
uncalled-for anthropomorphism. As Henri Maldiney points out, Heidegger's 
descriptions of living beings as plagued by a constitutive Benommenheit 
(captivation, dazedness) coincide with that “mode of being of the type 
melancolicus” elaborated by Tellenbach.258 If nature is overcome by a veil of 
despondency, it is because non-human life is wrought by a structure that is, 
for us, distinctively pathological: it is as if it is held back, stuck in its tracks, 
because it is incapable of a truly effective willing. Second, with emergence 
of desire, the self-sustaining circuitry of nature becomes disturbed by the 
interruptive presence of an extimacy, an inassimilable Real, within its very 
ebb and flow, causing its relatively balanced rotation to fall into a painful 
deadlock, an erratic oscillation of conflictual tendencies that become more 
and more uncontrollable as desire increases. If the animal gets its first taste 
of freedom in desire, then nature in the same moment gets the first taste of 
the madness that awaits it if this freedom were to fully actualize itself (the 
night of the world). Nature's pain is the unsteady, unpredictable palpitation 
of its heart of hearts threatening to explode in one excessive outburst as 
Todestrieb begins to awaken itself, but because it has yet to self-accumulate 
to a great intensity, and nothing has arisen to tame this propensity, there is 
a bleak darkness of antagonism. What is at issue here is the state of nature 
that precedes and sets the stage for humanity as a response; the emphasis 
is not on us, but rather on ontogenetic conditions, so that the apparent 
anthropomorphization of nature is coincident with the dehumanization of 
humanity, for inscribing desire into being is identical with taking it away 
from us as a privileged attribute.
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The Žižekian night of the world emerges as the nonconscious drives of 
nature for the first time liberate themselves from their blind rotation in being 
through an immanently generated pandemonium within the corpo-Real 
of the body. Properly speaking, desire is an impasse within the ontological 
life of substance—“[s]ince there is consequently an unremitting urge to be 
and since it cannot be, it comes to a standstill in desire, as an unremitting 
striving, an eternally insatiable obsession with Being”259—that prevents 
substance from encompassing all, for the organism now obeys its own 
non-natural logic. It stands for the irremovable and impenetrable kernel 
of the Real qua logical paradox/internal limit that disturbs the annular 
circulation of drives through its own self-assertive violence. Here, the 
analogue with the body again proves to be useful to perceive the radicality 
of Žižek's reactualization of Schelling. Although the biological unity of 
the corpo-Real can astound us with its organic dynamism and systematic 
efficacy, the very awe-inspiring force of this self-organizing totality can cast 
a shadow over its dark underbelly, whose traumatic fact is often attested by 
nature's production of monstrosities, degenerative diseases, the mindless 
proliferation of cancerous tumors, or even the emergence of various forms 
of mental illness and psychosis caused by pure organic dysfunction, a fact 
that demonstrates how, from within the closed totality of a determinist 
system, a part can assert itself from within and hegemonize the organic 
whole, restructuring it according to its own “unruly” whim and thereby 
perturbing its harmonious, symphonized flow. Even if everything is logically 
pre-determined (the ebb and flow of matter can only follow certain paths 
carved out by genetics, the neuronal interface of the brain, and various 
different autopoietic systems), the laws that normally regulate the body 
can by themselves immanently generate a (bio)logical short circuit, thereby 
opening up a negative space within the body's corpo-Real that can assert 
itself and wreak havoc over its self-governing unity through a glitch in its 
programming. That which guarantees the placid functioning of everyday life 
and the health of body can suddenly turn into a ghastly apparition of true 
terror. Like an illness or disease within Schellingian ontology, desire does 
not stand for a positive ontological unity, but for an internal scrambling 
of the biological system that does not follow its supposed path within the 
whole and instead stubbornly asserts its own self at all costs—even its own 
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dismal downfall by obstructing its own life source. A false unity, it simultaneously 
represents an ontological perversion and a metaphysical distortion: freedom 
is a devouring black hole, a mere disturbance, in the vital throes of being. In 
this context, Žižek talks of Jacques-Alain Miller's remarks on an unsettling 
rat experiment mentioned in one of Lacan's unpublished seminars, where 
it is only through a kind of neurological mutilation that a rat can be made 
to behave like a human. Formally, the specific character that distinguishes 
human freedom and separates it from the rest of the world is identical to 
rampant malfunction, a violent ontological disfiguring.260 
As the force of desire is raised to a higher and higher degree of ideality, 
matter enters into a self-lacerating rage (sich selbst zereißende Wut) like a 
cancer-ridden, disease-stricken body howling under its own out-of-control 
energy.261 Desire is a self-destructive mania that tears apart the smooth 
fabric of the world. This is why Žižek finds Schelling's “Wagnerian” vision of 
God so terrifying. It depicts a being that, by means of the painful, crippling 
amplification of desire into Todestrieb, becomes completely denaturalized 
and can thus posit itself as distinct from the anonymous, faceless pulsation 
of substance by the carving up of a self: “[t]he horror of the rotary motion 
resides in the fact that it is no longer impersonal: God already exists as 
One, as the Subject who suffers and endures the antagonism of drives,” “a 
state of an endless 'pleasure in pain,' agonizing and struggling with Himself, 
affected by an unbearable anxiety.”262 The primordial unruliness of human 
nature and its coequal term diabolical evil are therefore synonymous with 
this grotesque excess of life that we witness in the breakdown of the corpo-
Real in times of illness, with what occurs when the self-enclosed logic of 
nature auto-disrupts through pure dysfunction. In this regard, the freedom 
of the subject—that anarchic state that precedes the birth of the Symbolic 
as a form of retroactive damage control—is not a positive characteristic 
or attribute: it is the failure of the auto-actualization of the essence of 
nature, its inability to contain itself within its own preset logistics, which 
causes an ontological catastrophe.263 As Žižek makes clear in an interview, 
when viewed from the standpoint of the natural world we can only even 
understand the peculiarity of (self-) consciousness and human intelligence 
by positing something going horribly wrong in its internal development:
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Žižek. What I am currently engaged with is the paradoxical 
idea that, from a strict evolutionary standpoint, consciousness 
is a kind of mistake—a malfunction of evolution—and 
that out of this mistake a miracle emerged. That is to say, 
consciousness developed as an unintended by-product 
that acquired a kind of second-degree survivalist function. 
Basically, consciousness is not something which enables us 
to function better. On the contrary, I am more and more 
convinced that consciousness originates with something going 
terribly wrong—even at the most personal level. For example, 
when do we become aware of something, fully aware? Precisely 
at the point where something no longer functions properly or 
not in the expected way.
Daly. Consciousness comes about as a result of some 
Real encounter? 
Žižek. Yes, consciousness is originally linked to this moment 
when “something is wrong,” or, to put it in Lacanian terms, 
an experience of the Real, of an impossible limit. Original 
awareness is impelled by a certain experience of failure and 
mortality—a kind of snag in the biological weave. And all the 
metaphysical dimensions concerning humanity, philosophical 
self-reflection, progress and so on emerge ultimately because 
of this basic traumatic fissure.264 
8.2 Malfunction, Mal-adaptation, Breakdown:  
Žižek and the Sciences
We should pause for a moment and consider this Žižekian notion of 
a “snag in the biological weave” in order to draw out its full meaning 
and implications for our understanding of the sciences, which will 
simultaneously allow us to show that such an ontogenetic account of 
the emergence of Todestrieb is not enough to explain the emergence of 
subjectivity. Taken at a purely formal level, both standard accounts of 
evolution and Žižek's theory of the ontogenesis of the subject appear to 
share a fundamental presupposition. Functioning through random mishaps 
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in the self-replication of genetic code producing new, unforeseeable 
ontological differences in living being, neo-Darwinian evolution is rendered 
possible by a moment of malfunction, error, the always possible upsurge 
of inconsistency in the “rhythmic” flow of nature. Irreversible mutations 
form the basal and primordial stuff from which life gains its mercurial 
character. Consequently, for modern-day biology, nature too is not-all 
insofar as there is no eternal, overarching unity in the vital energetics of 
substance, no all-inclusive weave with a preset structure, plan, or predictable 
movement: there are constant slips and slides in positive reality, glitches 
and functional disturbances. Evolution is nothing other than nature 
encountering its own real limit, which proves to be the actual driving force 
of material creation and change: its weakness does not prove to be a mere 
limitation, a deficiency, but is often even its strength, allowing its forms to 
endure by adaption. However, what we could call the biological movement 
of the negative is only able to ground this transformative activity insofar 
as it sets up a new “dialectic” between organism and environment. As 
malfunction slowly and contingently gives rise to new characteristics by 
the sedimentation of small changes over the sluggish march of evolutionary 
time, an automatic rubric of natural selection occurs: those who are, by 
pure chance, more “fit” for their particular niche survive and pass on the 
biological glitch that, paradoxically, shows itself retroactively to have been 
a source of force and power, making those that were not struck by accident 
with the given mishap of self-replication in question disadvantageous, 
leading them to die out. Though here the possibility of monstrosities 
coincides with the possibility for new natural forms, a new emergent logistic 
is able to subsume both within a greater system of the struggle for life and 
death, even if this struggle is, in and of itself, non-teleological.
For Žižek, however, this naturalistic account of biological “negativity” 
within being at the level of the self-reproduction of organisms does not go 
far enough. Although he agrees with its fundamental presuppositions—
nature as not-all, as driven forward by an internal yet productive 
inconsistency—he believes that the mechanism of neo-Darwinian evolution 
is unable to explain the emergence of subjectivity because it falls back 
into the trap of an organic theory of nature. Even if it does not posit 
an indwelling, necessary tendency for progression, a forward-moving 
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advancement towards more sophisticated life-forms, the “dialectic” between 
organism and environment is all-inclusive: the law of self-preservation and 
homeostasis becomes so primordial that even a mishap in reproduction 
becomes ultimately subsumed under a species' attempt to assert itself and 
stay alive, so that the moment of the negative retroactively posits itself 
as being always already a teleologically guided, rational development. In 
other words, we can always give reasons as to why this or that evolutionary 
feature benefited the organism as a being immersed in the natural cycle of 
life and death. Even if within the naturalistic viewpoint nature/substance is 
in a certain respect not-all—there is nothing guaranteeing its completion—
it does not go far enough, for nothing transcends its grasp. There may 
be conflict and negativity within the system, but this in no way poses a 
problem to the inner algorithm of its biological “dialectics.” The problem 
with this theoretical position is that it fails to see how the subject, haunted 
by Todestrieb, demonstrates that there is no single overarching principle of 
explanation, that there is a “place” in nature that is, strictly speaking, non-
natural and defines itself against the rhythm of life and death, fullness and lack: 
the negativity that opens up the space for self-consciousness cannot be, 
even retroactively, subsumed within an evolutionary narrative of survival. 
Scientific methodology cannot explain the human, for the zero-level (= 
unruliness) of experience not only provides no functional advantage in 
nature, but even disturbs the dialectic of organism and environment because 
it cuts the link between Innenwelt and Aussenwelt. As Žižek says, “we should 
bear in mind the basic anti-Darwinian lesson of psychoanalysis repeatedly 
emphasized by Lacan: man’s radical and fundamental dis-adaptation, mal-
adaptation, to his environs,”265 a point not only argued for by Lacan, but 
also by Kant and Fichte at the beginning of the German Idealist tradition.266 
In his own work on cognitive science, Žižek attempts to show for this 
very reason how a variety of cognitive scientists and neurophilosophers falter 
at the enigma of consciousness and thereby create a plurality of approaches 
at odds with one another. He divides the latter into four groups, which cover 
the logical possibilities of explaining consciousness in terms of the standard 
natural model (sadly, the details of each on the Žižekian reading must be left 
aside here):
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I. eliminative/reductive materialism: the proclamation that there is 
no such thing as consciousness and qualitative experience is a 
“naturalized” illusion (Patricia and Paul Churchland);
II. the antimaterialist position: the necessity of positing a 
new fundamental force of nature yet to be discovered 
(David Chalmers);
III. the inherent inexplicability of consciousness: given the “cognitive 
closure” limiting knowledge, we must assert that the birthplace 
of conscious awareness is unknowable, even if it did arise out of 
materiality (Colin McGinn, Steve Pinker);
IV. an “as-if” non-reductive materialism: consciousness exists, and we 
can use teleological language to describe it, but it has emerged 
entirely due to natural laws and can ultimately be completely 
subsumed within them (Daniel Dennett).267 
What remains common to each of these approaches, according to Žižek, 
is the failure of a purely scientific account of consciousness. In typical 
psychoanalytical style, it is the places where these discourses reach an 
impasse, where their symbolic space is internally obstructed, that are the 
most revealing; paradoxically, this occurs whenever they face the essentials of 
the very object of their investigation. Whether it be (i) the outright dismissal of 
self-consciousness reflexivity as a pseudo-problem, (ii) the thesis that the 
only way to inscribe the singularity of consciousness within nature is to posit 
a new force comparable to gravity or electromagnetism, (iii) entirely giving 
up any possible material explanation of consciousness, or (iv) the forced 
attempt to understand conscious reflexivity as a purely natural phenomenon, 
the closed loop of infinite self-relating that is the condition of the possibility of self-
consciousness is itself the impasse of each discourse, for consciousness cannot be 
naturalized. This leads Žižek to say: “I am therefore tempted to apply here 
the dialectical reversal of epistemological obstacle into positive ontological 
condition: what if the 'enigma of consciousness,' its inexplicable character, 
contains its own solution? What if all we have to do is to transpose the gap 
which makes consciousness (as the object of our study) 'inexplicable' into 
consciousness itself?”268 Either by trying to bypass the problem by fiat ([i] 
completely eliminating the object, “consciousness,” or [iv] stripping it of 
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its singular character as ideal self-reflexivity—both an attempt to show the 
theoretical prowess of materialism) or by tackling it head-on ([ii] declaring 
the irreducibility of mind or [iii] making a possible materialist explanation 
disappear—both an attempt to demonstrate the necessity of idealism), 
what each option shows, positively or negatively, is that the self-reflexivity 
constitutive of consciousness is a disruption of natural laws that demands a 
new metaphysical vision of the world.
For these reasons, Žižek does not locate the moment of malfunction 
constitutive of the subject at the level of genetic mutation and, in a second 
step, he refuses to equate it completely with a breakdown of the libidinal-
material ground of nature. It goes beyond a scientifically measurable 
“unit of change” (even if is ultimately incited by a certain series of genetic 
mutations) insofar as it breaks with all totalizing, homogenizing principles or 
laws. As a closed loop of infinite self-relating, consciousness can only be made 
possible by a prior psychotic withdrawal of the world into its nocturnal, 
ontologically solipsistic self, the primordial rupture dividing Innenwelt and 
Aussenwelt. It is this founding gesture that sets an internal limit to scientific 
models because it obstructs the “dialectic” of organism and environment: 
the self-organizing, instinctual schemata offered by our genetic code go 
haywire in the life of the organism, so that we are no longer immersed in 
the world through a preset logistical program, but open up a space within 
which we are able to freely relate to it as an Other. The point is not to search 
for how the raw immediacy of the brute Real of neurons and their ancestral 
history in immemorial time dissipates the primordiality of self-experience, 
but how the irreducible reflexivity that sustains consciousness itself emerges 
from within the brute, faceless abyss of asubjective brain matter in such a 
way that the former remains incommensurate with latter, even if the latter is 
its obscure birthplace. Relying upon John Taylor's theory of consciousness, 
Žižek locates this primordial act of ontological division at a very specific 
point: through the relation of past working memory to present input, present 
experience spontaneously acquires the ability to relate to itself through a 
detour through the (its) past, the condition of which is “bubbles” of neuronal 
activity in local cortical regions establishing complex feedback systems. It 
is this direct self-instituting short-circuiting that allows for free, infinitely 
self-standing thought, the ease, energy and speed of mental operations, in 
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contradistinction to the complex mediative channels of neuronal activity 
that produced the organism as a biological system, for it allows present 
experience to liberate itself radically from a mere attachment to input.269 In 
a flash, the organism stops being determined through external conditions, 
but creates a zone within which it can relate to itself as a self so that bit by 
bit this self-relation takes charge of instinctual schemata. For Žižek, this 
“short circuit” or “(bio)logical glitch” between various faculties within 
the brain—a kind of naturally inexplicable overlapping that creates the 
possibility of psychotic self-relation, which, just like Schelling's account of 
the self-begetting of God, “can be described (narrated) only post festum, 
after it has already taken place, since we are dealing not with a necessary 
act but with a free act which could also not have happened”270—as a meta-
transcendental condition of consciousness is related only in a derivative 
or secondary sense to the “malfunction” so fundamental to the process of 
neo-Darwinian evolution.This is true for two reasons. First, it makes itself 
superior to the natural basis that paves the way for it and thereby elevates 
itself above it. Second, it is not predictable from the mere level of genetic 
mutation. In this sense, not only is it a pure self-positing that depends 
on nothing but itself (even if it is incited by a genetic mutation, it remains 
irreducible to and logically distinct from it: it is a mere neuronal mishap, 
a disruptive emergence in the interstices of the logical network sustained 
by the biochemical and electrical interface of brain matter), but this 
capacity for self-assertion also allows it to liberate itself from its immersion/
imprisonment in the natural world (the generated closed loop of self-relation 
breaks the interpenetration of Innenwelt and Aussenwelt in such a way that it 
cannot be retroactively subsumed within a survivalist narrative of newfound 
functionality, even if it does manage to acquire a second-degree survivalist 
function). Genetic mutation, the “dialectics” of organism and environment, 
and with it the breakdown of the libidinal-material ground of the organism, 
may be necessary for explaining the origins of subjectivity, but they are not 
sufficient. For full-fledged subjectivity to emerge, natural breakdown must 
paradoxically double itself.
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8.3 Terror, Perplexity, and the Awakening of the World
Situating his own philosophical project within the heritage of German 
Idealism, Žižek's psychoanalytical reactualization of the Schellingian 
eruptive logic of the Grund is an attempt to show how the subject is not 
external to the absolute. In other words, the gaze of the subject in Žižekian 
ontology must be seen as the material universe finally “gaining” the power 
to look upon itself through an internal reflection: “the whole domain of the 
representation of the world (call it mind, spirit, language, consciousness, or 
whatever medium you prefer) needs to be understood as an event within 
and of the world itself. Thought is not at all opposed to being, it is rather 
being's replication within itself.”271 As the dense, closed circuitry of nature 
dissolves under the impact of the Todestrieb, it gives way to the possibility 
of the “miracle”272 of human thinking and its free idealization of the world 
as immanent in the latter. However, this moment of parallax shift from 
mere being to thought must be taken for what it is. Within the ancestral 
genealogy of forgotten, phenomenologically inaccessible time, the system 
of nature slowly and contingently grows in complexity, eventually reaching 
its autopoietic apotheosis in the structure of the brain, which, because 
of its some one hundred billion neurons possessing a total of at least one 
hundred trillion synaptic connections, thereby displaying one hundred times 
more synapses than the estimated number of stars in our galaxy, is unable 
to hold itself together according to its own immanent, self-regulating laws. 
Unintended loops and gaps in its processes become visible as they writhe 
under the infinite pressure of their own labyrinthine intricacy, nature failing 
to find its own way in its own production. Substance falls into deadlock: 
with the emergence of the complex neuronal interface of man, it can no 
longer successfully posit itself as a fragile all, and it breaks into a series of 
membra disjecta, which opens up the space within which the self-enclosed 
loop of experience asserts itself out of nowhere, further intruding upon 
and obstructing its activity from within. All at once and as if in a cosmic 
flash, through an accident of overlapping in the neuronal network, material 
being encounters its own internal limit amplified to the maximum and the 
world opens its eyes: with the rise of subjectivity it appears that an unsolvable 
glitch in the smooth functioning of its own inward-dwelling logic posits 
itself as such, enabling the world for the first time to find the distance to 
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self necessary for its own self-phenemonalization by virtue of a shock, 
a blow, a violence, for which it itself is responsible. The claustrophobic 
immanence that drowns everything in the blind void of non-experience is 
finally shattered—yet when the world finally opens its eyes for the very first 
time in the mode of subjectivity it does not rejoice, it does not celebrate, nor 
does it feel a passive, grateful joy from the beauty surrounding it and bask 
in the bliss aroused by the wonder and amazement of the brute fact of its 
existence. It whimpers under its own weight, hearing its own inarticulate cry 
as it experiences itself in a moment of unbearable agony and catastrophic 
self-diremption, “a mixture of terror and perplexity” that Žižek compares to 
the atrocity of sexual abuse and the horrific pictures of children dying from 
radiation exposure in Chernobyl:
Although one of today's main candidates for the figure of Evil 
is child sexual abuse, there is nevertheless something in the 
image of a hurt, vulnerable child which makes it unbearably 
touching: the figure of a child, between two and five years 
old, deeply wounded but retaining a defiant attitude, his face 
and poise remaining stubborn, although he is barely able to 
prevent an outburst of tears—is this not one of the figures of 
the Absolute? One thinks here about the photos of children 
dying from exposure to radiation after the Chernobyl accident, 
or—also from Ukraine—one of the photos on a child-porn 
website showing a really young child, no more than four years 
old, confronting a big ejaculating penis, face covered with fresh 
sperm. Although the shot probably plays on the link between 
the penis ejaculating sperm and the mother’s breast full of 
milk, the expression on the child's face is clearly a mixture 
of terror and perplexity: the child cannot make out what is 
going on.273 
What the world first sees is not its own awe-striking unity and oneness, 
the spiritual fullness of a self-seizing, self-actualizing centre that holds 
everything together in an all-encompassing totality. All it discerns is the 
tumultuous uproar of erratic pulsation, an insurmountable, non-masterable 
chaos resulting from the degradation or collapse of its own positive, 
autopoietic activity. The self-awareness of the world, its self-experience 
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in the first person as made possible by the existence of subjectivity and 
thus all experience as such, is necessarily preceded by this irreducible 
and irreversible auto-disruption that must be seen as catastrophic. The 
ontogenetic basis of subjectivity is the trauma of primordial loss, where 
nature is forever alienated from itself through complete breakdown (N 
≠ N), so that we must say that the subject is paradoxically that which 
has survived its own death, for “the past traumatic loss of substance [...] 
is constitutive of the very dimension of subjectivity”274—or as Schelling 
himself puts it, “[p]ain is something universal and necessary in all life, the 
unavoidable transition point to freedom [...]. It is the path to glory.”275 But 
this is no mere rhetoric on behalf of Žižek: as his Schellingian-inspired 
argument makes clear, this psychosis-inducing auto-disruption of being is 
a necessary theoretical posit if free experience is to be possible instead of a 
blind experiential void:
We cannot pass directly from nature to culture. Something 
goes terribly wrong in nature: nature produces an unnatural 
monstrosity and I claim that it is in order to cope with, to 
domesticate, this monstrosity that we symbolize. Taking 
Freud's fort/da as a model: something is primordially broken 
(the absence of the mother and so on) and symbolization 
functions as a way of living with that kind of trauma.276 
In short, the ontological necessity of “madness” resides 
in the fact that it is not possible to pass directly from the 
“animal soul” immersed in its natural life-world to “normal” 
subjectivity dwelling in its symbolic universe—the vanishing 
mediator between the two is the “mad” gesture of radical 
withdrawal from reality that opens up the space for its 
symbolic reconstitution.277 
The implication of this is that the Symbolic (the reconstitution of reality, 
the world's self-replication within itself) is nothing but an attempt to tame, 
to gentrify this constitutive mayhem/madness in the immanent fold of 
being. But it must be insisted that this can only be accomplished at the 
level of the virtual: “[t]he third moment which 'resolves' the contradiction 
is by definition 'prothetic' (virtual, artificial, symbolic, not substantially 
natural).”278 When the world “perceives itself” as lost to self and infinitely 
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dirempt (N ≠ N as the originary [onto]logical violence preceding and 
possibilizing transcendental imagination) in the mode of subjectivity, it 
recoils into culture as a defence mechanism to try to sublate this gap in 
its being, to fill in this hole in its depths and thereby posits itself as such 
as a full-fledged subjectivity.279 In short, the passage from darkness to 
light only occurs at the level of the Symbolic: in the Real, nothing changes, 
unruliness (our break from nature) is left untouched. It is this aspect of the 
intrinsic madness of culture, language, and phenomenal reality, its psychotic 
lack of contact with the world, that Žižek claims we forget, that we must 
necessarily forget, if the transcendental misrecognition of reality necessary to 
subjectification as a reaction formation is to be a successful “compensation.” 
All our discourses, all our “truths,” are nothing but the deluded ravings 
of the asylum unaware of their true origin within the founding gesture 
of subjectivity as a recoil spurred on by the brutal trauma of violently 
awakening up into a dismembering hemorrhaging of being, the ultimate 
ontological catastrophe. All the beauty of the world merely belies its true, 
unbearable horror: “[i]f we take into consideration the many terrible things 
in nature and the spiritual world and the great many other things that a 
benevolent hand seems to cover up from us, then we could not doubt that 
[the ego] sits enthroned over a world of terrors.”280 In this respect, “the true 
point of 'madness' [...] is not the pure excess of the ‘night of the world,' but 
the madness of the passage to the Symbolic itself, of imposing a symbolic 
order onto the chaos of the Real. If madness is constitutive, then every 
system of meaning is minimally paranoid, 'mad.'”281 Paradoxically, the world 
can only become known to itself—being can only replicate itself within 
thought—if its medium of self-disclosure operates “with no external support 
of its truth,”282 without ever touching the Real.283 
Accordingly, Schellingian desire must be said to be the beginning of 
being's withdrawal into its nocturnal, irreal self and that which opens up the 
space necessary for ego development as symptom formation (a defence). 
Following various hints and gestures in the middle-late Schelling, Žižek 
takes premonitions of the psychoanalytical experience of mind-body discord 
and brings to the fore their underlying eruptive logic. This leads him to the 
idea of Grund and existence as a dialectically irreconcilable pair emerging 
through the caustic collapse of being as it gains notional self-reflexivity, 
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this being the fundamental logical moment for understanding how his own 
parallax ontology can bring together a materialism and a self-grounding 
idealism. It is not the mediating filters of language that are primordially 
responsible for our lack of access to extra-subjective reality due to some 
internal limitation—rather, it is reality itself that renders impossible its own 
access to itself. The Symbolic is always already revelatory of the nature of 
the world, albeit in an intrinsically negative manner: the prison house of 
language, our inability to “transcend” it and grasp reality as it is in itself,284 
necessarily refers to the material processes that gave birth to the alienating 
linguistic-conceptual structures that permanently rob us of the immediacy 
of being. Psychosis is not the feature of a single isolated subject lost in 
disarray—it is the rite of passage of becoming a subject, a point explicitly 
brought to the fore by Lacan285 and that justifies rereading Schelling 
through Lacanian psychoanalysis. It is no accident that both Schelling's 
Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen and the third draft of the Weltalter contain at 
a crucial point a meditation on the relationship between subjectivity and 
madness and the latter's irreducibility (in the former when discussing the 
soul's higher faculties, in the latter at the very end of the book of the Past): 
“[u]nderstanding, if it is to be an actual, living and active understanding, is 
therefore properly nothing other than a coordinated madness”;286 “[f]or in 
what does the intellect prove itself than in the coping with and governance 
and regulation of madness? [...] Without continuous solicitation of it, there 
would be no consciousness.”287 
The difficult paradox of Žižek’s metaphysical archaeology of the 
subject is that it is only through this ontological catastrophe that the true 
“miracle”288 of human thinking can emerge, so that there is a speculative 
identity between the highest (that which sustains and creates the 
autonomous sphere of spirit in its dialectical creativity) and the lowest (the 
irrevocable alienation of being to itself, its schismatic auto-disruption that 
produces a non-natural excess). As that which thereby negatively binds 
together materialism and idealism, the impossible in-between that is the 
subject is neither Real nor Symbolic insofar as it dialectically coincides with 
both modalities simultaneously, yet is also outside of them, thus rendering 
its status as a vanishing mediator undecidable. In both, it is internally 
contained as external, present as absent, included as excluded. The subject 
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is therefore infinitely non-coincidental and contradictory: having no place 
in either mind or body, it can only show itself as the caustic breakdown of 
substance (N ≠ N) or in the fleeting, ephemeral distortions of symbolic 
space between signifiers ($), but these two traces fail to grasp its essence 
in its purity, for the subject is more than the material collapse of being and 
the limits of discourse. But what is more, not only is the subject outside 
the Symbolic because it is minimally non-coincident with it, but insofar as 
it is at its very origin and must withdraw in order for the Symbolic to take 
hold, we need a new form of language even to discuss its genesis out of pre-logical 
antagonism, since not even the inconsistencies of our notional apparatus 
could thus aid us to explain its pure upsurge. The subject is “a non-provable 
presupposition, something whose existence cannot be demonstrated but 
only inferred through the failure of its direct demonstration.”289 As a result, 
the metaphysical archaeology of the subject I have been executing contains 
a necessary moment of speculative fabulation to fill in the unavoidable gaps of 
the narrative of how thought arises within the flat plane of being.
Here, however, we encounter a major methodological difficulty. 
Drawing upon Schellingian ontology to embark upon such a mytho-poetic 
articulation of how substance could act in the self-effacing, self-sundering 
mode of subjectivity presents an immediate problem to those who are 
familiar with the texts upon which Žižek relies, for the Freiheitsschrift 
and the Weltalter display the structure of a quaternity, with a principle 
exterior to the dynamic of Grund and existence that ties them together as 
androgynous opposites in a point of absolute indifference, an Ungrund, 
whose conceptual contours appear to have starkly different consequences 
for human self-consciousness and culture, namely, that humans participate 
in the theo-cosmogonic drama of God's search for self-manifestedness in 
creation, or to put it differently, in the emergence of “the cosmos (of fully 
constituted reality, ruled by logos) out of the proto-cosmic pre-ontological 
chaos.”290 According to this picture, ontological catastrophe (the subject) 
is less a cataclysmic breakdown than part of the inherent negativity in the 
intimate life of God that makes His personality truly alive. Only through 
the preclusion of a theosophic philosophy of nature as the illusion that there 
is “a secret, invisible, all-powerful agent who effectively 'pulls the strings' 
behind the visible, public Power... [an] obscene, invisible power structure 
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acts the part of the 'Other of the Other' in the Lacanian sense, the part of the 
meta-guarantee of the consistency of the big Other (the symbolic order that 
regulates social life),”291 can Žižek ground his reading of the ontogenesis of 
the subject by identifying the act of decision—the pure self-positing of the I 
that separates Grund from existence for the first time—with the self-assertive 
violence of evil and disease. Because there is no God who needs a being like 
Himself in order to recognize Himself as Himself through a mirror that is 
His Other, the irreducible freedom of the human subject can only be seen 
as an ontologically narcissistic disturbance of the relatively ordered whole of 
nature: there can be no internal teleology guided by divine understanding 
and will whereby man participates in the divine drama of being's search 
for self-disclosure. Nature is not the primordial, first revelation of God,292 
but the obscure basis of subjectivity, that against which it defines itself by a 
self-caused break. Rejecting the theosophic Ungrund central to Schelling's 
middle-late texts, Žižek sees traces of a disavowed analytic of finitude 
within them that, wrought with self-destructive, self-sabotaging tendencies, 
can paradoxically efface itself in the production of an extimate kernel of 
negativity, which then, in another moment, hegemonically takes over. In 
this sense, Žižek's own ontology—just like his work on Hegel—must be 
understood as an attempt to psychoanalytically construct the unconscious 
truth of Schelling's thinking by demonstrating how “his thought—for a brief 
moment, as it were in a flash—renders visible something that was invisible 
beforehand and withdrew into invisibility thereafter,” and how this tension 
constitutes the central difficulty of his theosophic epic.293 What, then, 
motivates and philosophically founds Žižek's violent “reactualization” of the 
Schellingian subject? To come to terms with this, we will have to explore the 
psychoanalytical conflict omnipresent in the Weltalter project.
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Chapter 9
The Abyss of Unconscious Decision
Schelling's Weltalter and Psychoanalytical Horror of 
Substance as Subject
Since Schelling's own account of the Grund has theosophic tendencies 
in contradiction with the Lacanian subject, and by consequence with the 
disavowed yet formative Grundlogik of German Idealism, Žižek is only able 
to reactualize Schelling by “formalizing” its content. By elaborating Žižek's 
psychoanalytical methodology, I will show how Žižek is able to legitimate 
such a violent overhauling of Schelling insofar as he sees an inability to 
assimilate an encounter with the Real within key conceptual moments, 
a maddening struggle that simultaneously causes the “failure” of his 
middle-late philosophy and testifies to his prowess as the greatest thinker of 
subjectivity, thus presenting us with a nuanced and controversial reading of 
Schelling's philosophical development and his relation to German Idealism 
as a whole. What is more, reconstructing this “therapeutic space” will enable 
us to not only come to a greater understanding of the systematic rigour of 
Žižek's approach in opposition to what his critics want us to believe, but 
also bring us face to face with the psychoanalytical horror of the founding 
insight of modernity—the ontologically catastrophic nature of the subject 
as the vanishing mediator between the Real and the Symbolic—and the 
mechanisms by which even the greatest thinker of subjectivity can be 
seduced by fantasies as he tarries with its essence.
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9.1 Into the Void: The Frenzy of God's Self-Diremption
The ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling relationship within Žižek stems from 
his critique of Schellingian metaphysics. Even if Žižek's own transcendental 
materialism is founded upon a notion of emergent ontological catastrophe at 
the origin of subjectivity, a notion he largely derives from the Freiheitsschrift 
and the Weltalter, Žižek is quite adamant in distancing himself from these 
texts, even if in the same breath he praises Schelling's profound ability to 
penetrate into the pre-symbolic material of the Real.294 Indeed, immediately 
after his remarkable and provocative reading of Schelling in The Indivisible 
Remainder, Žižek argues for the supremacy of Hegelian dialectics. Despite 
the ephemeral moments of genuine breakthrough that emerge “as it were 
in a flash,”295 Žižek insists that Schelling remains philosophically inferior 
to his great rival: he ultimately fails to conceive the radicality implicit in 
the self-positing act of separating Grund from existence and tries to cover 
up the non-coincidence in being it indicates by making the two distinct 
from one another only by being founded within absolute indifference, 
which itself, as Schelling says, “is not a product of opposites, nor are they 
contained in it implicite; rather it is a being of its own, separated from all 
oppositions, on which all oppositions are broken, which is nothing other 
than their very non-being, and which therefore has no predicate except 
predicatelessness.”296 The eruptive logic of the Grund, intrinsic to the notion 
of ontological catastrophe, is thereby completely lost: “from this neither-nor, 
or from this indifference, duality [...] immediately breaks forth, and without 
indifference, i.e., without an unground, there would be no twofoldness of the 
principles,”297 in such a way that “the [Schellingian] Absolute is primarily 
the 'absolute indifference' providing the neutral medium for the coexistence 
of the polar opposites” of the Real and the Ideal.298 As such, it provides a 
way out of the abyss of freedom as a kind of metaphysical violence: the act 
of unconscious decision, the vanishing mediator that mediates between the 
real and ideal poles, “'repressed' by the formal envelope of the ‘obscurantist’ 
Schelling,” becomes relegated to a mere secondary position in a theosophic 
drama that subsumes it.299 
Although Hegel's mature ontology as outlined in the Encyclopedia suffers, 
in Žižek's view, from a similar deficiency by articulating the complete return 
of the Idea to itself in a manner that attempts to get rid of the psychotic 
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night of the world, nevertheless Hegel develops a superior logic because 
within it there is no need to leave the internal dynamic of Grund and 
existence and posit some transcendent principle. All can be done at the level 
of (a self-destructive, negativity-wrought) immanence. What Hegel fails to 
bring to full conceptual expression is how in dialectics the very category of 
“and” changes, along with the full range of implications this presents for 
any metaphysical system of the world: through the paradoxical identification 
of Grund and existence “and” becomes, in essence, tautological,300 which 
not only prevents Grund and existence from being mere opposites existing 
alongside one another through their foundation in something external to 
their own movement, but also excludes the possibility of any self-totalizing 
activity. In the logical process of the dialectic, the third term is the second, 
understood as a negativity or internal limit inscribed in the first, but only 
insofar as it has successfully taken over, usurped, the originary position from 
which the movement began by asserting itself as such—that is, the passage 
from the second to the third is that of an emergent extimacy within the first 
moment, which renders it non-coincident to itself, and thereby not-all, by 
owning itself and taking over its originary position to which it was once 
held at bay through an uprising. In terms of substance and subject, this 
means that “this very reversal is the very definition of subject: ‘subject’ is the 
name for the principle of Selfhood that subordinates to itself the substantial 
Whole whose particular moment it originally was.”301 Nothing at the level of 
content changes: it expresses a purely formal self-relationality giving birth 
to itself from within the radical non-coincidence of the absolute with itself, 
a self-begetting that resets the latter's logical hardwiring in an unpredictable 
way from within an unforeseeable self-posited zone of operation. The 
dialectical movement from (i) immediacy → (ii) negation → (iii) negation 
of negation is superior to Schellingian metaphysical narrative because there 
is no genuine return movement to the first, for everything takes place within a 
self-effacing, yet productive immanent field: the beginning and end do not 
overlap because something irreducibly different emerges within the first 
moment (negativity being now made foundational to identity): namely, an 
“out of joint” spirit that has a degree of notional self-reflexivity. In other 
words, the tautology indicated by the category of “and” is, in fact, revelatory 
of a monism bursting at the seams: to say that Grund and existence are 
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identified is to say that Grund can only attain to existence, can only subsist 
in the modality of existence, insofar as it has erased itself, withdrawn from 
the scene. In this way it makes itself identical to the latter through the 
institution of its very difference from it, a difference that at some level is 
always a self-difference, a self-sabotaging, for there is no outside.302 We come 
across a “self-enclosed” immanence that has produced a transcendence that 
persists in its heart of hearts in the paradoxical mode of the double feature 
of inclusion/exclusion, internal/external, presence/absence, so characteristic 
of Lacan's descriptions of the Real, but in such a way that what is excluded, 
external, absent, has a power over that from which it has emerged. 
Negativity means that the indivisibility and power of substance is shattered 
from within, because it is colonized by its own parasites like a madman is 
terrorized by his own hallucinations, but with the added effect that there 
is no need to posit a state of “originary health” of which the devouring 
restlessness of the negative cannot be predicated to explain the dynamism 
inherent to reality.
Because of the theosophic structure of the middle-late Schelling, 
Žižek's own appropriations of concepts such as Grund and Entscheidung in 
the development of his own metaphysics put him in a delicate situation. 
The issue at hand is further complicated by Žižek's division of Schelling's 
philosophy into three distinct and irreconcilable stages, which he finds 
reflected in the three existent drafts of the Weltalter.303 Schelling
1
 largely 
coincides with his quasi-Spinozistic philosophy of absolute indifference, 
where freedom is completely subsumed under the positive order of being. 
In the first draft this is seen in terms of the explication of freedom as a 
logical mode of necessity within the inner articulation of substance, its 
subsumption within the self-harmonizing genesis of the latter's rational 
structure and order. In the Schelling
2
 of the second draft of the Weltalter and 
the Freiheitsschrift, we see an interesting twist with regard to the concern 
with how the contraction of material being itself is made possible. By 
conceiving the act of contraction as ultimately free and self-positing, here 
Schelling is able to think the will-to-contraction (the No) and the will-to-
expansion (the Yes) as identical and therefore internal to the dynamic of 
freedom, which makes his thinking approach that of Hegelian dialectics and 
secures his position as the concluding step of the unconscious Grundlogik of 
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German Idealism whose lineage culminates in the advent of psychoanalysis. 
For Žižek, this brief period of breakthrough was quickly left behind by 
the Schelling
3
 of the philosophy of mythology and revelation, where we 
see a return to a pre-modern “essentialism,” traces of which he claims are 
already hinted at in the third draft of the Weltalter, where Schelling posits 
another principle of synthesis external to the movement of contraction 
and expansion within which freedom and determinism are grounded 
as opposites.
It is because of these tendencies (which explain why Žižek qualifies 
the revolutionary character of Schelling's philosophy by describing him 
as the father of “New Age obscurantism” just as much as the father of 
contemporary philosophy of finitude)304 that Žižek so quickly changes tone 
in the second chapter of The Indivisible Remainder. Yet while consistent with 
his overall interpretation of Schelling, this emphatic shift is simultaneously 
ambiguous insofar as Žižek does not distinguish which Schelling he is 
arguing against or justify how he is able to read the second draft of the 
Weltalter as an ephemeral rupture in Schelling's thought “which goes farthest 
in the direction of Freedom.”305 Given that the only way for freedom to exist 
according to Žižek is through the space opened up by the caustic collapse of 
being, and that both Hegel's ontology and Schelling's logic fail in their own 
fashion to come to terms with this insight,306 even if each encounters it in a 
significant manner, how exactly is Žižek able to retrieve this concept from 
the second draft without falling into the pitfalls of Schelling's own thinking, 
insofar as it is evidently against its letter and spirit even as he presents it? 
How is he able to maintain that the Weltalter and the Freiheitsschrift are the 
most sustained confrontation in the entire tradition with the frightening 
origins of subjectivity and its metaphysical implications, that they reveal the 
most profound penetration into the “perverted” core of the cogito that lurked 
latent in itself since the very founding gesture of modernity?
What specifically interests Žižek in the middle-late work of Schelling is 
its frantic and uncertain nature. For all its intense, uncontrollable passion, 
for all its feverish outpouring, it does not get off the ground. Schelling's 
masterpiece, the Weltalter, never gets finished. Although this is not an outlier 
in Schelling's long philosophical career—his entire corpus is ridden with 
rapidly written sketches of systems and allusions to publications on the 
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horizon that never appear—there is an undeniable hesitation saturating this 
period. The trunk of stillborn, abortive drafts of the first book of the Weltalter 
found in the library of Munich, of which only three remain today due to 
the fires that wrought havoc in the city in the aftermath of Allied bombings 
(but of which there were more than twelve different handwritten versions) 
is enough to demonstrate that this work haunted Schelling in a manner and 
with an intensity that others did not, as does the fact that after the 1809 
Freiheitsschrift he refrained from publishing another major work, and largely 
withdrew from the German intellectual scene where he was once the rising 
star. Aside from scattered lectures—for instance, an 1827 and an 1833 
course on the System der Weltalter—he would not return to the public eye 
with any sustained vigor until he was called to Berlin in 1841. At that time, 
assuming Hegel's chair ten years after the latter's untimely death, addressing 
an audience that had eagerly awaited him to break his silence for decades 
(an audience that included both Engels and Kierkegaard) and whose final 
reappearance was exacerbated by the uncertain fate of Hegelianism, he gave 
lectures on the philosophy of mythology and revelation. But the Hörsäle, 
first overflowing with excited, enthusiastic students of philosophy anxious 
to hear the words of Hegel’s old rival, were quickly abandoned in utter 
disappointment, leaving only a handful of devoted students, Fichte's son 
Immanuel Hermann von Fichte among them.
But what explains this sudden change in Schelling's career, this lack of 
desire to publish, to engage in dialogue, to spread his philosophy over the 
European landscape that had eagerly welcomed it? Jason Wirth hints at 
something that comes to mind for anyone who knows Schelling's life story:
Yet 1809 marked a turning point in Schelling's zeal to 
publish. Already Schelling's reputation had been injured by 
Hegel's unwarranted dismissal of the intellectual intuition 
as the “night when all cows are black.” [...] More seriously, 
however, Schelling's wife, Caroline, had become very ill. It is 
hard to read the Freedom essay, published in May 1809, with 
its analogy between sickness and evil (sickness is to Being 
as evil is to human being), without thinking of Caroline. In 
the treatise, Schelling claimed that the “veil of melancholy 
[Schwermut] that is spread out over all of nature is the 
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profound and indestructible melancholy of all life.” Caroline 
died on September 7, 1809. Schelling was devastated. In 
a letter written less than a month after Caroline's death, 
Schelling claimed that “I now need friends who are not 
strangers to the real seriousness of pain and who feel that 
the single right and happy [glücklich] state of the soul is the 
divine mourning [Traurigkeit] in which all earthly pain is 
immersed.” A year later, Schelling began work on Die Weltalter, 
a philosophical poem about the rotatory movement of natality 
and fatality, pain and joy, comedy and tragedy within God, 
that is, within the whole of Being, itself.307 
Žižek allows us to offer a new, interesting, and controversial spin on this 
enigma. If we follow and reconstruct his implicit methodology, we see 
that he refuses the claim that Schelling's “retreat” was spurred on by 
the tragic death of his true love and great muse Caroline in 1809 just 
before the publication of the Freiheitsschrift, or for that matter even by the 
overwhelming influence of the Hegelian system that could also be seen 
as leaving him in a state of philosophical and existential paralysis. What 
Žižek invites us to argue is that, when one looks at the very structure of the 
Weltalter drafts themselves, one is confronted with an uncanny struggle of 
composition that reveals something primordial concerning what its texts 
give witness to and attempt—but ultimately fail—to bring forth. This painful 
unrest is not to be reduced to the mere level of personal dissatisfaction, as if 
there were a conscious recognition by Schelling that his own “masterpiece” 
could never hold its own as a rival of Hegelian logic, nor could it just 
boil down to some personal trauma that began to cloud Schelling's own 
philosophical capacities through a devouring melancholy that made the 
world during these years an agonizing repetition of bitter grey upon bitter 
grey. Instead, it provides the key to understanding both the self-deploying 
historico-dialectical (Lacanian) cause of German Idealism at work in 
Schelling's thought and ultimately dividing it into the three distinct stages 
as outlined by Žižek and establishing its true greatness in this fragmented 
second stage, whereby we can open up a legitimate space in which to 
reactualize it and let it come to terms with that which, by itself, it was 
not able to do.
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After Hegel’s critique of the Schellingian absolute indifference308 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit, and recognizing the strength of Hegel's 
dialectics, Schelling is forced to rethink the philosophical foundation of his 
thought and its attempt to balance transcendental idealism with an organic 
philosophy of nature in such a way that he can at the same time fight against 
the perceived threats of Hegel's philosophy. He puts his own prowess to use 
in articulating his account of the emergence of temporality and finitude that 
does not succumb to the claustrophobic subsumption of human freedom 
within the self-mediation of the absolute. Arguing that Hegel can only show 
the notional necessity of things and never their brute reality, he embarks on 
a theosophic exploration of the creation of the world that would not only 
challenge, but hopefully put a stake in the heart of the philosophy of his 
now adversary and former friend. Yet Schelling's middle-late philosophy 
is not just a theo-cosmogonic odyssey of the vicissitudes of divine being 
in its restless search for self-revelation. Following reason by analogy and 
identifying a structural parallel between God's speaking of the Word by 
which he becomes a full person and the birth of self-experience out of the 
eternal darkness that precedes it,309 Schelling's philosophy simultaneously 
functions on two levels, that of the theo-cosmological and that of the 
metapsychological, in such a way that Schelling is able to say, at the end 
of the Freiheitsschrift, that we “have established the first clear concept of 
personality.”310 It assumes that we can pass from the lowest to the highest, 
from the known to the unknown, by a careful, methodologically guided 
introspection, insofar as there is “a system of times [...] for us, of which 
the human system would be just a copy, a repetition within a narrower 
sphere.”311 
What is so intriguing about Schelling's attempt to describe the 
emergence of finitude from eternity and human subjectivity out of nature 
is the conceptual restlessness evident in the existent drafts of the project, 
each of which oscillates around an insurmountable deadlock located in the 
movement from the Past to the Present: that is, how the divine and human 
subject could emerge from the non-experiential void that precedes them. 
Schelling remains unable fully to explicate the meaning of what Žižek calls 
the “breach of symmetry,” God's contraction of finitude, and in the same 
vein the emergence of a free, deciding being (the subject) in a manner 
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that leaves him at ease. In the first draft the abyss of freedom contracts 
materiality out of necessity, so that both divine and human freedom are 
subsumed within the self-unfolding of substance, while the second declares 
that the very contraction itself is an act of freedom, a self-positing, which not 
only renders the two opposed principles of the Yes and the No identical in 
the internal dynamic of freedom, but also (and more disconcertingly) results 
in a structural homology with sickness and evil as an unpredictable negative 
reversal of established ordered and wholeness from within. The third 
merely complicates the picture insofar as it breaks from the “Spinozistic” 
determinism and closed systematicity of the first and the radical philosophy 
of freedom with its potentially unsettling implications proclaimed by the 
second: by synthesizing both polar principles within a point of metaphysical 
simultaneity within the Godhead that is the Ungrund within which both 
rest as androgynous pairs, God the Creator's personal freedom is saved 
from being logically dependent upon a moment of cancer in divine being 
that upsets the joyful bliss of eternity, and in a similar move, subjectivity 
is no longer made possible by that which disrupts the smooth placidity 
of substance.
These basic conceptual differences at such a foundational level of inquiry 
reverberate through the entire movement of the three stages in a meaningful 
way in each draft:
1. Not only is human freedom actually a misrecognition of blind 
(Spinozistic) causality, so that the movement of dialectical 
human temporality is an illusion, all being co-present in the 
self-harmonizing synchronicity of the system—here we see 
Schelling struggling to rearticulate his old ideas in a new 
format—but even the act of contracting finitude is a necessity, so 
it could not not have happened, deriving from the “primordial 
Freedom in an absolutely immediate, 'blind,' non-reflected, 
unaccountable way.”312 
2. The fact of finitude in God or of freedom in man proclaims 
that synchronic substance cannot be a devouring totality, but 
must be an open not-all plagued with fragility and inconsistency 
all the way down. The very self-positing of finite being in God 
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not only precludes all attempts to enclose it within a totalizing 
whole even within the divine understanding itself, since self-
positing is equated with an absolute self-assertion, but (even 
more devastatingly) the emergence of God as a personal being 
out of its contracted material Grund is uncertain, insofar as there 
is no guarantee that He will come to His own by speaking the 
Word, unlike in the first draft where it is part of divine's substance 
infinite self-articulation.
3. The problematic ramifications of the second position are 
foreclosed by making God's free existence as an entity 
predetermined and guaranteed in advance through the dialectical 
simultaneity of freedom and determinism in a higher synthetic 
principle. Thus the creation of the world is an absolutely 
contingent act following from a volitional arbitrariness expressing 
God's essence as love, making divine being, rather than a turmoil-
ridden drama with an unforeseeable end, a self-maintaining 
whole. In this sense the third draft symbolizes a kind of retreat 
from the second; one is even tempted to say an (unconscious) 
attempt to save oneself from the traumatic, horrifying implications 
of its philosophy of freedom. The true basis of spontaneity was, as 
it were, too much for Schelling—he had to pull back.
Not only do the existent drafts of the Weltalter give testament to an 
uncompromising tension, an endless circulation around an inassimilable 
kernel, both in terms of the relationship of God as person and consciousness 
to the eternal darkness of their ground, but it also appears as if Schelling's 
own philosophical career could only continue once it cut off, repressed, this 
encounter with the Real. In the turn to the Schelling
3
 of the philosophy 
of mythology (already hinted at in the third draft of the Weltalter) we can 
glimpse a recoil from the abyssal basis of freedom as pure self-positing 
unleashed in the second in the same way that the earlier Realphilosophie of 
Hegel is later abandoned in order to embrace a consoling triadic dialectics: 
just as Hegel tries to save the absolute from a diremptive wound that can 
never be healed, here Schelling attempts to save the essence of God and 
nature from the insoluble deadlock of drives eventually engendered by 
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the self-institution of finitude and negativity he stumbled across in the 
Potenzenlehre of the second draft and already implicit in the eruptive logic 
of the Grund in the Freiheitsschrift; in both there is an attempt to retreat 
from the notion of a barred organic whole, a metaphysics of the not-all, as 
forced upon us by the philosophy of freedom whose first outlines we see 
already in Kant, substantiating Žižek's claim that both Hegel and Schelling 
repress the unacknowledged truth, the Grundlogik, of German Idealism.313 
By referring to the Godhead as das Überexistierende that summons the 
blind rotatory movement of drives, the third draft strives to save reality 
from the irredeemable conflict that it is faced with in the contraction of 
finitude: instead of the latter being absolutely self-positing as a moment 
in the movement from the potentiality of freedom in its abyssal eternity 
to its actualization, God in some strong sense now precedes the Grund of 
His existence, assuring His protection from the non-coincidence to self 
announced by the dependence of light on darkness: there is “an activity 
performed at a safe distance.”314 This becomes even more evident in the 
late philosophy of mythology, where the entire theoretical edifice becomes 
grounded on the distinction between the Was and the Daß of God. The 
transcendence of the Daß from the flux of the Potenzen not only allows 
for an implicit, yet self-articulating teleological movement intrinsic to the 
antagonisms of finitude of the latter so that there are stages that unfold 
throughout nature and then human history that ultimately pave the way for 
the final revelation of God, but it also makes any appearance of ontological 
disarray merely a “perceptual illusion” generated by a self-harmonizing 
scheme deduced by negative philosophy (in Žižek's words, this is Schelling’s 
regress to pre-modern essentialism). Complementing negative philosophy, 
Schelling envisages a form of positive philosophy, one of whose primary 
tasks is to find and explicate these stages in nature and history: that is 
to say, “to function as a kind of 'transcendental empiricism,' and to 'test' 
the truth of rational construction in actual life,”315 thereby subsuming 
the restless negativity at the heart of reality as revealed specifically in 
the second draft into a mere secondary feature of God's plan within the 
spectacle of the absolute's own self-development, deflating it to a mere 
ephemeral phase in an overarching cosmic dance towards revelation. The 
absolute yearns for self-disclosure once it has willed it, so that all things in 
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creation move towards it, even if unknowingly: here, not only is nature's 
unpredictable catastrophism and widespread murder and extinction316 no 
longer indicative of a lack of a totalizing principle, but man, denied the 
right to be an autonomous writer in the drama of divine being, is reduced 
to a mere actor or puppet who follows a pre-written script (a telos) given 
by the very structure of the Potenzen themselves for the joy of its author in 
His distant, cold kingdom of divine eternity, the non-rational Daß of God 
being, after all, distinct from and existing over and above the Was of God. 
But in the movement from Schelling
2
 to Schelling
3
 we should not just draw 
our attention to how in the latter there is absolutely no room for subjectivity 
with the very technical sense of the word that we have been using. What is 
much more revealing is how concerned Schelling
3
 is to establish God as 
that which guarantees the consistency and internal coherence of nature 
and history, previously jeopardized, for us and God Himself: there is a frantic 
obsession to demonstrate the existence of the Other of the Other in the Real 
when the inconsistencies and frailty of order have already been pushed upon 
us. The third stage in Schelling's thought is nothing but a reaction formation 
against his radical philosophy of freedom.
Leaving aside the possible theological implications of Žižek's reading 
of Schelling—which deserve to be evaluated in their own right—due to his 
outright rejection of theosophy as ultimately nothing but a mytho-poetics 
of the Symbolic's coming into being, what Žižek's Schelling unearths in his 
frenzied attempt to develop a philosophical program able to battle Hegelian 
Absolute Idealism is the not-all nature of the absolute. Trying to give an 
account of the emergence of finitude and driven on by the alchemical 
intuition that there is an identity between the highest and the lowest, the 
self-begetting of God and the self-caused birth of the subject in its freedom, 
he delves into the nocturnal site out of which the human self is born and 
experiences the terror of the failure of positive being to ground itself, its 
“self-lacerating rage” (sich selbst zerreißende Wut), which acts as the vanishing 
mediator between nature and culture by opening up the possibility for the 
self-assertion of freedom from within the Real and its vicissitudes. This not 
only by definition prevents the completion of the project of the Weltalter 
insofar as it precludes any possibility of the reconciliation promised by the 
Third Age, the Future wherein Grund and existence become reconciled in 
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redemption, which would merely just institute a triadic dialectics similar 
to that of Hegel's mature system—it also brings Schelling's philosophy to 
a halt, a standstill, as it comes upon metaphysical implications revealed by 
the split nature of subjectivity. Only ever successfully completing the first, 
preliminary part of his mytho-poetic ages of the world, his description of the 
eternal Past, Schelling remains forever unable to proceed; it is this which 
causes him to fade slowly from the public eye, where he was once a star and 
the leader of one of the greatest intellectual movements the world has ever 
witnessed, because he came too close to its true horrifying core.
9.2 That Which Is in Schelling More than  
Schelling Himself—Žižek
Schelling's failure to finish the Weltalter is not due to his lack of conceptual 
prowess or an earth-shattering, existential strife: it results from an encounter 
with the Real, an encounter that is philosophically meaningful. Because 
there is an inassimilable kernel within its symbolic space tearing it apart, its 
discourse is riddled with harrowing tension: unable to bring this encounter 
to its complete symbolization, Schelling's Weltalter falls to the ground and is 
only able to save itself through an unconscious disavowal that takes the form 
of an insistence on the existence of the Other of the Other. By consequence, 
it has to be interpreted psychoanalytically so that its truth or cause can 
finally be integrated into its symbolic space, and its place as the concluding 
step of German Idealism's formative Grundlogik can be firmly established. If 
this can be accomplished, then we will be permitted to say that, retroactively, 
Schelling's project fell to the ground not only in the sense of a purely 
negative collapse, but also as the condition of the possible opening of a new 
beginning, following the double connotation of the German zugrunde gehen. 
The failure of the Weltalter, the fact of its incompletion, turns out to be a 
triumph of human reason:317 its apparent limitations—the feverish frenzy 
of the work, the inconsistency brought forth by its conceptual unrest—are 
actually expressive of an underlying ontological and metaphysical intuition 
that we can catch a glimpse of through the interstices of its discourse. Žižek's 
claim is that if we pass through the negative determination at the heart of 
the work, the non-coincident in-itself we witness can become a for-itself.
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The “victory” that Žižek perceives in the Weltalter is in its gestures 
towards philosophical logic underlying the birth of consciousness and its 
wider metaphysical implications. The strangeness and density of the Weltalter 
project are not due to its out-of-jointness with the modern tradition, 
but due to the fact that it comes too close to its disavowed essence. The 
anxiety-inducing reverberations that shake one's body when one reads the 
descriptions of “Schelling's grandiose 'Wagnerian' vision of God in the 
state of a endless 'pleasure in pain,' agonizing and struggling with Himself, 
affected by an unbearable anxiety, the vision of a 'psychotic,' mad God”318 
are so difficult because they make us approach the very kernel not just 
of our existence as subjects but also the nature of the world at large. This 
experience of reading its drafts is properly “traumatic” in the meaning Lacan 
gives to this term drawing upon its etymological origins in ancient Greek: 
they bring forth a devastating encounter by which the symbolic support of 
our personality is “wounded” or “pierced,” during which the coherence of 
our identity is torn apart as it comes upon its truth.319 The effect is twofold. 
Firstly, both Schelling's own inability to finish the project, his heap of lost 
manuscripts, and the subsequent necessity to “invent” a solution to continue 
his philosophical career and its neglect in the philosophical community as a 
whole could thus be seen as nothing but a recoil from the Real of our being 
as finally explicitly brought into the open within his texts. It is thus Schelling 
who, in an attempt to give a death-dealing materialist response to Hegel's 
“pan-logicism,” most fully experiences out of all the representatives of the 
modern tradition the “incomprehensible basis of reality,” that mysterious 
X that forever haunts transcendentally constituted reality (the Real as a 
“kink” in the Symbolic), precedes it (the Real as pre-symbolic immediacy 
lost due to language), and in some modality conditions its very possibility 
(the Real [R⁄ ] as auto-disruptive substance [N ≠ N] whose self-laceration 
creates the space for free experience). In an attempt to articulate the 
irreducibility of freedom, Schelling plunges headfirst into the paradoxical 
character of subjectivity—not only into the denaturalized state of unruliness 
we must posit as prior to the emergence of phenomenal reality and culture, 
the pulsating cauldron of chaotic, heterogeneous forces that first make 
possible the gesture of infinite withdrawal into the nocturnal irreal self of 
the world, but the very ambiguity of the latter as an absolute self-positing 
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act. Secondly, the originality of this narrative of German Idealism that Žižek 
allows us to construct is its implicit claim that the Weltalter is the text of 
modernity and that its incompletion, fragmentation, and unpopularity are 
philosophically rich in meaning, perhaps even necessary reactions to its truth. 
Not only does this contribute to elevating Schelling to his rightful place in 
history of philosophy after having long been overshadowed by Hegel, it also 
(and more importantly) calls us to own up to other elements of our being 
that may be more difficult to bear, even too difficult to bear, by one of their 
greatest theorists.
Žižek's work on Schelling is so crucial for understanding his philosophy 
as a whole, not only because it provides us the resources we need to show 
the coherence of his reading of the modern philosophical tradition, but 
also because it allows us to demonstrate the profound level of philosophical 
scrutiny and methodological rigor inherent in his apparent heterodoxy. If 
the self-development of the former's account of subjectivity is characterized 
by a recoil from the parallax ontology of transcendental materialism at 
the core of the cogito's self-positing, the traces of which we can see in the 
negative contortions of its symbolic space through its entire history, it is 
only by reconstructing his psychoanalytical interpretation of Schelling 
as the culmination of German Idealism that we can truly legitimate and 
assess this claim. Although such a recoil from this traumatic Real may be 
evident in Descartes’s reification of the subject as a thinking thing, Kant's 
attempt to ontologize “this I or he or it (the thing) that thinks” or more 
strongly his inability to delve into obscure foundations of unruliness and 
diabolic evil, or in Hegel's mature system as a covering up of the madness 
of the night of the world, it is only by recourse to Schelling that he can 
retroactively posit such a self-deploying disavowed knowledge that deepens 
itself through the trajectory of the tradition and that leads to its eventual 
culmination in psychoanalysis.320 What makes Schelling such an important 
outlier to this sustained recoil, however, was his ability (for a relatively brief 
period of time) to completely immerse himself within the frenzy, horror, 
and pandemonium that are the true origin of subjectivity in such a way that 
he brings to the fore the entire latent Grundlogik of modern philosophy of 
the subject preceding him and that is surpassed only by psychoanalysis' 
thematization of the unconscious and Todestrieb. His own turning away 
208 Chapter 9
from this insight and the various inconsistencies that lace his texts must 
be seen as symptomatic of a greater tendency within the movement (and 
in humans in general) towards the development of defense mechanisms 
in the face of an inability to integrate the psychoanalytical truth the Real 
tries to force upon us. If Schelling's own recoil—a return to a pre-modern 
essentialism—is so severe, it is because he, as the one who experienced the 
horror of the metaphysical implications of subjectivity most strongly, needed 
a defense mechanism more radical than the rest. In their “very failure, [the 
Weltalter] are arguably the acme of German Idealism and, simultaneously, a 
breakthrough into an unknown domain whose contours became discernible 
only in the aftermath of German Idealism.”321 
Žižek thus sees his philosophy not only as an attempt to reactualize the 
German Idealist tradition, but also as immanently participating within its 
own self-deployment. He understands his project as a remodulation of its 
surface logic by clinically working through what he perceives as its internal 
tension, so as to construct the self-effacing, transcendental materialism 
that has been its unconscious truth.322 He is not merely performing an 
act of hermeneutical retrieval, but (more strongly) taking these ideas into 
what he considers to be their dialectical “completion” from which they 
have been hindered by the tradition itself. For Žižek, it is Lacan who gives 
us the methodological tools we need to “rehabilitate” its fundamental 
concepts, but which amounts to something more than a mere application 
of psychoanalytical concepts to various texts in the history of philosophy. 
The approach is much more provocative. By enacting a kind of therapeutic 
space within key texts of the middle-late Schelling as the culminating 
point of German Idealism, the wager of Žižek's philosophy is that, by 
being open to their own inner movement, he can bring forth that which 
is in Schelling more than Schelling himself: the extimate, traumatic core 
lodged deep within his spirit and soul and from which Schelling withdrew 
into philosophical “paralysis” by integrating (constructing) the originally 
inassimilable theoretical potential and unsettling metaphysical consequences 
of the second draft of the Weltalter. The relationship of Žižek to Schelling as 
the endpoint of German Idealism is therefore structurally identical to that of 
Lacan to Freud. As Miller puts it:
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The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis appears to be 
a tribute to Freud, since the four concepts are taken directly 
from his work. Just as Lacan at that time calls his institute the 
“Freudian School,” in his seminar he uses the term “Freudian 
concepts” just to prove that he is not a dissident. But within 
this “tribute” he tries to go beyond Freud. Not a beyond 
Freud which leaves Freud behind; it is a beyond Freud which 
is nevertheless in Freud. Lacan is looking for something in 
Freud's work of which Freud himself was unaware. Something 
which we may call “extimate,” as it is so very intimate that 
Freud himself was not aware of it. So very intimate that this 
intimacy is extimate. It is an internal beyond.323 
But how is Žižek able to accomplish such a feat, seeing that Schelling 
himself fought against this?
9.3 A Mytho-Poetics of Creation and the Seducing 
Hand of Fantasy
The answer lies in the second draft, where Žižek sees a distinctively Hegelian 
structure that enables him to develop a metapsychological reading of the 
text, preventing its underlying ontology from succumbing to philosophical 
commitments that he rejects and identifies as in opposition to the 
unconscious Grundlogik of German Idealism. In fighting against what he 
perceives to be the limitations and threat of Hegelian logic, Schelling, in 
the end, only radicalizes its perverse truth, yet is unable to contain the 
monster that he unleashes. After developing an astonishing philosophy of 
freedom, Schelling immediately recoils from its implications by positing 
a principle of mediation that enables the neutral coexistence of Grund 
and existence through their mutual grounding in what Schelling in the 
Freiheitsschrift refers to as the Ungrund, that which in itself is ungrounded 
and thus simultaneously precedes both and is neither one nor the other. 
Because Schelling here understands the freedom of unconscious decision 
(Entscheidung) that separates Grund from existence as a return to the 
primordial origin of all reality that is the abyss of freedom itself, its 
conceptual edifice displays a structure of quaternity, which is articulated 
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in his thinking largely through a systemization and reconceptionalization 
of thinkers like Jakob Böhme and Franz Baader, and is thereby able to 
sidestep the implication of freedom as a cancerous upsurge of pure self-
assertion. But insofar as the second draft displays freedom as a kind of 
self-positing activity that identifies Grund (the will-to-contraction, the No) 
and existence (the will-to-expansion, the Yes), Žižek jumps at this slight 
“slip” in Schelling's text, seeing in this discursive inconsistency a possibility 
of “formalizing” the conceptual movement of the work by “purifying” it of 
all extraneous theosophic commitments through traces of Hegelian logic 
he sees operative within it. It is in this sense that Žižek's philosophy is a 
hybridism of Schellingian ontology and a Hegelian quadruple dialectics of 
non-reconciliation.
For Žižek, Hegel is the superior logician because he has no need to 
posit a principle of mediation outside of the internal dynamic of Grund 
and existence. There is no possible return to (or even initial existence 
of) a state of “originary” health, as typified by the abyss of freedom as 
independent from the antagonism of the dual principles, for there is nothing 
that has not always already succumbed to the restlessness of the negative. 
Although textbook Hegelianism presents the third moment of the logic as 
a synthesis of two previous incompatible conceptual polarities by means 
of a cancellation of the falsehood and a preservation of the truth contained 
in each and thereby bringing them into a higher, more comprehensive 
dialectical standpoint (the banal reading of the equivocal character of the 
word “Aufhebung”) Žižek thinks this picture misses the true philosophical 
innovation that we see in the movement from one stage to another.324 The 
third moment itself is only the second insofar as it hegemonically usurps 
the position of the first through positing itself as such—which is, in a way, 
a mere amplification of an already existing interruption in the immanence 
of the first's logical field, an amplification that destroys its sway from 
within, but without ever leaving its fold. The dialectical movement from (i) 
immediacy → (ii) negation → (iii) negation of negation is superior not only 
because there is no return to the first (something irreducibly different and 
operatively new emerges, irreversibly reconfiguring the entire [onto]logical 
apparatus through its self-positing) but also because there is no need to 
posit something outside the self-movement of negativity to explain the 
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entire logical process: “[t]here is thus no reversal of negativity into positive 
greatness—the only greatness is 'negativity' itself.”325 In other words, the 
negativity of the second is entirely inscribed within the first, arising from 
within its closed immediacy as a kind of tension or contradiction, and is 
in this regard not separate or distinct from it insofar as there is nothing 
but the dialectical register of the first. Yet because the second presents us 
with an internal limit (it itself has no substance of its own) and is thus by 
definition non-coincident with the first and its operational principles, it 
is in the same breath minimally distinguished from it, thus engendering a 
fissure in the logical self-closure of the field in a movement that makes the 
entire order inconsistent and ill at ease, which in turn opens up a foothold 
for the possibility of change.326 For Hegel, it is this deadlock of real internal 
limit—an inassimilable kernel—that ultimately serves as the springboard for 
all dialectical change by creating the space necessary for the unpredictable 
self-founding of a new order, but of itself it only becomes explicit in the 
aftermath of the third as it overthrows the primacy of the first through the 
paradoxical causality of a retroactive positing of presuppositions (Setzung 
der Voraussetzungen). There is something like an internal parasitic logic that 
re-totalizes the entire dialectical framework, so that instead of witnessing a 
return to the first, an initially subordinate moment degrades its own genetic 
conditions into its own subordinate moment by means of the unforeseeable and 
destructive power of negativity, which now reigns supreme.327 
With the self-positing of the third (the second positing itself, counting 
itself, thus making itself the third by a self-doubling), negativity is finally 
fully “brought to life,” but in such a way that its dark pre-history in 
the vicissitudes of the previous stage as a purely negative real limit 
necessarily vanishes from sight, for the contingency of its self-positing 
has been immanently overcome. But even if the stark remodulation of the 
(onto)logical field within which it occurs, a remodulation that effectuates 
itself by establishing itself as the supreme category, covers up its steps like 
an experienced criminal used to getting away with his crime, in the same 
breath it sets the stage for a new (relatively closed) immediacy and thus the 
possibility of new unforeseeable dialectical change. But we must recognize 
that this self-positing always comes too late: its upsurge may posit itself at 
the logical beginning of the movement as necessary, it may make itself the 
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primary principle, that to which the movement had always tended, but this 
only becomes visible after the fact and is thus plagued by a devastating 
belatedness. There is no way notionally to deduce the act of self-positing 
because, as free, it impossible to predetermine its arrival or even be aware 
that it could occur at all.328 The reversal characteristic of the third moment 
befalls being, for “every dialectical passage or reversal is a passage in which 
the new figure emerges ex nihilo.”329 What we often miss in the necessity 
of the dialectical movement and what is even obfuscated by it is the fact 
that every movement of its self-articulation is, in fact, constituted by a 
series of a contingent acts brought on by negativity, contingencies that only 
retroactively gain the status of necessity by making themselves necessary.330 
The passage from tension to victory is never ontologically guaranteed—and 
it is precisely this ambiguity intrinsic to the restlessness of negativity that 
constitutes the Real of the Weltalter. If it was Hegel who gave the former 
the most profound philosophical articulation in its raw purity in his Science 
of Logic, it was Schelling who was the first to stumble upon the full range of its 
metaphysical implications (to which we shall return).331 What is more, this 
also lets us explain why Hegel could have stopped dead in his tracks in his 
mature thinking of a triadic relationship between logic, nature, and spirit 
despite already having at his disposition such a sophisticated account of a 
metaphysically contingent retroactive restructuring of being from within. 
Although the inner movement he describes in the Logic gives perfect 
expression to the quadruple dialectics already hinted at in the night of the 
world of his Realphilosophie, the problem is that the categories it describes, 
like Lacan's mathemes, do not supply us with any horizon of meaning. As 
such, they must be supplemented with the “concrete” symbolic content 
of the philosophies of nature and spirit, thus creating space in which 
Hegel could phantastically recoil from his breakthrough insight into the 
subject as a self-instituting gap in being and its stark consequences for 
our understanding of the self and the world. Hence why the Weltalter is so 
crucial for grasping the true importance of subjectivity as a contingent, 
world-changing event: it gives us mytho-poetic content that comes closer to 
grasping the matter at hand than Hegel's account of the particular sciences 
does, which rather obfuscates it (just as many empirical accounts continue 
to do today when faced with the explosion of the Ideal out of the Real).
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The immediate problem facing Žižek here is the fact that all of 
Schelling's middle-late works present themselves as a theogony, an 
account of the birth of God, based on the anti-dialectical structure of the 
quaternity, where the last movement is not the expression of something 
logically irreducible and operatively new immanently emerging from within 
a system, but a “return” to the first as a kind of direct contact with and 
raising up to a higher power of a dormant force that is simultaneously the 
primordial and unfathomable origin of all things. Each text repeats the same 
movement, although the drafts of the Weltalter—in contradistinction to the 
Freiheitsschrift—abruptly end before historical time. As the first, the abyss 
of God's freedom as the impenetrably dark source of divine and created 
reality rests in the absolute joy of eternity, a blind existence, where it wills 
nothing because it is the pure virtuality wherein everything is potentially 
contained, though does not determinately exist. Yet without distinction 
and duality, the eternal nature as freedom remains unrevealed and thus 
lacks the fullness of self-knowledge. In order to achieve this, God (who 
is here not yet a person) must somehow contract finitude and difference, 
limit His freedom, if He is to have an Other through which He can reveal 
Himself, thereby establishing the distance necessary to Himself to become 
a subject capable of owning freedom as a predicate instead of merely being 
freedom as a pure virtuality. He breaches this pure virtuality by instituting 
the conflict of Grund (the No, the darkness of materiality, the contractive 
energy that holds all together) and existence (the Yes, the light of spirit, the 
expansive structures that give order to the rulessness of the Grund) within 
Him, so that He can beget Himself as a self-conscious being and eventually 
decide to bestow upon His own Grund the status of an independent and 
productive being, thus becoming God the Creator and allowing this same 
conflict constitutive of his inner life to be mirrored in all living things. Hence 
Schelling can say at the end of the Freiheitsschrift that nature is the first 
revelation of God.332 But with the highest creature, man, something new 
emerges in creation as the principles become separable, which leads to the 
possibility of the free conquering of the dark principle by the light if humans 
choose to live their lives in imitation of God's spirit as the perfect unity of 
Grund and existence and, by consequence, to the possibility of a complete 
revelation of God to Himself insofar as humans then become the image of 
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God (imago dei). With the forward march of history, the goal of creation 
will be attained when evil is completely vanquished, for this will have meant 
that we, like God, will have achieved the holy unification of the light and 
dark principles, insofar as we will have made ourselves subjects capable 
of owning freedom as a predicate by autonomously choosing the Yes and 
thus overcoming our separation from God by returning to Him. Material 
being, which we will have then “divinized” in showing how it is capable of 
the good in and through us, and personal God will then be reconciled and 
love—which presents itself as the fourth, the positive counterpart at the end 
of the system corresponding to the Ungrund as its absolute beginning—will 
prevail: as nature yearns for the spoken Word, humanity longs for for the 
destruction of the antagonism of principles in the Future, which proves itself 
to be a paradoxical “return” to the Past, since once the Present has begun, 
its beginning is always already lost, so that the only way the Ungrund can 
reemerge is if the world ends in a Future that is to come. The pure virtuality 
that contains everything potentially may be irretrievable, but redemption—
as love—awaits as a point to which the world tends, for this tendency 
towards its own annihilation as we know it is part of its metaphysical 
structure. The inner life of all being thus follows a series of fourfolds that are 
modelled after the structure intrinsic to the life of God:
Ungrund
↓
dark principle ←→ light principle
↓
self-manifest God or complete revelation
But how is Schelling able to maintain such a narrative within the second 
period even in face of a structure that apparently forecloses its very possibility?
That which enables Schelling to sustain such a narrative in face of a 
structure that compromises the dynamic of the quaternity paradoxically 
coincides with his insight into a parallactic dialectics of restless negativity. 
The success of Schelling's reaction formation goes hand in hand with the 
intensity of his plunging into the abyssal origins of subjectivity, since the 
latter constitutes some kind of primordial trauma whose repression is 
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simultaneous with the transcendental constitution of reality so that it is only 
to be expected that such a two-way tension would emerge. Given that the 
origins of the Symbolic withdraw in their founding gesture, if Schelling is to 
describe the interior involutions of the Real, and in what sense they could 
bring forth the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely free subjectivity 
(either human or divine) Schelling must have recourse to a mytho-poetic 
medium to talk about that which forever precedes and can never enter 
the light of consciousness and language. If the subject is “the primordial 
Big Bang” of experiential reality,333 how are we to grasp what occurred 
only nanoseconds prior to it? The issue is not the Real-as-excess as that 
which logically precedes and exceeds symbolization, which spectrally haunts 
all synthetic constitution, but the very moment in which the Symbolic 
upsurges; and because such an event is a structurally impossible object of 
discourse, any discourse that attempts to account for it is by the same token 
plagued by this very impossibility. Faced with this impasse, we are forced 
to fall back into mythology to explain that which transcends the bounds of 
ideality as its core:
Does not this step involve “regression” to a version of New 
Age mythology? When, at the key points of their theoretical 
edifice, Freud and Lacan also resorted to a mythical narrative 
(Freud's myth of the primordial father in Totem and Taboo, 
his reference to Plato's myth of androgynous primordial man 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Lacan's myth of “lamella” in 
his Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis), they were 
driven by the same necessity as Schelling: the need for the 
form of mythical narrative arises when one endeavours to 
break the circle of the symbolic order and to give an account 
of its genesis (“origins”) from the Real and its pre-symbolic 
antagonism.334 
Although mythology is rationally justified insofar as we have, as it were, 
deduced the necessity of the non-deducible and now need a new manner to 
investigate it, it does not come without its risks: the pre-symbolic act at the 
very founding gesture of language—the vanishing mediator between nature 
and culture that cannot be found in either—is that which we can “access” 
through a kind of self-reflexive speculative fabulation that stages “the birth 
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from darkness into light,”335 but in such a way that we cannot guarantee a 
priori that such an endeavour will not be plagued by defence mechanisms, 
unconscious fantasies and wishes, especially given its essentially traumatic 
nature. To search for our origins, we must plunge into the abyss, but it can 
lead us astray: the mytho-poetics of speculative fabulation can just as much 
help us narrate the pre-history of the Symbolic and the always already lost 
act that institutes it, the trauma that is the lacerating cut of pure self-positing 
in its full horror, as it can nourish psychoanalytical defences against it when 
we approach the ontological catastrophe at our nativity as human subjects. 
It is exactly here at this juncture of interplay of mytho-poetic fabulation 
and phantasmic interference within Schelling's second period that Žižek 
intervenes, using the resources of Lacanian psychoanalysis to traverse its 
fantasy and thereby restructure its conceptual space so as to bring forth that 
which is in Schelling so intimately that it is most properly characterized as 
extimate. But how can Žižek accomplish such a feat? Before we can directly 
answer this question, it is necessary to summarize the two intertwined levels 
active in the rational mythology of the Weltalter project in order to locate the 
unsolved tension from which psychoanalysis offers us a way out.
Within the stillborn drafts of the Weltalter, Schelling divides the 
passage from the eternal Past to the Present into three distinct stages. 
Because Schelling's text simultaneously operates in a theosophic and 
metapsychological mode, I will quickly summarize Žižek's presentation 
of each stage. Instead of outlining the various conceptual distinctions 
and internal differences that occur within the three existent drafts of the 
Weltalter, I will only be dealing with Žižek's own exegesis, which focuses on 
the second draft, since as we have seen he largely dismisses the importance 
of the other two versions.
1. In the absolute beginning prior to God's contraction of 
material being and the annular rotation of drives, there is a 
joyous nothingness, a pure potentiality that exists in timeless, 
inexhaustible rapture. God is not a yet a “He,” but merely an 
impersonal, anonymous “it”: knowing no conflict, God knows 
not even itself as radical freedom. For Žižek, in contemporary 
terms this would be equivalent to the pure void that exists before 
the vacuum fluctuation declared by quantum cosmology, a 
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nothingness that must be declared positively charged because 
from its (auto)disturbance “something” emerges. What is of 
utmost importance here is the irreconcilable contrast between 
this stage and the next: the joyous void of divine non-being is 
breached by the contraction of finitude and the self-diremption of 
perfection that it entails. Metapsychologically, this sundering of 
heavenly symmetry is thus structurally identical to the disruption 
of the oceanic unity of child and mother that supposedly precedes 
the Oedipus complex, or the smooth, placid functioning of 
cyclical nature, which is skewered by the advent of human 
subjectivity.
2. After the contraction of material being, we have what Žižek 
calls “Schelling's grandiose 'Wagnerian' vision of God.” Within 
Schellingian cosmogony, this is so “terrifying” because, instead of 
the endless joy of divine eternity, we have a God as subject who 
finds Himself caught within the self-lacerating rage of matter. 
There is a sense in which God the Almighty is in infinite pain 
because his freedom has been lost within the torment-ridden 
movement that is coincident with the moment when the blind 
rotation of drives falls into an erratic, uncontrollable oscillation. 
As such, God is comparable to a helpless animal stuck in a trap.336 
To exemplify this point further, Žižek compares this stage to the 
unfathomable chaos that occurs after the vacuum fluctuation 
at the origins of the universe: the contraction of matter into 
an infinite point of absolute singularity, an incomprehensible 
upheaval within which the logic of our known physical universe 
breaks down. In terms of a metapsychology, it can be read as a 
mytho-poetic description of the ontological short circuit within 
the instinctual schemata of nature occurring before the eruption 
of human subjectivity. This moment of ontological standstill 
coincides with the pre-personal realm of anarchic self-experience 
seen in the night of the world and expresses the first beginnings 
of psychotic withdrawal of nature into an irreal self that severs the 
Innenwelt from Aussenwelt.
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3. Finally, we have God who is able to speak the Word and thus 
overcome the deadlock that he found Himself lodged within 
by becoming a full-fledged subjectivity. Ejecting the materiality 
that He had contracted, pushing it out of him like some kind of 
foreign body, he bestows upon this now excremental product 
its own independent existence and thus becomes God the 
Creator. For Žižek, this corresponds in physics to the primordial 
Big Bang itself: the beginning of our material universe as the 
self-expansion of the initially infinitely dense point of matter. 
Metapsychologically, in the Word we see the unconscious 
decision (Entscheidung) that separates Grund and existence for 
the first time. The Symbolic erupts as an attempt to discipline the 
unruliness of the previous stage, which has immanently disrupted 
the primacy of organism's autopoietic schemata. The schismatic 
split that characterizes the essence of the psychoanalytical 
experience and the actual freedom of the cogito is posited as such 
for the first time as a response to the complete denaturalization 
that is the zero-level of the subject. In both the theosophy of 
creation, the physics of the Big Bang, and the metapsychology 
of the birth of subjectivity, this stage is something unpredictable 
that founds something new (God the Creator, material reality, the 
universe of meaning).
The existent drafts of the Weltalter find themselves confronted with 
the same problem as the Freiheitsschrift, that is, the arbitrariness of the 
beginning: why does God speak the Word? If the act of unconscious decision 
cannot be deduced according to notional necessity (were it able to be, 
Schelling would fall back into the perceived threat of Absolute Idealism 
that he is fighting against) there is no guarantee that God, after contracting 
material finitude, will be able to assert His freedom by making it a predicate 
of Himself: that is, there is no guarantee that the subject will be able to 
liberate itself from the deadlock of the drives within which it finds itself, in 
other words, their unruliness. Attempting to articulate a radical philosophy 
of freedom, Schelling in the second draft has no possible recourse to an 
explanatory principle capable of saving God or human being from possible 
infinite diremption: he is unable to foreclose the possibility that both could 
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have become completely lost to themselves at a now inaccessible point in 
the vicissitudes of their dark pre-history. What is so terrifying here is that, 
instead of the light of consciousness and the universe of meaning, there could 
have been nothing but the agonizing rotation of drives in their frantic disorder, 
nothing but the ontological mayhem/madness wherein being would be irrevocably 
laid to waste in its own breakdown and catastrophism. If being awakens in a 
moment of primordial trauma, how could one be certain that its defense 
formation (subjectification through the Symbolic) would work? That it 
would solve its antagonism? If freedom is to be irreducible, it must posit 
itself entirely by its own activity from within the clutches of unbreakable 
determinism, but this comes at a price—and it is exactly around this 
problematic of the breach of symmetry necessary for a suitable “foundation” 
of freedom and its alarming metaphysical implications that the existent 
stillborn drafts circulate and ultimately falter, each offering a different spin 
irreconcilable with the others.
For Žižek, however, the psychoanalytical tension of the Weltalter drafts 
displays a much more complex structure than that of a mere attempt 
to cover up the dialectical contingency at the heart of the unconscious 
decision and its wider implications. What intensifies the problem at hand 
is that the entire investigation has the fundamental structure of fantasy.337 
In the articulation of the absolute beginning, we insert ourselves as a pure 
gaze into the Real that is prior to our own conception, just as if we were 
to imagine ourselves as spectators in our funerals watching our friends 
react to our death—and if we read the mytho-poetic introspective analysis 
that leads Schelling to such a discussion with this in mind, then we must 
conclude that it too exhibits the psychoanalytical traits associated with 
such fantasy constructions, complete with all of the problems that go along 
with them. For both endeavour to describe the impossible: a linguistically 
ordered field of experience where there is none, a world of thought where 
no thinking could possibly exist, the first merely in a “subjective” sense (I 
cannot witness my own funeral because my own personal ego will never 
exist after my death in order to be able even to see such events unfolding 
as I may imagine them), but the second in an “objective” sense (not only is 
there no one there to witness the emergence of a world of signification, since 
consciousness presupposes someone has already emerged, but thought itself 
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as logos has yet even to appear on the scene). When put in this manner, the 
question that poses itself is how the second, “objective” fabulation can be 
saved from the various kinds of illusions that may play themselves out in 
the first, “subjective” mode of fabulation such as those that occur in our 
daydreaming. In this respect, it is understandable how Schelling could have 
fallen into a trap: because we can only retroactively posit the material origins 
of subjectivity from within the Symbolic and the Imaginary and these 
origins represent the unthinkable basis of thinking itself,338 the descriptions 
of this natal darkness can serve as a mere screen upon which we project 
fantasmatic supplements to satisfy unconscious desires. Not only does 
the very nature of the investigation jeopardize it (since we can structurally 
never reach the act that brings consciousness into existence, speculation 
has reached its limit and must pass into dramatic mytho-poetics) but it 
could easily be abolished through a reduction to the narcissistic orbit of 
the Imaginary or succumb to various symbolic levels of defence that would 
prevent the subject from performing its description, even in a self-reflexive 
mytho-poetic medium. By protecting us from the traumatic Real of our 
being, something that we of course all want, these supplements can lead us 
away from the truth for which we are searching. But it is precisely here that 
the strength of psychoanalysis shows itself: as a discourse about discourse, 
in short, a discourse whose aim is to understand the inherent limitations 
plaguing all discourse (itself thus included), it is able to bestow upon such 
theoretical investigation an extra level of self-reflexivity that could help it 
from falling into such traps: “the way to avoid this utopian reduction of the 
subject to the impossible gaze witnessing an alternate reality from which 
it is absent is not to abandon the topos of alternate reality as such, but to 
reformulate it so as to avoid the mystification of the theosophic mytho-
poetic narrative which pretends to render the genesis of the cosmos.”339 
Thus, by focusing on the ambiguity of inserting ourselves as a pure gaze 
into the absolute beginning that we must retroactively posit, that is, the 
very impossibility of the endeavour itself to succeed in its task, Žižek is able 
to find a way to entirely cut off the theosophic character of Schelling's text 
and read it exclusively as a metapsychological account of the emergence 
of Symbolic from the meaningless Real. Man's inclusion within the divine 
theo-cosmogonic drama ultimately proves to be an extraneous feature of the 
The Abyss of Unconscious Decision 221
operative logic of the Weltalter drafts, a code to be deciphered, many features 
of which can be ignored as a mere phantasmal projection accidentally 
adjoining itself to an exploration of the abyssal origins of subjectivity. One 
of Žižek's most provocative claims is that one can see such a phantasmal 
projection in the attempts to cover up its most groundbreaking insight: 
the destructive self-movement of negativity in reality that leads to and is 
radicalized in the self-positing of subjectivity. In this way, we can say that 
paradoxically “it was [Schelling's] very 'regression' from pure philosophical 
idealism to the pre-modern theosophical problematic which enabled him to overtake 
modernity itself.”340 But now the question imposes itself upon us: what is 
revealed when we purify the odyssey that is the Freiheitsschrift and the 
Weltalter from its mytho-poetic phantasmagoria?
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Chapter 10
Radicalizing the Subject
Substance Gasping for Breath, the Metaphysics of Quantum 
Mechanics, and the Žižekian Unconscious
Although Žižek's transcendental materialism relies upon Schelling to 
explicate the origins of subjectivity, Hegel is nevertheless omnipresent 
in Žižek's work. Perceiving a strictly Hegelian structure of self-relating 
negativity in the second draft of the Weltalter that identifies Grund and 
existence in a manner inconsistent with its surface structure of quaternity, 
Žižek offers a psychoanalytical reconstruction of Schelling's aborted 
masterpiece by showing how Hegelian dialectics is its unconscious truth. 
Demonstrating this complex and nuanced hybridism of Hegelian logic and 
Schellingian ontology at the heart of Žižek's philosophy does not merely 
help us see its originality and singularity; it also enables us to shed light on 
in what sense his philosophy is a revisionist metaphysics of the subject. The 
existence of subjectivity not only attests that nature is at best a fragile not-all 
whose disruptive wounds are more primordial than its positive being. More 
drastically than this, the absolute, instead of being a fully subsisting reality 
that exists by means of a self-explanatory surplus, is at its most basic level 
only minimally indistinguishable from the void of nothingness, whereby the 
subject becomes one of the names of the eternal disturbance of this void by 
means of which there is something rather than nothing. This also leads us 
into a discussion of the paradoxical causality explicit in the self-begetting 
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of the Žižekian subject and its repercussions for our understanding of the 
unconscious.
10.1 From the Psychoanalytical Purification of the Theosophic 
to Substance Gasping for Breath
Žižek does not articulate his own solution to the problematic of how he is 
able to purify the odyssey that is the Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter from its 
mytho-poetic phantasmagoria. The issue at hand is how he can formalize 
Schelling's philosophy by purifying its theosophic content (the illusion of 
an originary oceanic bliss and its crucial role in covering up the intrinsically 
dialectical structure inherent to the Grund by means of a quaternity) by 
traversing its fantasy. To do this, Žižek relies on the primordiality of the 
psychoanalytical experience and the irreducibility of negativity in Hegelian 
logic, the traces of which he sees in the second draft's descriptions of the 
three stages involved in the movement from the Past to the Present. The 
resources offered by both allow us to internally reconfigure its conceptual 
movement by removing this distorting fantasy element through a 
philosophical reconstruction of the abyssal origins of the subject by tarrying 
with the Real of Schelling's texts. It is this revamped version of the Weltalter's 
investigations into the spectral, never-present beginnings of the Symbolic 
that enables Žižek to draw out the full metaphysical implications of the 
paradoxical nature of psychoanalytico-Cartesian subjectivity.
According to psychoanalytical experience, the zero-level fact in the 
passage from the Past to the Present has to be the second stage,341 that 
is, the self-lacerating rage of matter. Because Žižek identifies the subject 
with the non-coincidence of substance, its alienation from itself,342 this 
self-lacerating rage is equivalent to what Lacan refers to as the “organic 
dehiscence” exhibited in the mirror stage that forms the basis of the 
ontogenesis of personality.343 But if we are to mytho-poetically explain 
how such a dismemberment forms the meta-transcendental conditions 
for the possibility of subjectivity's self-positing, we cannot understand it 
as a haphazard feature of nature that falls upon it like an alien blow from 
nowhere—rather, its pure contingency must itself emerge from some kind 
of immanent, self-effacing possibility always already implicit within it.344 As 
that which metapsychologically corresponds to the eternal calm of the pure 
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immanence of substance preceding the deadlock of drives and the struggle 
to speak the Word, the joyous nothingness of divine eternity is therefore 
merely a part of the ego's fantasy of desired fullness, a narcissistic and 
reactive attempt to secure the false status of nature as all in order to protect 
us from the dark truth implicit in the psychoanalytical experience: that 
one cannot draw a metaphysical distinction between substance as a nothingness 
that rejoices in the oceanic bliss of non-experience and the unruly basis of human 
subjectivity that “disrupts” this unity. For Žižek, the transcendental materialist 
logic of which we see premonitions in the second draft thus allows us to 
add precision to the late German Idealist attempts to think substance as 
subject: the model of subjectivity as a disease within the vital fold of being 
needs to be slightly modified, for there was never a state of metaphysical 
harmony and innocence that the going-haywire of human unruliness could 
have brought into ruin once and for all. This is exactly why Žižek feels 
justified in proclaiming the superiority of Hegelian logic and violently 
remodulating Schelling's middle-late ontology to get rid of its notion of 
absolute indifference, for in positing an initial state of health, Schelling 
demonstrates a tendency—a tendency only encouraged by the abyssal void 
of the Real-as-origin—to construct a rampant fantasy whose imaginary 
support (certain theosophic details) could protect him from his own insight 
into the restless movement of negativity in the interior life of being and at 
the core of the subject's pure act, a fantasy that in itself is filled with holes 
and inconsistencies as shown by the endless proliferation of stillborn drafts 
of the Weltalter in an attempt to secure it.
That the subject is synonymous with the irrevocable self-sundering 
of substance does not mean that before the advent of complete 
denaturalization in our constitutive excess there was no internal obstruction 
within the former's immanent ebb and flow. If the human being is an 
irreversible blockage in the vital fold of being, it must represent an 
amplification of an already existing potentiality in nature. We can see this 
in various forms—natural disasters, deformed animals, mass extinction, 
black holes, all of which point to ways in which the originary “harmony” of 
the world is predicated upon disorder, eruptive disarray, and its inability to 
sustain itself in perfect symmetry. Knowledge in the Real is never perfect:
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The most unsettling aspect of such phenomena is the 
disturbance caused in what Lacan called “knowledge in the 
Real”: the “instinctual” knowledge which regulates animal 
and plant activity. This obscure knowledge can run amok. 
When winter is too warm, plants and animals misread the 
temperature as a signal that spring has already begun and so 
start to behave accordingly, thus not only rendering themselves 
vulnerable to later onslaughts of cold, but also perturbing the 
entire rhythm of natural reproduction.345 
These examples of destruction in nature must, however, be seen in their raw 
conceptual materiality. Rather than being justified by Žižek's rhetoric, they 
point to one of the major achievements of Žižek's dialectics: its ability to 
think through the philosophical implications of what is normally seen as a 
mere contingent breakdown of all-present order or a short-lived calamitous 
outburst of pandemonium in the otherwise smooth flow of things. Žižek 
refuses such a thesis: for him, contradiction and non-coincidence are to be 
seen as at the very basis of reality to such an extent that reality's logical closure 
upon itself is unable to sustain itself and is constitutively torment-ridden with 
fracture points. Rather than being a totalizing weave that is and thus embraces 
all things in its soft, calming touch, despite things seeming otherwise in 
experience (just as turbulent eddies are only possible given the oneness of 
the ocean that persists through them), substance is dirempt and constantly 
risks bursting at its seams due to its own internal fragmentation. These 
wounds in the absolute do not exude the vital blood of substance in such a 
way that they will, after a brief moment of cosmic fright, heal themselves and 
once again be subsumed within the economy of a symphonized sexualized 
dance of lack and plenitude, life and death: substance does not engage in a 
ritual of bloodletting to gain strength, as if conflict, although internal to the 
system, only existed so that through its conquering substance could express 
again and again its infinite, almighty power. On the contrary, the wounds 
of substance are those places where it touches the void. Torn apart from the 
inside out, substance in its auto-laceration is in danger of dissipating into 
nothingness, of no longer being capable of holding itself together. Here one 
must think of the fundamental presupposition of Schellingian philosophy: 
were substance (God) all, were there from the very beginning nothing but 
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a balanced movement, a pure, all-devouring totality, no subjectivity or 
experience would be possible.346 In this sense, Žižek is not merely trying to 
radicalize this insight by reactualizing Schelling's metapsychology so that it 
does not succumb to its theosophic tendencies, but more primordially trying 
to make it internally consistent. According to Schelling's own words, if we posit 
an initial state of health, we cannot explain how subjectivity could emerge. 
Perfection is only an imaginary, fantasmatic extension of the existential 
horizon of our broken finitude, that is, a reaction formation, a reaction 
formation within which we encounter again and again the insupportable 
negativity that tears apart the world, for after all, the repressed always returns. 
As the greatest thinker of subjectivity, we begin to grasp why there would be 
such an immense conflict within Schelling's middle-late period between the 
irreconcilable extremes of a radical philosophy of freedom and an equally 
radical philosophy of a theo-cosmogonic drama of divine being seeking 
self-manifest revelation. They go hand in hand: traumatic insight elicits 
protective defences, but the latter can never be completely successful.
Accordingly, Žižek psychoanalytically modifies Schelling's descriptions 
of the Past as that elusive X that forever haunts and precedes consciousness 
so that the real encounter (the horror of substance as subject) can be 
freed from its imaginary, fantasmatic surface (the theosophic odyssey) 
and brought into explicit mythologico-symbolization. This has severe 
consequences. First and foremost, we must remember that at the 
level of logic, Schelling's mytho-poetic narrative of the Past does not 
primordially present a chronology of the absolute, even if it is derived from 
phenomenological experience by the alchemical identification of the highest 
and lowest and can thus be used to explain the ontogenesis of the individual 
subject by means of reason by analogy. The “stages” Schelling refers to 
are purely logical and organized according to priority: the category of 
linear temporality only emerges with the Present as that which mirrors the 
structural relations intrinsic to the inner life of God. Consequently, there is 
no sense in which the joyous nothingness temporally precedes God as subject 
caught in the throes of the self-lacerating rage of matter. However, insofar as 
freedom as a predicate of a subject exists (stage three), the abyss of freedom 
as pure potentiality—a freedom that is not yet posited as such—must be said 
to logically precede the rotation of drives prior to full-fledged subjectivity 
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(stage two). Žižek follows the argument thus far, but then makes a crucial 
change in an attempt to draw out a truth hidden in Schelling's descriptions 
of the passage from one moment to the other. Given that there is no 
temporal separation between the descriptions of the joyous nothingness of 
non-experience and the infinite, agonizing oscillation of the potencies, or 
substance and subject, they are, in essence, two sides of the same coin. The 
“passage” is nothing but a logical conversion:
Let us step back for a moment and reformulate the primordial 
contraction in terms of the passage from a self-contented Will 
that wants nothing to an actual Will which effectively wants 
something: the pure potentiality of the primordial Freedom—
this blissful tranquillity, this pure enjoyment, of an unassertive, 
neutral Will which wants nothing—actualizes itself in the guise 
of a Will which actively, effectively, wants this “nothing”—that 
is, the annihilation of every positive, determinate content. 
By means of this purely formal conversion of potentiality 
into actuality, the blissful peace of primordial Freedom thus 
changes into pure contraction, into the vortex of “divine 
madness” which threatens to swallow everything, into 
the highest affirmation of God's egotism which tolerates 
nothing outside of itself. In other words, the blissful peace 
of primordial Freedom and the all-destructive divine fury 
which sweeps away every determinate content are one and the 
same thing, only in a different modality—first in the mode of 
potentiality, then in the mode of actuality.347 
The ultimate paradox of the shift from the bliss of divine eternity, freedom 
as pure potentiality, to the annular rotation of drives in the Grund that serves 
as the stepping-stone to freedom as the predicate of a subject is that there is 
no movement at all—Grund is always already the Ungrund, the “closed” circle of 
nature is always already the scene of the possible emergence of freedom.348 If we 
equate freedom with negativity, then we see that the Ungrund is no longer 
that which neutrally grounds the conflict of the polar principles in order 
to know itself and reveal itself to itself through them, but rather becomes 
synonymous with the devastating negativity at the heart of being, the places 
where it risks touching the void, and that even when it remains non-posited 
Radicalizing the Subject 229
as such, is always already present within the palpitations of the latter like 
a cardiac arrest waiting to happen: the ground is always already minimally 
ungrounded, ridden with tension, bursting at the seams. We see this clearly in the 
dialectic of the ontogenesis of the subject. Although the movement from (i) 
the rapture of symmetry that is substance to (ii) the harrowing madness of 
the drives in the unruliness of the infant appears to be due to the grotesque 
excess of life that is human being as an unfortunate accident, the matter is 
more complicated. In the first stage freedom (negativity) is always already 
there as a logical possibility, but remains for the most part non-posited 
in the general economy of the dynamics of substance, though it shows its 
head constantly, so that we just have a relatively closed and blind annular 
rotation of drives; in the second, however, it finally successfully posits 
itself in a significant manner (although not as such) as the self-lacerating 
rage of matter, but in such a way that its rawness risks devouring itself. It 
needs to be tamed, disciplined, gentrified. The decisive moment comes 
with (iii) the act of decision through which freedom as subject (inner limit 
of substance) is converted into freedom as the predicate of a subject (self-
relating negativity), an act that is not only notionally non-deducible because 
it is, in itself, radically free, but also one that withdraws in its very gesture 
of self-positing. When this occurs, negativity, instead of being a single part 
in the totality of material being, turns itself into an independent center 
that hegemonically dominates the whole to which it once belonged, which 
in turn forces the negativity always already contained in the first moment 
finally to become fully explicit. Freedom is not in direct contact with the 
Ungrund as that which neutrally grounds the conflict of the polar principles 
as indifference, nor is it a resurgence of the primordial abyss of freedom: it 
is nothing but this movement in which the second (the negativity of being), 
relating to itself, counting itself, usurps the position of the first (being) 
and thus institutes a mere formal reconfiguration of the whole.349 As pure 
negativity, full-fledged self-standing freedom (self-relating negativity) does 
not emerge out of nowhere within a harmonious play of forces, because its 
existence attests that there is freedom (negativity) all the way down. As Žižek 
says, “the only greatness is 'negativity' itself.”350 
What the psychoanalytico-Cartesian subject thus shows us is that the 
idea of extra/pre-subjective nature as the self-harmonizing Grund of all 
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things, a causally closed play of forces caught within a blind necessity, is 
a pure fantasy: the beginning is not a solid, inert density, but a seething 
mass of heterogeneous matter lacking overarching symmetry and balanced 
movement. Matter is not some kind of impenetrable or irreducible “real 
stuff” that persists beyond conscious representation and follows eternal 
laws—at its very core, matter constantly dematerializes itself by opening up 
its flesh to the void of (virtual) non-being to the point where it is no longer 
matter but something more: that is, a full-fledged subject. The self-operative 
logic of nature as Grund consequently demonstrates that the immanence of 
substance is not a permeating weave of positive being, a never-ending sea 
whose fullness encompasses all: it is plagued constitutively by the possibility 
of self-fragmentation, since irrevocable zones of (virtual) non-being 
shattering the ordered reality of the world and its causal closure always 
threaten to erupt and turn it into a chaotic pandemonium of disordered, 
anarchic forces combating for rulership—a state that would, in fact, bring 
substance itself to its untimely end, for a substance that has globally turned 
“into a dispersed floating of membra disjecta”351 is no longer a substance 
at all. The self-lacerating rage of matter thus takes on a new meaning. 
The libidinal frenzy of the unruliness of human nature does not merely 
represent a single case of the diseased breakdown of the ontological, but 
rather the inability of substance to posit itself as all: substance is destined 
towards auto-destruction; the “ground fails to ground,”352 for it is always 
on the verge of passing over into hemorrhaging conflict and ravaging 
antagonism. In this regard, substance is constitutively weak, a precarious 
all whose fragility is not only always struggling to keep itself together as the 
contractive energy of all things, but also always capable of the new and the 
unpredictable at any cosmic moment due to its negativity, for what will be 
is not necessarily causally contained in what was. Here we see the extremely 
Hegelian logic that Žižek extracts from Schelling in the second draft: it is 
the failure of the first moment (the self-actualization of substance and the 
indivisibility of its causal self-enclosure, its closed annular rotation) that 
leads to/is the second (the unruliness of human nature, the unbearable short 
circuit in the rotation of drives), whose vicissitudes in turn set the stage for 
the third (the self-positing of the subject through this rupture in the fold 
of being, which opens up an autonomous logical space that attempts to 
Radicalizing the Subject 231
suture the hole). The essence of the third moment is the self-negation of 
the previous one, which gives it a fully developed notional self-reflexivity 
in such a way that by guaranteeing the identity of Grund and existence 
Žižek is able to foreclose the possibility of a theosophic quaternity from 
within the conceptual fabric of Schelling's text. In this sense we can finally 
comprehend two controversial claims put forth by Žižek: first, that that 
“the founding gesture [the subject as the vanishing mediator] 'repressed' 
by the formal envelope of the 'panlogicist' Hegel is the same as the gesture 
which is 'repressed' by the formal envelope of the 'obscurantist' Schelling,”353 
for both reveal in their own way the “unacknowledged” Grundoperation of 
German Idealism; and, second, that “to articulate clearly the Grundoperation 
of German Idealism [...] necessitates reference to Lacan; that is to say, 
our premiss is that the 'royal road' to this Grundoperation involves reading 
German Idealism through the prism of Lacanian psychoanalytical theory.”354 
It is in this respect that Žižek's philosophy is a hybridism of Hegelian logic 
and Schellingian ontology, for it is a mere attempt at the thematization of its 
unconscious Grundlogik.
The metaphysical basis of freedom is the irremovable possibility of 
negativity from within any self-totalizing, self-enclosed system. There are 
always unavoidable ruptures and breaks within the logical fold of the world, 
but these are not mere contingent features of the otherwise harmonious 
symphony of the infinity of being: the activity of the first moment always 
already “possesses” its own failure as exhibited in the constant proliferation 
of negativities that can never be fully subsumed within its dynamics, 
indicating that substance is constitutively minimally non-coincident to 
itself. Monstrosities and ontological abortions are an inescapable effect 
of substance's functioning, for function now shows itself to be one with 
dysfunction. In terms of Žižek's “reactualization” of Schelling, it is here 
that its most textually violent moment is located. It proclaims that the 
only way to save the Schellingian legacy is to say that nature as a full, rich 
creative potency inherent in the dark womb of the world is an illusion. 
Nature was always already a sickly creature, whose collapse coincides with 
its own conditions of (im)possibility. It is not only that nature never knew a 
moment of eternal happiness and joy, but that the dull, inarticulate pressure 
of its own gasping for breath (spirit, we remember, comes from the Latin 
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spiritus, “breath,” and is related to spirare, “to breathe”) precedes the very 
positivity of its being. Substance can only be substance—nature can only be 
nature—insofar as it is always already internally torn apart by a constitutive 
moment of auto-laceration that is the site of spirit/subject: “incompleteness 
[is] already in itself a mode of subjectivity, such that subjectivity is always 
already part of the Absolute, and reality is not even thinkable without 
subjectivity.”355 
If the ontological dislocation attested to by emergence of the subject 
is always already a part of the absolute, then the passage from nature to 
culture is a mere logical conversion—it only requires a certain gesture or 
incitation to be brought to the fore while nothing changes at the level of 
“positive” being. Full-fledged subjectivity, and hence the symbolic universe 
of meaning that emerges as a belated response, may be an unpredictable 
event whose result institutes a new age of the world, but its ontological basis 
demonstrates that there is no ultimate opposition between us and the world. 
The idea of a unified, self-penetrating substance only comes après-coup as 
part of a fantasy that helps the subject protect itself, for without such a 
fantasmatic support of fullness we risk losing our very subjective consistency 
in face of the tragic incompletion of the world. The fiction of “Nature” is, 
in many ways, unavoidable: we unconsciously create it to save ourselves 
from recognizing the true basis of subjectivity and its stark implications, 
namely, the fact that the world, constitutively ravaged by the Ungrund, is 
metaphysically imbalanced and thus not-all:
True “anthropomorphism” resides in the notion of nature 
tacitly assumed by those who oppose man to nature: nature as 
a circular “return of the same,” as the determinist kingdom of 
inexorable “natural laws,” or (more in accordance with “New 
Age” sensitivity) nature as a harmonious, balanced Whole 
of cosmic forces derailed by man's hubris, his pathological 
arrogance. What is to be “deconstructed” is this very notion 
of nature: the features we refer to in order to emphasize man's 
unique status—the constitutive imbalance, the “out-of-joint,” 
on account of which man is an “unnatural” creature, “nature 
sick unto death”—must somehow be at work in nature itself, 
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although—as Schelling would have put it—in another, lower 
power (in the mathematical sense of the term).356 
But here we must be careful. Insofar as the subject is an immanent event 
within the world, that is, insofar as through it being has “gained” the power 
to look upon itself by internal reflection due to a maximization of this 
constitutive self-sabotaging tendency within nature and symbolization 
occurs as a means to deal with this trauma, one cannot conclude that 
symbolization is a mere defence mechanism constitutive of the human 
ego. The illusionary world of the Symbolic into which we withdraw to 
save ourselves from the trauma that is the very essence of our freedom 
is simultaneous with being's own recoil from itself as it achieves self-disclosure. 
Awakening into the nightmare that is the psychoanalytical horror of 
substance as subject in all of its ambiguity, the primordial reaction of the 
world opening its eyes for the first time is that of hellish panic, a panic 
whose ultimate fate is the necessity of an ontological passage through 
madness which we enact as symbolic subjects by (re)constituting reality in an 
ontologically solipsistic, eternally nocturnal space of signifiers, a universe 
of meaning. If the self-revelation of being to itself leads to an originary 
madness, then not only should we understand the proliferation within 
the latter of self-composing dream-like images, a rhapsody of social and 
political phantasmagoria that function as the fabric of our own identities, 
as events in being, but also this very fiction of ontological completion we witness 
in accounts of “Nature.” Through us, in a moment of fantasy, being sees 
itself as perfect—or as having been possibly perfect were it not for our 
intervention—by living out the impossibility of its own illusionary fullness, a 
fantasy that is a complete perversion of the typical narrative of God reaching 
full self-consciousness only by means of human activity. In this sense, if 
the theological implications of quantum mechanics, wherein particles can 
cheat the universe by coming into and out of existence before they are 
“symbolically” registered, are that we must “posit a God who is omnipotent, 
but not omniscient,”357 then Žižek's metaphysics compels us to posit a God 
(nature, the absolute) that is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, yet 
somehow persists in being. But how?
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10.2 Eppur si muove: Ontological Dislocation and the 
Metaphysics of the Void
At this conceptual conjuncture, Žižek takes an additional step in his 
psychoanalytical reconstruction of German Idealism that simultaneously 
brings into complete culmination its unconscious, disavowed Grundlogik 
and leads him into a profoundly new variety of metaphysical thinking that 
is uniquely his own. If in order to explain the emergence of the subject 
out of substance we have to proclaim that the latter, rather than being an 
indivisible oneness that weaves all things into an all-encompassing fabric, is 
predicated upon a site of auto-laceration, then the subject—as a name for 
this gap in substance that “sets it in motion”—has in turn to be more fully 
investigated, for we have not yet seen how ontological dislocation could be 
a creative force. We cannot stay at the level of substance qua nature: the 
ordered universe that compromises cosmological, geological, and biological 
time is so ravaged by negativity that the subject in its various vestiges does 
not merely indicate the places where substance in its trembling and uneasy 
auto-articulation risks touching the void, that is to say, is in danger of no longer 
holding itself together, but also the places where the void threatens to (re-)erupt. 
In this regard, the dynamic processes of the world are not just dependent 
upon (potential) disarray, but suggest that substance cannot be the last 
metaphysical word, since it appears on a second glance that the world itself 
is a response to something more primordial, something that is constantly 
trying to show its ugly head: ultimately “there is no Substance, only the Real 
as the absolute gap, non-identity, and particular phenomena (modes) are 
Ones, so many attempts to stabilize this gap.”358 
Risking anachronism,359 Žižek sees a way to reinterpret the German 
Idealist attempt to think substance as subject through quantum mechanics 
that sheds light on this problematic. As quantum mechanics teaches us, 
any metaphysical investigation into the foundation of substance qua nature 
(the basic material constituents of reality) has a paradoxical result. Instead 
of coming upon a dense field of fully constituted realities that form the 
ultimate building blocks of the universe, “the more we analyze reality, the 
more we find a void”:360 rather than encountering entities complete in 
themselves, we see irreducibly indeterminate states lacking being in any 
traditional sense and from which “hard” reality can only emerge if there is 
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a collapse of the wave function;361 “normal” laws of linear temporality and 
causality break down as we encounter particles that retroactively “choose” 
their paths along virtual chains of possibilities and others that can even 
cheat the universe, coming in and out of existence without the latter even 
knowing.362 But this not only drastically challenges any sharp distinction 
between nature and culture,363 but also attests that the micro-universe 
of quantum particles is strangely “less” than that of the macro-universe 
that constructs itself from its vicissitudes, in a way that is remarkably 
similar to how the Kantian subject can only construct a unified world of 
appearances from the inconsistent fragments of sensation. In an uncanny 
logical short circuit, it would appear that not only is there no bottom-up 
causality at the level of experience (transcendental constitution is more 
real than what Kant calls “a rhapsody of perception,”364 since it founds 
a coherent field of reality), but even the most fundamental level of the 
universe is metaphysically more chaotic and constitutively less ontologically 
complete than the ordered macro-level physical world that science, as 
according to classical models, describes. Substance is not a given, but an 
achievement: it is as if all reality is transcendentally constituted, as if nature 
itself emerges out of this field of quasi-entities. But just as we had to explain 
the ontogenesis of unruliness, we must also explain the emergence of these 
ontologically incomplete realities that serve as the basis for the ordered 
universe, since they cannot be a brute, arbitrary given. The emphasis of the 
key philosophical question is thus shifted from how the subject can emerge 
out of the Real qua substance (thought from being) to how the subject can 
emerge out of the Real qua void (something from nothing), for the more 
strictly speaking ontological question of ontogenesis thus proves to be 
irreducibly entangled with the most fundamental of metaphysical questions.
The more we analyze reality the more we find a void, because once 
we reach the level of quanta our conventional conceptions of the ordered 
cosmos just stop working. Not only do we here recognize that “there simply 
is no basic level,” that “divisions go on indefinitely,” whereby “the quantum 
level marks the beginning of the 'blurring' of 'basic' full reality,”365 but also 
that “[o]ne should thus reject the ‘positive’ ontology that presupposes some 
zero-level of reality where things 'really happen' and dismisses the higher 
levels as mere abbreviations, illusory self-perception, and so forth. There 
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is no such zero-level: if we go 'all the way down,' we arrive at the Void.”366 
This has a surprising consequence, one whose full metaphysical implications 
quantum mechanics thus summons us to accept: namely, that the closer 
we get to the origin of all things, the more ontologically incomplete reality 
is, the less distinguishable its fundamental constituents are from the void, 
thus forcing us not merely to proclaim that the void is “the only ultimate 
reality,”367 but more drastically still that “'all there is' is, precisely, not-All, a 
distorted fragment which is ultimately a 'metonymy of nothing.'”368 In short, 
what we experience as hard, full reality is at its core a mere vibration of 
nothingness lacking any true ontological depth, since there exists a certain 
radical indistinction between being (a structured physical universe) and the 
void (a structureless zone without any dense ontological determination in 
any traditional sense).369 
But if the building blocks of the world are nothing but variations upon 
nothingness, then why do they emerge in the first place? And what prevents 
the universe from imploding upon itself in some kind of triumphant suicidal 
gesture, leaving us with nothing but the “eternal peace” of the void? Why 
something rather than nothing? Žižek hints that the answer is to be found 
in the very tension between the void and this field of quasi-entities that, 
the further we push them, the more indistinguishable they appear from 
nothingness itself—using the Higgs field as an example. Physical systems 
tend towards a state of lowest energy. In another vein, if we take energy away 
from a system, we should eventually expect to reach a vacuum state where 
the total energy count would be zero. Yet certain phenomena tell us that 
“there has to be something (some substance) that we cannot take away from a 
given system without raising that system’s energy—this 'something' is called the 
Higgs field: once this field appears in a vessel that has been pumped empty, 
and whose temperature has been lowered as much as possible, its energy will 
be further lowered.”370 Incredibly, once a physical system's energy has been 
lowered to the point where it it is on the brink of zero, this “something” 
appears, a “something” that requires less energy than nothing. Consequently, 
“'nothingness (the void, being deprived of all substance) and the lowest 
level of energy paradoxically no longer coincide, that is, it is 'cheaper' (it 
costs the system less energy) to persist in 'something' than to dwell in 
'nothing,' at the lowest level of tension, or in the void, the dissolution of 
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all being.”371 But here we should radicalize this paradox by extending it to 
the ultimate metaphysical level of reality. It is not merely that we cannot 
bring any physical system to a zero-level of energy without the Higgs 
field positing itself: what the latter suggests is that nothingness is minimally 
“inconsistent” with itself and that it is this very “inconsistency” that is responsible 
for the emergence of something out of nothing. The rapture of void, the bliss of 
an eternity freed from all tension, does not merely come at too high a price 
for us as creatures living in this world, but is, strictly speaking, impossible. 
Metaphysics is thus starkly remodulated:
What if we posit that “Things-in-themselves” emerge against 
the background of the Void of Nothingness, the way this Void 
is conceived in quantum physics, as not just a negative void, 
but the portent of all possible reality? This is the only true 
consistent “transcendental materialism” which is possible after 
the Kantian transcendental idealism. For a true dialectician, 
the ultimate mystery is not “Why is there something rather 
than nothing?” but “Why is there nothing rather than 
something?”372 
Although Žižek makes use of the Higgs field mainly as an image, in Less 
Than Nothing his expansive engagement with quantum mechanics sheds 
new light on its precise conceptual role in his own thinking. Not only does 
this engagement enable him to draw out underlying ontological implications 
from quantum mechanics' fundamental insights, but it more strongly gives 
us sufficient resources from which we can extract a more strictly speaking 
metaphysical argument from his discussion of the Higgs field, which attests 
to how Žižek potentially supplies quantum mechanics with a wider, non-
naturalistic foundation while simultaneously founding a new alternative in 
metaphysics argumentatively independent from its framework. As that which 
(theoretically) controls whether forces and particles behave differently, 
the Higgs field has two modes: it is either “switched off” (inoperative) 
or “switched on” (operative). While in the first, given that the system is 
in a state of pure vacuum, forces and particles cannot be distinguished, 
in the second symmetry between particles and forces are broken so that 
differentiations among them can occur. However, the paradox lies precisely 
in the following: what is so unique about the Higgs field is that it is favorable 
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for it to be “switched on” (operative), for if a system is in a state of pure 
vacuum “the Higgs field still has to spend some energy—nothing comes 
for free; it is not the zero-point at which the universe is just 'resting in 
itself' in total release—the nothing has to be sustained by an investment of 
energy.”373 Because the pure vacuum requires the expenditure of energy, in 
order to solve this paradox we are forced to substitute it with another by 
“introduc[ing] a distinction between two vacuums”:
first, there is the “false” vacuum in which the Higgs field is 
switched off, i.e., there is pure symmetry with no differentiated 
particles or forces; this vacuum is “false” because it can only 
be sustained by a certain amount of energy expenditure. 
Then, there is the “true” vacuum in which, although the Higgs 
field is switched on and the symmetry is broken, i.e. there is 
a certain differentiation of particles and forces, the amount 
of energy spent is zero. In other words, energetically, the 
Higgs field is in a state of inactivity, of absolute repose. At the 
beginning, there is the false vacuum; this vacuum is disturbed 
and the symmetry is broken because, as with every energetic 
system, the Higgs field tends towards the minimization of 
its energy expenditure. This is why “there is something and 
not nothing”: because, energetically, something is cheaper than 
nothing.374 
What is crucial to note with the Higgs field is that the two vacuums whose 
existence it posits are not by any means equal: rather than encountering a 
mere polarity, a two-sided principle that brings together a delicate dance 
of opposites like light and day, life and death, fullness and lack, into 
equilibrium, we see a constitutive imbalance. Once we apply this principle 
cosmologically as a metaphysical principle, instead of having an eternal 
repetition of creation (breaking of the symmetries) and its destruction 
(return to the void), reality and its disappearance into the abyss, we come 
across a “displaced One, a One which is, as it were, retarded with regard 
to itself, always already 'fallen,' its symmetry always already broken.”375 As 
such, there is nothing but creation or reality because the “pure” vacuum 
wherein one would expect absolute repose is “false,” that is, stricto sensu 
impossible—it structurally must have always already passed over into and 
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became the “true” vacuum; and although this would appear to make the 
“false” vacuum theoretically superfluous (it never had, or could, exist) 
“this tension between the two vacuums [is to] be maintained: the 'false 
vacuum' cannot simply be dismissed as a mere illusion, leaving only the 
'true' vacuum, so that the only true peace is that of incessant activity, 
of balanced circular motion—the 'true' vacuum itself remains forever a 
traumatic disturbance.”376 But why? For the precise reason that without this 
primordial antagonism we could not explain the minimal distinction between 
the void and its vibrations, between the nothing and the ontologically incomplete 
realities barely distinguishable from it—in short, how the symmetries between 
particles and forces could have been broken in the first place. Were we only to 
have the “true” vacuum, then finitude, materiality, and ultimately experience 
would be a mere illusion, for there would be no difference between the 
symmetry of the void and its disturbance, leaving nothing but a nirvana-
like principle of nothingness to which all things are reducible. But once we 
witness the irreducibility of the antagonism within the void itself between 
its two modes, reality becomes less a seeming that we have to break through 
than an intrinsic part of the void that necessarily arises as a response to 
the primordial metaphysical trauma that is the perturbation of the “true” 
vacuum and whose essence is thus preserved. Even if nothing and the 
metonymy of nothing is all there is, this presupposes that the latter does 
not logically collapse into the former although the exact boundary between 
them is blurred. Hence, the reason Žižek can say that if “[t]he answer to 
'Why is there Something rather than Nothing?' is thus that there is only 
Nothing, and all processes take place 'from Nothing through Nothing to 
Nothing,'” then “this nothing is not the Oriental or mystical Void of peace, 
but the nothingness of a pure gap (antagonism, tension, 'contradiction'), the 
pure form of dislocation ontologically preceding any dislocated content,”377 
thus radically changing our very notion of nothingness itself.
The Higgs field thus not only offers us an interesting naturalistic 
explanation of the world when used in cosmology, but more strongly hints 
at a new variety of metaphysics. Fleshing out its broad consequences, Žižek 
is not only able to offer a new account of the emergence of things that is 
inspired by though independent from quantum mechanics, but can also 
radicalize his ontology of the subject, thereby weaving metaphysics and 
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ontology into a dynamic, self-articulating whole. For him, the primordial 
fact from which metaphysics must begin is the fact that nothingness is. 
Drawing upon insights gained by contemporary science, however, he says 
that in order to explain the mere existence of things, we must posit that 
nothingness necessarily fails “to be,” for any attempt to have a purely 
vacuous void paradoxically costs more energy than things existing against 
the background of this void. Here we encounter “the primacy of the inner 
split,”378 whereby irresolvable conflict is at the origin of all things: the 
absolute is nothing but this fragile de-substantialized process that “arises” 
out of the self-splitting of a positively charged void, a split that befalls it 
from within through its own failure “to be” what it is without that very split. 
There is no primordial fullness, no positive hard reality that self-unfolds 
according to a creative principle of actualization;379 there is nothing but a 
pure ontological dislocation of which we can only say eppur si muove (“and 
yet it moves”). But insofar as this gap cannot be mediated with the absolute, 
it presents itself as “the non-dialectical ground of negativity,” so that 
“[t]he old metaphysical problem of how to name the nameless abyss pops 
up here in the context of how to name the primordial gap: contradiction, 
antagonism, symbolic castration, parallax, diffraction, complementarity, 
up to difference.”380 But the name that is perhaps best suited to this is the 
subject. This would inscribe this metaphysics of the void into the legacy of 
the German Idealist attempt to think substance as subject, while bringing 
us simultaneously beyond it and into a new sphere, a new materialism.381 
If German Idealism has taught us that epistemic ambiguities in idealism 
(how can the subject overcome its own synthetic mediation of the world and 
reach the latter an sich?) occur because our division from being is identical 
with being's own division to itself, quantum mechanics calls us to radicalize 
this notion of the subject even further and claim that it exhibits the same 
structure as the split responsible for all things:
This, perhaps, is how one can imagine the zero-level of 
creation: a red diving line cuts through the thick darkness 
of the void, and on this line, a fuzzy something appears, the 
object-cause of desire—perhaps, for some, a woman's naked 
body (as on the cover of this book). Does this image not 
supply the minimal coordinates of the subject-object axis, the 
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truly primordial axis of evil: the red line which cuts through 
the darkness is the subject, and the body its object?382 
If in Žižek's strictly metaphysical thinking the emphasis shifts from how 
the subject can emerge out of the Real qua substance (thought from being) 
to how the subject can emerge out of the Real qua void (something from 
nothing), it is because there is no radical difference between the creation 
of the world and the creation of the world of meaning. Both exhibit the 
same catastrophic cutting, so that the primary question becomes that of the 
originary catastrophe itself rather than just one of its specific “instantiations” 
in human freedom. The fact that the answer for both (the Real is always 
already subject) is identical proclaims that there is only the Real of the 
gap, that the splitting precedes what is split. Žižek's paradoxical conclusion 
is that if the subject is “the primordial Big Bang,”383 it cannot merely be 
that of the universe of meaning, but must also be that of all that there is. The 
great lesson to be drawn from the metaphysical archaeology of the subject 
is that “[w]hat, ultimately, 'there is' is only the absolute Difference, the 
self-repelling Gap”:384 although substance qua nature proves itself to be 
not-all (traces of which we see in German Idealist accounts of negativity 
and most radically in contemporary science), so that we must posit the 
logical precedence of the void to which its indivisibility is always already 
contrasted and thus impossiblized, nevertheless just like substance qua 
nature this originary void in itself also proves to be split—a split that is not 
merely a mere catastrophic cut, but a rupturing antagonism imbued with an 
“energetic” or “energizing” force, a force that is somehow less than nothing. 
This has two drastic consequences. First, the complex order of the cosmos 
may at some point in time be reduced to unimaginable chaos (being nothing 
but a heterogenous play of powers) but never to a nirvana-like nothingness, 
for before the moment at which an absolute zero would be reached the 
void would, as it were, break its own symmetry in advance and prevent its 
own repose. We cannot escape the fragile and macabre dance of the not-all: 
non-coincidence is the pulsating heart of all reality, a heart whose diastoles 
and systoles may whimper under their own weight and threaten to collapse 
upon themselves at any moment in one great and final apocalyptic turmoil, 
yet cannot, because this turmoil costs the universe less energy than the pure 
virtuality of the void. Second, if thinking substance as subject reveals that 
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nature itself is anything but a powerful, creative source, a pure affirmation 
displaying ontological closure à la Spinoza, then the void in being imposed 
upon us by the metaphysical archaeology of the subject demonstrates 
something much more radical than the fact that the human subject is not 
a mere accidental breakdown of the natural order, but actually depends 
upon an inborn negativity that impossiblizes its attempt at a self-articulating 
totality from the outset (“we should accept that nature is 'unnatural,' a 
freak show of contingent disturbances with no inner rhyme or reason”385). 
It further demonstrates that it is not the human subject that is the ultimate 
ontological catastrophe, but reality as such:
There is nothing, basically. I mean it quite literally. But then 
how do things emerge? Here I feel a kind of spontaneous 
affinity with quantum physics, where, you know, the idea 
there is that [the] universe is a void, but a kind of a positively 
charged void—and then particular things appear when 
the balance of the void is disturbed. And I like this idea 
spontaneously very much, that the fact that it's not just 
nothing—things are out there—it means that something went 
terribly wrong, that what we call creation is a kind of a cosmic 
imbalance, cosmic catastrophe, that things exist by mistake.386 
However, if what we call creation, the primordial Big Bang, is some 
kind of cosmic mishap, then this mishap must in some sense have been 
unavoidable. The ontological catastrophe that is creation is a necessity 
because nothingness itself fails “to be” nothingness and through its 
failure never ceases to create “something”; and since this “something” is 
paradoxically less than nothing, the infinite proliferation of ontologically 
incomplete quasi-entities is only minimally distinguishable from the purely 
vacuous void itself. The world does not find its origin in a willed creation, an 
impersonal emanation from a sphere of consummate being overflowing in 
itself, or the uncontainable productivity of substance qua nature as absolute 
power—no, the world comes to be in an originary disaster, a primordial 
metaphysical cataclysm that is always already occurring, it being impossible to 
pinpoint a logical moment within which nothingness could have succeeded 
at “being” itself. Yet the split that is the subject in both its modes should 
not be considered a loss, but rather a liberation. Ontological catastrophe 
Radicalizing the Subject 243
is paradoxically “a deprivation, a gesture of taking away which is in itself a 
giving, productive, generative, opening up and sustaining the space in which 
something(s) can appear,”387 even if these something(s) only exist because 
ontological catastrophe is uncannily less than nothing.
The veritable horror of substance as subject—ontological catastrophe—
revealed through the metaphysical archaeology of the psychoanalytico-
Cartesian subject is therefore twofold. At the first level, it indicates that 
nature was always already a sickly creature, its rhythms always already 
disordered, unsteady, broken. Within the “passage” from drives to desire, 
substance to subject, no positive content is added, nothing changes at 
the level of the Real qua Real. What the subject imposes upon us is the 
realization of the constitutive contingency that lies at the centre of creation, 
the fragility of the seemingly ordered cosmos that has arisen before us, 
so that the immanent causality of nature is seen to be predicated upon 
its potential internal breakdown. On the second level, the metaphysical 
archaeology of the subject tells us that if we remain here, we have not gone 
far enough. If we are truly to understand how the not-all of substance 
could sustain itself in its own precarious being and, more fundamentally, 
how it could have emerged in the first place, we must radicalize the subject 
understood as an underlying dysfunctioning of substance's dynamics. If, 
as Žižek maintains, experience is revelatory of the fact that reality must 
be not-all, then it also contains a still deeper truth: reminding us that 
substance fails to ground itself, that it is riddled with holes, that it opens up 
the logical space of the substance and its contrast, the void, forcing us to 
explore the latter. We have thus come full circle: an ontological account of 
the emergence of the subject (the arising of representation out of being) has 
morphed into a discussion concerning the ultimate metaphysical structure 
of the world (the upsurge of “something[s]” out of nothing), because the 
two questions are seen to be intimately linked, the former automatically 
leading to the latter. And falling upon this intuition, Žižek asks what if the 
same structure is at play at both levels, so that the answer to the latter will 
prove to be similar to that of the former, namely, that the movement from 
the Real of void to creation is not as initially problematic as it may appear 
because the Real of void shows itself to be always already tainted by the 
Real of gap. Ontological catastrophe is the zero-level of reality because 
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there is a necessity of the primordial void of which mystics speak to be 
disturbed, a necessity that is not due to the notional necessity of right-
wing Hegelian theology (in order for the Idea to actualize itself as infinite 
freedom, it must sacrifice itself in nature so that it can fully return to itself 
in spirit after arising from its own ashes) or the conditional necessity of the 
late Schellingian quaternity (if the Ungrund were to become self-manifest 
to itself, then it would have to arbitrarily limit its primordial freedom in 
the kabbalistic act of contracting finitude) but a necessity that derives 
from the impotence of the void “to be” a purely vacuous void, a necessity 
that is synonymous with the absolute non-coincidence of nothingness to 
nothingness that is motor of all things. The language of catastrophe is in this 
sense completely justified, for creation does not present itself as intrinsically 
beautiful and creative or purposeful, but rather as a monstrous seat of 
ontological abortions and terrors devoid of sense though from time to time 
capable of miracles. Rather than the world being given to us by the self-
overflowing exuberance of the Good or the personal hand of God, it moves 
from nothing through nothing to nothing due to the self-repelling gap of the 
void, the internal split of a positively charged nothingness, which denies all 
positivity to that which it sets in motion: “[p]erhaps this gap separating the 
two vacuums is then the ultimate word (or one of them, at least) that we can 
pronounce on the universe: a kind of primordial ontological dislocation or 
différance on account of which, no matter how peaceful things may appear 
sub specie aeternitatis, the universe is out of joint and eppur si muove.”388 
10.3 The Act of Uneasy Self-Begetting: Entscheidung and the 
Paradoxical Self-Positing of Freedom
By plunging into the abyssal origins of subjectivity Žižek is not just led to a 
new, disquieting form of transcendental materialism that offers an original 
account of the relationship between the Real and the Ideal, with stark 
implications for our understanding of substance, the emergence of order, 
and even the beginnings of the cosmos. He is also led to develop a theory of 
the unconscious that challenges both the traditional Freudian and Lacanian 
accounts, and even the one developed by Schelling that he draws upon. 
This theory deserves to be highlighted in some detail because it is revelatory 
of one of the most difficult and provocative aspects of Žižek's philosophy: 
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that is, the pure act at the origin of the subject that is simultaneous 
with the ontological passage through madness that forces upon us the 
rational necessity of speculative fabulation to embark upon a metaphysical 
archeology of the subject.
Schelling's account of the birth of subjectivity is more than a theory of 
the meta-transcendental state of affairs that must be in place if subjectivity 
is to arise out of nature with a triumphant cry, for central to Schelling's 
ontogenetic narrative is that the former, though providing necessary 
conditions for the birth of the subject in/out of nature, does not supply its 
sufficient conditions. To explicate the moment of ontological judgement that 
institutes the pure difference between Grund and existence and with it the 
entire universe of human meaning (the Present), Schelling must concern 
himself with the very moment of unconscious decision (Entscheidung) by 
which subjectivity paradoxically liberates itself out of the immanent field 
of being to which it once “belonged” in a moment that is a self-caused 
immaculate conception insofar as this self-positing, which cannot be 
deduced according to notional necessity, is an arbitrary act of pure freedom. 
What is of paramount importance is the root of the term, which in English 
displays a similar play on words: Entscheidung as Ent-Scheidung, decision as 
de-scission. Since the German suffix -ung refers to a process, Entscheidung 
designates a “de-scissioning” at the basis of self-consciousness and language 
as that which, by creating the Present, banishes the Past into the abyssal 
dregs of forgotten and inaccessible time. What Žižek focuses on is precisely 
the formal structure of the act itself, its activity of severing the Real into 
the parallax of the unconscious drives of nature and phenomenal reality, 
whereby the act itself is primordially repressed as necessary for the dawning 
of full-fledged subjectivity and becomes an impossible object for any 
discourse. Recognizing that the Entscheidung itself is that which originarily 
constitutes the conscious/unconscious distinction, Žižek argues that one 
of the fundamental breakthroughs of the Weltalter is its demonstration that 
drives themselves are, strictly speaking, nonconscious: if the very conscious/
unconscious distinction only occurs with the utterance of the Word (there 
cannot be a ground without a grounded: prior to the grounded, the ground 
cannot be posited as ground as such, for it is merely a self-subsisting, 
semi-closed system of materiality, rather than the ground of existence) then it 
246 Chapter 10
would be philosophically fallacious to call this energetic rotation of energy 
the unconscious proper or the true foundation of subjectivity, even if it 
incites (or to put it differently negatively carves up the room for) the latter's 
founding gesture. The result is that the Žižekian-Schellingian subject of 
the unconscious is radically non-coincident with both the id-forces of the 
body in its primary mode (the Real of Triebe can only be unconscious as a 
secondary effect of the self-positing of the act of de-scission[ing] as such) 
and the more-than-conscious matrix of the Symbolic (the self-generating 
play of language and culture only emerges after the founding gesture 
that marks the beginning of transcendental self-reflexivity). That is, the 
unconscious is the very gap, the irreconcilable parallax, between both registers: 
it is synonymous with the subject itself as the impossible in-between that 
binds together materialism (being) and idealism (thought) in their non-
relationality by protruding out of yet being simultaneously spectrally present 
in both. As an irreducible, self-positing negativity that institutes the realm of 
culture and eternally separates it from nature, the subject of the unconscious 
is the true site of freedom.
Here lies the challenge to Freud and Lacan, who broadly could be said 
to have respectively located the unconscious in the biological movement of 
instinctual energy and the alienating effects of language. For Žižek one must 
presuppose a more primordial level of unconscious activity than that of the 
biologically closed libidinal energetics within the corpo-Real of the body 
or that which emerges through the split between the subject of enunciation 
and the enunciating subject caused by the unpredictable reverberations of 
meaning within the infinite web of language: namely, an act that exploits the 
libidinal frenzy of the Real of the human body, the unruliness represented 
by the Todestrieb, to ground the self-generation and self-proliferation of the 
automatic machinery of language as a reaction formation. In this sense, 
Žižek's reactualization of the Schellingian unconscious is an attempt to 
sublate both the traditional Freudian and Lacanian accounts within a 
higher dialectical unity by showing their dependence on another, more 
fundamental conceptual level. His original addition to psychoanalysis is the 
formation of a conception of “the subject [which] at its most elementary 
is indeed 'beyond the unconscious': an empty form deprived even of 
unconscious formation encapsulating a variety of libidinal investments.”389 
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Here again we see just how much Žižek's account of the subject is highly 
reliant upon his “modification” of the Weltalter in a way that challenges his 
so-called Hegelianism.
Žižek's controversial wager is that there is something more primordial 
within Schelling's descriptions of the birth of the subject out of the utter 
twilight of pre-personal being than an account of the self-transformation 
of the “unconscious” spirit of nature as it rises towards the openness 
of self-revelation. In a move similar to psychoanalysis' claim that the 
material processes of our organs cannot be, strictly speaking, unconscious 
(physiological stimuli and reflexes are of a radically different nature),390 
Žižek levels out the richness of the Schellingian account of nature to 
a mere material autopoiesis that is unable to explain the true seat of 
personality. This is also why Žižek is so adamant that the unconscious is 
not to be equated with the set of irrational drives that structurally oppose 
and yet affect the self-transparency of rationality as we see in various 
forms of Lebensphilosophie.391 What Schelling's account of decision as 
the metapsychological event par excellence proclaims is that there is no 
point of positive juncture between nature as Grund and the subject of the 
unconscious, insofar as decision takes over/usurps the logically primary 
position of the Grund through its own self-positing freedom, but in a 
manner that its self-positing is more fundamental than, and even erases, its 
dark pre-history: the libidinal-material chaos within nature does not come 
close to establishing the unconscious proper because the latter is never 
completely subsumable within the dynamic movement of natural history or 
laws, for it institutes itself into the fabric of being by means of a self-caused 
immaculate conception. If freedom is to be truly free, then we must not be 
able to deduce it according to notional necessity; it is as if, when substance 
risks touching the void in the painful oscillation of drives constitutive of the 
unruliness of the human organism, the subject creates itself out of nothing, 
with all the paradox that entails:
In the psychoanalytical perspective, of course, this primordial 
act of free self-positing cannot but appear as the Real of 
a fantasy-construction: the status of the primordial act is 
analogous to that of the Freudian parricide—although it 
never effectively took place within temporal reality, one has 
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to presuppose it hypothetically in order to account for the 
consistency of the temporal process. The paradox of the 
primordial act is the same as that of Baron Münchhausen 
pulling himself out of the swamp by lifting himself by the 
hair—in both cases, the subject is somehow already here 
prior to existence and then, by way of free act, creates-posits 
himself, his own being.392 
The subject's freely posited withdrawal into self is intrinsically paradoxical, 
for the very act of self-positing creates the very self that is at the origin 
of said positing. This is why we cannot escape the Baron Münchhausen 
dilemma: the subject is miraculously present at its own birth.393 But how? To 
follow Žižek and draw upon a Hegelian logical category, when full-fledged 
subjectivity emerges in being it can be said to come into existence by a 
process of recollecting or interiorizing itself. This recollective interiorization 
(Er-inner-ung) is the direct effect of the subject's uneasy self-begetting, 
the aftermath of its self-caused immaculate conception in/out of matter 
that exploits the immanent negativity of the latter for the institution of its 
“miracle”:394 this recollection is not a mere remembering of something 
in cosmic memory, an always already existing but non-actualized self 
awaiting the dawning of consciousness in the world—the very gesture of 
interiorization is that which creates what is interiorized, that is to say, the self 
in which the world withdraws out of its bloody night, in such a way that 
the recollected self or interiority retroactively posits itself as that which was 
always at the starting point.395 Even a self-caused immaculate conception in 
being demonstrates a threatening belatedness, for it is stuck in a dialectical 
contradiction that cannot be resolved: “'[r]econciliation' between subject 
and substance means acceptance of this radical lack of any firm foundational 
point: the subject is not at its own origin, is secondary, dependent upon 
its substantial presuppositions; but these presuppositions do not have a 
substantial consistency of their own and are always retroactively posited.”396 
The only successful ontogenesis is one that underlines the very impossibility, the 
upper limit, of ontogenesis as such: what is essential is not a transition (whether 
it be understood in terms of teleological development or the potential 
productivity of breakdown, as we see in the night of the world) but the 
pure difference that is the full-fledged subject (which is responsible for “the 
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madness of the passage to the Symbolic itself”397) which institutes a “gap 
which makes impossible any account of the rise of the New in terms of a 
continuous narrative.”398 
But we must be very attentive to the conceptual movement if we are not 
to lose its radicality. Insofar as the chaotic oscillation of drives we witness 
in unruliness only becomes the Grund of existence after the act of decision, 
drives only become unconscious in the aftermath of the act itself. Due to 
the latter's irreducible self-positing, consciousness and the Real of drives 
qua unconscious both emerge in one magical brushstroke that retroactively 
constitutes its own evolutionary past—covers up its contingency—by 
subsuming the ontogenetic pre-history of the subject as part of its own 
self-effectuation through the paradoxical causality of the Freudian 
Nachträglichkeit/Lacanian après-coup/Hegelian positing of presuppositions. 
Here, however, we notice the difficulty of the Real-as-origin: since the 
abyssal beginning of the subject—the act of decision—effaces itself in the 
simultaneous gesture of converting the Real of drives into the unconscious 
as a libidinal system and founding consciousness, the birthplace of the 
subject becomes a mere posit that is in and of itself never accessible in 
language; and, as that which only shows itself in its very withdrawal (“sous 
rature”), it is denied the right of even “indirectly” shining through the 
cracks of the Ideal. It can only be narrated. Although we must posit the 
ontogenetic condition of desire (a pre-logical antagonism in the Real-as-
excess) as that which precedes and in a certain sense renders possible the 
self-positing of the decision, the latter proves itself to be not only superior 
by saying “No!” to substance, thereby setting up a new age of the world 
within which the Past is always already “lost” through symbolization (an act 
that institutes the hegemony of the Real-as-lack), but also to be ontologically 
primary, despite being ontogenetically secondary. In a paradoxical movement 
where the cause-and-effect chain loses its grip, the self-unfolding causality 
of nature as substance is “torn apart” in the upsurge of freedom as self-
relating negativity, which demands primordiality at all costs, even making 
being infinitely non-coincident to itself. It must be remembered, however, that 
this movement from Grund to subjectivity, from the breakdown of nature 
into a writhing mass of heterogeneous forces to the abyss of unconscious 
decision, must be described at the level of mytho-poetics. At the level of the 
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Real, we are not warranted to make certain claims we have been forced to 
make: when the subject asserts itself at the beginning of its own pre-logical 
genesis (posits its own presupposition), it is not actually giving birth to itself 
(which implies a poietic production or genesis) in some kind of temporal 
loop, but directly creates itself at the instant of its own upsurge. The example 
of Baron Münchhausen's pulling himself up out of the swamp by his own 
hair expresses the intrinsic difficulty posed to any transcendental materialist 
account of the subject, for the subject does not exist before the very act 
of self-positing that it nonetheless paradoxically enacts—hence why it all 
happens in one magic brushstroke. The subject has no history except at the level 
of speculative fabulation (rationally justified mythology), for it is only after the 
subject's self-positing that we can raise the question of its origins: “what escapes 
our grasp is not the way things were before the arrival of the New, but the 
very birth of the New, the New as it was 'in itself,' from the perspective of 
the Old, before it managed to 'posit its presuppositions,'”399 which is why 
Žižek can say that the true arche-fossil for correlationism is not occurrences 
in cosmological or geological time before the transcendental, but the very 
transcendental itself.400 
In this sense, the difficulty of the task of speculative fabulation finds 
itself reflected upon itself: that is to say, doubled. Not only do there exist 
psychoanalytical defence mechanisms to cover up the abyss of unconscious 
decision at the “heart” of subjectivity by means of fantasy constructions, but 
because the only way we have access to the latter is through a mytho-poetic 
ontogenesis of the subject's dark pre-history in the ontological vicissitudes 
of being, there is always the tendency to swap the real trauma (the pure 
contingency of the act as absolute spontaneity) for a fake (the painful 
oscillation of drives in the human infant that shows nature's sickness unto 
death in humanity). Even Schelling has a tendency to make us forget that 
the Grund, “this monstrous apparition with hundreds of hands, this vortex 
that threatens to swallow everything, is a lure, a defence against the abyss of 
the pure act,”401 which is why psychoanalysis is so important. Although this 
secondary trauma must still be considered as having explanatory merit—it 
is, after all, a necessary condition for the primary trauma—the point is 
to pierce through one trauma (ontological catastrophe as the immanent 
breakdown of substance) to arrive at a more primordial one (ontological 
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catastrophe as the pure difference that severs being in two). The “repressed 
spectral 'virtual history' is not the 'truth' [...] but the fantasy that fills in 
the void of the act [...] the secret narrative that tells its story is purely 
fantasmatic,”402 which is why:
Schelling's fundamental move is thus not simply to ground the 
ontologically structured universe of logos in the horrible vortex 
of the Real; if we read him carefully, there is a premonition in 
his work that this terrifying vortex of the pre-ontological Real 
itself is (accessible to us only in the guise of) a fantasmatic 
narrative, a lure destined to distract us from the true traumatic 
cut, that of the abyssal act of Ent-Scheidung.403 
This is why Schelling's inability to complete his middle-late project of an 
ontology of freedom is of such paramount importance to Žižek, for “[t]he 
repeated failure of his Weltalter drafts signals precisely Schelling's honesty 
as a thinker—[not only] the fact that he was radical enough to acknowledge 
the impossibility of grounding the act or decision in a proto-cosmic myth,” 
but also that he was “compelled to posit an uncanny act of Ent-Scheidung 
(decision or separation), an act in a way more primordial than the Real of 
the 'eternal Past' itself.”404 
Focusing on the necessary posit of the convulsing labyrinth that is the 
pre-symbolic Real-as-excess in human unruliness, and plunging ourselves 
into it, we risk forgetting the abyss of the Real-as-origin that stares us in 
the face. The painful oscillations of the Grund in unruliness merely defer us 
from the true terror that is the pure act instituting the Symbolic's infinitely 
self-reflexive play of signifiers in which we live and which guarantees that 
it possesses no direct connection to the extra-notional world. Because this 
act absolutizes the short circuit between the Innenwelt and Aussenwelt, we 
can only encounter its abyssal origins in their very gesture of withdrawal. 
It is not nature, even in its mode of self-erasure (N ≠ N), that is the first 
revelation,405 but rather, the void within which the Entscheidung spins—and we 
can only catch glimpses of the latter as the impossible in-between negatively 
tying together nature and culture, the Real and the Symbolic, and thereby 
hope to develop a comprehensive theory of subjectivity inclusive of a new, 
paradoxical form of metaphysics from within the mytho-poetics of the 
subject's slow, unsteady, and painful “emergence” out of the vicissitudes 
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of being. But all of this has an interesting implication. If the Symbolic is a 
self-organizing system that freely constitutes the fabric of experience without 
any contact with objective reality, then this suggests that, from within its 
ontologically solipsistic dance of cybernetic ciphering, we can break through 
the impenetrable dusk of psychosis as we (in a reflexive albeit fabulative 
gesture) see it as the madness it is in a careful reconstruction of its trauma. 
Here, however, we encounter one of the most fundamental and perhaps 
paradoxical conclusions of Žižek's parallax ontology. It must be recalled that 
the trauma at the birthplace of the human subject is not only coincident 
with its freedom:406 that is, its withdrawal from one's natural environment 
into an irreal, virtual self,407 but its exploration necessarily demonstrates the 
structure of fantasy as we insert ourselves as a pure gaze in the moment of 
our own birth.408 Not only can materialism only justify itself in “the shadow 
cast by [self-grounding] idealism's insurmountable incompleteness,”409 but 
more radically, if we follow the true horror of substance as subject at the 
core of the latter, then we are forced to conclude that a metaphysics is only 
possible as a form of “successful” psychotic thinking,410 a thinking that, from 
within the clutches of idealism as an insurmountable ontological psychosis 
and using the very energy and internal limitations of this psychosis, manages 
to succeed in achieving the impossible coincidence of subjective and 
objective reality: that is to say, in developing a comprehensive metaphysics 
of the Real. A cure to our correlationist imprisonment being excluded from 
the outset, philosophy has no hope of offering a therapy. What is more, 
if such a form of thinking is to be truly successful, not only must we find 
a way to overcome the realism-idealism debate within idealism, but we 
must also do so from the side of realism by writing the great epic of being 
as the eternal Past to come to terms with the ontological passage through 
madness at the latter's foundation, a task that requires a self-conscious 
mythologizing, fictionalization, or retrospective narration and is only achievable 
by entering the abyss of the spectral Real-as-origin and fending off the 
thrust of unconscious desires that try to protect us from it in order to draw 
out its stark metaphysical consequences. Only a scientific, psychoanalytically 
guided fabulation allows one to catch sight of the vanishing mediator that 
enacts the withdrawal into the night of the world. But how is a radical 
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subjective idealism capable of such a feat? And as what brand of metaphysics 
should we baptize it?
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III
Overcoming Idealism

Chapter 11
From Radical Idealism to Critical Metaphysics
How Idealists Write Being's Poem
Žižek's transcendental materialism understands itself as an uncanny 
variation on the late German Idealist theme of providing an ontogenesis of 
the subject consistent with transcendental idealism. But being more than 
a rethinking of its central problems, it presents itself as a highly rigorous 
psychoanalytical reconstruction of its unconscious Grundlogik, which reveals 
itself as a disavowed insight into the identification of subjectivity with an 
immanent rupture in being so devastating that not only does being lose all 
direct access to itself, but we must actually posit ontological dislocation as 
the primary metaphysical fact. In so doing, however, it would appear that 
there is a potentially fatal inconsistency in Žižek as he oscillates between an 
inconsistent idealism (the Hegelian notional or symbolic Real-as-lack) and 
a self-sabotaging materialism (the Schellingian pre/extra-symbolic Real-
as-excess). What is more, pointing to the immense difficulty of describing 
the emergent parallax of being and thinking—the ontological passage of 
madness—from within the ontological solipsism of thinking itself, Žižek argues 
for the necessity of a form of thinking that would enable being and thinking 
to be fully reconciled from the side of being itself through the mytho-poetic 
narrativization of the moment of parallax. If radical idealism can succeed 
at overcoming itself and writing being's poem, it will prove itself capable of 
being maximally idealistic and realistic in a single gesture that leaves behind 
the speculative throes of correlationism by rendering correlation itself 
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immanent to the absolute, thus becoming a critical metaphysics that has 
much to offer today to the so-called speculative turn.
11.1 Lacan and the Prison-House of the Symbolic
As an account of the subject's own immaculate self-begetting from within 
the material flux of being as that which institutes the genesis of the 
Symbolic, Žižek's transcendental materialism is an attempt to explicate 
the ontological origins of a self-grounding idealism wherein ontology has 
been rendered seemingly impossible. Insofar as the Symbolic is able to 
generate meaning without external reference, it refuses all forms of realism: 
access to a Real outside of the correlation being/language is proclaimed 
a naïve position to be rejected due to the immense linguistic power that 
constructs our reality. Yet even if our entrapment within the self-referential, 
masturbatory play of signifiers is absolute, the ontological solipsism that it 
entails is precisely that: namely, an ontological solipsism whose very existence 
suggests that this very inability is somehow internal to the interior play of forces 
constitutive of being. The issue at hand is that “the transcendental standpoint 
is in a sense irreducible, for one cannot look 'objectively' at oneself and 
locate oneself in reality; and the task is to think this impossibility itself as 
an ontological fact, not only as an epistemological limitation.”411 In this 
minimalist sense, images and words cannot be seen as mere parasites that 
contingently latch themselves onto being and disturb its otherwise smooth 
flow, but must be negatively indicative of some self-sabotaging tendency 
always already at work in its heart of hearts: “[t]he symbolic order is not 
a cause which intervenes from the outside, violently derailing the human 
animal and thus setting in motion its becoming-human.”412 In other words, 
to account for the very “consistency” of the Symbolic we are called upon 
to write the great metaphysical epic of that forgotten eternal Past preceding 
our coming into the world as speaking subjects.
Such a conceptual move, however, poses an epistemological problem. 
Within the Lacanian registers, the Real necessarily appears as a lack. As 
soon as the Symbolic emerges as a self-replicating, self-evolving differential 
system that transcendentally constitutes the condition of the possibility 
of phenomenal reality, any direct contact with the Real qua ontological 
field is lost. The Lacanian thesis is a variation of structuralist linguistic 
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idealism: it is not only that concepts do not need to adequate themselves 
with objects subsisting in a world that exists despite me; more radically, 
the free ciphering of the Real by the Symbolic means that signification has 
nothing to do with objective reality in itself, for signifiers only participate 
in an endless chain of self-relation that precludes access to the “outside” 
world. There is no room possible for a realist epistemology within Lacan 
because the very link between signifier and extra-linguistic object is cut. And 
although Žižek remains unsatisfied with taking such a theoretical edifice as 
a given and seeks to understand the ontological/meta-transcendental event 
that it must imply (thus recognizing the ultimate need for giving an account 
of the Symbolic if psychoanalysis is to find a proper scientific footing) the 
constraints that Lacan himself bestows upon discourse make Žižek's project 
appear intrinsically problematic. Doesn't the Real in itself prior to or outside 
of language remain essentially unknowable (because it is always already 
constituted by a subject, therefore produced by it, and never without its 
taint)? Isn't the pre- or extra-symbolic Real an impossible concept, for only 
that which can be spoken in language exists?
Nevertheless, Žižek offers more than another sophisticated form of 
structuralist linguistic idealism. If Lacanian psychoanalysis proclaims that 
the Real can only appear as a lack within the ciphering activity of language, 
Žižek attempts to break out of the correlationist circle of language by 
showing that the very inconsistencies of thinking offer a solution to the 
problem of how we are able to reach the Real even if we are trapped within 
the play of appearance appearing to itself. Because the Real we encounter in 
thinking the world is never “simply subjective, [whereby] it would present 
a case of the hollow playing of the subject with itself, and we would never 
reach the level of objective reality,”413 thinking's inability to close in on 
itself shows that the pre/extra-Symbolic must insist within it. However, 
such a formulation does not directly address the minimal transcendental 
conditions of the possibility of attaining an access to the Real “it itself” 
from within the Symbolic. Adrian Johnston's formulation of the paradoxical 
materialism-idealism relation is highly revealing of the deadlock Žižek faces: 
“materialism [...] formulates itself vis-à-vis the deadlocks internal to radical 
transcendental idealism. On this account, materialism is philosophically 
tenable only as the spectral inverse of idealism, accompanying it as the 
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shadow cast by idealism's insurmountable incompleteness.”414 The problem 
is the following: even if the immanent “breakdowns” of solipsistic self-
enclosure—the internal obstructions of language's psychotic dance—
represent the inability of the subject to posit itself as an autocratic all 
hallucinating its world, they only point to a negative experience of the Real and 
do not suffice to offer a positive articulation of the ontological qua ontological. 
Of course ciphering sometimes runs into knots, but this very blockage can 
only be understood in the Symbolic by the Symbolic and in such a way that 
we never leave its prison. How could a kink in the Symbolic be revelatory 
of the pre- or extra-symbolic Real that somehow unpredictably upsurges 
within its sphere? Even given the paradoxical mode of the double-feature 
of inclusion/exclusion, internal/external, and presence/absence that defines 
the Real, it is still, formally speaking, a lack, nothing more than a notional 
antagonism in its ciphering code. It is unclear how this logical torsion, 
an internal hindrance in ideality, could serve as a foundation for a new 
materialist metaphysics, for there is no such thing as an outside or Other to 
symbolic mediation to which we can have access: “the Lacanian Real—the 
Thing—is not so much the inert presence that 'curves' the symbolic space 
(introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, the effect of these 
gaps and inconsistencies.”415 If it is understood as the alien presence of 
some extra-ideal presence within synthesis, it can only be understood as 
such insofar as it is posited as such—or, as Fichte says, insofar as there is a 
transference of the productive activity of the subject to the not-I, but such 
a transference, although enabling us to give a consistent account of why 
representations often fail due to some “alien presence” that obstructs them 
(the necessity of a realist moment in a critical idealism), never leaves the 
constraints of a subjective idealism. We appear stuck in the most rampant 
form of correlationism.
Even if the Real can negatively show itself through an internal tension 
pressurizing the Ideal from within, we can never reach the ontological as 
such. There is always the correlation language/being wherein being itself 
is reduced to that which is constructed in the symbolic field of discourse, 
regardless of there being elements that appear within the latter that it cannot 
control. We may forever approach it as the negative magnitude contorting 
our notional apparatus as produced by the latter's very inconsistency, but 
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this never leads to any knowledge of the Real in itself. From within the 
originary psychosis of a self-grounding idealism, there can be no overlapping 
of subjective and objective reality, for the very emergence of the subject as 
an ontological lacuna has as its founding gesture an irreconcilable rupture 
between the Innenwelt and Aussenwelt. Despite this, however, Žižek embarks 
upon an exploration of how a structuralist self-enclosed system preventing 
any direct engagement with the Real could have arisen by using the very fact 
of the Symbolic as a manner of proceeding. If the Symbolic is an ontological 
solipsism, then the lack of access to being we have must be understood as 
an event in being. In this sense, the Real-as-lack must ultimately open onto 
a metaphysics of the Real as that which precedes and exceeds the Symbolic 
and the Imaginary. But Žižek's Lacanian commitments would seem to 
render such a move unjustifiable. It is uncertain how he can balance his own 
radical idealism with his other materialist tendencies—indeed, his attempt 
to inscribe the former within the latter, to make the epistemic limitations of 
linguistic idealism synonymous with being's non-coincidence to self, appears 
to intensify the problem. How can a “negative materialism” based on the 
infinite conflict between mind and body found a new metaphysics? If we 
take as our starting point the (non-)relation between system (materialism) 
and freedom (idealism) as revealed by the psychoanalytical experience, 
then doesn't the logical category of the disjunctive “and” explicit in their 
contradiction prohibit us from delving into the retroactively posited past of 
the Real-as-origin to see how the latter explodes out of being as an event? 
How can we overcome the withdrawal into the nocturnal self of the world at 
the very birth of subjectivity so as even to see this withdrawal for what it is?
11.2 The Hegelian Real-as-Lack: The Painful March of 
Ontological Solipsism
The problem at hand is how to understand the separate theses that (i) the 
inconsistency of thinking methodologically justifies an overcoming of the 
realism-idealism debate from within idealism and (ii) given the fact that 
the Symbolic is always already minimally outside itself we can embark 
upon an explication of its origins without ever leaving it. Endeavoring 
to give Lacanian psychoanalysis the support it needs—a comprehensive 
metaphysics—it is perhaps to be expected that Žižek falls into such a 
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theoretically difficult position. Lacan argues that we are stuck in language 
and, accordingly, that access to the ontological is impossible. Yet such a 
claim, if it cannot account for the ontological genesis of that which in the 
first place impossiblizes our access to the ontological, risks being merely a 
dogmatically asserted statement. This tension between the two major 
theoretical roles that the Real must assume—a notional lack and a 
symbolically excessive activity that is independent to all forms of correlation 
or access conditions—explains the constant oscillation in Žižek's position 
as he wavers between his strictly Lacanian and larger metaphysical and 
ontological commitments, even if the latter are always mediated by the 
former. Although most of his comments on Schelling, for instance, bespeak 
the possibility and necessity of delving into the Real-as-excess,416 understood 
as the pre-symbolic antagonism that gives rise to the transcendental 
matrices of the subject (the “orgasm of forces”) he often refers to the 
purely fantasmatic character of such inquiry due to the impossibility of 
reaching the absolute beginning of language417 and its necessary mytho-
poetic component given its resistance to rational speculation,418 often 
without acknowledging the problem that this could appear to pose to the 
endeavor of establishing the ontological grounding of the subject. Given 
that he identifies “the key question” of philosophy as that of “how thought is 
possible in a universe of matter,” so that we should focus our efforts on “the 
very rise of representation or appearing out of the flat stupidity of being” 
if we are to avoid “a regression to a 'naive' ontology of spheres or levels,”419 
the conceptual contours of this problematic deserve to be investigated in 
full. This is further necessitated by the fact that many fundamental Žižekian 
concepts directly exhibit this tension-ridden simultaneity of two opposed 
directions between the Real-as-lack and the Real-as-excess. His discussions 
of the night of the world in The Ticklish Subject, for instance, have a tendency 
to treat the Real as the other side of transcendental imagination, and hence 
as a logical rather than an ontological concept (Žižek warns us that “it 
is crucial to 'close the circle': we never exit the circle of imagination”420), 
although he also bestows upon the notion a clear metaphysical reach by 
locating the destructive force of understanding preceding its synthesizing 
powers within the originary event of substance's auto-destruction (equating 
it with an ontological “tearing apart” or “dismembering”421). This latter 
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utilization of the concept—which he presents as a reworking of Kant's 
theory of unruliness—is then used to displace the mature Hegelian 
dialectical triad and argue for its inability to explain the passage from nature 
to culture,422 thereby further intensifying its speculative reach. How can he 
move from one register to the other?
Despite this uncertain wavering between the purely logical and 
metaphysical or ontological value of Žižek's reading of the night of the 
world, other categories that Žižek extracts from Hegel show why he, as a 
rule, would generally have a preference for Hegel over Schelling, even in 
face of the obvious debt to the latter in his own transcendental materialism. 
The Hegelian concept “tarrying with the negative,” for instance, intrinsically 
displays the structure of the Real-as-lack and is thus, strictly speaking, 
completely compatible with Lacanian epistemology, whereas the categories 
he finds in Schelling pose a more immediate problem. Emerging out of 
Hegel's critique and extension of the Kantian thing-in-itself, tarrying 
with the negative is an attempt to show that the latter, as a theoretical 
posit, is superfluous. Objects give themselves to consciousness, but it is an 
illegitimate move to say that, beyond their appearing, there is an inner core 
of the thing that is hiding, ever out of reach of the transcendental ego's 
limited synthesizing powers, because even this infinite elsewhere of subject-
independent interiority is itself only possible from within the manifold field 
of phenomenal experience: that is, it is itself an appearance. This becomes 
most evident in the experience of non-coincidence between our concepts 
and that which they “represent.” Within the inconsistency of the immanent 
structure of knowledge exhibited by these types of encounters, the object 
“in itself” shows itself through the form of a negative determination that 
burdens experience. We could say that what we come across here is the 
raw positivity of the object that obstructs our idealization and forces us to 
adapt to it, but only with the qualification that this positivity is revealed 
within the shadows cast by idealization's failure in such a way that it can 
only be brought forth or posited retroactively by means of a modification 
of the matrix of concepts that constitute our mediation of the world so 
that the original paradox or blockage disappears. In the aftermath of 
this epistemic remodulation, we see that what we initially experienced 
as an internal or structural deformation of ideal space was the negative 
266 Chapter 11
refraction of the object's “true” nature such that the Real, less than a solid 
thing that obstructs ideality from the outside, is a pure effect. This has 
two implications: firstly, we do not need to overcome the split between 
phenomenal appearance and the thing-in-itself because this very split 
arises from within appearance itself, so appearance is “always more than 
appearance,” as it were. Secondly, the noumenon as a “transcendence” 
that gives itself of itself to experience is reduced to a mere defence 
against the potential horror of the immanent, uncontrollable flux of pure 
appearance, for if a transcendent object causes our representations, then our 
representations are guaranteed to constitute a minimally smooth fabric. As 
an illusion of a place wherein all contradiction is always already resolved in 
a reality complete unto itself, the noumenon helps bestow a sense of order 
and unity to the structure of experience even where it does not of itself 
display any, thereby taking the edge off of ideal fragmentation. The infinite 
(the perfect ontology of the noumenal extra-subjective being) only emerges 
as a response to the radical finitude of phenomenal reality (ideal obstruction 
in our dealings with reality), whereby “every positive figure of the In-itself 
is a 'positivization' of negativity, a fantasmatic formation we construct 
to order to fill in the gap of negativity”423: there is only the restlessness 
of the negative, the incessant internal fracturing of experience due to 
idealism's intrinsic limitations and inability to posit itself as a complete all, 
which always leads to symbolic dismemberment, so that noumena, now 
understood as the negativity of phenomena, their internal inconsistency, 
“designate the In-itself as it appears to us, embedded in phenomenal reality  [...] 
there is no mysterious gap separating us from the unknown, the unknown is 
simply unknown, indifferent to being-known.”424 In other words, what is on 
the other side of the screen of consciousness is not another reality, but “the 
same reality we find in front of the screen”: Žižek tells us to think of the illusion 
of a theatre stage, where what is responsible for the illusion is not the 
machinery backstage to which we have no access while the play is going on, 
but the very theatre stage itself, for even if the backstage and its mechanics 
are visible not only do we realize that the secretive reality normally “beyond 
our grasp” is exactly the same as the one being staged, but the deceptive 
effect is nevertheless still produced;425 in other words, thinking itself produces 
the illusion that it has no access to being due to the transcendental framework 
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through which it (only haphazardly) grasps (fragments of) the latter. The 
issue is not that thinking cannot comprehend being, but that, since it is 
inscribed within the latter, thinking can obtain no transcendent gaze upon 
it by which it can totalize it into a complete system. Thinking is necessarily 
incomplete—there is an irremovable lacuna in every truth-claim—because it 
can never get rid of the subjective gaze, a gaze that, while making knowledge 
finite, simultaneously renders it possible in the first place. Following this 
train of thought to its logical conclusion, we must assert that not only can 
we never know the system of the world, but if thinking itself is a part of the 
world, and there is only one world, there is no god’s-eye point of view from 
which the world can never turn back upon itself and close itself. The gaze of 
the subject is a non-suturable gap in being—this is what it means to say that 
“phenomenalization, appearance, 'illusion,' split, finitude, Understanding, 
and so on, [...] are inherent to the life of the Absolute itself.”426 
Through its own subjective movement, thought comes to realize that 
there is an outside to thinking posited from within as that which insists and 
persists as the extimate core of all discourse. That is to say, thought is a constant 
struggle insofar as its struggle with itself is never a mere masturbatory play, 
but is simultaneously a struggle with the outside world. Its operationally and 
epistemologically closed ciphering of the world is capable of knowledge 
because the very inside-outside distinction becomes intra-discursive, that 
is, immanent to thinking itself because it is sustained by the activity of thinking, 
so that there is a paradoxical coinciding of the purely subjective and the purely 
objective: “[e]very tension between Notion and reality, every relationship of the 
Notion to what appears as its irreducible Other encountered in the sensible, extra-
notional experience, already is an intra-notional tension i.e., already implies a 
minimal notional determination of this 'otherness.'”427 Although we are trapped 
in idealization and the Real-as-lack is our doomed fate, there is no need 
to mourn the loss of some kind of immediate being in itself, some Oedipal 
womb of nature from which we have fallen: what Hegel shows is that, from 
within the level of the logical self-articulation of the reflective notional 
constructs of thinking themselves and the symbolic space of self-generating 
meaning they engender, we can “reach” objective reality because there 
is no significant gap between thinking and being at the level of thinking. 
The Symbolic is that which opens up access to being: we provide a freely 
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developed notional construct that creates the norm for an intelligible field, a 
field that then may fall into inconsistency when said notional construct fails 
to render its corresponding phenomenal reality consistent, but inasmuch as 
the failure of said notional construct enables us to modify it we thus can be 
said to slowly and patiently track truth over time. Once we have seen that 
“[t]he opposition between idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore 
without meaning,”428 we can develop a metaphysics critically rather than 
dogmatically. This dissolves the worry regarding how we can have access 
to the world from within the clutches of subjective thinking. To say that 
the Real is a product of thought is not to lapse into a Berkeleyan form of 
idealism wherein reality is simply created by the subject: “the Real is not 
some kind of primordial Being which is lost,” but rather “what we cannot get 
rid of, what always sticks on as the remainder of the symbolic operation.”429 
As an aftereffect of this symbolic operation, it ensures that we have an 
indirect but methodologically secure entry point into the world by means 
of the inconsistencies that our notional apparatus generates in the freely 
determined self-generation of the universe of meaning, inconsistencies that 
unexpectedly let us develop an objective discourse.
But the limits of idealism entail that idealism is always already more 
than itself—thought itself is utterly incapable of positing itself as a self-
enclosed positivity that simply creates its own universe of meaning; it 
becomes contaminated, as it were, by a constitutive “outside” as soon as 
it tries to posit itself in its own self-determining freedom, so that it must 
constantly struggle with this outside. This constitutive failure on behalf of 
thinking successfully to posit itself as all guarantees that there is a subject-
independent reality that we experience and can speculatively describe:
There is a Real not because the Symbolic cannot grasp 
its external Real, but because the Symbolic cannot fully 
become itself. There is being (reality) because the symbolic 
system is inconsistent, flawed, for the Real is an impasse of 
formalization. This thesis must be given its full “idealist” 
weight: it is not only that reality is too rich, so that every 
formalization fails to grasp it, stumbles over it; the Real is 
nothing but an impasse of formalization—there is dense reality 
From Radical Idealism to Critical Metaphysics 269
“out there” because of the inconsistencies and gaps in the 
symbolic order.430 
With this insight gained Žižek, like Hegel, discovers an epistemological 
foothold—the productive space of ideal inconsistency (in the quote above 
Žižek is talking about our access to the Real from within the Symbolic 
rather than its ontological constitution)—from within which he can find the 
resources required to develop a new metaphysics. It is less idealism that 
poses a problem for the latter than the traps that it (unconsciously) creates 
for us as we attempt to catch a glimpse what “lies beyond” phenomenal 
reality: the inevitable and necessary symbolic dismemberment of a self-
grounding idealism that fails to fully become itself not only creates the 
possibility of error, but since the first showing of the Real is always an 
internal deformation of ideal structure (a pure negative form lacking 
content), it itself risks being riddled with a thick layer of fantasmatic 
projections and unconscious desires. That which allows idealism to overcome 
itself also can hinder the speculative process. Yet, despite this, the Real-as-
lack and the Real-as-excess do not stand in opposition to one another. 
Although the former is always epistemologically superior or primary, being 
the transcendental condition of the possibility of access to the latter, we 
are nevertheless capable of attaining that which is pre- or extra-Symbolic 
not only despite but more primordially by dint of the Symbolic's clutches. 
This is why, on Žižek's reading, Hegel's Science of Logic, while never leaving 
the matrix of self-thinking thought, can coincide with metaphysics and 
describe pre-subjective reality in its raw categorial purity and dialectical 
movement. Ontological solipsism is only apparent, for materialism justifies 
itself in the cracks of a radical idealism: the very condition of possibility 
of discourse means that discourse is always more than itself, even if that 
means that its very possibility coincides with its impossibility. Fichte refers 
to such a theoretical position—a critical idealism brought to fruition—as a 
real-idealism or an ideal-realism.431 Although his own position may fail to 
execute this adequately, it can serve nevertheless as the most consequent 
description of a true, successful idealism. As Žižek correctly points out, 
“[t]he irony of the history of philosophy is that the line of philosophers 
who struggle against the sophistic tradition ends with Hegel, the 'last 
philosopher,' who, in a way, is also the ultimate sophist, embracing the self-
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referential play of the Symbolic with no external support of its truth.”432 
Hegel can accomplish this prima facie paradoxical feat because he is able to 
demonstrate that accepting the impossibility of leaving the “correlationist 
circle” does not fall into a naïve idealism whereby objective reality is 
reduced to nothing, but rather shows how even the self-referential nature 
of thinking itself always already depends upon and is entangled with the 
world, thereby attesting that the split between knowledge in itself and for 
us exists not because we are separated from the world, but because we are 
a part of it: “the very limitation of our knowing—its inevitably distorted, 
inconsistent character—bears witness to our inclusion in reality.”433 In this 
respect, idealism (reflection, notional constructs, language as such) creates 
the space of reasons in virtue of which things can present themselves to us 
as they are in reality in itself. This presenting, however, requires a stage upon 
which their theatrical appearance can be performed, a stage that produces 
the illusion of a backstage to which we do not have access. Instead of merely 
separating us from the world, the reflexivity of the Ideal thereby allows 
objects to have meaning for us as something more than objects to be used 
by specialized biological or natural needs. We symbolize them, grant them 
a place in discourse, a discourse whose failures make it seem as if a world 
out there directly attacks our concepts and theoretical models when, in fact, 
we never exit discourse at all, for only its self-sustaining matrix can sustain 
phenomenal reality as a universe of meaning. This signifies, moreover, that 
to pose the question of being qua being, there must be a difference between 
us and being, for being qua being can only show itself to a finite thinker for 
whom there exists a distance within which being can be phenomenalized 
or phenomenalize itself by means of notional constructs. It is important 
to note, however, that in order to get being right, we must also be able to 
get it wrong, the minimal condition of which is satisfied by the ontological 
madness that is the basic structure of ideality as that which prevents us 
from having a direct “immersion” in the world and as such opens up the 
possibility of replicating being within itself; the self-stipulating norms 
of discourse internally guide the constitution of phenomena while their 
inconsistency demonstrates that we are capable of objectively describing 
them simply through the process of thinking only thinking itself. In this 
regard, Hegel's monumental achievement is the critical proof that one of 
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the effects of the Symbolic's self-enclosure is that, in point of fact, it allows 
things to appear intelligibly through the reflective mediation of language. All 
we have to do is take the appropriate attitude toward the inner limitations 
of phenomenal reality as such. Paradoxically, a realist epistemology does not 
make a realist. This is why the choice between idealism and realism is false 
for the idealist.
11.3 A Call for a Critical Metaphysics
At this juncture we must underline one important feature of this argument 
for a self-grounding idealism that intrinsically contains an irreducibly real 
moment. If the Symbolic freely constitutes phenomenal reality “with no 
external support of its truth,”434 then this suggests that from within its 
ontologically solipsistic dance of cybernetic ciphering, we can break through 
the impenetrable dusk of psychosis as we find, in an innovative theoretical 
gesture, a secure foothold from which to found a new science of being. 
But this means that we should not merely overcome radical idealism from 
within idealism (an epistemological sublation of the correlation): we must 
also overcome it from the side of being by showing how the ambiguities of 
idealism are in fact a part of the world's fundamental structure through an 
account of how being comes to appearance/thinking/phenomenalization (an 
ontological inscription of the correlation). If we can succeed, then realism 
and idealism will have become intimately dialectically linked. Not only 
would this entail a strong theory of thinking insofar as the latter would be 
inscribed within the fold of being as an irreducible event rather than as a 
mere illusory feature, but also a profoundly rich metaphysics inclusive of 
both realism and idealism given that both would now reciprocally ground 
one another (in realistic and idealistic terms) in a completely self-sufficient 
and self-reflexive whole. That is to say, we would have a new variation on 
the late German Idealist theme of the unification of system and freedom: 
or, in other words, another take on the Kantian heritage and how it 
radically changes the field of philosophizing. In this respect, whereas much 
of contemporary philosophy's understanding of idealism fails to take 
it seriously, often equating it with a form of Berkeleyanism (a tradition 
that runs from Kant's first critics to Lenin435 and taken up once again by 
Moore436 and most recently by Meillassoux437), one of the greatest strengths 
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of Žižek is his nuanced vision of the world that is able to use idealism's 
resources not only to overcome its own apparent limitations from within, 
but also to demonstrate how, if this self-overcoming is successfully executed, 
our understanding of being is simultaneously remodulated. Idealism and 
realism, transcendentalism and metaphysics, are not mutually opposed if 
you think them through in relation to one another, for the former forces 
us to come to grasp what it means for thinking to exist in an irreducible 
manner, a fact that has stark consequences for our understanding of the 
world at large.
After a long period in contemporary philosophy where there was a 
general disdain for speculation, what distinguishes Žižek so radically 
from others who have also raised the question of the possibility of a new 
metaphysics (perhaps most notably Deleuze and Badiou) and those who are 
now active in establishing this possibility is his call for a critical metaphysics 
and its superiority over a mere return to dogmatic philosophizing as a means 
of overcoming the heritage of what has recently come to be known since 
Meillassoux's After Finitude as correlationism.438 For Žižek, the urgent 
call for a philosophy that can combat the apparent speculative throes of 
the irreducibility of the correlation in our knowledge of the world (if the 
intelligibility of any specific empirical truth-claim depends upon the subject 
for whom such a truth-claim has meaning in the first place, how can we 
even speak about that which occurred before the existence of such a subject 
without falling into ontic nonsense?) does not have its origin in paradoxes 
concerning “ancestral” statements concerning what the universe must have 
been like prior to humanity, as Meillassoux would like us to believe,439 this 
having been proven to be an intrinsic possibility opened up by the logical 
space of the correlation as such, but rather what the universe must be like 
if something like humanity and its transcendental constituting powers 
are to arise at all. The issue is how the Real could have come to appear to 
itself—and although this may appear to risk an anthropomorphization of 
nature (“[w]e should apply here something like a weak anthropic principle: 
how should the Real be structured so that it allows for the emergence of 
subjectivity [...]?”440), one should proceed cautiously. Žižek's metaphysical 
archaeology of the psychoanalytical subject is an attempt to think the 
intersection of the Real and the Symbolic, the coldness of being and the 
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fervor of humanity, because if images and words, and by implication 
thinking, exist, they must exist in the world. The universe is inclusive, not 
exclusive, of humanity: a true speculative philosophy should comprehend 
both the Real in its pure non-correlationality (the nonhuman) and how 
correlation comes to pass in being (the human). Perhaps unexpectedly, 
the price we pay for this theoretical gain of re-inscribing humanity into 
nature, that is, the latter's minimal anthropomorphization, is a simultaneous 
denaturalization of nature and a dehumanization of humanity. Not only is 
nature now reduced to “a freak show of contingent disturbances with 
no inner rhyme or reason,”441 but even if humanity still retains a certain 
qualitatively distinct status in contradistinction to other things in virtue of 
its autonomy, what we normally take as the great and sublime achievements 
of thinking are, in fact, grounded in a mere virtual re-compensation for our 
traumatic disruption from the Real. What thus makes Žižek's speculative 
real-idealism/ideal-realism (to borrow that German Idealist leitmotif) so 
penetrating and deserving of attention today is its ability to combine a 
profoundly idealist epistemology with a dynamic realist metaphysics in one 
single gesture, which shows us one path that contemporary metaphysics 
could take: namely, a critical one. In this regard, if Meillassoux's critique of 
correlationism is a call to station ourselves after (Kantian) finitude, it must 
be recalled that this is precisely what Schelling and Hegel did in their own 
critique of correlationism avant la lettre.
Žižek is able to balance the real and ideal poles in such a nuanced way 
because of his precise and original take on the breakthrough inaugurated 
by transcendental philosophy, a breakthrough that for him presents itself 
as the unthought (Lacanian) cause at the heart of German Idealism. One 
of his central claims is that if we read Kant closely, we see hints that what 
truly fascinates him is not how the subject brings forth its own universe 
of meaning as a new kind of metaphysical agent capable of guaranteeing 
the universality and necessity of experience/empirical truth, the two being 
identical for Kant, but “something quite different,” something that sets 
the stage for the “few decades [of German Idealism that] represent a 
breathtaking concentration of the intensity of thinking” within which “more 
happened than in centuries or even millennia of the 'normal' development of 
human thought.”442 Commenting on Kant's description of the Copernican 
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revolution (the experiment of seeing “if he might not have greater success 
if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest”443), which Kant 
identifies with his own transcendentalist position, Žižek notes:
The precise German terms (“die Zuschauer sich drehen”—not 
so much turn around another centre as turn or rotate around 
themselves) make it clear what interests Kant: the subject loses 
its substantial stability or identity and is reduced to the pure 
substanceless void of the self-rotating abyssal vortex called 
“transcendental apperception.”444 
What initially appears as a rampant subjectivism wherein the ego reigns 
above the world proves on closer inspection to be something infinitely 
more complex, for the self-grounding field of phenomenal reality only 
exists because it itself revolves around the positively charged void of I. 
The breakthrough of transcendental idealism is precisely the discovery 
of this zone of negativity within the subject, that X that can never be fully 
appropriated into transcendental constitution and yet somehow engenders 
its very possibility, whereby it shows itself to be not so much a displacing 
of the substantial unity of reality from the external world to the conceptual 
forms of cognitive construction (a subjective Ptolemaic counterrevolution 
against Galileo’s de-centering of the medieval world of teleology445) as 
the opening up of a new understanding of being, that is, of the radical 
ontological incompletion of reality, the breakdown of substance, provoked 
by the meta-transcendental conditions of thought as such. As the late 
German Idealist reappropriation of the subject demonstrates, what is 
truly unique in transcendental idealism is that the real and ideal poles 
are unsettled in one brush stroke: linked to the Todestrieb that destroys the 
homeostasis of nature and das Unbehagen in der Kultur that prevents our 
second nature from becoming a new substantialist order, the “objectal 
status” of the subject is that which is “no longer” ontological and “not 
yet” symbolic because it cannot be contained in either register in its pure 
form;446 it is what Žižek sometimes refers to as the absent centre that, by 
protruding out of all ontological and symbolic structures, negatively ties 
them together in its very undecidability. Here, and only here, the real and 
the ideal poles intersect, so that both are given their equal due because of 
an unapproachable X, a je ne sais quoi, that relates them in their very non-
From Radical Idealism to Critical Metaphysics 275
relationality and whereby one leads to the other: “[w]e can also see in what 
way two lacks overlap in this impossible object: the constitutive lack of the 
subject (what the subject has to lose in order to emerge as the subject of 
the signifier) and the lack in the Other itself (what has to be excluded from 
reality so that reality can appear).”447 
Although the transcendental (our subjective position) objectively exists 
in the world, it nevertheless appears to itself in its first mode as merely 
subjective. To overcome itself and pass over into a metaphysics, it must do 
so from within; it does so by drawing attention to the fact that, beneath 
the correlation of (the conscious) subject and reality, “there is the more 
primordial correlation of the subject (of the unconscious) and its Real/
impossible objectal counterpoint, S-a.”448 Although this may seem to 
be just another correlation (as Heidegger only institutes the correlation 
being/Dasein as more originary than that of consciousness/world, doesn't 
Žižek do something similar?) this is a false appearance. Rather than being 
a strict correlation in Meillassouxian terms this binary points towards 
the emergence of correlation within being: “this impossible/Real object is the 
very mode of inscription of the subject into trans-subjective reality; as 
such, it is not transcendental but (what Derrida would have called) arche-
transcendental, an attempt to circumscribe the 'subject in becoming,' the 
trans-subjective process of the emergence of the subject.”449 Žižek's wager, 
one that he shares with the entirety of post-Kantian idealism as a critical 
metaphysics fighting against any dogmatic breed thereof, is that if we are 
to truly break free from correlationism, no return to a “naïve” realism is 
possible. Not only is the latter always open to critique insofar as it could 
remain correlational in a hidden way (isn't its specific image of reality 
related to a subject?450), so that the specific nature of the correlation, 
namely the ideal conditions of the possibility of intelligibility of any 
theory, should always be thematized before embarking on speculation, but 
more primordially it fails to give us of a grasp of how thought is situated/
comes to pass in being and, therefore, the very ontological conditions of 
the possibility of its own status as a theory. Concerning the latter, merely 
explaining subjectivity as a purely contingent emergence amongst others à la 
Meillassoux bodes no better: “one should locate traces of this contingency 
in a kind of umbilical cord which links the subject to its pre-subjective 
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Real, and thus breaks the circle of transcendental correlationism.”451 In 
this manner, we should search for how the transcendental hints towards 
its dark beginnings (the pure act of the Real-as-origin and the unruliness 
of drives in the Real-as-excess that precedes it), the emphasis being on 
the ontogenetic process of becoming more than on the specificity of the 
transcendental constitution of reality for us, so that the fundamental issue 
is no longer so much how can we attain knowledge of the absolute (this 
already being accomplished by the first methodological step, as for instance 
in Hegel) but how does our subjective viewpoint fit into it as something that 
objectively exists: “[t]he true question is therefore how I (as the site where 
reality appears to itself) emerge in 'objective' reality (or, more pointedly, 
how can a universe of meaning arise in the meaningless Real).”452 With this, 
we have come full circle and hit upon the great merit of Žižek's philosophy. 
Having already overcome idealism from within, and having opened up the 
space for a speculative philosophy, he can develop a theory that is capable 
of being maximally realist and idealist and therefore best suited as a self-
explanatory theory of the metaphysical “totality” of the world, insofar as it 
can simultaneously supply the ontological conditions of the possibility of 
its own status as a theory and the ideal conditions of possibility of its own 
intelligibility in one sweeping move, thus making the theory itself extremely 
self-referential in its structure. In short, the theory displays complete 
systematic self-enclosure: it explains itself as a theory in both the real and 
ideal registers in such a manner that both depend upon and mutually ground one 
another in a self-articulating whole; it has succeeded at developing “a concept of the 
world or the Real which is capable of accounting for the replication of reality within 
itself.”453 What Žižek teaches us, a lesson already brought to the fore in late 
German Idealism but since forgotten, is that radical idealism is not a closure 
to the absolute. It is rather a new approach towards it, a new way of relating 
to it—and to see it as such merely requires a parallax shift in perception.
11.4 Being's Poem: Speculative Philosophy and the  
Mytho-Poetic Parallax Shift
If Žižek is right to say that the founding gesture of idealism is an ontological 
passage through madness, then it would not go far enough if we were to 
admit that the opposition between realism and idealism has been already 
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resolved at the level of idealism. Something is missing, for the real event 
that immediately precedes the autarchy of the Ideal, and whose exploration 
would enable this opposition to be also resolved at the level of realism (thus 
radicalizing and guaranteeing what Fichte referred to as a real-idealism or 
ideal-realism), is an impossible object of discourse. Conceding that notional 
antagonism can indeed be spectrally expressive of objective reality, and thus 
enable us to speculate about reality within ideality, to fully explain how we 
can have contact with the world where there is properly speaking no contact 
at all we must nevertheless acknowledge that we can never even indirectly 
reach the exact moment at which being begins to exist in the modality of 
the Ideal. The difficulty is much more severe than that the Real is always 
already minimally symbolized, since the Real-as-origin expresses two 
fundamental theoretical problems. First, insofar as its abyss of unconscious 
decision represents a pure self-instituting difference that unpredictably 
splits the world into two new logically irreconcilable registers, it cannot be 
deduced from the auto-movement of the Real; there is no “transition,” but 
only a self-caused “leap” that forever evades complete conceptual or natural 
dialectic mediation. Second, because this act withdraws in the very gesture 
of giving birth to the Symbolic, it lies stricto sensu “beyond” the grasp of 
the latter and can never appear within it, not even negatively. It is in this 
precise manner that the subject is neither Real nor Symbolic and is only 
expressible through a series of paradoxical avatars unable to bestow content 
upon it (the disjunctive “and,” the “in-between,” the “abyss of freedom,” 
the “vanishing mediator,” and so on). A philosophical discourse about the 
subject is thus intrinsically paradoxical because the latter is “a non-provable 
presupposition, something whose existence cannot be demonstrated but 
only inferred through the failure of its direct demonstration.”454 In short, 
it can only be investigated at the level of mytho-poetics. But what intensifies 
the problematic of such a metaphysical archeology of the subject is that 
without such a mytho-poetic narrativization of its impossible Past we would 
be unable fully to explicate how the Symbolic can in fact relate to reality in 
itself, for without it we cannot perform the parallax shift of “transposing the 
tragic gap that separates the reflecting subject from pre-reflexive Being into 
this Being itself,” whereby “the problem becomes its own solution: it is our 
very division from absolute Being which unites us with it, since this division 
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is immanent to Being.”455 In other words, the real and the ideal sides of 
overcoming idealism are intimately connected and cannot be discussed in 
isolation from one another: in order for idealism to completely surmount 
its own apparent limitations, it must be able to come full circle and show 
how, from within realism, its own ambiguities are not merely epistemological 
but also ontological; it must show what it means for thinking to be a part 
of the world, a manner in which the world relates to itself, no matter how 
paradoxically.
In creating itself by an act of immaculate conception, the Real-as-origin 
of the pure act at the birth of full-fledged subjectivity retroactively takes over 
what we come to know as the Real-as-excess of the drives. In a contradictory 
moment in which cause-and-effect relations are torn apart, the effect 
becomes greater than and autonomous from its cause, even going so far 
as to write a virtual possibility into the eternal dregs of the Past that never 
existed prior to its having been written there through an act of positing of 
its own presuppositions. The subject creates its own past in the same instance 
in which it begets itself out of nothing, so that the true “arche-fossils” are not 
ancestral statements concerning what occurred billions of years ago before 
the emergence of the thinking subject or life itself, but the objectal status of 
the subject:
what Lacan asserts is precisely the irreducible (constitutive) 
discord, or non-correlation, between subject and reality: in 
order for the subject to emerge, the impossible object-that-
is-subject must be excluded from reality, since it is this very 
exclusion which opens up the space for the subject. [...] The 
true problem of correlationism is not whether we can reach 
the In-itself the way it is outside of any correlation (or the 
way the Old is outside its perception from the standpoint of 
the New); but the true problem is to think the New itself “in 
becoming.” The fossil is not the Old the way it was in itself, 
the true fossil is the subject itself in its impossible objectal 
status—the fossil is myself, the way the terrified cat sees me 
when it looks at me. This is what truly escapes correlation, not 
the In-itself of the object, but the subject as object.456 
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Because the objectal status of the subject escapes any straightforward 
causal explanation and lies outside of all correlation insofar as it is 
responsible for its very upsurge, the only way to reach it is by means of a 
mytho-poetics of speculative fabulation. And given that this realistically 
non-deducible and idealistically inaccessible zone coincides with that very 
place in which the subject is inscribed within being as one creature amongst 
others (and is thus that which would enable us to pass without any immanent 
obstacle from the real pole to the ideal pole and vice versa) the parallax 
shift from the negative limitation of knowledge to the positive structure of 
the absolute itself requires more than mere rational ideal discourse. Only 
then can we “relate the In-itself to the split in the subject,”457 for “what 
Lacan calls the objet a, the subject's impossible-Real objectal counterpart, 
is precisely such an 'imagined' (fantasmatic, virtual) object which never 
positively existed in reality—it emerges through its loss, it is directly created 
as a fossil.”458 In this sense, Žižek's philosophy is paradoxical precisely 
because it attempts to think the unthinkable, that is, the cogito ergo sum as “I 
am that impossible piece of the Real where I cannot think”459 that uncannily 
corresponds to that space within which the meaningless Real contingently 
awakens and opens its eyes for the first time. In so doing, the metaphysical 
archaeology of the subject it offers endeavors to demonstrate that what the 
subject “loses” in order to become a subject coincides with what is excluded 
from reality so that reality can appear to itself, in such a way that the Real 
is thereby transformed from being a primordial being to which we have 
lost access due to its symbolization into something of which we cannot 
shake ourselves, no matter how hard we try, because through a mere formal 
reversal the gaze of the subject is seen to be the gaze of the world upon itself, the 
ambiguities and difficulties of the former being always already those of 
the latter: what we see is that “the narrative [we are telling] is not merely 
the subject coping with its division from Being, it is simultaneously the 
story Being is telling itself about itself,” so that realism and idealism are no 
longer in opposition, but stand in a self-sufficient totality inclusive of both 
as immanent to the life of substance. The system of being and thinking has 
closed upon itself in one final self-referential gesture.
In Žižek, we must narrativize the movement from being to thinking if we 
wish to reconcile the two and completely escape the speculative throes of 
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correlationism, since at the level of content there is always a minimal “non-
dialectizable” difference of one to the other (a division) that prevents such a 
move in purely rational discourse. But we must highlight the precise logical 
structure of this solution if we are to come to terms with the originality, 
daringness, and potential problems of Žižek's position. Given that the 
exact real event that instigates being's coming into appearance/thinking/
phenomenalization is the primordial ontological trauma that is the subject 
as object, we must in a mytho-poetic register (the subject in its objectal 
status being forever elusive) show that this trauma is not a mere accidental, 
haphazard occurrence in the personal history of an individual subject, 
but rather reveals itself as a constitutive, yet disrupting part of a greater 
trauma within being itself. But this (Žižekian) dialectical reconciliation is 
not a complete sublation of the opposition between realism and idealism, 
a complete break with the paradoxes of correlation, for the problematic 
nature of the latter is something that must be accounted for rather than 
explained away. As with all dialectical movement, “reconciliation is a 
reconciliation with the irreducibility of the antinomy, and it is in this way 
that the antinomy loses its antagonistic character,”460 so that in this case, 
reconciliation only truly occurs when we realize that there is no reconciliation 
(a complete solution) possible because what we take as our finitude should 
be inscribed into the thing itself (being) as its non-coincidence to self; 
and although this reconciliation can only thus come to pass at the level 
of mythological form, and never at that of content, instead of focusing 
on the impossibility of idealist representation to capture that which is 
being described, namely the objectal status of the subject, the solution 
paradoxically “shifts the focus to how (as Lacan put it) the signifier itself 
falls into the Real, that is, how the signifying intervention (narrativization) 
intervenes into the Real, how it brings about the resolution of a real 
antagonism,”461 thus working against its own impossibility: “the narrative 
path directly renders the life of Being itself.”462 Though we can never “exit 
the circle of imagination”463 to capture the abyss of unconscious decision 
at its real origin, by writing being's poem we can see, due to a mytho-
poetic parallax shift, that the poem we are writing coincides with the one 
that being is writing about itself. The human eye is never merely human: 
it is identical with the world itself “gaining” the power to see itself, so that 
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our apparently purely epistemological limitations are intimately linked to 
the ontological grounding of our notional apparatus. But is such a mytho-
poetic narrativization a sufficient basis for a new speculative philosophy? As 
we will see in the next chapter, delving into this question leads us to three 
potentially fatal issues with Žižek's critical metaphysics, all emerging from its 
fundamental concept of ontological catastrophe as the vanishing meditator 
between the Real and the Ideal. Does Žižek have the resources necessary to 
combat them? And if so, at what price?
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Chapter 12
The Deadlocks of Ontological Catastrophe
The Cases of Naturphilosophie, Anton-Babinski Syndrome, and 
Tarte à la crème
Žižek's theoretical philosophy aims to be a critical metaphysics capable 
of simultaneously overcoming radical idealism from within idealism (an 
epistemological sublation of the correlation) and from within realism (an 
ontological inscription of the correlation). However, at this juncture three 
potential problems emerge from various directions. The first direction 
is that of Schelling's Naturphilosophie. Not only does Schelling proclaim 
that, insofar as the subject is anything but an ontological catastrophe, 
thought is inscribed within being in such a way that we have no need to 
overcome radical idealism from within itself, it also challenges Žižek's own 
psychoanalytical reactualization of Schelling. The second direction is that 
of the skeptic, who can invent a thought experiment to demonstrate that 
it is perhaps impossible to develop any positive metaphysics from within 
a differential system of signifiers without any external reference. The 
third direction is that of the very basis of ideality itself understood as a 
psychotic withdrawal into the night of the world, the overcoming of which 
demands the seemingly impossible task of developing a paradoxical form 
of “successful” psychotic thinking capable of penetrating the impenetrable 
dusk of its own psychosis. How does Žižek stand up to such critiques? Is 
his radical idealism truly capable of providing us with a comprehensive 
metaphysics?
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12.1 The Schellingian Real-as-Excess: Iain Hamilton Grant, 
Naturphilosophie, and the Interior Involutions of Being
But is mytho-poetics the only option here? Although Žižek follows Hegel's 
defence of radical idealism as capable of a speculative account of extra-
notional reality, a potentially fatal problem arises internally within Žižek's 
own position as soon as we take a closer look at Žižek's other major 
interlocutor: Schelling. Ultimately unsatisfied with Hegel's mature account 
of the passage from nature to culture, Žižek turns to Schelling to explicate 
the genesis of the Symbolic. What Hegel missed was the paradoxical essence 
of this very movement, a dialectical movement that causes dialectics to 
collapse upon itself. With the birth of subjectivity, we see a snag in substance 
that prevents the absolute from self-actualizing itself so that, instead of 
being the Idea completely returning to itself out of its otherness in nature, 
which would present us with a reconciliation of nature and spirit in the 
Idea, nature's complete self-sublation in spirit, culture is actually a mere 
secondary (“virtual, artificial, symbolic, not substantially natural”464) 
response to the primordial ontological trauma that lies at the core of the 
human being. For Žižek, this means that culture is the always failed attempt 
at reconciliation: the Idea is nothing other than this very act of its own 
returning to itself, this movement being constitutive of that to which is 
returned;465 for it to reach its end would herald its death. Representing a 
recoil into a psychotic, irreal space, not only do the subjective and objective/
mind and world thereby fall into infinite conflict with one another, but it 
becomes impossible to explain why the Ideal emerges. According to Žižek it 
is Schelling who, fighting against the perceived threat of Hegelian Absolute 
Idealism, gives the most detailed account of this immanent self-sundering 
of being into its real and ideal poles in his account of the Grund as the ever 
elusive, eternal Past of consciousness, and the pure act of unconscious 
decision underlying the birth of the universe of human meaning. Schelling's 
position is paradoxical: from within a solipsistic space (transcendental 
idealism) he tries to develop a philosophical language capable not only 
of piercing the primacy of the Real-as-lack and explaining its monstrous 
pre-history within pre-symbolic antagonism (materialism), a logically prior 
but directly unreachable modality of the Real that precedes and exceeds the 
Symbolic, but also of describing the inexplicable self-positing of subjectivity 
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(idealism). After all, even if we can be said to have access to both the 
ancestral past of the Real prior to subjectivity and the Real that surrounds 
us “outside” of language through the very inconsistency of our notional 
apparatus, the methodology of which Hegel offers us through an analysis of 
the dialectic of phenomenal appearance and the very structure of symbolic 
thought, nevertheless the precise moment in which the subject institutes 
itself into being poses a problem to such a self-overcoming of radical 
idealism, because it is a leaping point in the Real into a new age of the world 
that is always “beyond” the Symbolic as its irretrievable origin. Because 
Schelling realizes the impossibility of a purely speculative account of the 
subject's emergence, and thus the necessity of a mytho-poetics, it is he and 
not Hegel who most adequately realizes the quadruple logic of dialectics at 
the core of German Idealism.
But even with his highly methodological psychoanalytical construction 
of the unconscious Grundlogik of German Idealism, for anyone who is 
familiar with Schelling's vast corpus it is unclear how Žižek can appropriate 
Schelling for his own project without potentially destabilizing his most 
fundamental theoretical category: that of the ontological catastrophe. 
Although the two major concepts Žižek utilizes—denaturalized unruliness 
(the dark pre-history of subjectivity in the vicissitudes of being) and the 
unconscious decision (the separating Ent-Scheidung whose effect is the 
institution of a metaphysically disjunctive “and”)—are meant to explain how 
we get entrapped in the Symbolic and the matrix of idealization, Žižek's own 
writings on Schelling do not seem fully to take into account the possibility 
that the latter might not be able to be so easily translated into the framework 
that he sees as basic to the entire tradition. His division of Schelling's 
thinking into three distinct stages—the Schelling
1
 of a quasi-Spinozistic 
philosophy of absolute indifference, Schelling
2
 of a radical materialist 
ontology of freedom, and Schelling
3
 of the philosophy of mythology 
and revelation—already hints at an irremovable tension. It is uncertain 
that the materialism-idealism relationship we see in the Schelling of the 
Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter can be read as a mytho-poetics of the birth 
of a radical transcendental idealism in the manner Žižek suggests. When we 
look at Schelling's thought, even as Žižek himself presents it, we are tempted 
to say that, if Hegel is able to show that the absolute opposition between 
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idealist and realist philosophy is without meaning from within idealism, 
Schelling could be said to do the same from within realism and without 
needing to pass through the former. This is further supported by the fact that 
Schelling never gives us a dialectical analysis of phenomenal appearance 
or the structure of symbolic thought in the way Hegel does and describes 
his own idealism in the Darstellung as “real” or “objective,” for its principal 
idea is not to use thought's inconsistencies to find a new starting point 
for speculative philosophy, but rather to directly investigate the origins of 
thought itself from its dark nonconscious ground,466 a point repeated by the 
“higher realism” of the Freiheitsschrift467 and the emergence of ideality in the 
Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen out of minerals.468 The argument that Schelling
2 
is an ephemeral rupture risks succumbing to arbitrariness, since now we 
find a manner to unify the central problematic of the Naturphilosophie 
and the “theosophic” philosophy of freedom. Given that one of the key 
tools for the development of Žižek's own metaphysics is the extracting of 
an unconscious Grundlogik underlying German Idealism, if Schelling's 
philosophy turns out to be more continuous than Žižek's analysis lets on, 
then his psychoanalytical construction of the German Idealist tradition 
could be jeopardized.
For Schelling, we do not just “tarry with the negative.” The X that eludes 
consciousness, one of the centrepieces of Schelling's thought, is never just 
a mere formal limit: it is an attempt to express the subject-independent 
interiority of nature to which we have access despite the mediating activity 
of consciousness precisely because the subject and its ideational capacities 
are a part of nature, one way through which nature relates to itself as ground. 
Schelling refuses to separate the ontological in-itself of precognitive or extra-
symbolic reality from the epistemological sphere of idealist representations, 
arguing that the two must be intimately connected if philosophy is to find 
a secure basis. If there is an identity between the Real and the Ideal, the 
problem of their relation to one another is relegated to a metaphysical or 
naturephilosophical level rather than a strictly epistemic or idealist one. 
Whereas in the middle-late period this idea of identity is expressed by 
the notion of the Mitwissenschaft (“co-science”) of creation, it is more 
clearly for our purposes articulated in the earlier Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature, where Schelling argues for the necessity of a dialectically positive 
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interactivity between mind and matter if transcendental idealism is to have 
a proper founding, which goes in the face of both the Hegelian proof of the 
insignificance of an opposition between idealistic and realistic philosophy 
and a Žižekian metaphysics of the disjunctive “and”:
For what we want is not that Nature should coincide with 
the laws of our mind by chance (as if through some third 
intermediary), but that she herself, necessarily and originally, 
should not only express, but even realize, the laws of our 
mind, and that she is, and is called, Nature only insofar as 
she does so.
Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible 
Nature. Here then in the absolute identity of Mind in us and 
Nature outside us, the problem of the possibility of a Nature 
external to us must be resolved. The final goal of our further 
research is, therefore, this idea of Nature.469 
It is exactly this problematic that reverberates throughout the entirety 
of Schelling's thinking, even when he attempts to outline the tension-
ridden oscillations of the Yes and the No, the light and the dark principles, 
constitutive of the self-operative logic of the Grund. Rather than offering 
some kind of paradoxical eruptive logic balancing materialism and idealism 
through their infinite conflict, Schelling's philosophy can very easily be 
read as a passionate attempt to show that the forces underlying human 
spiritual-transcendental activity are nothing more than the already existent 
potencies of nature arisen to a higher “power” through nature's auto-
development. If the starting point of Žižek's transcendental materialism is 
a self-grounding idealism (which shows his distinctive Lacanian-Hegelian 
presuppositions), Schelling's own transcendental materialism is a self-
articulating realism (which shows how Schelling has been influenced by 
the evolutionary dynamism of natural scientists such as Kielmeyer), the 
stark point separating them being that whereas in the former materialism 
is always a spectral materialism developed in the cracks of idealism, in the 
latter idealism becomes, as it were, a mere conditioned phenomenon. In this 
strict sense, if Schelling's philosophy is an account of the self-unfolding of 
the powers of nature according to their inner movement, it is because it is a 
speculative realism understood in its original etymological meaning: deriving 
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from the Latin speculari (to watch over), it is a realism that attempts to, 
through a scrutinizing surveillance, account for the immanent pulsations 
of the universe as it transforms bodies of matter into the complex field of 
living being and eventually thought as ideal self-mediation, so that the Real 
is not only always excessive to the Ideal, that which can never be brought 
into it due to nature's raw productivity, but the latter also loses its theoretical 
primacy insofar as nature in the stirrings of its nocturnal ground itself 
becomes the true a priori.
It is interesting to bring up this aspect of Schelling's philosophy, not 
just because it could be a weak point in Žižek's psychoanalytical reading, 
but also because it is a specific manner in which Žižek's metaphysical 
problematic enters into direct debate with the current speculative turn. In 
this regard, Iain Hamilton Grant's own transcendental materialism is in 
complete opposition to that of Žižek, so that contrasting the two allows us 
simultaneously to bring to the fore both the daring character of the latter's 
position and its potential internal limitations. Taking up Schelling's diagnosis 
that modern philosophy exhibits an agonizing deficiency—that nature does 
not exist for it470—Grant puts forward the argument that this diagnosis is just 
as sound today as ever: “[i]nsofar therefore as the antithetical couple ‘Plato-
Kant’ that lay at the heart of the immediate postkantian context continues 
to organize metaphysics, contemporary philosophy is importantly and 
immediately postkantian.”471 Through a careful reconstruction of Schelling's 
philosophical career with an eye towards its explicit naturephilosophical 
content and the natural scientific context that surrounded and inspired 
it, Grant's thesis is that by following its spirit, we may finally find a way to 
leave behind us the Kantian heritage insofar as Schelling offers us, instead 
of a two-world metaphysics that results in an “eliminative practicism” (the 
irreducibility of culture to nature), a “one-world physics capable of the 
Idea.”472 We cannot cut the world in two, for there is no great divide: even 
to understand culture as culture, we have to understand its genesis from 
its ground within nature, for culture itself is originally natural. There is no 
absolute split between the Real and the Ideal, mind and matter, the dead 
movement of inanimate objects and the life of organic being—there are 
only the unconditioned, groundless powers of nature as a pulsating all that 
creates specific bodies and their various, innumerable, and unpredictable 
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organizations according to its own cryptic inner process. According to 
Grant, Schelling's revolutionary thesis is that the only way we can explicate 
ideality is to see it as just one specific expression of nature's productivity, 
one among many possible products of nature as a priori. There is just a 
difference of degree and not of type between, say, atoms, chemicals, and 
free ethical subjects, insofar as there is a natural history of mind to which 
we must have recourse to explain its apparent autonomy. Far from being 
an idealism that grounds itself from within the infinite self-reflexivity of 
thinking “with no external support of its truth,”473 Schelling's idealism is 
a naturephilosophical investigation into the interior involutions of being, 
the latter being equally inclusive of thought's transcendental activity as 
the somatic constitution of physical bodies. Nature is a dark dynamicity 
that brings philosophy far away from the practico-concrete sphere of an 
anthropocentric universe into the enigmatic palpating powers that gave birth 
to it in their antagonism and the forgotten aeons of the abyssal dregs of 
cosmic time that have preceded us. In this manner, Grant is taking Schelling 
literally at his word:
A great work of the ancient world stands before us as an 
incomprehensible whole until we find traces of its manner of 
growth and gradual development. How much more must this 
be the case with such a multifariously assembled individual 
as the earth! What entirely different intricacies and folds must 
take place here! Even the smallest grain of sand must contain 
determinations within itself that we cannot exhaust until we 
have laid out the entire course of creative nature leading up to 
it. Everything is only the work of time, and it is only through 
time that each thing receives its particular character and 
meaning.474 
Although Grant and Žižek are reading Schelling in different, largely 
incommensurable ways—the former by a remarkable reconstruction 
of Schelling's naturephilosophical and scientific context, the other by 
a violent psychoanalytical overhauling of the entire German Idealist 
tradition—the fact that they both fall upon the same figure to elaborate 
their own materialist position is extraordinarily thought provoking. First 
and foremost, it suggests that the role of Schelling in Žižek's thinking poses 
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a potential problem for the latter's own transcendental materialist ontology 
of the subject, and not merely for external reasons: it challenges the latter's 
very notion of a metaphysics of the disjunctive “and.” The great contribution 
of Schelling's Naturphilosophie was to enact a complete displacement of 
the human subject, for it imposes upon us the counterintuitive task of a 
geology of morals that fights against any complete separation of the human 
(the realm of free acting) from the natural (the realm of necessity). The 
stark implications of this, as Grant himself notes, were clearly perceived 
by Eschenmayer, a Fichtean natural scientist, who after reading the 
Freiheitsschrift fell into a paroxysm of horror due to its primary soul-
wrenching implication: “your essay on human freedom seems to me a 
complete transformation of ethics into physics, a consumption of the free 
by the necessary, of feeling by understanding, of the moral by the natural, 
and above all a complete depotentiation of the higher into the lower order of 
things.”475 Commenting on this passage, Grant writes:
We can imagine Eschenmayer’s shock: why does this work 
on the subject of freedom contain so much geology? Why 
is the turba gentium [...], the world-disorder or species-
riots, presented as the ground of freedom? [... B]ecause the 
consequences of the dependence of transcendental physics on 
dynamic naturalism impose upon Schelling’s reconditioned 
transcendentalism the demand that the All be grounded in the 
“subject of nature itself,” i.e., in the forces. Accordingly, the 
more disorderly the phenomenon, the darker and more abyssal 
the ground. This is why the inquiry into human freedom must 
(a) specify the attachment of this power of infinite evolution 
to a finite phenomenon (human), and (b) consider the ground 
of such a freedom as derivative of the “self-operation of the 
ground” or the “will of the deep” in the geological series: 
the potentiating series through which such a freedom must 
(repeatedly) evolve must therefore present the expression of 
geological potencies in practical intelligence.476 
In this respect, when Žižek claims that it is Schelling who gives the most 
detailed description of the ontogenesis of subjectivity in the philosophical 
tradition—which makes him the father of dialectical materialism and 
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contemporary philosophies of finitude—he is in many ways completely 
justified, but in so doing he risks opening himself to the criticism that 
he misses how Schelling proceeds in this endeavour as well as its larger 
philosophical consequences, which presents two immediate major problems 
in his own usage of Schelling. First, if Grant is correct, Schelling rejects 
from the outset the very idea of a self-enclosed transcendental framework 
and its concomitant mind-body dualism, the ontological emergence of 
which is, according to Žižek, the fundamental philosophical obsession of the 
middle-late Schelling. If the unconscious Grundlogik of German Idealism 
is constituted by the dynamic of a self-grounding idealism and a spectral 
materialism grounded in the former, then Schelling's precise place within it 
would seem to be uncertain. Second, if Žižek's transcendental materialism 
assumes the birth of the I out of the not-I as an impossible event with no 
true precursor in the ancestral past of the pulsating fires of the heavens, 
the sluggishly slow evolution of geological formations, or even the forces 
of evolution in biological life-forms (none of its apparent brethren come 
close to its pure difference), in such a way that the self-positing of freedom 
literally cuts the absolute in two in an inexplicable manner, then we must 
conclude that Schelling's own metaphysics does not automatically result in 
a metaphysics wherein substance is split at its core, and thus ontological 
dislocation is the primordial fact. Contra Fichte, Schelling explicitly claims 
that there is a continuity between the I and the not-I, that the passage is 
one of a transition, not a leap. If psychoanalysis is to work in a therapeutic 
setting, an encounter with the Real can only truly be brought forth if all 
the intended meanings of the subject have been understood for what they 
are; otherwise a psychoanalytical interpretation does not work, because 
it does not hit the cause (which is why Lacanian analysts rarely offer 
interpretations). Moreover, even if we agree that Žižek is right to contend 
that the theosophical content of the middle-late Schelling is a mythological 
component that we can formalize in order to render its content more explicit 
(which Grant's work also implicitly does, given that he does not explicitly 
deal with the theological aspect of the Freiheitsschrift or the Weltalter), 
it is uncertain that he can so easily get rid of the naturephilosophical 
implications of these texts. But the stakes are much higher than those of the 
philological-textual fidelity of an interpretation in this case: if Schelling's 
292 Chapter 12
philosophy presents a framework incompatible with the one Žižek sees in it 
and his own psychoanalytical reconstruction extensively relies upon this for 
its own argumentative vitality, Žižek's own development of a metaphysics of 
the Real by an engagement with Schelling is not only potentially misguided, 
but could also lose sight of various other resources explicit in Schelling that 
could be used to rethink the materialism-idealism relationship.
Elaborating on Grant's argument, we see that Schelling completely 
bypasses the problem of the materialism-idealism relationship because 
idealism is never a purely self-referential play. The whole concept of a 
“spectral” materialism just has no place here; speculative philosophy has a 
stricto sensu non-idealistic foundation. As Grant succinctly puts it, what is 
at stake is the “impersonal coincidence of the transcendentally generated 
universal and self-generating nature [... and] Schelling’s hypothesis 
is, in other words, that there is a naturalistic or physicalist ground of 
philosophy,”477 a ground that does not implicate an eliminative materialism 
wherein all is reduced to empirically observable bodies—somatism—but in 
such a way that genuine philosophy “consists in the dynamic elaboration 
of the identity of nature and Ideas.”478 In this manner, if one reads Žižek's 
own transcendental materialism alongside that which Grant develops from 
his own reactualization of Schelling, one is presented with an alternative 
to Žižek's own metaphysics of the not-all, one not centred in the Ideal as 
being's irreconcilable self-division, but rather one based upon the fragile 
productivity of nature as it contingently and continually takes on new 
forms (and destroys others), a productivity that in no way has man as 
its summit, but will create new creatures (and monsters) without end 
because there is no stasis, but only a restless movement of the depths, a 
beautiful and macabre dance of great delicacy and improvisation whose 
actors simultaneously whimper and laugh under its weight. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis prohibits this Schellingian move because it would require 
that the chain of signification constitutive of human language be not based 
on an operationally closed system with no natural grounding, but could 
actually open up onto the world as it is in its own interior involutions 
because it would be, as it were, one with it. Although we philosophize about 
nature by “following a procedure of successive unconditioning performed 
by thought-operations about nature,” a process that allows us to “arrive 
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at a conception of 'nature as subject,'” this investigation is never a mere 
reconstruction within the ideal series of the Real, but is rather a movement 
of the Real itself, for “such a philosophical system does not therefore seek 
a fixed point from which to gain leverage on an external world, nor to 
rise above it, but is itself a 'genetic' [...] movement in and on this world, 
unconditionally.”479 
Schelling expresses this identity most daringly when he says that “to 
philosophize about nature means to create nature.”480 “Mental” activity 
is always already a part of nature and therefore a part of its own auto-
development by being one of its emergent attributes, but nature, being the 
truly and absolutely a priori, is unconditional and thereby guarantees that 
thought is never limited to the mere ideational or physiological constraints 
of conditioned particulars insofar as it is an expression of nature's 
productivity rather than embodied in the fixity of one of its products. In 
this way, for Schelling, we are primordially “connected” with nature as 
the pre-Symbolic, insofar as the Real and the Ideal remain identified at an 
essential level, the consequence being that the subject is not a dialectically 
non-sublatable in-between that exists as the psychotic withdrawal of the 
world into self. Accordingly, Žižek's reliance upon Schellingian ontology 
risks problematizing his own position, for if Žižek draws upon Schelling as 
a partner for the elaboration of the impossible genesis of the transcendental 
out of an orgasm of forces within the pre-symbolic Real, this immediately 
draws our attention to other possibilities of understanding the subject 
that do not present the latter as an irrevocable moment of ontological 
catastrophe in the flux of material being. This would force us to rethink 
the very nature of the psychoanalytical experience and the essence of the 
disjunctive “and” that is central to Žižek's own parallax ontology—and in 
this manner, not only does its theoretical first principle begin to tremble, 
but the very primacy of the Lacanian psychoanalysis that serves as its 
starting point is put into question. It is highly revelatory that to make use of 
Schelling for his project in the first place Žižek can only focus on two works 
(the Freiheitsschrift and the second draft of the Weltalter) because of their 
apparently disavowed Hegelian structure as that which would enable one to 
extract from them a self-operative logic establishing the primacy of the Real-
as-lack through the abyss of unconscious decision.
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We can begin to see why Žižek's proclamation that his project is 
Hegelian, but never Schellingian (despite the fact that the Freiheitsschrift and 
the Weltalter contain the most vivid description of the emergence of the 
Symbolic), is multilayered. First and foremost, Žižek takes radical idealism 
as the only true beginning for philosophy insofar as we can only interact 
with the world through the medium of thought, making correlationism 
basic to our experience. If the cracks within ideality epistemologically 
enable us to develop a spectral materialism, then the irreducibility of the 
Real-as-lack paradoxically does not prohibit us from having access to being 
as the Real-as-excess because this very concept thereby becomes internal 
to our notional apparatus. In this manner, Žižek is quite justified in saying 
that his project is Hegelian given that—on his own reading of Hegel at 
least—it strictly speaking shares this identical starting point and draws from 
it the exact same consequences, a move that in turn allows him to avoid 
the problem of expressing too strong a reliance on and debt to Schelling, 
which could potentially bring his own thinking uncomfortably close to 
everything he denies: the non-Freudian unconscious (in its Bergsonian, 
Jungian, Deleuzian, etc., forms), “pre-modern” cosmology, or Romantic 
theories of nature. Yet, this does not by any means solve the ambiguity 
of the Hegel-Schelling relationship in his thinking, for as we have seen, 
what is crucial to Žižek's own reading of Schelling is that Schelling's own 
theoretico-epistemological framework, at least in the second period of 
his thinking, is unknown to itself the same as that of Hegel. Although Žižek 
has to do great violence to Schelling to extract a Hegelian dialectical 
structure of negativity in his texts, nevertheless the interpretation he 
presents is extremely internally consistent and methodologically sound. 
If the thoroughness of a position like Grant's is a challenge to Žižek, then 
Žižek's own reading of Schelling is equally a challenge to Grant's and other 
canonical and non-canonical interpretations that exist. The game goes both 
ways—and because the conceptual terrain within which both operate is 
vastly different, it is not evident how we are to decide upon the favourability 
of one interpretation over another. However, one has to underline that this 
oscillation between Schelling and Hegel is not so much an inconsistency or 
sleight-of-hand gesture on Žižek's part, the reason being that what interests 
him is less the specific differences between the historical thinkers of the 
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tradition, but an unconscious truth that can be seen to deploy itself through 
them. Accordingly, not only is there absolutely no contradiction in saying 
that Žižek's philosophy is a hybridism of Hegelian logic and Schellingian 
ontology insofar as it is precisely this hybridism that can retroactively 
be seen to be the traumatic core at the formative heart of the tradition 
itself, but reflecting upon the intrinsic ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling 
relationship helps us reveal the originality and daringness of Žižek's critical 
metaphysics.
12.2 Anton-Babinski Syndrome: Slavoj Žižek's Paradoxical 
Overcoming of Idealism
Although Žižek's appropriation of Schelling could be perceived as highly 
problematic, insofar as the latter may not so easily fit into the proto-
structuralist framework Žižek sees as operative in German Idealism, 
another problem immediately arises that potentially hits the core of his 
overcoming of radical idealism. Even if we accept the legitimacy of his 
reading of Schelling, it is unlikely that Žižek's own Hegelian attempt to show 
the insignificance of any absolute opposition between idealist and realist 
philosophies from within idealism would satisfy a realist. If we never leave 
the clutches of idealism, then any knowledge that we possess would never 
be able to reach the absolute in its pure non-correlationality to the subject. 
We are always entrapped in the masturbatory play of signifiers in their 
incessant sliding. Moreover, the Real-as-excess as what precedes and exceeds 
consciousness is an explicitly impossible concept. Even Žižek's “materialist” 
response to idealism has as its fundamental task to bring to the fore this 
intrinsic impossibility: remodulating the Schellingian act of unconscious 
decision, its seeks to show how the shift from the Real-as-excess (pre-
symbolic antagonism) to the Real-as-lack (symbolic imprisonment) is the 
ultimate ontological parallax by a speculative fabulation of the always lost 
and inaccessible moment of the auto-disruption of the noumenal realm. At 
its best, realist metaphysics appears to be reduced to mythology.
Žižek's overcoming of idealism articulates itself in two distinct moments. 
First, since the Real-as-lack is the logical zero-level of any philosophy 
due to the insurmountability of the Symbolic, to arrive at some kind of 
knowledge of an “extra-”notional zone of experience (the Real-as-excess) 
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would appear a priori foreclosed. However, the very inconsistency of our 
notional apparatus allows us to develop knowledge of reality in itself, for as 
soon as we “apply” a category to the world and it shows itself as inadequate, 
we see that the field of appearing is always more than appearance, whereby 
the noumenal now appears as the self-limitation of the phenomenal. Our 
experience of the world is not a full-blown hallucination: we can use these 
experiences of breakdown to our advantage in order to explore a world 
that only seems to be infinitely “beyond” our reach. The Real-as-excess 
becomes an intra-discursive category, so that epistemic limitations of 
knowledge negatively demonstrate our inclusion into and thus capacity 
of understanding the world at large, rather than our imprisonment in a 
socially constructed universe of discourse. It is precisely because of this that 
Žižek says that “the true problem is not how to reach the Real when we are 
confined to the interplay of the (inconsistent) multitude of appearances, 
but, more radically, the properly Hegelian one: how does appearance itself 
emerge from the interplay of the Real?”481 Second, given that we are in some 
sense a part of the absolute, our failure to reach it has to coincide with a 
failure of the absolute itself. Žižek's wager is that if we do fail in reaching 
the absolute in thought, this cannot be due merely to the finitude of our 
notional apparatus: “[i]f we can think our knowledge of reality (i.e., the 
way reality appears to us) as radically failed, as radically different from the 
Absolute, then this gap (between the for-us and the in-itself) must be part of the 
Absolute itself, so that the very feature that seemed forever to keep us away from 
the Absolute is the only feature which directly unites us with the Absolute.”482 
The point is not to “'overcome' the gap [...] but to take note of how this 
gap is internal to [the Absolute]”:483 arguing that our inability to overcome 
our entrapment in the Symbolic and find our place within being is already 
the very lost object we are looking for, Žižek turns epistemological limit into 
positive ontological condition by inscribing the limitation of knowledge 
into the world as an event immanent in the latter: that is, by making it an 
(auto-)limitation of the absolute itself. If idealism is some form of ontological 
solipsism, then it must be revelatory of a zone wherein the absolute is 
irrevocably non-coincident to itself. In another vein, this means that any 
radically self-grounding idealism is always already a materialism, the two 
being nothing more than supplementary views on the same underlying 
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reality; moving from one to the other just requires a certain switch of 
perspectives, a parallax shift, whose very possibility we can only explain 
by making the very irreconcilable split between idealism and materialism 
the imperceptible truth of both. Žižek's name for that which can strangely 
mediate between them because it is neither idealistic nor materialistic 
yet is included in both as excluded (“include me out!”) is the subject as 
an insurmountable ontological and symbolic lacuna. Consequently, the 
Symbolic is always already more than itself because it points to its dark 
origins in being's passage through madness—and even if the precise moment 
in which the world withdraws into its nocturnal, irreal self is forever lost 
in the universe of meaning it brings forth, we are nevertheless justified in 
mytho-poetically fabulating the act of decision that induces our collective 
psychosis, because the Symbolic can never do away with its origins.
Although the undecidable ambiguity of the Real is a problem Žižek 
inherits from Lacan, a problem similar to that faced by many forms of 
idealism, Žižek throughout his writings remains true to his great master's 
attempt to desubstantialize the Real, but with an important twist, a twist 
that accentuates the theoretical challenge of his critical metaphysics. What 
most clearly distinguishes Žižek's project from that of Lacan is his refusal 
to take our lack of access to the Real as a brute fact and his subsequent 
endeavour to inscribe it within being. The question arises, however, of 
whether Žižek's account of this emergent ontological parallax is even 
philosophically possible, given his epistemological commitments. Since 
phenomenal reality emerges only after being has sundered itself, whereby 
our access to the Real must be mediated by transcendental constitution, 
Žižek's double claim that the internal inconsistency of idealism is that 
which allows us to overcome it from within and that our inability to reach 
the thing itself is already that which we are looking for poses two important 
difficulties to his project that, for many, may not be adequately resolved or 
seem outright problematic. On the one hand, to switch epistemological limit 
into positive ontological condition by a mere parallax shift of perspective 
appears in many ways to be a mere sleight-of-hand argument. Given that 
this precise moment where our division from the absolute coincides with 
the self-division of the absolute (so that the story we are telling about 
being is simultaneously the story that being is telling to itself) can only be 
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narrativized at the level of mytho-poetics, which reconciles substance and 
subject at the level of form and never at the level of content, it is unclear 
that the claim that the problem its own solution does the argumentative 
work it purports to do. To put it bluntly, since this precise moment defies 
any proper speculative explanation, it merely covers up the underlying issue 
that we are facing: that is, how we could have access to being in the first place. 
On the other, it is unclear that we can really collapse the distinction between 
realism and idealism by making the very distinction itself intra-conceptual or 
intra-discursive insofar as this move fails to sufficiently provide the conditions 
under which we could develop a truly speculative account of reality in itself 
that is not always already entrapped within the ambiguities of symbolization. 
In both cases, a realist would be quick to argue that we have done everything 
but leave the correlationalist circle, that we are stuck in a constituted 
world for us. For the former, it could not be said that we have some kind of 
“access” to reality through the immanent obstructions of the Symbolic as 
that which indicates the spectral presence of an extra-notional reality posited 
from within it, for the Real is a mere effect of the Symbolic. Does this go far 
enough in establishing the groundwork for a new metaphysics?
If we call the Real an internal limit or limitation of the Symbolic, we must 
be careful, because the Real is not so much a limit in the sense of a border 
that separates two distinct yet commensurable terrains, or a limitation in 
the sense of a restricting condition coming from an exterior force that one 
ought to overcome. Rather, the adjective “internal” is of utmost importance 
here because it stresses that the Real is completely immanent to the 
Symbolic's very idealizing activity in such a way that there is no outside 
except an outside that is paradoxically posited as inside. If the Symbolic 
functions within a psychotic withdrawal from the world, not only does it 
freely (re)constitute reality according to an autonomous, self-referential play or 
ciphering, but any obstruction that occurs within it would only be due to its 
freedom. In its first guise, the Real is nothing other than “a purely formal 
parallax gap or impossibility,” “the rupture or gap which makes the order 
of discourses always and constitutively inconsistent and non-totalizable,”484 
so that even if we are permitted to call this negative encounter with the 
Real a “positive running up against” the exterior world that operates as if 
it “touches the Real,”485 in the same breath we must qualify this statement 
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insofar as this can only be brought forth in the aftermath of symbolic 
distortion, that is, après-coup. This recognition of an indirect confrontation with a 
constitutive outside internal to the Symbolic is in itself just another symbolization: 
any “materialism” that could be developed by means of it will always already 
be entrapped within its ambiguities, so that this “materialism” is nothing 
but a mere retroactive adjustment of ideality to accommodate for its internal 
inconsistencies, for it is only from within the Symbolic that we see the Real 
as the residue of a failed attempt to synthesize an “extra”-notional reality. As 
Adrian Johnston puts it:
It's not that there is no Real that isn't immanent to the 
Symbolic. Instead, the non-immanent Real is accessible 
exclusively through the deadlocks and inconsistencies 
immanent to the Symbolic [...]. The Real-as-presupposed [the 
Real-as-excess as posited in/by the Symbolic] actually exists 
“for us” only insofar as it indirectly shines through the cracks 
in the façade of Imaginary-Symbolic reality, insofar as it is 
asymptotically approached by the parlêtre along the fault lines 
of this reality's inner conflicts.486 
But “...indirectly shines through...” is a misleading metaphor: nothing breaks 
through the prison of language. As Žižek says, “we do not touch the Real 
by way of breaking out of the prison of language and gaining access to the 
external transcendent referent [...]. We touch the Real-in-itself in our very 
failure to touch it.”487 This is what Žižek emphasizes when he posits an 
ontological passage through madness at the beginning of the Symbolic, for 
once it has occurred there is no contact with the world that is possible. If 
we take Lacan and Žižek at their word, we can never truly liberate ourselves 
from the psychotically self-sustaining construction of reality that is the 
Symbolic's autonomous idealization. Even if the latter does not equate to 
an omnipotent, non-limited hallucination of our world of experience—a 
Godlike primary process—nevertheless there is no escape from our 
collective hallucination of reality: impenetrable in its density, omnipresent 
in its extension, nothing is left untouched by this tenebrous realm of 
transcendental phantasmagoria within which we live and breathe as speaking 
subjects. The light of being is unable to radiate through the holes of the all-
encompassing web of the Symbolic.
300 Chapter 12
Here the case of Anton-Babinski syndrome should be evoked as a 
possible skeptical argument against Žižek's overcoming of radical idealism. 
A rare medical phenomenon, the syndrome is a symptom of brain damage 
(usually from a stroke) in the occipital lobe. What is so peculiar is that 
people who suffer from it, although cortically blind, claim that they can 
see. In their speech and general behaviour there is often, at first, no sign of 
blindness—family members and the medical team typically only begin to 
notice something is amiss when the patient begins to stumble into various 
physical objects in their path, whether it be tripping over a coffee table in 
front of him, walking into a wall, or describing things that are not really 
there. Not only do patients continue to refuse to admit their blindness 
despite all the inexorable obstructions in the all-out hallucination of their 
own visible field of experience, but, more primordially, it is clear that no 
amount of tarrying with the negative offered by the latter's internal short-
circuiting would ever enable them to develop a “spectral” vision of the world 
in itself of which they have been deprived through organic devastation. To 
deal with the incomprehensible agony caused by such constant disturbances 
in their psychotically self-sufficient and imagined perception of subjective 
reality, those who suffer from Anton-Babinski syndrome actually find 
ways of giving support to its free generation by falsifying their memories, 
a process that in the medical community is called confabulation. In other 
words, even if a patient, realizing their condition, were to think that they are 
actually in the process of developing a sound mental map of the physical 
universe that is around them through the aid of their mishaps as a means 
of retroactively readjusting their imaginary field, and this not only with the 
hope of learning to navigate within it, but also to overcome their blindness 
by making the absolute opposition between a hallucinated world produced 
in the void of blindness and a vision of objective reality caused by retina 
input without meaning within their hallucination, it must be concluded that 
they could never assure themselves that this “spectral” seeing captures 
the world nor whether it is not just another hallucination that has been 
produced to save themselves from the psychological trauma of their own 
blindness. Lost in visual madness, they can never indirectly see the world 
shine through the inconsistencies of their hallucination.
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But isn't this precisely the same situation we find ourselves in with 
respect to Žižek's attempt to break the correlationalist circle? The only 
possibility for an ontological grounding of the psychoanalytico-Cartesian 
subject being a phantom-like vision of the world building itself within the 
internal obstructions of the Symbolic's ciphering of the world, it would 
seem that just as it is impossible for those suffering from Anton-Babinski 
syndrome to spectrally construct a vision of the world that has been lost to 
them due to their lack of sight, so it is impossible that one could achieve 
some kind of paradoxical coincidence of the subjective and the objective 
capable of positive truth from within the nocturnal night of the world. If 
the self-overcoming of radical idealism proves insufficient to ground a new 
speculative philosophy, then the only alternative left is a pure mytho-poetic 
fabulation of the obscure origins of the Symbolic, the latter's ontological 
solipsism always already pointing beyond itself to an inaccessible material 
event that haunts it but that remains forever inaccessible. Unable to sublate 
the opposition of realism and idealism from within idealism, we could still, by 
writing being's poem, provide a mythological account of how our division 
from being is the same as being's division to itself, thereby hinting towards 
how this opposition is always already reconciled from within realism, making 
the problem itself moot: we must tell a story that inscribes our failure to 
reach the absolute in the absolute itself, so that which appears to keep 
us from the absolute is in actuality the only thing that ties us to it. Our 
madness is being's own. But if such a medium of expression presents itself 
as the rational necessity of a non-rational discourse to explain discourse as 
such, then just as those suffering from Anton-Babinski syndrome create false 
memories to guarantee the consistency of their self-sufficient hallucination, 
so too does all speculative fabulation risk always being nothing more than 
a confabulation. What complicates this philosophical issue is the fact that 
in all mytho-poetic narratives where the very “origins” of the Symbolic in 
the Real are at stake, the event in question that institutes the movement 
from one to the other “never effectively took place within temporal reality, 
[although] one has to presuppose it hypothetically in order to account for 
the consistency of the temporal process.”488 The result is that the event 
of the decision that violently separates Grund from existence potentially 
never occurred: it could be nothing but a fantasmatic, retroactive posit 
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necessary for the internal consistency of our universe of meaning, so that 
the distinction between philosophy and fantasy/defence mechanism risks 
being blurred. As a consequence, Žižek's Schellingian “obscurantist idealist” 
manner of “deducing” this act from the pre-Symbolic could only be true 
insofar as it gestures towards the fundamental horror underlying subjectivity, 
just as the empirically false memories unearthed by those with false memory 
syndrome (being seduced, child sexual abuse) often merely reveal an 
underlying deadlock haunting a patient (that there is no sexual relationship). 
In this regard, not only is it unclear how we could truly test one mytho-
poetic fabulation against another so as to guarantee their scientificity, but 
whether they have any metaphysical or ontological merit as such.
Given that our freedom means that we are forever stuck within a 
constitutive psychosis, the withdrawal of the world into the eternal darkness 
of its irreal self, the very category of truth here has been so starkly modified 
that Žižek's own philosophy risks undercutting the very ground it seeks. The 
subject is reduced to a mere spinning in the void of freedom, a void whose 
very emergence appears to render itself inexplicable and problematize any 
knowledge of the “outside” world. A realist will not only always find the 
reduction of the thought/being opposition to an intra-conceptual distinction 
an insufficient basis for a positive knowledge of the ontological and its 
vicissitudes, but will also reject myth as a speculative science insofar as 
correlationism has been preserved rather than overcome, for without the 
prior self-overcoming of idealism, the best mytho-poetics can do in the 
framework of a radical subjective idealism is to reconcile substance and 
subject at the level of mere mythological form rather than that of content. 
If idealism is co-incident with an ontological passage through madness, 
how could we develop a form of linguistic thinking able to overcome the 
psychotic withdrawal from objective reality that appears to be its very meta-
transcendental condition of possibility to describe its event in being?
12.3 Fichte's Laughter, Henri Maldiney, and the Necessity of a 
“Successful” Psychotic Thinking
Spinning in the void of freedom—isn't this the Fichtean position? Does Žižek 
truly succeed in overcoming the theoretical impossibility forced upon us by 
the pure I and develop what Fichte thought was contrary to reason: namely, 
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a transcendental materialist account of its emergence out of the not-I? Or is 
it not Fichte who, by refusing to fall upon the speculative potential opened 
up by the Anstoß and sticking to the internal dynamics of subjectification, 
ultimately has the last laugh in the history of post-Kantianism as a 
paradoxical attempt to develop a new metaphysics in the wake of idealism? 
Could he have uncannily predicted this dilemma? Perhaps it is in this 
precise sense that we should read Fichte's incomprehension of his critics, an 
incomprehension designed not so much to show his disgust at the childish 
laughter of established scholars at the apparent absurdity of his position 
(“Fichte, do you really think that air and light are a priori transcendental 
conditions of human freedom?”) as to directly express by public ridicule his 
own laughter at the absurdity of their position (“Established scholars, you 
really think you can break free of correlationism and develop a speculative 
philosophy?”):
I tell them that I have given here an a priori deduction of air 
and light. They answer me: “Air and light a priori, just think of 
it! Ha ha ha! Ha ha ha! Ha ha ha! Come on, laugh along with 
us! Ha ha ha! Ha ha ha! Ha ha ha! Air and light a priori: tarte à 
la crème, ha ha ha! Air and light a priori! Tarte à la crème, ha ha 
ha! Air and light a priori! Tarte à la crème, ha ha ha!” et cetera 
ad infinitum.
Stunned, I look around me. Where did I lose my way? I 
thought that I had entered the republic of scholars. Have I 
fallen into a madhouse instead?489 
For Fichte, true madness is not the psychotic withdrawal at the founding 
gesture of subjectivity, but rather rejecting its implications—in short, acting 
as if it never happened. If the ontological solipsism of the Ideal reduces all 
reality to a mere image, so that all “is transformed into a fabulous dream, 
without there being any life the dream is about, without there being a mind 
which dreams; a dream which hangs together in a dream of itself,”490 rather 
than bemoaning the loss of being, we should realize the implications of this 
inexplicable leap into freedom, that is, that the phenomenal world “absolutely 
creates itself [...] in a genesis out of nothing.”491 
Just like the Fichtean transcendental Wissenschaftslehrer is able to come 
to the realization that life as we know it is nothing but a void doubled in 
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on itself, a dream of a dream, so too the Žižekian transcendental materialist 
is able from within the throes of originary psychosis to see this psychosis 
for what it is. But he does not stop there. While the Wissenschaftslehrer 
proclaims that the only thing left for us to do is to actively create, through 
the infinity of imagination, the groundless images necessary to fully actualize 
our freedom in concrete striving, the transcendental materialist pauses for 
a moment at this insight: if we can see that our life is a dream of a dream, 
if we can understand psychosis as psychotic, then there must be a minimal 
level of distance possible, as it were, between us and the transcendental 
(re)constitution of reality as a collective hallucination—and it is precisely 
this distance that enables us to thematize the entire process for what it is 
both in terms of the internal dynamics of subjectification and its wider 
inscription within being. In short, the theoretical gesture at the heart of 
Žižek's project is the following: if we can recognize our symbolic entrapment 
as entrapment, then our idealist psychosis is not only non-coincident with 
itself, but must in certain instances be “unable” to fully lock us within its 
cage. The very reason why we even know that there is a free transcendental 
constructionism fabricating our world of experience in the first place is that 
this constructionism fails and is unable to absolutely create itself: radical 
idealism fails to be radical idealism because it is haunted by seemingly 
non-ideal constraints, so that in this immanent failure it opens up the space 
for a new form of materialism insofar as it demonstrates that the Symbolic 
is always already minimally outside itself. In this sense, the Real-as-lack, as 
that which was apparently at the very root of the realist objection to being 
able to overcome correlationism from within idealism, is of irreducible 
importance since it enables us to enact a metaphysical archaeology of the 
subject, and thus mytho-poetically fabulate a picture of its emergence from 
a pre-symbolic antagonism that sets the stage for the free idealization of 
the world. For otherwise, we cannot explicate how we can see psychosis 
as psychotic in the first place. It is the only possible Archimedean point 
from which we could be saved from confabulation by a constant tarrying 
with its traumatic piercing. Yet a speculative fabulation is merely that—a 
fabulation: recognizing the limits of rational inquiry for describing the exact 
moment of withdrawal into self at the commencement of the universe of 
meaning, it supplements it with a mythology that is consciously aware of the 
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intrinsic inaccessibility of its object. Even if such a medium is justified by 
means of the Symbolic's own failure, which shows itself in a parallax shift of 
perspective as a disruptive ontological occurrence, we must concede that the 
actual narrative cannot truly articulate the miraculous advent of subjectivity 
in the Real. By delving into the impossible, the best it gives us is a sideways 
glance into the always absent origin.
The scientific legitimacy of mytho-poetics relies, for its theoretical 
force, largely on Žižek's solution to the realism-idealism debate from within 
idealism. To embark upon a mythologico-metaphysical archeology of the 
subject is to try to come to terms with the unfathomable zone in between 
the pure Real and the Symbolic that lies paradoxically in both and neither. 
But to describe the passage from one to the other is stricto sensu impossible 
because such a passage that can be nothing other than an unpredictable 
event that arises ex nihilo within the Real itself and which simultaneously is 
always already withdrawn from the very logical space that could rationally 
investigate it. But to see this as an impossibility in the Real (“the leaping 
point”) and not just of the Symbolic (its “origin” in unconscious decision) 
presupposes that the question has changed from how we can gain access to 
the Real through the Symbolic to the ambiguous genesis of the latter out 
of the former. But has Žižek given us an adequate foothold from within 
which we can escape correlationism and answer this? Henri Maldiney, a 
little known French phenomenologist who rethinks human transcendence 
through the experience of psychosis, can give us some useful if controversial 
resources to draw out the intrinsically paradoxical nature of this inquiry.
Discussing the introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's case studies 
on schizophrenia,492 Maldiney outlines a peculiarity in the former's 
phenomenological method. Rejecting the possibility of understanding 
schizophrenia directly, either through positivistic methodology or an 
immediate experience (what the person says being inadequate to express 
their illness), one has, as Biswanger notes, to “let oneself be carried by 
the very nature of things,” that is, presuppose an inner, self-articulating 
structuration of the phenomenon that will reveal itself through a careful 
description as that which lets its phenomenological essence mediate itself to 
us. In this sense, there is a distinction to be made between (the) phenomenal 
experience (of schizophrenia) and (the) phenomenological experience (of 
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schizophrenia as the object of a science). But this presupposition is, in fact, 
a Hegelian presupposition: “let oneself be carried by the very nature of 
things” is a literal repetition of the definition of science in the Preface of 
The Phenomenology of Spirit, where it is said that, in the dialectical method, 
we must let ourselves sink into the content at hand, thereby “letting it 
move spontaneously of its own nature.”493 We must always presuppose an 
interior life of the object whose essence will then be freely and spiritually 
internalized/mediated/idealized by the concept. Even if this presupposition 
appears harmless, it has a strange consequence in this context because 
of the specific object under investigation by the phenomenologist: “[i]t 
is not enough to bear witness to the incompatibility between science and 
psychosis. For their very incompatibility here is due to an extremely close 
proximity,” for given that the phenomenological aims to be the (self-)
thematization of the phenomenal, their very distinction risks dissipating 
into nothing as a certain undecidability emerges.494 The task of the 
phenomenological science of psychosis is to let psychosis live in its fullness, to show 
its true meaning.
It is this methodological ambiguity that in turn enables Maldiney to 
reap a wealth of resources from the experience of psychosis. For Maldiney, 
the similarity that Hegel's dialectical method in The Phenomenology of Spirit 
bears to Binswanger's phenomenological approach to schizophrenia and 
thus, by implication, to his own to psychosis is not just limited to how 
they define their way of proceeding. Rather, it can also be seen at the very 
level of the investigation of their objects, so that there exists an extremely 
close proximity between the two levels of investigation that is constantly 
in danger of conflating them, but with an important twist. In the case of 
a phenomenology of psychosis, by letting psychosis speak the fullness of 
its essence by letting oneself be carried away by the in-dwelling logic underlying 
its phenomenality, what is at stake is not merely to understand how a 
psychotic crisis is a singular event responsible for the existential demise 
of an individual, but more primordially how this demise is revelatory of a 
failed transcendence and thus continues to participate in the very ambiguity 
and enigma at the heart of transcendence itself, even if in an out-of-
joint manner, for “[i]ts dramatic testifies (pathei mathos) to that which is 
irreducible in man.”495 If this is the case, then we can question psychosis 
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in order to bring to the fore the various existentialia operative in the very 
process of subjectification and temporalization central to human existence: 
“[w]hether his illness [maladie] is organic or vesanic, for man it is first of 
all a human trail; and it is only possible to understand the latter if one first 
of all knows what it means 'to be man.'”496 In this sense, the experience of 
psychosis as a failed transcendence is beneficial for coming to terms with 
what a successful transcendence would be, by opening up the room for its 
(self-)thematization. In other words, if there is a certain ambiguity between 
the phenomenal (psychosis) and the phenomenological (its scientific 
essence) in this case, it is because the latter shows us that the former is 
always a possibility for us, an intimate potential of being human, so that the 
advent of the Real (in the sense of Maldiney) at the core of the subject is 
indifferent to the success or failure of the latter.
The Phenomenology, however, does not present us with a failed 
transcendence whose very failure highlights irreducible features of the 
drama of existence, as in Biswanger's case studies or Maldiney's own 
work on psychosis. But neither does it present us with a straightforwardly 
successful transcendence (if such a thing even exists) for the movement 
of consciousness it depicts is identical to the fundamental structure of 
depression, so that the question itself emerges as to how the Phenomenology 
can even arrive at dynamic unity and stability if the consciousness it describes is 
intrinsically depressive in nature:
The principle of Aufhebung, “to abolish and to preserve,” is 
consistent with the general scheme of depressive existence. 
Its double meaning agrees with, amongst other things, the 
double dimension of the depressive dramatic as explained by 
psychoanalytic theory, according to which the “relation to 
the object” serves to signify being-in-the-world with the same 
unilaterality that we see in Hegel. From the psychoanalytical 
perspective, depression is constituted by an uncertain relation 
to the primordial object, to which the subject remains attached 
even though it has been detached from it. Compelled, after 
the loss of the primordial object, to search for another, in the 
quest for a new object it is always in search of the lost object. 
But each object giving way to another object, those who suffer 
308 Chapter 12
from depression are forced to persevere in this indefinite 
path—a circle without beginning and end, a circle in which 
their thinking is ensnared, has become their only horizon.497 
For Maldiney, the primordial lost object that the Phenomenology searches for 
is “in reality existence” itself:498 that is, human transcendence as a capacity 
of welcoming the completely unexpected and utterly new as revealed to 
us in the very flesh of sensation wherein subject and object are constituted 
after the fact by means of a single movement in the flux of a pure appearing 
that knows no bounds and no a priori. Maldiney relates this not only 
to the originary impression (ursprüngliche Empfindung) that Hölderlin 
identifies at the origin of his poetry, a primordial experience that demands 
a complete transformation—an asubjective becoming-other—wherein the 
world emerges at each moment as something never seen before,499 but 
also to the pure present that is the true place within which subjectification 
and temporalization take place.500 As a result, the key to understanding 
transcendence is not ideational-conceptual mediation (the gnosologic: the 
encyclopedia, the systematic), but rather sensibility (the pathic: the eruption 
of the unpredictable, being held out into the Open), which leads Maldiney 
to claim that the present is ecstatic—not in the sense analyzed by Hegel, 
but as an event that is “an outpouring, a gushing, of the new. All of this is 
just to name the Originary. It is the originarity of the present which founds 
at each moment the reality of time; and it is its novelty that renders time 
irreversible.”501 Because Hegel's critique of sense certainty excludes any 
access to this primordial self-giving outside of conceptual mediation, it is 
as if the very source of all unity and stability has been obstructed. The paradox 
is that, although consciousness has lost its primordial object, which should 
lead to psychopathology, “the Hegelian Aufhebung reproduces—in its own 
register—the transcendence of existence; but it can only reproduce it (in 
terms of a substitute of an Ersatz)—and this is the decisive characteristic—
because existence has already been lost.”502 It is in this manner that the 
Phenomenology exhibits a contradictory existential form of “successful” 
depressive thinking.
The problem is only intensified when one takes into account the 
methodological ambiguity Maldiney emphasizes in any phenomenology of 
psychosis between the phenomenal and the phenomenological, insofar as in 
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the Phenomenology this ambiguity is expanded from the distinction between 
the phenomenal and the phenomenological to the distinction between the 
phenomenal and phenomenological and the investigator within which this 
distinction is enacted, so that the in-dwelling phenomenological essence of the 
phenomenality they investigate can be brought forth. Since the phenomenal 
here is conscious experience in its depressive existence, the investigator, 
by assuming the phenomenological attitude, is performing an ideal 
reconstruction of his or her own consciousness with said structure (which is 
simultaneously a self-construction of a depressive consciousness within the 
concept) into a scientific knowledge that is the system of experience. In this 
sense, the phenomenological level cannot be isolated from the phenomenal 
any more than it can in the phenomenology of psychosis, but now with an 
important precision to be made: the phenomenal experience is here the 
direct self-experience of the consciousness that goes through the odyssey 
that is the Phenomenology, but in such a way that it is as if phenomenal 
experience becomes phenomenological to itself, thematizes itself, in an act of 
gaining distance from itself, for the investigator who is exploring what it 
means to be a depressive consciousness is implicated in the very process. 
In short, there is ultimately no distinction between us and the object of 
investigation, because we are participating in the very thing that we are 
investigating. Accordingly, if the Phenomenology reveals that the fundamental 
structure of consciousness is a depressive structure, for those who embark 
upon it it is simultaneously a transformation of the mode of existing in 
transcendence that is depression into a unique style of living, wherein the 
same structure we see in the psychopathological state of depression is made 
into that which bestows upon consciousness a profound and never-ending 
source of energy while resting all the while depressive. If the phenomenology 
of psychosis brings to the fore various existentialia operative in the very 
process of subjectification and temporalization so that we see a successful 
transcendence in its contours, the Phenomenology offers a therapeutic 
realization of a similar kind of vitality that the latter provides, but within its 
very failure. To say that the Phenomenology is a form of successful depressive 
thinking is thus to say that it has apparently immanently overcome 
depression without ever leaving its clutches on existence by encountering the 
crisis head-on and coming out strong.
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Consequently, we see three structural levels of depression in Hegel's 
Phenomenology: the basal depressive structure of consciousness—the loss 
of the primordial object—which is the zero-level of its transcendence 
as such (originary depression or depression
0
, failed transcendence); the 
psychopathological response that brings a particular person to an existential 
standstill, which we see in psychiatry (clinical depression or depression
1
); 
and lastly the dialectical system of experience that, although depressive, 
is somehow successfully so, since even if its trial insists in experience it 
becomes a positive basis for a newfound energy and dynamism rather than 
a catalyst for decay (a form of successful depressive thinking, which is not a 
successful depression and is different in nature from depression
1
). Following 
a suggestion taken up by Jean-Christophe Goddard, we can expand the 
idea as follows: it is not merely that the Phenomenology is a paradoxical form 
of successful depressive thinking, but more radically, it sketches a form of 
successful psychotic thinking in general.503 Insofar as the event to which we 
are exposed by being held out into the Open in the pathos of sensation is 
the utterly new and unpredictable of which we can say nothing in advance, 
to give oneself over to it in its pure self-outpouring must itself be a form 
of originary psychosis, so that we see two possible responses: either from 
within an originary psychosis inflicting human transcendence as such we 
learn to be successfully psychotic or we opt for a path that would end in a 
pathological response to this primordial experience at the core of our being 
by levelling out its trauma instead of using it as the ground for the very 
impetus of one's subjective life in the world (a capacity Maldiney refers to as 
transpassibility).
Just as Hegel's Phenomenology could be described as an attempt to 
develop a form of successful depressive thinking, so too it could be ventured 
that Žižek's transcendental materialism may be an attempt to develop a 
form of successful psychotic thinking, but psychosis taken here not in 
Maldiney's unique understanding of it, but in the technical definition that 
Žižek instills it with as the world's withdrawal into its nocturnal self. Taking 
as its object the thematization of the inner structure of psychosis, which, 
since “madness signals the unconstrained explosion at the very core of 
human being,”504 can only be done in and through psychosis, it seeks to use 
psychosis to pierce through its own impenetrable dusk by letting it move 
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spontaneously of its own nature, that is, by reconstructing it ideally and 
scientifically in the concept through a mytho-poetic medium. But if the 
entirety of the Symbolic is some kind of virtual recompensation for this loss 
of objective reality, then this originary psychosis, essential to what it is to be 
a subject, must be primordially repressed if it is to be successful. We must 
forget that the very fabric of culture is nothing but the deluded ravings of 
the asylum, since otherwise we are confronted with the very monstrosity—
ontological catastrophe, the passage of being through madness—that it was 
meant to cover up. This is precisely why the psychoanalytical experience 
is of irreducible importance for Žižek, for we could only hope to get 
beyond the various defence mechanisms underlying the constitution of 
our fantasmatic reality and catch a glimpse of their abyssal origin if this 
reality were wrought with piercing holes: if in our everyday lives we are 
completely lost in the transcendentally hallucinated world fabricated by 
the Symbolic, then only the upsurge of the Real as indicative of the infinite 
disharmony between mind and body can enable us to gain the necessary 
distance towards our self-loss in psychosis and thereby render possible its 
free (albeit mythological) internalization within the concept. But the Real 
not only opens up the space necessary for speculative fabulation as a faculty 
for explicating how we got “trapped” in ontological solipsism; it also lets us 
find a way, from within our constitutive psychosis, to minimally overcome 
this very entrapment. As that which is irreducible to the autonomous 
construction of the world of experience, the Real creates a realist moment 
within idealism itself. With these two elements achieved, we could be said 
to have developed a form of successful psychotic thinking: that is to say, a 
thinking that, from within its own psychosis, would not be limited by the 
latter in the same way that a form of successful depressive thinking would 
not be limited by its depression and would have gained a vitality similar to 
successful transcendence, despite its remaining depressive in structure.
A successful psychotic thinking—such an expression is intrinsically 
ambiguous and reveals the insurmountable difficulty any radical idealism 
has to overcome its own limitations. If our starting point is a self-grounding 
subjective idealism, we can never truly get “behind” it from within the 
universe of ideality, even if this idealism is wrought with fracture lines, 
inner tension, and agonizing cracks, for its symbolic (re)constitution of 
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reality functions with no need of an “external support of its truth.”505 
Instead of representing that by which the light of being sneaks in despite 
the correlationalist prison, these can only indicate a torsion, an immanent 
implosion, from within ideal self-enclosure. By thematizing these places of 
non-coincidence we can perhaps come to terms with our entrapment and 
see it for what it is (namely, an entrapment). Yet it is not clear we can hope 
for much more if these skeptical reflections hold true: a successful psychotic 
thinking does not result in any strict overcoming of the epistemological 
constraints psychosis imposes upon us; it is only from within the Symbolic 
that we see the Real as the residue of a failed attempt of synthesis, thereby 
rendering it always already minimally symbolized, idealized, always already 
necessarily lost, there being nothing but the Symbolic and its self-referential 
play. The paradoxical overlapping of the purely subjective and the purely 
objective is precisely that: paradoxical. It does not allow for any encounter 
of the pure Real within the Symbolic, but is rather cognizant of the fact 
that, since the Real is an impossible concept, any attempt to describe its 
extra-notional character must be done from within its clutches. Knowledge 
of reality in itself becomes reduced to a retroactive readjustment of 
the Symbolic. We see this most clearly in the very expression itself. If 
a successful psychotic thinking is not a successful psychosis (a cure) but 
still exhibits the fundamental structure of psychosis, just as a successful 
depressive thinking in no way means that depression has been left behind 
and is always searching for the lost object, what we have attained would 
be at best the upper limit of the dialectic of appearance as such, which 
has finally collapsed upon itself in one great final cry giving voice to a 
contradictory combination of absolute power and utmost impotence. In 
recognizing the very limit of ideal synthesis, even if we are in a certain 
sense minimally beyond it (the “realist” moment) we can only admit the 
limit as an impasse with no beyond or content (even the “real” moment 
is completely determined by the throes of idealist entrapment). But is this 
sufficient to establish a new metaphysics? To speak metaphorically, it is as if, 
on Žižek's account, in radical idealism we see the four walls that surround 
us as a barrier not due to some window to the outside by which we know 
this site as the prison that it is (the ontological solipsism of the constitutive 
psychosis of the Symbolic) and could envisage an escape, but rather 
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due to their very shaking we feel that we are incarcerated in an infinitely 
claustrophobic space from which we will never emancipate ourselves. From 
the cracks in the wall there may seep through faint, trembling voices, but 
in the painstaking process of reconstructing their mumbled words they risk 
becoming identical with those voices that we hallucinate in our solitude. 
And even if we succeed at spectrally envisioning this outside by a careful 
translation of their garbled noise into structured speech, could we be said 
finally to have liberated ourselves by making the very distinction between 
liberty and imprisonment void?
If a successful form of psychotic thinking is an intrinsically paradoxical 
concept, it is perhaps because radical idealism is itself intrinsically 
paradoxical. To say that we can never reach reality, that we are forever 
stuck within the human universe of meaning, is not merely problematic 
to ordinary natural and scientific consciousness because it goes against 
our basic intuitions, but in a more primordially discomforting way: for 
it proclaims an originary withdrawal from objective reality at the very 
foundation of what it is to be human, thus potentially reducing the world 
of experience to the rampant free play of phantasmagoria. For someone 
who adheres to such a radical idealism, it would appear that even if the 
inconsistency of our notional apparatus may always be insufficient for a 
realist to overcome the ambiguity of a successful psychotic thinking, and 
thus to find resources to establish a strong realism from within idealism 
itself, we can still embark upon a speculative fabulation of ontological 
catastrophe as the necessary condition of the possibility of the subject. 
For we must nevertheless be able to explicate the fact that we can see our 
life as a dream of a dream, our ontological psychosis as psychotic, for the 
Symbolic fails to posit itself as all, and must therefore be always already 
minimally outside itself. Just as Schelling declares that many things take 
place before the beginning proper, so Žižek contends that a lot happens 
in the indemonstrable Real-as-origin haunting the Symbolic. The abyss of 
unconscious decision vibrates with an immense energy, and when we catch 
a glimpse of this impossibility in a mytho-poetics of the Symbolic's genesis, 
we simultaneously see a glimmer in the corner of our eye of why idealism 
is such an explosive event in being, despite the ontological solipsism of 
idealism itself. But such an epiphany is limited by the very impossibility 
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of its object, for we have fallen into a new age of mythology that has been 
rationally justified. Yet language is always more language (this is the major 
consequence of the Real), and if ontology and metaphysics have been 
rendered impossible, insofar as we can see this fact for what it is, we must 
have the right to investigate it in a non-rational discourse, no matter what 
the status of idealism's self-overcoming.
Although a transcendental materialism developed après-coup in the 
enclosed terrain of a radical idealism may always leave the realist unsatisfied 
as to its very possibility, turning epistemological limit into positive 
ontological condition via a mytho-poetic narrativization of being's self-
division does allow us to make minimal ontological claims that go beyond 
mythological imagery. If the Symbolic does present itself as quasi-full-
blown constructionism of reality that cuts all ties with an extra-notional, 
extra-linguistic outside, then the very founding gesture of the Symbolic's 
self-containment must be structurally homologous with that of psychosis 
understood as a withdrawal from social reality into an irreal self, and thus 
must attest to an originary madness at the very ontogenetic basis of human 
subjectivity. In this respect, were one to refuse the move to mythology as a 
means of overcoming radical idealism as a mere confabulation that assures 
the consistency of its order by the production of false memories, the latter 
would nevertheless reveal a deadlock haunting subjectivity: the deadlock 
of ontological catastrophe. If the Symbolic exists, then the world is, at best, 
a fragmented totality whimpering under its own weight—a totality that, 
unable to posit itself as all, in the case of at least one creature (man) is 
forced to withdraw into a nocturnal irreal self due to a primordial moment 
of metaphysical trauma in its heart of hearts, thereby establishing the 
primary role of dislocation in ontology. Even if we might not be able to say 
more without writing a great fabulative epic, many details of which may 
succumb to confabulation and fantasmatic figures, the mere existence of a 
radically self-grounding idealism would not only demonstrate that reality 
split itself into two irreconcilable logical zones insofar as thought must 
exist, but more primordially that ontological catastrophe, whereby being is 
infinitely divided from itself and doomed to wander in a world of images 
that are images of nothing, is irreducible in the transcendental explanation 
of the conditions of the possibility of experience and the Symbolic. Idealism 
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declares that something must have gone horribly wrong in the life of the 
absolute: for no God, no divine nature, could have wanted this to be our 
fate, since for both, our fate is tied up with theirs.
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OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
This book is an original investigation into 
Slavoj Žižek’s return to German Idealism 
in the wake of Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
As is well known, Žižek creates productive 
friction between these traditions by isolating 
their mutually compatible notions of the 
death drive, paving the way for Žižek’s highly 
original model of the subject. Joseph Carew 
systematizes the stark metaphysical conse-
quences of Žižek’s account. If the emergence 
of the Symbolic out of the Real marks the 
advent of a completely self-enclosed struc-
tural system, then we must posit the absolute 
as a fragile not-all wrought by negativity  
and antagonism.
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